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Abstract  
 
 
A Subcontinent’s Sunni Schism presents the first-ever history of the 150-year religio-
political rivalry between the Deobandis and the Barelvis—arguably the most important 
schism in the “Muslim world,” and certainly the most significant within Sunni Islam.  
More recently, that rivalry has often been expressed by means of bullets and bombs, 
especially in Pakistan.  But beyond the headline-grabbing violence of the Deobandi-
Barelvi schism lies the story of a century-and-a-half-long religious antagonism: at first 
over converts, later for competing visions of the political future, then for a place within 
a new “Islamic” polity—for dominance within its political structure.  For Deobandis, 
the rivalry was defined by their struggle to propagate a “pure” Islam, as opposed to the 
Barelvi deviation (plus an unmitigated hatred of the British presence in India); for 
Barelvis, their right to speak for the “Sunni majority” was what defined the battle—a 
privilege that the Deobandis had long sought to usurp. Running constant throughout 
the rivalry’s history, too, were the two schools’ separate visions of a glorious future 
Islamic epoch, of a truly Islamic state—or, perhaps more precisely, their differences on 
the subject of how to get there.  Of course, the rivalry did not develop in a vacuum; its 
participants were shaped, inspired, and manipulated by a host of outside influences, the 
strongest of which, perhaps, was the modern, “total” state. 
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PREFACE 
 
The words of Nehru, in reference to relations between “Englishmen and Indians,” might 
just as well be applied today to those between “the West” and “the Muslim world”: 
“What a great gulf divided the two…and how they distrusted and disliked each other!  
But more than the distrust and the dislike was the ignorance of each other, and, because of this, 
each side was a little afraid of the other and was constantly on its guard in the other’s 
presence.  To each, the other appeared as a sour-looking, unamiable creature, and 
neither realized that there was decency and kindliness behind the mask.”  On another 
occasion, the Pandit remarked, “An average Englishman, if he were frank, would 
probably confess that he knows some quite decent Indians but they are exceptions and 
as a whole Indians are a detestable crowd.  The average Indian would admit that some 
Englishmen whom he knows are admirable, but, apart from these few, the English are 
an overbearing, brutal, and thoroughly bad lot.  Curious how each person judges of the 
other race, not from the individual with whom he has come in contact, but from others 
about whom he knows very little or nothing at all.”  Apart from any academic 
aspiration, then, it is my hope that the telling of the story of the Deobandi-Barelvi 
rivalry, its long transformation, and its ripples within the politics of pre-Partition India, 
independent Pakistan, and beyond might in some small measure peel away another layer 
of that “ignorance”—Nehru’s “great gulf”—yet separating hundreds of millions of 
Muslims in the East from hundreds of millions of non-Muslims in the West. 
 
W. KESLER JACKSON 
New Delhi, 
28 April 2012/6 Jumada II 1433
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Note on Dates, Names, and Transcription 
 
Dates are generally presented through Chapter 3 of this work according to both the 
Gregorian and the Hijri calendars, respectively, separated by a forward slash symbol (/).  
Thus, 1857/1273 refers to the Gregorian year 1857 AD, or the Hijri year 1273 AH.  
The “old” AD signification has been retained (instead of the “new” CE) to add emphasis 
to both calendars’ religious underpinnings.  Where only the Gregorian year is 
employed, the acronym “AD” is used to so signify.  Hijri dates are meant as a reference 
and are only approximations.  From Chapter 4 onwards—chronologically, with the 
establishment of the Pakistani state—the Hijri references are dropped and only the 
Gregorian system is used. 
When introducing proper nouns, where possible I have chosen to use spellings 
either already in common use or preferred by the person, institution, or organization in 
question (as shown, for example, on their official websites or in their own 
correspondence, etc.).  The name “Muhammad,” however, has been spelled consistently 
throughout to avoid confusion.  Titles and descriptives, often lumped with names (as if 
they are part of the name) in Western and Islamic literature have been written, with a 
few exceptions, in transliterated format to distinguish them from the actual name.  Thus 
“Sayyid Ahmad Khan of Raebareli” has been rendered “sәyyid Ahmad Khan of Raebareli,” 
sәyyid being a title denoting descent from the Prophet. 
The system of transcription in this dissertation is, generally speaking, purely 
phonetic.  However, since more than one Urdu letter may correspond to a single Roman 
one, a number of modifications have been made, essentially along the lines of the system 
devised by Mumtaz Ahmad in his Urdu Newspaper Reader (Kensington, MD: Dunwoody 
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Press, 1985), who himself more or less followed the system created by Muhammad Abd-
Al-Rahman Barker in the 1960s/1380s.  All Urdu words are transcribed into Roman 
letters and/or symbols, except for proper nouns, and written in italics.  
The reader may refer to the following chart for the Urdu equivalent of all Roman 
letters or symbols. 
 
 
 ڈ   ә ا
D  ع ‘a  
  G غ   ź ذ  a آ
  f ف  r ر  b ب
  q ق  R ڑ  p پ
  k ک  z ز  t ت
  g گ   ʑ ژ  T ٹ
 ș ث
 
  l ل  s س 
  m م  sh ش  j ج
  n ن  S ص  ch چ
 ħ ح
 
  w/v و  ż ض 
  h ہ  ț ط  x خ
  i ی  ž ظ  d د
      
 
/ y  
      ْ u  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
When twenty-one-year-old Muhammad Siddiq, a village-born Deobandi from what 
is now called Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and a recent Lashkar-e-Jhangvi recruit, waded 
through the crowd of Barelvis celebrating the Prophet’s birthday (mwlyd) at Nishtar 
Park on 6 April 2006/7 Rabi I 1427, attendees could not have known that the young 
man was concealing a jacket packed with two pounds of explosives and three thousand 
ball bearings underneath his coat.  Just as the gathering’s leaders closed the mәGryb 
prayer, human bomb Muhammad Siddiq detonated in an act of destructive suicide, 
jointly claiming the lives of scores of celebrants (including the entire leadership of a 
Barelvi militant organization called the Sunni Tehrik) and injuring hundreds more.  
The attack signaled the opening of a new chapter of violence in the long-standing 
rivalry between the Deobandi and Barelvi schools of Sunni thought.  How it had come 
to this—how a theological debate that had once been carried out via books, public 
debates, and juridical rulings now routinely made use of bullets and bombs—is one of 
the chief subjects of this study.  But beyond the headline-grabbing violence of the 
Deobandi-Barelvi schism also lies the story of a century-and-a-half-long religious 
antagonism: at first over converts, later for competing visions of the political future, 
then for a place within a new “Islamic” polity—for dominance within its political 
structure.  For Deobandis, the rivalry was defined by their struggle to propagate a 
“pure” Islam, as opposed to the Barelvi deviation; for Barelvis, their right to speak for 
the “Sunni majority” was what defined the battle—a privilege that the Deobandis had 
long sought to usurp. Running constant throughout the rivalry’s history, too, were the 
two schools’ separate visions of a glorious future Islamic epoch, of a truly Islamic 
  
  2 
state—or, perhaps more precisely, their differences on the subject of how to get there 
(and who should lead the charge).  Of course, the rivalry did not develop in a vacuum; its 
participants were shaped, inspired, and manipulated by a host of outside influences, the 
strongest of which, perhaps, was the modern, “total” state. 
Though the Nishtar Park bombing of April 2006/Rabi I 1427 is only one of 
hundreds of similar attacks—most far smaller, some of comparable scale—to stain the 
now bullet- and bomb-ridden history of the Deobandi-Barelvi rivalry, the enmity 
between these two schools of Sunni Islam was, as aforementioned, not always 
characterized in such a blood-stained manner.  In fact, Nishtar-esque murderous 
outbursts are a rather recent animal, wreaking havoc on the unity of Muslims (and 
especially their religious leadership) within Pakistan in particular, with similarly 
divisive results in India, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and within South Asian Muslim 
communities across North America, the British Isles and continental Europe, East 
Africa, South Africa, and beyond—indeed, wherever the rivalry has spread in recent 
decades.   
Despite the Deobandi-Barelvi schism’s pivotal role in the politics of South Asia 
(indeed, as this work argues, the central part it played in pre-Partition independence 
politics in India and the literal shaping of the political structure of Pakistan), both 
schools are relatively unknown in the West (even among academics) and their rivalry 
one with another remains mostly unexamined.  Barbara Metcalf’s Islamic Revival in 
British India: Deoband, 1860-1900 (1982/1402) is the only full-length, scholarly, 
published work dealing specifically and primarily with the Deoband school, drawing 
heavily from sources in Urdu and Persian.  (The 2010/1431 doctoral dissertation of one 
of her students, Najeeb A. Jan—“The Metacolonial State: Pakistan, The Deoband 
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‘Ulama and the Biopolitics of Islam” [University of Michigan]—might be included 
here, too.)  The Deobandis are given serious consideration in Ziya-ul-Hasan Faruqi’s 
short The Deoband School and the Demand for Pakistan (1963/1383), too.  In Devotional 
Islam and Politics in British India (1996/1417), Usha Sanyal devotes half a chapter to the 
Deoband school of Islam.  M. Reza Pirbhai’s Reconsidering Islam in a South Asian Context 
(2009/1430) devotes a small but detailed section on the Deobandis, and Stephen Cohen 
devotes approximately four pages in The Idea of Pakistan (2004/1425) to the group.  
Pirbhai’s and Cohen’s treatment—devoting a few lines to a few pages—seems to be the 
norm, if the Deobandis happen to be mentioned at all.  But Metcalf’s survey, already 
almost thirty years old, ends with the turn of the twentieth century/late thirteenth 
century (and concentrates mostly on doctrinal developments and the establishment of 
the actual dar ul’alwm at Deoband), while Faruqi’s, almost fifty years old, is somewhat 
brief (148 pages) and fails to cover any period after Partition.  Sanyal’s work likewise 
deals only with early Deobandi thought and organization, scarcely reaching beyond 
1900/1318, while Pirbhai and most others, too, examine only the group’s founding 
years.  Of the aforementioned, only Cohen focuses on more recent times, but the 
mention is brief (and almost entirely within the context of fundamentalist violence and 
terrorism, like most other works that mention modern-day Deobandism); the same 
might be said about most any other serious academic work in which the Deobandis are 
momentarily featured.  In other words, no serious scholarly study (of significant length) 
on the Deobandis beyond 1947/1366 (or, more accurately, beyond the 1920s/1340s 
with the death of Mahmud Hasan) has been published.  Apart from the obvious sixty- to 
ninety-year omission in the research, such a gap is especially yawning since 
Deobandism has continued to grow and to spread far beyond its qәSbәħ beginnings in 
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the rural upper Doab.  Besides, the period after 1920/1338 would witness a surge of 
Indian and later Pakistani nationalism—a critical phase in the formation of the current 
political framework on the subcontinent, and one in which the Deobandis played a 
highly significant role (generally in opposition to Partition, then within the Pakistani 
state as a champion of an Islamic order as interpreted by the Deobandi scholars). 
Considering the school’s relevance to current world events, too, particularly in Pakistan 
and Afghanistan (including its entrenchment among the Pathan people of the north-
west frontier), the need for scholarship on the Deobandis, post-1920/1338, seems 
greater than ever. 
If the subject of the Deoband school of Sunni Islam suffers from a lack of scholarly 
attention, then its rival out of Bareilly has fared far worse in this regard, despite the 
latter’s significant numerical superiority.  The only academic study of note on the 
movement is Sanyal’s Devotional Islam, which, like Metcalf’s, draws heavily on Urdu- 
and Persian-language sources.  But even this work is more of a biographical one, 
focused on the movement’s guiding light, Ahmad Riza Khan, rather than on the Barelvis 
as a whole.  In any case, the book stops around 1921/1339, the year of Ahmad Riza’s 
death, leaving the next ninety years nebulous (Sanyal would follow up, in 2006/1427, 
with another completely biographical book: Ahmad Riza Khan Barelwi: In the Path of the 
Prophet, in essence a condensed version of Devotional Islam).  True, other works have 
devoted a few pages specifically to Riza’s movement out of Bareilly (including Metcalf’s 
Islamic Revival), but, like its Deobandi counterpart, the school suffers from a distinct lack 
of scholarly notice from around 1920/1338 to the present.  Such a void in South Asian 
history is unfortunate, especially since the Barelvi school claims a large majority of 
South Asian Muslims—making it likely the largest Muslim sect in the world.  (It should be 
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pointed out that Barelvis don’t consider themselves as belonging to a sect at all; they 
are, simply, “Sunni,” like “most Muslims” around the world; it is the Deobandis, in their 
view, who form a breakaway sect).  In addition, the Barelvi school, which has been 
known as a primarily rural movement as opposed to the allegedly urban Deobandis has, 
over the past half-century, “extended to towns and cities,” according to Hamza Alavi,1 a 
highly significant development (especially within the context of Pakistani politics) that 
has never, to the author’s knowledge, been studied by scholars.  On yet another note, 
the Barelvi school has always been viewed as just another Muslim revivalist movement 
of the late nineteenth/late thirteenth century, of which there were several.  But the very 
term “revivalist” may not be accurate at all in describing the Barelvis, since, unlike the 
Deobandis and other Muslim reform movements of the period, Ahmad Riza Khan and 
the ‘alәma associated with him were not organizing anything new—not initiating any 
“revival” per se.  On the contrary, their actions were a defense of the conventional in the 
face of what they viewed as a radical challenge.  Tradition-wise, they upheld the status 
quo and viewed only religious innovation (byd’at) as abhorrent—and to them, the 
Deobandis were in the business of byd’at.  (This is ironic, since the Deobandis view much 
Barelvi practice in the same light.)  While Deobandi leaders like Muhammad Qasim and 
Mahmud Hasan were introducing what might arguably have been deemed “new” 
concepts into Islamic practice (Qasim and Hasan, of course, would have characterized 
such “new” concepts as those originally upheld and practiced by the Prophet and his 
companions but subsequently forgotten, ignored, abandoned, or erroneously replaced by 
the majority of South Asian Muslims), Ahmad Riza Khan crusaded to protect the old.  
The Barelvis, then, held that their version of Islam—the “true,” “Sunni” version—had 
existed all along; it did not take the career of Ahmad Riza Khan to resurrect it (though 
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it may very well have required the man’s life’s work to preserve it, a sentiment echoed 
by some of his supporters); this was the Barelvi line of thought.  It may be argued, then, 
that Ahmad Riza Khan was neither a reformer nor the founder of any movement, but 
rather a defender of what was, a protector of existing Sufi and pir tradition, an anti-
reformer (or, as he would have seen it, simply anti-byd’at) who happened to be a 
charismatic teacher.  (Barelvis admire him most for his intense love and respect for the 
Prophet; most of the Barelvis’ grievances against the Deobandis stem from the latters’ 
perceived disrespect towards Muhammad.)  In a sense, then, the great majority of South 
Asian Muslims were “Barelvi” long before the designation existed.  In any case, after 
1920/1338 (and with the rise of Indian, then Pakistani, nationalism), it seems the 
Barelvis by and large favored Partition and an independent South Asian Muslim 
homeland. 
But it is the dynamic between the Barelvi and Deobandi sects of Sunni Islam in South 
Asia, so the thesis of this project goes, that played a critical role in the debate over the 
partition of India, the creation of a separate Muslim state (Pakistan), and the (continued) 
shaping of the political order in Pakistan (and even surrounding states, particularly 
Afghanistan).  From the early days (during the lifetimes of their founding figures), the 
two schools forced South Asian Muslims to examine their own religious practice, to 
scrutinize their own theologies, and to identify with one or the other (there were other 
schools of thought, too, of course, but the vast majority of South Asian Muslims 
gravitated toward one or the other category, either formally or informally).  During the 
run-up to Partition, the schools often could be differentiated purely by political position, 
as the Pakistan debate added fuel to the rivalry and acted as a venue for various scholars 
to descredit and otherwise defame their religious nemeses.  It is unlikely Jinnah would 
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have gained the support he needed in the final years before the birth of Pakistan without 
the Deobandi-Barelvi schism’s divisive power, preventing as it did any sort of joint 
Deobandi-Barelvi action (despite Deobandi attempts to win Barelvis over to their 
“side”).  Barelvi pirs and scholars (and a few Deobandi rebels, too) were instrumental in 
the Muslim League’s meagre “victory” in the Northwest Frontier, where loss might 
have spelled an abrupt end to the Pakistan dream.  In Pakistan, it was the Deobandi and 
Barelvi parties (along with, at times, the Deobandi-inspired Jama’at-e-Islami, as well as 
some other Deobandi or Barelvi groups) who led the charge for an Islamic constitution, 
often spearheading the Opposition.  Here again, though, it was the divisiveness that the 
rivalry engendered—and the subsequent inability of either party to combine in any sort 
of sustained joint political action—that prevented the “religious parties” from ever 
dominating Pakistani politics.  With the militarization that followed the breakaway of 
Bangladesh, the Iranian Revolution, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the rush of 
millions of Afghan refugees into Pakistan, the flood of Saudi and American cash along 
Pakistan’s western border, the continued struggle for Kashmir (and the ISID’s covert 
machinations in the region), Zia’s “Islamization,” the emergence of the Taliban, and the 
U.S. Government’s own invasion of Afghanistan—all combined with the politicization 
of Deobandi and Barelvi parties like the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam and the Jamiat Ulema-e-
Pakistan, among others—the rivalry took on an entirely new character.  Eventually this 
led to seemingly constant violence, with attacks increasing in regularity and scale.  All 
the while, the rivalry spread across the globe through the sizable South Asian diaspora, 
transforming, almost, into a microcosmal battleground for the soul of Islam between 
“fundamentalist” revivalists and “fundamentalist” preservers.  Despite this, and despite 
the fact that the combined population of these sects numbers in the hundreds of 
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millions, an academic study of any significant length dealing with the Deobandi-Barelvi 
rivalry has never been published by a Western academician as far as this writer is aware.  
The author submits this work as the first, hoping that its premises might be examined, 
built upon, corrected, and expanded in order to increase understanding of this highly 
important phenomenon in the Muslim world and beyond.  
Chapter 1, “Historical Background: Islam in South Asia to the Mid-Nineteenth 
Century,” looks backwards—to the early days of Islam, tracking developments 
especially pertinent to the rise of Deobandism and Barelvism all the way to 
1860s/1270s-1280s India.  Some of these developments include the precursor rivalries 
and power contestations through which the Deobandi and Barelvi schools can trace 
their ideological genealogy (like the tug-of-war between the court scholars and the Sufi 
mystics, or the schism that developed between court scholars and “other-worldly” 
scholars, to borrow a term from Robinson).  In other words, the chapter attempts to 
ground the Deobandi and Barelvi positions (especially those of the political variety) 
within a historical context.  Along the way, questions like, “What does the ideal Islamic 
state (and ruler) look like?” and, “What is the role of the ‘alәma and the Sufi shix within 
the state apparatus?” are posited and, hopefully, answered, if briefly.  Most of the 
information presented here is not new, but it has never, to the author’s knowledge, been 
arranged within the context of the Deoband-Barelvi rivalry in so comprehensive a 
fashion.  The focus of Chapter 2, “Genesis of a Rivalry: The Deobandi and Barelvi 
Schools, 1866-1921/1283-1340,” is the founding epoch of the two schools of thought—
first the Deobandi school (1866/1283) and then the Barelvi response, running into the 
mid-1920s/late 1330s.  The ground for most of this information has been broken by 
previous scholars, though its presentation as specifically focused on the Deobandi-
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Barelvi rivalry (not simply on one or the other) may be a first, as, too, might be the 
chapter’s more overtly political concentration. 
Chapter 3, “A Muslim Homeland: The Rivalry in Pre-Partition Politics, 1921-
1947/1339-1366,” attempts to shed light on the rivalry between the two schools within 
the pre-Partition politics of British India, from the 1920s/1340s right up to Partition in 
1947/1366.  Here, perhaps, some new ground has been broken, as most every Western 
or scholarly work on either school tends to peter out by the early twenties AD.  The 
chapter documents the rise and fall of the Khilafat Movement, the role of the Jami’at 
Ulema-e-Hind, the political divisions that developed within the Deoband school, the 
organization of the All-India Sunni Conference, the relationship between the Deobandi 
religious leadership and the Indian National Congress, the rise of the All-India Muslim 
League and its co-opting of the Barelvis (plus an influential Deobandi faction), and the 
jockeying for position of various Barelvi and Deobandi leaders as the prospect of 
Pakistan loomed.  Then, in “A New Islamic State: The Rivalry in Pakistani Politics, 
1947-1977/1366-1397,” the focus shifts almost entirely to the political rivalry as it 
pertains to the first several decades of Pakistan's existence (for most of this period, this 
included present-day Bangladesh).  Both schools formed political parties during this era 
that operated within the structure of the Pakistani state (and even, especially in the 
beginning, within other, more overtly political parties).  These organizations (most 
prominentaly the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam and the Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan) at times 
worked “together” toward a common cause (though typically employing a form of 
cooperation this writer terms “separate unity”)—like the institution of an “Islamic” 
constitution, the struggle against the Ahmadis, or wars with India over Kashmir—but 
typically stood at odds with one another, competing for constituents, their votes, and 
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the patronage and power that came with them.  Perhaps the most important aspect of 
the rivalry during this period was the way in which it prevented the two major Sunni 
sects in the country from ever mounting a truly united assault against the forces of 
secularism and socialism. 
The great transformation of the rivalry (initiated partly via its politicization within 
the context of pre-Partition independence politics and post-Partition Pakistani party 
politics, and partly thanks to its confrontation with the modern, total state) took its 
most significant turn during the period that followed, covered in Chapter 5: 
“Islamization and War: Militarization of the Rivalry, 1977-2001/1397-1422.”  The 
chapter focuses on the political rivalry during the years of “Islamization” under Zia ul-
Haq and afterwards. This period, this work argues, is vital to understanding the 
Deobandi-Barelvi schism’s metamorphosis from juridical rulings and religious tracts to 
suicide bombers and assassinations.  With an “Islamic Revolution” in Iran (and the anti-
Shi’a militancy it fostered in Pakistan), the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the 
intervention of the American and Saudi (and Pakistani) governments (among others) in 
the conflict, the participation of mostly Deobandi jyhәdis in the “war against 
communism,” the US- and petro-dollar-funded (via relatively new fiat currency systems) 
mushrooming of mәdarys in South Asia, the institution of a new “Islamic” order in 
Pakistan, the rise of the Deobandism-inspired “Taliban,” the rapid spread of both 
schools’ ideology to other centers across the world, and the coming of the so-called 
“War on Terror”—all of this taken together had a profound effect upon the dynamic in 
question.  Finally, chapter 6 (“Epilogue”)—truly an epilogue in both scope and 
brevity—attempts to bring the historical narrative, as far as is possible in a few short 
pages, up to the present day. 
  
  11 
And so we return to the Nishtar Park bombing of April 2006/Rabi I 1427, and the 
mega-attacks that have followed.  Such is the situation as of the time of this writing, 
even as Western governments’ armies occupy Afghanistan and drop bombs from drones 
in Baluchistan, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, 
and as intelligence agencies from around the world (and from Pakistan itself) meddle in 
Pakistan’s (and Afghanistan’s) internal affairs for information and covert action 
purposes.  U.S. Government troops, together with a smattering of others, occupy 
Muslim lands where the rivalry is well known among locals and highly influential both 
today and historically—yet scarcely understood by the relatively small group of 
American policymakers in Washington deciding the fate of billions of dollars in military 
expeditures and foreign aid, not to mention military and strategic policy in the region.   
And far from South and Central Asia—in Durban and London, in Chicago and Kuala 
Lumpur, in Singapore and Dar es Salaam, in Houston and Cairo and Johannesburg—the 
rivalry increasingly divides Muslims, continually forcing a reevaluation of belief and 
practice, and, in essence, drawing battle lines for a near-inevitable, future Islamic 
struggle for the very spirit of the faith. 
 
  
  12 
1 - HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: The ‘alym,  the Sufi shix,  and the 
“Muslim” State in South Asia 
 
 
The ‘alәma are the successors of the Prophet. 
               ABU DAWUD SULAYMAN, 9TH CENTURY A.D.2 
 
 
 
 
 
Just after noon on 24 January 2010/8 Safar 1431, a three-day conference—dubbed 
the “Biswa Ijtema,” or “Global Meeting”—came to an end outside of Dhaka, Bangladesh.  
The banks of the Turag river had provided the backdrop to the event, attended by 
anywhere from two to five million devotees (under the watchful eye of almost twenty 
thousand security personnel), including Bangladesh President Muhammad Zillur 
Rahman, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, and leader of the political opposition Khaleda 
Zia, among many other high-profile participants.  The pilgrims that made up the 
massive crowd had come from all over the world (from France and Palestine, from the 
United Arab Emirates and Ethiopia, from Algeria and Iraq, and more), descending upon 
the town of Tongi to offer prayers, hear sermons and the recitation of the Qur’an and 
hәdis (translated into Chinese, Tamil, Arabic, English, Bangla, and other languages), 
and to partake of the edification of brotherhood, at night sleeping in the cold fog of 
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winter under makeshift tents or the bare sky.  There was even a mass, dowry-free 
wedding, featuring one hundred forty couples.  Due to space constraints, thousands took 
part in the proceedings upon nearby rooftops or along surrounding roads.  The 
gathering was organized annually by a proselytizing Deobandi group called the 
Tablighi Jama’at (tәbliGi jәma’at, “Assembly of Proselytization”)—and the only Muslim 
gathering on the planet bigger was the hәj to Mecca itself.3  Meanwhile, Barelvis 
branded the Tablighi Jama’at, with its missionary efforts and mega-conferences, “an 
effective instrument” used by “the enemies of Islam” to “prevent the emergence of a true 
Islamic movement in Europe and elsewhere in the world.”4 
Two-and-a-half-weeks earlier, in the north-central Indian city (and traditional 
Barelvi stronghold) of Moradabad, some one hundred miles east of Delhi on the banks 
of the Ramganga, a sizable conference of “Sunni” religious leaders—under the ageis of 
the All-India Ulema Mashaikh Board, or AIUMB—issued a formal demand to the 
Indian government.  Deobandi usurpers, they claimed, had stealthily taken control of 
“more than one lakh [100,000] madrassas, dargahs, graveyards and other historical 
monuments.”  sәyyid Muhammad Ashraf Kichowchhwi, a mwlana and the general 
secretary of the AIUMB, described the Deobandis as a “13% miniscule, manipulative 
minority,” that had “hijacked” the state’s minority bodies (like the Central Haj 
Committee and the Urdu Academy, to name just two) both in Uttar Pradesh and within 
the central government of India.  “Since [the Deobandis] do not have faith in patron 
saints of ‘dargah’ or ‘mazar’ and have condemned the practice, logically they must not 
be considered for management of Ajmer Sharif or Deva Sharif [two of the most 
important Muslim shrine centers in India],” he argued, pointing out that the Barelvi 
religious leadership, on the other hand, spoke for “80%” of India’s Muslims.  AIUMB 
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secretary Babar Ashraf explained the power of the Deobandis and their ilk as emanating 
from the financial support of Wahhabi states like Saudi Arabia.  Meanwhile, an unnamed 
Deobandi cleric interviewed by the Times of India responded by speculating that the 
Barelvi conference “could [have] been just a pressure tactic to influence 
the…government.”5  
A few days after the Moradabad conference, a West Point military academy report 
published by one Imtiaz ‘Ali argued that Karachi, Pakistan might be transforming into a 
“Taliban safe haven,” and linked a number of Deobandi seminaries, by name, not only to 
the Taliban but to several anti-Shi’a, anti-Barelvi militant outfits as well.6   
The next month armed Deobandis attacked (mostly Barelvi) mwlyd processions in 
Faisalabad and Dera Ismail Khan, Pakistan, “causing death, injuries and mayhem”; a 
Deobandi preacher at a Faisalabad mosque was subsequently arrested for “inciting 
people to violence,” prompting observers to wonder if a “cure” to the country’s sectarian 
ills might best be focused on the “steady diet of dogmatic preaching” that “is to be found 
wherever such violence occurs.”7 
Two months before the attacks, the UK-based Guardian published an article 
entitled, “Here, everyone is a minority,” highlighting (among other things) South Asian 
immigration to Britain and concentrating on the so-called “Muslim city” of Leicester.  
One of the dominant images painted in the article presented a ten-year-old Deobandi 
mәsjyd, packed every Friday with over five hundred people, facing a one-hundred-year-
old Edwardian church with a congregation numbering only thirty.  The Guardian piece 
also underscored, however, the divided nature of the immigrant population, separated 
by ethnic, linguistic, as well as religious barriers.  The author, Andrew Brown, asked his 
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readers, “[Is] this…city a model for our future?  Or is it proof that mass immigration 
brings unmanageable strains?”8 
A few weeks after the Guardian piece, a joint American and Pakistani raid 
(conducted by the states’ respective intelligence agencies) captured top Taliban leader 
mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar in Karachi, though the elusive, Deobandi-trained mullah 
Muhammad Omar remained yet out of reach—while Barelvis vacillated between 
animosity for the mostly Deobandi Taliban movement and hatred for the Pakistani 
Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISID) and the American Central Intelligence 
Agency and military.9 
The above exercise merely provides a snapshot, of course—restricted to a couple 
months’ time, randomly selected—of the Deobandi-Barelvi dynamic as it plays out 
across the world within religious, social, and political spheres.  What is this apparent 
Deobandi-Barelvi schism, and how has it become so centrally connected to such broadly 
unrelated phenomena as the world’s second-largest Muslim gathering (in Bangladesh), 
the largest missionary organization of any faith on the planet in the Tablighi Jama’at (a 
position disputed by the Barelvis’ own Dawat-e-Islami), minority disputes over 
government influence in north-central India, reports issued by West Point researchers 
in the United States, “Muslim” immigration to Britain, outbreaks of sectarian violence in 
Pakistan, and the machinations of intelligence agencies vis-à-vis the Afghan Taliban 
movement?  To answer this interrogative, it may be necessary to go back to the 
beginning, to the days of the Prophet Muhammad, and trace the development of the 
ideologies and belief systems and political philosophies, as far as is possible, that would 
eventually coalesce and emerge into the separate schools now classified as 
“Deobandism” and “Barelvism.”  Along the way, perhaps, the reader might gain an 
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improved understanding not only of the tangled roots of the past from which these 
schools’ draw inspiration and sustenance, but also of their separate visions for a future, 
glorious Islamic order. 
 
Medina:  the First  Islamic State . 
The beginnings of an overtly political Islam can be traced all the way back to the 
days of the Prophet Muhammad and the Emigration (hyjrәt; 622 AD/1 AH) to 
Medina.10  Before this watershed, Muhammad had been, simply, a “messenger” 
(piGәmbәr) of God; each revelation (later to become a chapter [swrәt] of the Qur’an) 
that he received was memorized and recited both by him and his followers as part of 
their religious ritual.  The Meccan revelations, too—usually significantly shorter than 
their subsequent Medinan counterparts—tended to possess a more “spiritual” (as 
opposed to temporal) nature, communicating ideas about the greatness of God, warning 
of God’s judgments, expressing the significance of showing gratitude, conveying the 
importance of charity, and underscoring Muhammad’s calling as a messenger of Allah.  
These early revelations seemed to avoid, for the most part, the mundane or the worldly 
(though there is a subtle undercurrent of hostility against the wealthy merchants of 
Mecca, many of whom belonged to clans opposed to Muhammad’s own Hashimite clan 
and its allies).11   
But after Meccan opposition drove the Muslims from the holy city and into the 
desert, Muhammad and his followers became, for the first time, a community set apart.  
From this point forward, Islam denoted not just a religious philosophy but also an 
identifiable, explicitly political phenomenon.  Indeed, the Prophet assumed the role not 
only of spiritual leader but political ruler as well (not to mention political arbiter 
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between the various Medinan tribes)—and the change was reflected in the swrәts 
received in the Muslims’ new oasis center.  Here, the Prophet’s revelations became 
longer and dealt with a much wider range of everyday community issues.  Within six 
months of his arrival, Muhammad was sending out “expeditions” to plunder Meccan 
caravans (though their first successful raid didn’t come for another year) and make 
alliances with nearby nomadic tribes—both overtly political moves.  And within the 
first five years (though probably around the time of his arrival in the oasis), Muhammad 
had drawn up a “Constitution of Medina,” outlining a political alliance between the eight 
Arab clans of the town (each of whom had pledged to embrace Islam) plus the 
muhajyrwn, or “emigrants,” that Muhammad had led out of Mecca; the Jews and pagans 
(i.e. all of the non-Muslims) were allotted allied status vis-à-vis the “main” community.   
Meanwhile, as a political leader, Muhammad continued to govern his own clan of 
émigrés, order raids (taking his one-fifth when they returned successful), make alliances, 
and position himself politically within Medina, all the while acting as a judge of sorts 
between the various Medinan groups when necessary.  The political structure of Arab 
society in Muhammad’s time did not befit a single despot, thus the Prophet’s use of such 
indirect means of control, at least during the initial Medina years, is hardly surprising.  
Indeed, one mid-nineteenth/mid-thirteenth century commentator described the political 
system of the Arabs during this period thus: 
 
The representative of the common ancestor of each tribe possessed a 
natural authority over it; but, having no support from any external power 
he could only carry his measures by means of the heads of subordinate 
divisions, who depended, in their turn, on their influence with the 
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members of the family of which they represented the progenitor.  The 
whole government was therefore conducted by persuasion and there was no 
interference with personal independence unless it directly affected the general 
interest. [Italics added.]12 
 
As time passed and Muhammad, based in Medina, consolidated power, this “persuasive” 
form of government evolved into something more coercive, setting the stage for the 
even more top-down system established by his successors and, eventually, the “Islamic” 
states that would emerge later.  Muhammad’s flight from Mecca to Medina plus his 
early years in the oasis might therefore justifiably be described as a transitional 
period—from the almost wholly “persuasive Islam” of the Meccan era to the more 
coercive version of the faith (including coercion via the threat of violent reprisal against 
members of the community and military action against enemies) that later developed in 
Medina.  It was to this later, more compulsion-based (at least as it compared to the early 
Meccan period) epoch that future Muslim scholars would look for the ultimate example 
of righteous Islamic government.  Both the Deobandis and the Barelvis would draw 
inspiration from Muhammad’s example as a political leader, and from the ideal Islamic 
state that he instituted in what had once been the minor desert town of Yathrib.   
After a Muslim victory over far superior Meccan forces at Badr (624/2)—during yet 
another raid—the political prestige of Muhammad skyrocketed.  Several assassinations 
(in which he may or may not have had personal involvement) quickly ridded him of 
critics and political opponents, to boot.  He oversaw a siege against one of the Jewish 
tribes (mostly goldsmiths and armor-makers) of the oasis before expelling them 
completely from the area.  The concept of jyhad (or holy “struggle,” strictly against non-
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Muslims) developed, too, perhaps as a way for the various tribes to continue their 
traditional raids while simultaneously preserving the peace of the Muslim community at 
large (ummәt).  The Muslims survived a close call against the Meccans at Uhud (625/3) 
before driving a second Medinan Jewish tribe (keepers of palm orchards) away.  A third 
major engagement against Meccan forces—the Battle of the Trench (627/5)—saw the 
Muslims victorious, and was followed by the murder of all of the men of the remaining 
Jewish tribe in the oasis (and the sale of the tribe’s women and children into slavery) for 
alleged conspiracy with the enemy.  Each of these overtly political actions eventually led 
to the Prophet’s emergence as unchallenged leader in Medina.  He was, in effect, both 
spiritual and political head of an oasis state.  Meanwhile, the task of building alliances 
with nomadic tribes continued. 
By 628/6, Mecca was no longer in a position to destroy Muhammad or his 
followers; indeed, the city’s leaders signed a treaty with the Prophet allowing for 
Muslims to make pilgrimage there the following year.  Truly, Muhammad’s political 
power had grown tremendously in the mere six years since the great merchants of his 
hometown had more or less driven him out of their midst.  Meanwhile, the Muslims had 
captured a Jewish oasis (named Khaybar), significant in that its inhabitants were 
allowed to remain as long as they paid tribute to the Muslim state; the seeds of an 
Islamic empire had been planted.13  By 629/8, Muhammad’s forces had taken Mecca 
with minimal bloodshed.  Subsequently, Muhammad’s gentle treatment of his erstwhile 
enemies quickly won many of them over.  Following a victory over a group of tribes 
east of Mecca soon afterwards, Muhammad’s polity and its martial forces were 
recognized as more than a match for any other tribe or group of tribes in all of Arabia; 
deputations from many of these tribes now traveled to Medina to formally ally with the 
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Muslims.  One condition underlying each alliance: the acceptance of Islam.  For the first 
time that anyone could remember, the feuding Arabian tribes of the vast desert 
peninsula were more or less united under a single banner (indeed, one scholar described 
the political situation of Arabia at this time as “pax Islamica”).14  Toward the end of his 
life, Muhammad led a major expedition (comprising tens of thousands of men) outside of 
Arabia into Syria, where he contracted treaties with Jewish and Christian communities, 
laying the groundwork for the later Islamic empire’s “dhimmi” (źymi) system.  The 
expedition opened the door, too, to external conquest, taken up with a vengeance by the 
Prophet’s successors, and made additionally possible by the recent collapse of the 
Persian Empire and the sheer “exhaustion” of Byzantium.15 
Even examining these earliest early years of Islam, it is possible to identify the roots 
of both the scholarly ‘alәma (“jurist-theologians,” to use the descriptive of M. Ahmad; 
singular: ‘alym) and the Sufi mәshayx (“elders,” “leaders,” or “great men”; singular: shix), 
both of which, in different forms, would play a central role within the development of 
the Deobandi and Barelvi schools and within the progression of their mutual rivalry.  As 
mentioned previously, though the Prophet recited the Qur’an as revealed to him by 
God, the Prophet’s Companions became known as qurra, “reciters of the Qur’an” 
(singular: qari), too (as revealed to them by the Prophet).  Some modern-day scholars 
trace the beginnings of the ‘alәma to the qurra of Medina, though a distinct class of 
Muslim scholars appears not to have been identifiable until the period of hәdis-collection 
and Qur’anic law codification (c. eighth-tenth centuries/second-fourth centuries).16  
More certainty about historicity is expressed by the various Sufi orders, each of which 
traces its spiritual genealogy—their “initiatic chains,” or sylsәla—all the way back to the 
Prophet himself.  Of course, no one in Muhammad’s day was likely thinking about 
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documentation for the benefit of establishing historical legitimacy in the eyes of future 
scholars, and as a result such “hard proof” is lacking.  Still, for Sufis, their particular 
brand of religious practice “begins…in a real and important sense with the origins of 
Islam itself.”17  Each of the major orders in South Asia, whose ranks include both 
leading Deobandis and prominent Barelvis, can name each and every link in the chain, 
stretching back one-and-a-half millennia to Muhammad’s Arabia.  The Prophet, 
according to Sufi doctrine, is the founder of the Sufi orders—not any other individual.  
(For example, the Naqshbandis identify their sylsәla as having been introduced during 
the hyjrәt, when Muhammad evidently initiated Abu Bakr while they were hiding in a 
cave from Meccan enemies).  In a sense, then, all Sufism is revivalist, as the initiatory 
pledge necessary to gain admittance to a Sufi order becomes a key to “gain access,” to 
quote Algar, to the “’auspicious age’ which it is the purpose of the Sufi to relive.”18 
Upon the death of Muhammad in 632/11, his Companions at once selected a 
successor and “deputy” (xәlifәħ, or “caliph”): Abu Bakr.  What is remarkable is that, 
according to tradition, this reorganization took place more or less unanimously (despite 
some initial rumblings in ‘Ali’s favor) and immediately—even before the Prophet’s body 
had been laid in the earth.  This episode in the history of Islam has been interpreted by 
many of the ‘alәma as demonstrating the religiously obligatory nature of the caliphate 
(xylafәt), an institution so important that the Companions “preferred it [this obligation] 
over the burial of the Holy Prophet” [italics added].  This act, strengthened as it was by 
the consensus of the Companions, thus became “a permanent source of [shәri’at],” in the 
words of one prominent Pakistani mufti.19  The selection of Abu Bakr as caliph is 
considered a textbook example of how a board of responsible, intellectual people (әhәl 
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әlhәl w әl’aqәd)—typically ‘alәma, of course—possess the responsibility (and power) to 
appoint the next viceroy of the Prophet. 
Over the next three decades alone (the period of the “Rashidun” [rashydin], or the 
four “rightly-guided” caliphs after Muhammad; 632-661/11-40), the new Muslim polity 
spread rapidly, annexing territory from the Arabian peninsula in the south to what is 
today Turkey and the Caucasus in the north, from northern Africa and southwestern 
Europe in the west to Persia and much of Central Asia in the east.  The ‘alәma and 
Muslim historians, even of the early twenty-first/mid-fifteenth century, write of these 
conquests as glorious affairs, the crowning achievement of an era of greatness since 
unrivaled.  As one Muslim commentator has described this phenomenon, “Muslims 
[throughout the ages] could not forget the memory of their early triumphs” (italics 
added).20  This period and (perhaps especially) those that followed after it illuminate 
several key ideas connected to the present work—including that of the ideal Muslim 
ruler, the role of the ‘alym as well as the Sufi shix vis-à-vis such a ruler, and the religio-
political vision of the ‘alәma for the future.  Identifying and understanding these 
historical roots is vital to comprehending the long-standing rift between the religious 
schools born of Deoband and Bareilly, including their more modern-day manifestations 
within the political framework of pre-Partition India and post-Partition Pakistan.  Both 
schools are driven in large part by visions of the distant past and, shaped by that past, of 
Islamic revival and a more glorious future. 
From the Rashidun period to the present, Muslim rulers (and the scholars and Sufis 
inhabitating their realms—some as legitimators, others as contestors of legitimacy) 
constantly harked back to the original Muslim empire established by Muhammad and 
expanded by his first four “rightly-guided” deputies.  Here, then, lies the key to 
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establishing righteousness upon the earth—a true Islamic state ruled by a legitimate 
caliph of the Prophet.  As a reputable Muslim scholar in Pakistan has pointed out, 
taking his inspiration from this early period, the ideal ruler within an Islamic order 
must (a) always strive to act according to God’s will, (b) respect the ‘alәma and the 
mәshayx, (c) ensure the fair treatment of the people by his subordinate officers, (d) show 
equal justice to both “high and low,” (e) snuff out immorality, (f) encourage commerce, 
(g) show charity to the poor, and (h) handle the financial affairs of the realm such that 
surplus money might be allotted to deserving charities, scholars, divines, and artists.21  
Perhaps the verse of eighteenth-century/twelfth-century Urdu poet Mirza Ahmad Rafi 
Sauda describes this ideal well, too.  The following comes from Sauda’s ain-e-dawri 
(“Rules of Good Governance”): 
 
Once a beggar, we are told, to a king did pray: 
“I would like to say something, if you heed my say. 
Of good and wise governance this is the foremost rule 
That a ruler should be kind to the destitutes. 
When a king delivers justice from his regal seat, 
Both the great and the small he should with even hand treat. 
Only to such advice should he lend his ear, 
Which contributes to the public welfare. 
He should treat his subjects as tender blooms and buds, 
And like a vernal cloud his gentle shade spread, 
His kindness with even course flows for one and all, 
His grace, on boss and worker, in equal measure falls. 
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How tragic that the men considered God’s vice-regents, 
Should be unacquainted with the rules of governance!  
[Italics added.]22 
 
Sauda’s verse is pertinent on a number of levels, though his obvious emphasis on justice, 
equity, and mercy, common themes for great rulers within Muslim historiography (even 
those considered brutal, piratical, or bloodthirsty by, for example, Western standards), 
is perhaps the most relevant here.  The final lines of the poem indicate, of course, that 
Muslim observers recognized that the ideal not infrequently remained just that—an 
ideal, all-too-often unrealized in the temporal world. 
Hand-in-hand with the ideal Muslim ruler is the ideal Muslim state.  In the words of 
leading (Deobandi) Islamic juridical scholar Muhammad Taqi Usmani, Islam is “a 
complete way of life” dealing with “political, economic, and social problems,” not just 
“theological issues.”  The ‘alәma point both to Qur’anic injunctions concerning such 
earthly matters as loans, business, mortgages, contracts, penal law, marriage, war, 
peace, international relations, politics, and inheritance, as well as to interpretations 
related to these and other issues gleaned from the sunnәt, as proof that the domain of 
Islam extends beyond the wholly spiritual to the day-to-day mundane details of mortal 
life.23  For Muhammad, as Watt reminds us, religion was a “total response” to the “total 
situation” confronting him in seventh-century/first-century Arabia; it thus extended 
beyond the realm of the intellectual or the strictly spiritual or the “religious.”  “[I]t is 
impossible,” Watt concluded, “for any occidental to distinguish within [Muhammad’s] 
achievement between what is religious and what is non-religious or secular.”24  
Returning to the question of an Islamic socio-political framework, then, it is not enough 
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to enjoy the freedom to carry out Islamic ritual, worship, and study within a given 
geographical area—not enough to possess the autonomy to live one’s religion as one 
pleases without the interference of the state.  This individualist, more libertarian 
outlook, both the Deobandi and Barelvi religious scholars agree, simply will not suffice.  
Islam, as a “complete way of life,” must be established within the apparatus—indeed, as 
the very bedrock—of the State.25  Since the days of the Messenger, one scholar has 
explained, it was “the possession of power” that “was seen to be essential to upholding the 
shari’a…” [italics added].26  Perhaps it is unfortunate that something akin to a more 
classical liberal approach rarely, if ever, seems to have been considered, for once shәri’at 
is to be established via the guns of government—and the threat of violence, whether 
implicit or explicit, by which government fundamentally operates—the question of 
who’s version of shәri’at is to be applied becomes especially critical.  This phenomenon 
was to embed itself centrally at the heart of the Deobandi-Barelvi dispute. 
 
Muslim Footholds in South Asia. 
In South Asia, contact with Islam seems to have first been initiated by Arab 
merchants, plying their trade along the coasts of what are today southern Pakistan, 
western India, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives (though several abortive Muslim raids had 
penetrated the subcontinent as far as Multan within the first half-century of the Islamic 
era, too).  Eventually considerable-sized Muslim settlements developed in many of the 
trading ports ringing the Indian Ocean.  Here Islam spread more or less non-coercively, 
as local populations (and, at times, local rulers) adopted the foreign traders’ faith as their 
own.  Muslim merchants journeyed far beyond India, too, regularly conducting 
commercial activity up and down the Southeast Asian coast, in China, and even in 
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Korea.  In fact, the Muslim merchants of Korea would play what might be considered a 
decisive role in the spread of Islam in South Asia.  For it was here that, upon the deaths 
of a number of these merchants, the Korean king commissioned a group of Persian ships 
to convey the deceased trader’s wives and children to Iraq so that this husbandless and 
fatherless collection might be reunited with its coreligionists.  The convoy experienced 
little trouble sailing south from Korea, past China, Vietnam, Cambodia, around the 
Southeast Asian peninsula and into the Indian Ocean, past Ceylon and up the western 
Indian coast.  But as the widows and their families were sailing on the waters south of 
Sindh, they were attacked—either by pirates or the naval forces of the local Brahmin 
king; historians aren’t certain which.  Immediately upon hearing the news, the Muslim 
viceroy in Iraq requested that the Sindhi ruler intervene, but he refused.  In fact, 
according to Muslim sources, the women, children, and shipmen in question were even 
at that moment being held prisoner—not by pirates, but by the wily ruler himself.  
(Other historians point to the Brahman king’s stated reason for non-compliance with 
Arab demands: namely, that the city wherein the Arab ships had been seized lay outside 
of his jurisdiction). 
The Iraqi viceroy’s response was to send the young Muhammad bin Qasim at the 
head of a mighty army into the subcontinent, and by 712/93 the conquest of Sindh, 
briefly attempted before bin Qasim (but never successfully), was complete.  The move 
not only opened up increased trade with the rest of India, clearing the sea lanes for Arab 
merchants, but it also convinced many of west India’s rulers that friendship and 
commerce with the new conquerors was prudent.  The aforementioned development of 
Muslim communities up and down western India’s coastline mostly occurred after the 
Sindhi conquest of Muhammad bin Qasim. 
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The description of Muhammad bin Qasim handed down by history (or “through 
Muslim eyes,” as contemporary descriptions of the man, his victories, and his rule are 
inevitably garnered from Muslim pen) is an interesting one—and relevant to the topic 
of this work.  Far from being painted as a tyrannical invader who conquered town and 
city only to rule and reign as plundering despot, Muhammad bin Qasim is described as 
just, tolerant, and kind (even, however reluctantly, by at least one prominent 
nineteenth-century/thirteenth-century British writer, who characterized him as 
“prudent and conciliatory”).27  Muslim historians insist that he preserved Buddhist and 
Hindu places of worship and that he went out of his way to show respect to Brahmins.  
“His main mission was to punish a willful aggressor [the erstwhile ruler of Sindh],” not 
forcefully convert a country.  In fact, his policy vis-à-vis his vanquished foes was one of 
forgiveness and “friendship for all.”  He even authored a proclamation that one Pakistani 
historian has dubbed “the Charter of Liberty of Brahmanabad,” in which, among other 
things, he declared freedom of worship for Muslims and non-Muslims alike.  Perhaps 
most interestingly, he raised the status of Buddhists and Hindus so that they stood on 
equal footing with Jews, Christians, and Zoroastrians “in the true spirit of Islam.”  This 
was an ideal type, a true Muslim conqueror: one whose arrival was veritably forced by 
political expediency—by justice, even—and whose conquest, though swift and militarily 
inspiring, was nevertheless followed by merciful rule (including a strong tendency 
toward forgiveness), equity, tolerance, patronage of the arts, and strong central 
administration.  The ideal ruler broke the bonds of evil or inherently unjust local 
tradition and custom, too; in Sindh, Muslim rule brought with it the breakdown of “the 
coercive caste-ridden alien rule of the Brahman dynasty.”28 Muhammad bin Qasim 
becomes for us the first example of the Muslim ideal ruler type in South Asian history.  
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Such a portrayal is certainly not universally accepted, of course, but most Muslim 
historians—and thus most Deobandi and Barelvi scholars—seem to paint bin Qasim in 
such strokes.29 
Sizable “Muslim” forces arriving from the outside wouldn’t make an appearance in 
the subcontinent again until the late tenth century AD, amidst the “age-old” Indo-
Turkic rivalry of Hindustan’s northwestern frontier.30  Muslim historians insist that the 
aggressors were the Indian states, more or less confederate, to the east (or, at the very 
least, that they [the Indians] fell behind on promised tribute payments); it seems, 
however, that the conflict was focused, as ever, on land (eastern Afghanistan) and that 
each side aggressed upon the other.  After a series of attacks, the conflict between 
Ghazni, ruled by the Turk Sabuktigin, and the Indian states came to a head in 988/378.   
It was in that year that the Indian Jaipal, said to have been leading a host culled 
from the various north Indian states and numbering one hundred thousand, marched on 
Ghazni.  The Ghaznavids were growing too strong, and Sabuktigin (who had “started 
vigorously to expand his dominions”)31 had already conducted several raids as far as 
Lamghan and Multan; in fact, these very raids had precipitated the alliance of “Hindu” 
kingdoms against the Ghaznavid threat, an alliance that would only grow with time.  
Now Jaipal was bent on putting the Turks in their place.  Meanwhile, from the walls of 
Ghazni, the teenaged son of Sabuktigin, Mahmud, likely watched the oncoming horde 
with not a little trepidation.  And so the battle commenced, and a furious clash it was, 
but Sabuktigin prevailed, crushing the aspirations of his Indian rivals and extending the 
Turkic king’s domain to Peshawar.  Evidently he could have taken more, but 
Sabuktigin, ever a noble Muslim ruler, was forgiving and interested in peace above all—
and thus he agreed to the terms aforementioned, trusting in Jaipal to honor them and 
  
  29 
thereby assure the survival of his (Jaipal’s) kingdom.  But the Hindu rajәħ, we are told, 
continued his machinations against Ghazni in spite of the latter’s good faith.  Young 
Mahmud, a witness to this history—the battles against the invading Indians, their 
perceived intrigues and scheming—almost certainly made mental preparation to 
prevent a similar set of circumstances when his own time came to inherit his father’s 
kingdom.32 
That time came in 997/387.  Upon ascending the throne of Ghazni, Mahmud vowed 
to keep the Indian kingdoms in check through consistent and calculated aggression that 
would keep them too busy at home to execute any sort of westward invasion.  In 
1001/391, he faced Jaipal in battle again; Jaipal’s loss was so humiliating that the Indian 
king took his own life by fiery self-immolation.  By 1008/398, Mahmud had defeated a 
second confederacy of Indian states—this one led by Jaipal’s son—in a battle at 
Peshawar.  Much of the Punjab fell into Mahmud’s hands as a result, and a Ghaznavid 
governor was installed at Lahore.  By the time of his death in 1030/421, Mahmud had 
conquered cities and states across northern India (typically leaving them in the hands of 
Hindu vassals) as far east as Somnath (1024/415), and raided forts, towns, and Hindu 
temples enough to fill his treasury.  After all of these expeditions into the plains, 
however, the son of Sabuktigin really only incorporated the Punjab into his empire.   
Despite his reputation among many western historians as a raider and plunderer, 
Mahmud of Ghazni is described by Muslim histories as not only a military genius, but a 
just ruler as well.  Writes Qureshi, “He was neither a mere robber nor a bloodthirsty 
tyrant, as some modern writers have called him, and shed no blood except in the 
exigencies of war.”33  It had been the Indian states that had aggressed first, and often—
and when they had lost and agreed to pay indemnities, they had defaulted.  Mahmud 
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had thus done what was necessary to prevent further Indian incursions against his 
dominions.  The Hindu temples he destroyed, though many, were not those of his own 
Hindu subjects (which he preserved).  Mahmud is, in fact, credited with considerable 
broadmindedness, evident in his apparent attempt “to reconcile the Hindus and 
integrate them under his government and polity.”  This last he accomplished by 
recruiting Hindus into his civil administration (even in Ghazni, where a few rose to 
considerable heights), incorporating Hindu divisions into his army, and even minting 
coins depicting local mythical figures and Sanskrit script.34  And as a patron of the arts 
and scholarship, his “reputation has remained undiminished throughout the ages”;35 it 
was under his sponsorship that polymath Abu Rayhan Muhammad ibn Ahmad al-Biruni 
(considered by some as the father of Indology, geodesy, and anthropology) labored, and 
Hakim Abul Qasim Ferdowsi Tusi wrote the epic Shahnama under his patronage.  
Mahmud of Ghazni thus joins Muhammad bin Qasim as an ideal Muslim ruler within 
the South Asian context.  Eighteenth-century/twelfth-century political philosopher and 
revivalist Shah Waliullah (on whom more later) would describe Mahmud as the greatest 
Islamic ruler after the original Muslim caliphate (and point out that his victories—all 
fought for with the express aim of propagating Islam—were in part a result of his 
sharing a horoscope with the Prophet).36  “[I]n Afghanistan he is regarded as a 
philosopher prince, the conqueror of infidels,” writes one British historian, while “in 
India he has left a bitter legacy for his violent conquests.”37 
Several other Ghanzavids might also be included in this category, including Ibrahim 
(r. 1059-1099/451-492), whose peace settlement with the Seljuks to the west made 
possible further conquest east into Hindu India, and his son Masud (r. 1099-1115/492-
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509).  The rule of Ibrahim and Masud, Muslim historians insist, facilitated an impressive 
flowering of culture in Lahore.   
Throughout the Ghaznavid period, the relationship between the rulers and the 
‘alәma remained close, a political feature that was more or less inherited by the 
Ghaznavids as quasi-successors of the Samanids.  These Muslim scholars not only 
advised their political masters on matters of shәri’at, but also were active as impeders of 
Shi’a (and particularly Ism’aili) influence.38  Maintaining Sunni orthodoxy through the 
guns of government was the rule, thus it makes sense that the ‘alәma were concentrated 
in Ghazna and, later, in Lahore—the seats of political power in the realm.  M. Ahmad 
singles out shix Ism’ail Bukhari (d. 1056 AD), based in Lahore, and Safiuddin Kazuruni 
(d. 1007 AD), who established himself farther south, in Uchch, as particularly 
noteworthy ‘alәma of the age.  Bukhari pioneered the study of hәdis in South Asia—a 
theme that later reformers, like Shah Waliullah and the Deobandi fathers, would 
adopt—in addition to his missionary efforts; Kazaruni, a generation earlier, had likewise 
proselytized for the faith in the subcontinent. 
Indeed, perhaps the most important dynamic then being established in the 
northwestern region of the Indian subcontinent was not military (i.e. the Ghaznavid 
conquests) or scholarly (i.e. the efforts of the ‘alәma), but centered on Sufi proselytizing.  
Since as early as the eighth/first century, when Muhammad bin Qasim invaded Sindh, 
Sufi missionaries had been penetrating the subcontinent—and by the time of the 
Ghaznavids, many had been established in northwestern Hindustan (and further south, 
along the western coast) for many years.39  To borrow from Robinson, “Sufis were the 
prime agents in the long process of slowly drawing people [east of the Hindu Kush] of a 
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myriad local religious traditions into an Islamic milieu” (italics added).40  M. Ahmad 
described the genesis of Sufism as follows: 
 
Some of the ‘ulema’ who preferred to dedicate themselves to the 
missionary work of Islam or devote themselves exclusively to rigorous 
spiritual self-discipline were called by the names of sufiya, awliya, 
mashaykh and pir.  In order to preach Islam among the people at large, 
they adopted the ‘mass contact’ technique and developed for this purpose 
a separate ‘code of ethics’ and a body of ‘doctrines’ based on the esoteric 
interpretations of the Qur’an and the Sunnah.  In contrast with the ahl al-
Shar’iah [People of the Law], they are known as the ahl al-Tariqah 
[People of the Way].  In fact what the mighty Muslim rulers could not 
achieve by the sword, these sufis achieved with love and tolerance.  They 
were miraculously successful in pushing the frontiers of Islam to the 
farthest extent through peaceful conversion.41 
 
Thus while the approach of the ‘alәma to things political was to exert direct influence on 
policy-makers as members of the political class and components of the sultan’s court, 
the Sufis, generally speaking, adopted what could be considered in modern parlance a 
more libertarian method—one that relied on persuasion, preaching, long-suffering, 
selfless service, and personal example to effect change, without direct systematic 
recourse to the levers of the State (though such recourse was taken indirectly at times).  
The ‘alәma were the guardians of Islamic law—and it was through the law, enforced by 
a just Muslim ruler within the domains of an Islamic state, that righteousness could be 
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established upon the earth.  The Sufi saints, on the other hand, while sharing the goal of 
establishing righteousness, sought its realization by “acting as a common source of 
inspiration both to the rulers as well as the ruled.”  Indeed, some scholars have argued 
that Sufi influence resulted generally in a more “passive” subject population, less 
disposed to unrest and rebellion.  But their sway did not flow downward only; the Sufis 
regularly, through advice-giving and sermons, are reported to have curbed the tyranny 
of those less just rulers whose actions towards the common people might have required 
attention.42 
It should be noted that Sufi and ‘alym are not by any means mutually exclusive 
terms (indeed, one scholar has called them “complementary,” while obviously 
“nonetheless distinct”).43  In fact, many of the greatest ‘alәma were and are members of 
at least one Sufi order, and often several.  At times, and particularly in the 
contemporary news media in the context of South Asian (especially Pakistani) Islam and 
politics, the term “Sufi” is presented as being almost synonymous with “Barelvi” (a term 
far less employed), while the Deobandis are considered part of an ‘alәma movement.  
Such views are entirely erroneous, however, and may be attributed to the Deoband 
school’s reputation as a “puritanical” institution (and a slight, gradual trend since its 
founding towards a greater emphasis on scholarship), opposed to the assumed historical 
Sufistic tendency to adopt local, possibly unorthodox ideas and practice—commonly 
associated with the Barelvis.  For the Sufi preachers’ missions of conversion by 
persuasion “meant accommodating local needs and customs,” explained Robinson; such 
“accommodation” meant 
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incorporating worship of trees, or fish, or crocodiles, or cults relating to 
St George or Khwaja Khidr, into local sufi piety.  It meant tolerating a 
range of ritual practices: the lighting of candles, the smearing of sandal 
paste, the tying of a piece of cloth to a shrine to remind a saint of a 
request.44 
 
This sort of “accretion” has indeed been the target of much Deobandi criticism, but one 
must realize that there exists a wide spectrum of Sufistic thought and practice, from the 
highly esoteric to the more orthodox; the Naqshbandiyya, for example, would probably 
fall into this latter category.  In any case, even within a single order, great variation in 
practice and even doctrine has historically existed.  Another potential source of this 
misunderstanding may lie in what Sanyal observed as “one of the ways the Ahl-e-Sunnat 
[i.e. Barelvi] movement has changed in the course of the twentieth century,” namely 
“the leadership’s increased emphasis on the role of Sufism.”45  Simultaneously, a de-
emphasis on Sufism as a central tenet of religious practice occurred among the 
Deobandis, whose focus slowly shifted towards the study of traditional Islamic sources 
and shәri’at.  In the northwest frontier area, for example, where Deobandism quickly 
gained a major foothold, Haroon has pointed out that “accounts of religious pedagogy in 
the region” from the late nineteenth and early twentieth century AD “all note madrasas 
aimed at imparting a formal Quranic education.  The centrality of tariqa [țәriqәt, or the 
Sufi “way”]…began to diminish.”46 
The fact of the matter is that both the Barelvi and Deobandi founder figures held 
membership in multiple Sufi orders while simultaneously having attained the scholarly 
rank of ‘alym.  (Indeed, the Naqshbandi order has itself been dubbed by some as “one of 
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ulema.”)47  “Sufis are the dignity of Deobandism,” one of the school’s adherents, a local 
dignitary in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa’s Mansehra district, informed the writer, “and [the] 
faith would be incomplete” without the belief that Sufis represent those closest to God, 
“the most perfect” of all people.48  The mistaken scholar-Sufi binary characterizing the 
two schools’s relation to each other may also be attributed to the fact that while the 
Deobandis revere the Sufis and continue to be initiated into their spiritual lines (albeit 
less and less), they believe that the “route to Allah” is discovered through emulation of 
the Prophet’s life—in other words, living according to the shәri’at (what Robinson calls 
“this-wordly piety”).  The Barelvis, on the other hand, place added faith in țәriqәt—“the 
Sufi route to Allah”49—which, in the words of one Deobandi, “cross[es] the boundaries” 
which “Allah has set for his creatures” (and thereby approaches Robinson’s “other-
worldly piety”).50  The “Sufi route to Allah” involves the suggestion that the 
intercession of a pir for man with God could have efficacy, an approach still clinging to 
life in some Deobandi circles but very much alive within Barelvism.  Thus only in 
approach to Sufism and the Sufi orders, then, do the two schools differ.  Sufism itself 
plays a major role in both Barelvism and Deobandism.  Still, perhaps in this admittedly 
blurred dichotomy—between the ‘alәma and the Sufis—can be observed, however 
faintly, one of the historical roots of what would become the Deobandi-Barelvi rivalry.  
Taken alone this would, in light of what has been written above, constitute a gross 
oversimplification.  But the difference in approach towards both religious orthodoxy and 
the exertion of political influence that at least partly defined these two groups certainly 
merits recognition as a significant thread in the fabric of modern-day Deobandi-Barelvi 
dynamics. 
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Ghazni was burned to the ground in 1150/545 by a new power in Central Asia: that 
of the Afghan Ghurids.  And though the Ghurids would suffer a setback of their own at 
the hands of the Seljuks, yet another group—the Oghuz Turks—finally drove the 
Ghaznavids from their capital.  They found refuge in Lahore, where their dynasty 
continued.  Meanwhile, the Ghurids, now recovered from their previous setbacks, took 
Ghazni, Multan, and Uch (1175/571) under their leader Muhammad bin Sam, and made 
an abortive attempt at conquering India through Gujarat in 1178/574.  Though the 
latter failed, another expedition was launched following the more well-worn path to the 
north; in 1179/575 Muhammad bin Sam took Peshawar, in 1181/577 Sialkot fell, in 
1186/582 he seized Lahore (thus effectively ending the Ghaznavid dynasty), and by 
1191/587 he had taken Bhatinda, threatening Ajmer and, ultimately, Delhi.  In 
response, the Hindu rulers of those two citadel cities joined forces and marched on 
Bhatinda, where a temporary victory could not shield them from their fate; both Ajmer 
and Delhi fell to Muhammad the next year (1192/588).  But the Afghan conqueror 
wasn’t finished.  Within a handful of years, Muhammad bin Sam had added Varanasi 
and Kannauj to his empire, while one of his generals (Muhammad bin Bakhtyar Khalji) 
conquered Bihar and Bengal.  For the first time, “Muslim” rule extended across 
northern India, and further expansion was only prevented by troubles in Central Asia.  
He and his successors were known to “favour the ulema, by being generous to them and 
paying attention to their words” (and by “bestowing on them large amounts of money”), 
according to one Muslim chronicler.51  Simply “paying attention” to the ‘alәma was 
requisite for the ideal ruler; in the modern era, in Pakistan, the perceived discounting of 
both Deobandi and Barelvi scholars was one of very few things that might cause the 
‘alәma to temporarily shelve their own dispute and oppose this or that regime as “un-
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Islamic” or “anti-Islam.”  On the other hand, political rulers that were wise enough to 
meet with the ‘alәma and consider their point-of-view, to give them a voice—even if 
their advice might be ultimately decided against—tended to meet with the scholars’ 
approbation (at which point the Deobandi and Barelvi religious leadership could return 
to jockeying for power between themselves). 
The Ghurids, like previous dynasties, patronized the ‘alәma with plunder gained 
through the administration of their empire and the conquest of new lands.  As political 
rulers are wont to do, the Ghurids discriminated between the various schools of Muslim 
thought, identifying and financially supporting this or that ‘alym, much to the chagrin of 
those excluded (one of the many dangers of state patronage).  In the end, the Shafi 
leanings of the early Ghurids gave way to the Hanafi majority of Afghanistan (the 
empire’s base of control) and the Ghurid soldiery that would go on to conquer India, 
with great consequence for South Asian Islam.52  Muhammad of Ghur himself was 
“reputed to be a mild and benevolent man,” the Muslim historian tells us, and “a good 
general and a just ruler.”53  Like Muhammad bin Qasim and Mahmud of Ghazni, the 
example of Muhammad of Ghur is celebrated today by millions of Muslims.  The 
Ghurid conqueror is considered a hero, possessing many attributes of the ideal Islamic 
ruler type, despite the nature of his conquests (as “invasions”; after all, as Wood notes, it 
was a “combination of brutality and high civilization” that characterized “medieval 
Islam”).54 
 
Delhi Sultanate . 
A former slave of Muhammad of Ghur, Qutbuddin Aibak, became the first sultan of 
Delhi in 1206/603, ushering in a new era in the history of the subcontinent: that of 
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sustained “Muslim” rule over vast Indian territory.  Under the Mamluks (1206-
1290/603-689), the Delhi Sultanate expanded across much of north India.  Their 
successors, the Turko-Afghan Khaljis (1290-1320/689-720), extended the sultan’s 
domains into central India while simultaneously holding back Mongol would-be 
invaders—one of the few polities successful in this regard.  The next dynasty (the 
Tughluqs, 1320-1414/720-817, of Turkic origin), after some initial military success, 
including the extension of the sultanate to its territorial height (almost conquering all of 
the subcontinent under Muhammad bin Tughluq [r. 1325-1351/725-752]), ultimately 
experienced a series of crippling setbacks.  These obstacles included the loss of much 
territory and, devastatingly, the invasion of Timur the Lame in 1398/801—an event 
that resulted in the eight-day plundering of Delhi and the massacre of an estimated one 
hundred thousand of the sultan’s subjects.  Within a decade-and-a-half, the Tughluqs 
had been replaced by the Sayyids (1414-1451/817-855), whose short rule ended with 
the abdication of the last Sayyid sultan to a new dynasty: that of the Lodis (1451-
1526/855-933).  The Lodis, ethnic Pathans, held the throne for three quarters of a 
century, finally falling to a new power in South Asia—the Mughals—in 1526/933. 
One might generally say, as Qureshi does, that the Delhi sultans “adhered to the 
legal conception of the position of the sultan which was common throughout the 
Muslim world.”55  And though, as Metcalf and Metcalf (and others) assert, “it 
is…misleading to speak of this era as the period of ‘Muslim’ rule,” since other, “non-
Muslim” Indian states were organized and behaved in much the same way (Hardy 
describes the Delhi sultanate as, for example, merely “pious policemen”—the sultans—
collaborating with “pious lawyers”—the ‘alәma), the fact remains that the period has for 
centuries been regarded by Muslim scholars as distinctly Muslim, complete with several 
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ideal or at least near-ideal rulers (with a few rotten eggs thrown in).56  Gohar writes, for 
example, that Ghiyasuddin Tughluq (r. 1320-1325/720-725) “reigned for five years 
with justice and equity, restoring order and peace,” and that his son, too (Muhammad 
bin Tughluq), though his rule would be marked by several major mistakes and 
disappointments, nevertheless was “himself highly learned” and “greatly respected the 
‘alәma” (though the same cannot be said about his position vis-à-vis the Sufi shixs); this 
sultan’s setbacks are often glossed over as the result of natural impulsivity (and even 
bad luck), despite his being pious and highly intelligent.57  On the other hand, Alauddin 
Khilji (r. 1296-1316) saw his role as sultan as “separate from [shәri’at] and religious 
tradition,” urging a sort of church-and-state separation that a few Pakistani leaders have 
attempted to advocate, with mixed results.  To Alauddin, shәri’at was the domain of 
judges and muftis; as sultan he should be more concerned with “grain, cloth and basic 
necessities for the people…”58  This dichotomy might justifiably be compared to the 
competition, seven centuries later, between the religious parties on the one hand and 
Zulfiqar ‘Ali Bhutto’s PPP (especially during that organization’s early period) on the 
other.  At its heart, the issue was the role of government: was it to implement shәri’at 
(which would, many of the ‘alәma argued, bring about prosperity and equity on its 
own)?  Or was it to act as a sort of paternal provider of temporal welfare (with the 
scholars and muftis operating within their own sphere)?  This is not to suggest that the 
‘alәma themselves were not somewhat divided on this issue (they were, then as now), but 
rather to underscore the long tradition of political rulers who have attempted the 
construction of a wall between their own earthly responsibilities and those supposedly 
more otherworldly tasks of the ‘alәma. 
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Like all good Muslim rulers, the Delhi sultans, often at the behest of their advising 
‘alәma, typically sought legitimacy for their rule from the generally accepted caliph of 
the Muslim world.  For the early sultans, this meant applying for recognition from the 
Abbasids in Baghdad.  And even after the Mongols sacked that great city on 10 
February 1258/7 Safar 656, and had the last Abbasid caliph wrapped in a carpet and 
trampled to death by horses, the sultans in Delhi continued to more or less recognize 
the dynasty for another four decades.  One or two sultans later claimed that they were 
caliphs (albeit only within their own domains), but this didn’t last long. Muhammad bin 
Tughluq was convinced, perhaps by the ‘alәma counseling him, that recognition from 
the reigning caliph was necessary to make his rule legitimate; this time application was 
made to Cairo, from where the “shadow caliphate,” a line drawn from an Abbasid 
survivor installed by the Mamluk Sultanate, sent Muhammad bin Tughluq a diploma in 
1344/744.  Feroz Shah received one, too, as did the breakaway Bahmani Sultanate in the 
Deccan (though this last is debated).  The Sayyids and Lodis also recognized the caliph 
(at least on their coinage), and the former, as their name indicates, additionally claimed 
to be descendants of the Prophet.  All of this was consistent with the Muslim notion of 
“singleness and political unity” defining the pan-Islamic world (a concept that 
“resonate[s] among some Muslims even now,” says one modern Muslim writer; this is 
certainly true of the two schools about which this work is concerned).59  Though the 
reality on the ground might have reflected anything but a politically unified polity, 
religious legitimization was important if the ruler wanted to exercise the “right” to such 
plunder as land taxes.  Such was the importance of the ‘alәma stamp of approval. 
Official state positions for the ‘alәma during the Delhi Sultanate era were plentiful 
and prominent.  Throughout this period, religious affairs fell under the Sәdәr ul-Sudwr, 
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head of the Religious Affairs Department.  Under the Sәdәr ul-Sudwr fell the shix ul-
yslam, an ‘alym responsible for handling state patronage of Sufis and other Muslim 
divines.  The position of qazi-e-mәmalyk—Chief Judge—was probably the most powerful 
next to the Sәdәr ul-Sudwr; indeed, often both offices were combined in one individual.  
The Chief Judge appointed all other judges in the realm (effectively making him the 
head of the Justice Department), and additionally appointed ymams to lead prayers in all 
mosques.  To these highly significant responsibilities must be added the Department of 
hysba—in essence, a Department of the Propagation of Virtue and the Prevention of 
Vice.  This morals-enforcement agency of government was, more or less completely, a 
creature of the ‘alәma, and though its practical strength fluctuated over time, it often 
enjoyed real power (as, ironically, during the reign of Alauddin, whose supposed 
separation-of-church-and-state philosophy was evidently more separation-of-church-
and-sultan, granting the scholars free reign without intereference from the political 
ruler).  Thus there was ample room within the political structure of the Delhi Sultanate 
for the ‘alәma to make their influence felt.  “[E]ven when they could not influence a 
sultan,” A. Ahmad informs us, their place within the state apparatus ensured that “they 
could not easily be influenced by him.”60  In addition to their political role, the jurist-
theologians with the title mufti also acted as issuers of fәtawa, or juridical rulings, and 
studied, analyzed, and wrote about the Qur’an, hәdis, and Islamic law (fyqħ). 
One might generally say that the ‘alәma “occupied a position of great prestige” 
under the Mamluks, reaching a peak in authority under Bahram Shah (r. 1240-
1242/637-639) thanks in part to matrimonial ties to the sultan’s house. This was 
followed by a quieter influence during the latter half of the dynasty’s rule, though the 
‘alәma continued to enjoy a close personal relationship with the sultan.  Their authority 
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waned some during the short Khalji period, only to pick up again under the house of 
Tughluq (especially during Feroz Shah’s reign: 1351-1388/751-790).  Unfortunately for 
the scholars, this coincided with the aforementioned decline of the Delhi Sultanate’s 
power, specifically towards the end of the Tughluq period and throughout the Sayyid 
period.  This would change with the arrival on the scene of the Lodis, under whom the 
Delhi Sultanate would experience somewhat of a resurgence—and the power of the 
‘alәma, too, despite Sikander Lodi’s personal distaste for the scholars’ orthodoxy.61 
Such authority often set the ‘alәma at odds with the Sufis.  Indeed, it was not 
uncommon for the court scholars to accuse the Muslim mystics of committing the great 
sin of innovation (byd’at)—adding to or changing pure Islam as revealed to and by the 
Prophet.  This is the central accusation leveled by the Deobandis at the Barelvis.  
Typically such an accusation would be made through the levers of the state, with formal 
charges written up against an individual Sufi, resulting in a trial before a panel of ‘alәma 
and Sufis.  Sufis were dragged before such juries on a variety of charges—from listening 
to music to adultery—though as often as not the verdict was decided in the Sufis’ favor 
(and, sometimes, to the injury of the ‘alym from whence the charge originated).62  By 
prohibiting an act by means of state-enforced legislation or mandate, a scholar’s nemesis 
might be destroyed or otherwise marginalized.  This mechanism was simply another 
means by which the ‘alәma-Sufi rivalry played out. 
A related phenomenon of this period was the establishment and proliferation of the 
xanәqaħ, or Sufi shrine center—especially, during this period, of the Chishti and 
Surawardy orders.63  From the thirteenth/seventh century, the Sufi shixs, or pirs (a term 
prevalent in South Asia; in much of the rest of the Muslim world “pirs” are known as 
walis—“friends of God”) had begun establishing themselves in many of the Islamic 
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kingdoms, centered around such xanәqaħs.  Though these saints and their followers 
considered God the omnipotent ruler of all, Allah was, for all intents and purposes, 
“inaccessible to the common man.”  And so God had spoken through prophets.  The last 
and greatest of these had been Muhammad, through whom the Qur’an had been 
revealed for the benefit of humankind.  But there were to be no more prophets after 
Muhammad; the final great revelation for the world had been communicated.  What, 
then, of the rest of humanity—all of the billions born after Muhammad, who would 
never have the benefit of a prophet to guide them?  The pirs and their disciples had an 
answer.  Rather than leave His creatures with naught but the words of the Qur’an, as 
sacred and perfect as they were, Allah in his mercy continued to provide living “guides 
and guardians,” “friends of God” whose role was to maintain “the smooth operation of 
the entire world” and continue to impart blessings to humanity.  These pirs, all sәyyids 
(descendents of the Prophet), could trace their authority back to an “original saint” (the 
quțb, meaning “pole” or “axis”; one of these, for example, was the great Abdul Qadir al-
Gilani [d. 1166/561] of Baghdad, “founder” of the Qadiri order), and from thence to 
Muhammad himself; thus by virtue of their place in the spiritual chain (sylsәla) and by 
blood the pirs were to be vehicles of blessing to humankind.  In northern Hindustan 
(mostly in the northwest, in modern-day Pakistan) and neighboring Central Asia, the 
xanәqaħs came to wield significant political as well as spiritual power in the region 
round about.  Oftentimes a tribal chief or other leader would approach the pir on behalf 
of his entire group and submit to conversion through a ceremony of allegiance (bi’at).  
Each year, the bond between pir and those communities tied to him would be bolstered 
when he undertook a circuit of his spiritual domain, collecting donations for the 
maintenance of the shrine center.  In return, the pir was to act as a mediator between his 
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followers and God.  It was through him that the surrounding communities were blessed; 
their supplications to him were made in turn by him to the quțb, and by the quțb to the 
Prophet Muhammad—who himself enjoyed direct access to God.  Even after the pir had 
been taken by death, his tomb continued to pour out blessings upon those tied to the 
xanәqaħ, and worshippers of God made pilgrimages there to ask for help and pray for 
guidance.  In the meantime, his hereditary successor, or sajjada-nishin (in essence, as 
Ewing points out, a “hereditary pir”), continued to act as the regional spiritual mediator 
and maintainer of the shrine.64 
Many a Sufi shix made temporal claims, too—to territorial wylayәt; that is, the pir 
asserted authority (i.e. spiritual authority, though this often translated, of course, into 
political authority) over a given area.  A constant (though often subtle) struggle, about 
which Digby has written much, was thus waged between the sultan and the Sufi shix for 
control and dominance.  Indeed, the contest had to be subtle, for many believed that the 
very temporal survival of the empire, or at least of the territory over which the shix 
claimed wylayәt, depended on the Sufi shix’s personal attendance, well-being, and 
blessing.  His words could, it was believed, literally bring a curse upon the land.  
Prosperity (and even the enthronement of kings) might be attributed to his very 
presence or promise, and natural calamity, foreign invasion, the impoverishment of a 
city, the death of an emperor, or even the fall of a dynasty to his departure or spoken 
words.  The sultans endeavored to patronize the Sufis, and were largely successful vis-à-
vis those of lesser status (the greater mәshayx could not, by virtue of their claims, accept 
official patronage); this fell under the purview of the aforementioned shix ul-yslam, 
whose duty was to keep the Sufis in check through the distribution of state-garnished 
plunder and other material favors.  Much that was involved in this patronage betrayed 
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what was, perhaps, its true purpose—emphasizing, as it did, the supremacy of the 
sultan’s authority over that of the Sufi shix.  Land grants and religious endowments 
from the state ensured the shix’s political support as an influencer of opinion (and even 
as a military recruiter in times of civil strife).65  Sufis who refused the sultan’s largesse 
were considered potential threats to the sultan’s authority (and their xanәqaħs potential 
hotbeds of political rebellion).  Thus we are told by one Pakistani historian that 
Ghiyasuddin Tughluq, for example, was “fearful of the reach and influence of 
Nizamuddin,”66 the most prominent Sufi (Chishti) shix of the time (perhaps Tughluq had 
it right; some Muslim scholars later ascribed that sovereign’s untimely death—by 
collapsing pavilion—to a pronouncement of this Sufi shix, thereby illustrating the Sufis’ 
perceived power over temporal affairs).67  Such suspicion was not entirely unfounded, as 
from time to time, both during the Delhi Sultanate period and afterwards, a Sufi shix 
would be involved in a political conspiracy against the sultan himself.  Often the family 
of a shix and that of the powerful Muslim landlord (zәmindar) class would join forces 
through marriage, thereby further buoying the pir’s power and influence.68  Even under 
the Mughals, emperors from Jahangir to Aurengzeb continued to employ the mostly 
effective “payoff” tactic, granting these regionally influencial divines cash, lands, and 
imperial authority, all in an attempt to influence the politically powerful pirs—and keep 
them in line; the pirs had a history, after all, of organizing revolts against the emperor 
(like the Pathan pir Roshan’s anti-Akbarian rebellion).69  Thus the supreme temporal 
ruler and this host of lesser spiritual ones played a delicate game for political control.70 
During this long period of predominantly “Muslim” rule in north Hindustan, the 
‘alәma generally provided religious legitimization to the Muslim ruler, whether or not 
the ruler in question actually strove for piety.  Often dependent upon the state for their 
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livelihood—indeed, as a class of veritable spiritual courtesans—the ‘alәma remained 
generally loyal to the sultan under whom they lived.  For his part, the sultan—even if 
he generally favored the Sufis over the ‘alәma whenever the two found themselves at 
odds—respected the scholars as a means of consolidating his own power over the 
Muslim elite and the army, over whom the ‘alәma held much sway.71  Despite numerous 
rebellions, on numerous grounds, against kings and rulers from Morocco to Bengal, 
“there is hardly any example available,” writes Mushir Haq, “of the uprising of the 
‘alәma against the ruler on the ground of his irreligious activities.”72  No, the religious 
scholars tended to need the court—and the plunder it gathered by threat of violence 
from its subjects—too much to raise a fracas over issues of religious legitimacy.  “In 
Muslim history the [‘alәma] generally remained loyal to the throne so long as the ruler 
professed to be a Muslim,” wrote M. Ahmad, “irrespective of the quality of his 
administration.”73  Perhaps it is not surprising, then, that the majority of the ‘alәma 
were associated in some way with state (with “the court, the ruling elite and the 
administration”).74  As long as the ruler acted in conformity with Islamic law, the ‘alәma, 
according to Ahmad, “did not bother whether he was a despot or a tyrant or an unjust 
ruler.”75  When questions of justice (i.e. tyranny and/or despotism) threatened the unity 
of the ummәt, the latter (unity) took precedence; indeed, Muhammad himself had 
exemplified this principle when he developed the concept of jyhad to preserve internal 
unity among the Muslim tribes while still allowing for conquest and expansion 
externally.  In short, if the ruler was a Muslim, that ruler could typically count on the 
‘alәma to support him, minor religious disagreements notwithstanding, for the sake of 
union.  It is easy to see, then, how a “pattern of dependence on princes,” as Metcalf 
characterized it, naturally developed between the religious scholars and the court.  This 
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being a general rule, there were, of course, several notable exceptions.  Indeed, some of 
the most eminent ‘alәma in history were imprisoned or tortured for their opposition to 
the ruler of the day.  (Several foundational scholars of fyqħ—Abu Hanifa [d. 767 AD], 
Malik ibn Anas [d. 795 AD], Ahmed ibn Hanbal [d. 855 AD]—fall into this category.)  
By and large, however, the ‘alәma “were content with official careers” within the 
political structure of the state.76 
One result of this scholarly dependence on the court (apart from the Sufi-scholar 
rivalry, aforementioned) was the development of a distinction between “other-worldly” 
scholars (‘alәma-e-axyrәt, or those devoted to study for study’s sake, or for the sake of 
the glory of God, with an eye towards the afterlife) and “worldly” scholars (‘alәma-e-
dunia, i.e. those “professional” ‘alyms who “preferred a worldly career”).77  Both the 
Sufi/‘alәma and the ‘alәma-e-axyrәt/‘alәma-e-dunia dynamics are relevant to the 
Deobandi-Barelvi phenomenon that would emerge centuries later.  This will, it is hoped, 
become more obvious as the reader proceeds.  At times, both schools have accused 
members of the other of getting mired in “worldly” affairs unfit for the truly pious ‘alym 
or shix.  Ahmad Riza Khan, the “founder” of Barelvism, would himself level such an 
accusation at the Deobandis, of whose anti-British machinations (including critical 
involvement in the Khilafat Movement) he strongly disapproved.  Meanwhile, 
Deobandis have sought to defend their leaders as righteous men caught up in the 
expediency of politics for the greater good, even as the Barelvi leaders mingled and 
sided with the secular Aligarhists or even the British themselves (many Deobandis still 
believe that Ahmad Riza was a British agent).  These events and themes will be 
presented at greater length in subsequent chapters. 
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Some scholars give the South Asian ‘alәma credit for enjoying “unchallengable 
authority” when it came to interpreting shәri’at (and therefore the “formulation of the 
policies of the realm”).  One South Asian historian noted that “[no] ruler could ever 
defy the shari’ah, or enforce any law that was repugnant to the shari’ah”; in addition, the 
‘alәma “had always resisted the attempts of rulers to deprive them of their legislative 
veto power.”78   Though this is probably an exaggeration, it nevertheless underscores 
the important political role played by the Islamic jurist-theologians within the “Muslim” 
Indian state.  The religious scholars more or less maintained this position into the early 
Mughal period (indeed, some of the ‘alәma from the Lodi dynasty were kept on by the 
new Central Asian dynasty). 
But such status wasn’t to last. 
 
The Mughal State . 
The first Mughal ruler, Babur, defeated the last Delhi Sultan in 1526/932, ushering 
in the last major era of “Muslim” rule.  But it wasn’t until Babur’s grandson, Akbar, 
consolidated power as the third Mughal emperor that the dynasty truly established 
itself as a durable polity with staying power on the subcontinent.  And it was under 
Akbar that the position of the ‘alәma was to change substantially, and not in the 
scholars’ favor.  It should be remembered, however, that for the first phase of Akbar’s 
long reign, the ‘alәma, ironically, may have enjoyed more power than ever before.  
Indeed, the young shaħәnshaħ likely started out as an orthodox Muslim, and he appears 
to have shown great (even exceptional) respect for the religious scholars in his court.  
“For some time,” Al-Badauni recorded, “the Emperor had so great faith in [his Sәdәr ul-
Sudwr] as a religious leader that he would bring him his shoes and place them before 
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his feet,” before listening to the ‘alym expound upon the life and teachings of 
Muhammad.  This particular scholar, Abdul Nabi, had earlier “abandoned” the Sufi 
traditions of his fathers for the “rule of the traditionalists,” demonstrating, again, the 
dichotomy between the two.  It is noteworthy that Akbar would appoint such a man as 
his Sәdәr ul-Sudwr, seemingly bespeaking a traditionalist bent of his own.  The 
traditionalist-Sufi schism, though certainly not an exact Deobandi-Barelvi match, 
nevertheless reveals the early rumblings of both schools’ emergences.  In any case, the 
appointment of Abdul Nabi came in 1565/972, when the Mughal ruler was still in his 
early twenties; he was yet to develop the religious positions for which he would be long 
remembered.  Surely Abdul Nabi did not foresee the transformation that would occur, 
especially considering that, for a time, this venerable scholar was considered “so 
powerful” that “never was there in the reign of any monarch” a Sәdәr ul-Sudwr his 
political equal.79 
Whatever Abdul Nabi’s own qualities (whether personal and academic), however, 
over time Akbar developed a severe disenchantment for what he considered the 
“arrogance, petty-mindedness, intolerance and mutual rivalries” of the ‘alyms at court.80  
Badauni concurred, describing them as “time-serving muftis and stirrers up of strife.”  
Akbar appears to have both lost patience with their wrangling over the meaning of 
Islamic law and felt tied down by the seemingly constant reliance on their juridical 
opinions.  “Why do you not free me from dependence on these mullahs?” he reportedly 
entreated one prominent advisor.  And “at last,” Badauni lamented, “owing to the 
disagreements of [Abdul Nabi] and all the other ill-dispositioned [‘alәma] the 
Emperor’s opinion of him changed completely.”  The situation inspired the historian to 
compose the couplet, 
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All those who see for pride 
Of place are fools, 
Aye, those who style 
Themselves the ‘alәma. 
 
Subsequently the ‘alәma were commanded to gather together, many “against their will,” 
and “forcibly seized and compelled” to attest to an imperial decree “affirming the 
religious supremacy of the Emperor”—including “his superiority to all ecclesiastical 
dignitaries.”  Both Akbar’s Sәdәr ul-Sudwr and his shix ul-yslam were so disgraced that 
they followed the assembly and attestation with long pilgrimages to Mecca.  One not-
so-impartial turn-of-the-twentieth-century German academic would characterize the 
display as part and parcel to the emperor’s more general “struggle against the most 
destructive power in his kingdom, against the Mohammedan priesthood.”81  The jurist-
theologians would never regain the prestige and influence they had once enjoyed within 
the state apparatus.  
Some Muslim historians have attempted to explain the politico-religious aberration 
that was the Akbarian period by blaming it on the emperor’s upbringing.  He had, after 
all, spent his childhood in Kabul in the care of an uncle, where, we are informed, “no 
religious teaching was arranged for him.”  After assuming the title of badshaħ as a young 
teenager and then, at eighteen, finally taking the reigns of power, he spent much of his 
early reign on military expeditions.  He was thus “deprived of knowledge and a religious 
education.”  Others have asserted that Akbar’s turn from orthodox Islam was politically 
motivated—meant to shore up Hindu (especially Rajput) support against his chief 
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political rivals, the (Muslim) Pathans.82  Whether or not there is merit to these 
arguments, one phenomenon that was at the center of the emperor’s spiritual 
transformation was his deep personal admiration for the more mystical strains of the 
faith (and, eventually, even for the divines of other faiths).  What he saw as the narrow-
mindedness of the court scholars had sowed doubt in his mind, at least as it pertained to 
their traditionalist, orthodox path; he allegedly “would pass entire nights sitting out of 
doors on a stone,” so tormented was he about his ‘alәma dilemma.   Not so with the pirs.  
With “regularity,” he made “yearly” pilgrimages to the graves of Muslim saints—and in 
battle, he would vow to make a pilgrimage to a certain shrine if victory could be 
achieved.83  The great emperor was said to have once walked two hundred miles, from 
Fatehpur Sikhri to Ajmer, as a show of gratitude towards a pir for the birth of his son 
Selim (later the emperor Jahangir).  It was during Akbar’s reign, too, that Baqibillah (d. 
1603 AD), who is credited with introducing the Naqshbandi Sufi order into India, 
arrived on the subcontinent, eventually initiating several of the emperor’s military 
leaders and courtiers into the order.84  
  Among the “great” Mughal rulers, Akbar’s reign was thus marked by a sharp 
decline in the influence of the ‘alәma—and his son and successor, Jahangir, inherited the 
political structure that Akbar had built (one in which the scholars played little direct 
role).  Unwittingly, perhaps, Akbar’s downgrading of the scholars’ importance in favor 
of Sufi pirs and others naturally exacerbated the rivalry between the two, as the 
demoting of any previous recipient of government preference is wont to do.  Though 
Jahangir was not particularly religious personally, his reign did allow for some 
scholarly influence on the state, albeit indirectly—a phenomenon that had all but 
vanished under his father.  The influence of Ahmad Sirhindi (d. 1624 AD), for example, 
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may have been particularly significant.  It should be noted that Sirhindi, a disciple of 
Baqibillah, is perhaps most accurately described as a Naqshbandi Sufi (though he’d 
received training in the Suhrawardy, Qadiri, and Chishti paths as well) first, and as an 
‘alym second, well-known in his day for his opposition to the “peace above all” policy of 
Akbar.  The author of hundreds of letters, many of them written to the Mughal ruler, 
Sirhindi is often credited with almost single-handedly steering South Asian Islam back 
into orthodoxy, thereby “saving” it from falling victim to the syncretistic milieu of 
Indian religious philosophy.  It is through the Sirhindi line (the “Mujaddidi” branch, 
which subsequently spread from South Asia into Central Asia and the Middle East) of 
the Naqshbandi order, established partly in opposition to Akbar’s religious policies,85 
that such future South Asian Muslim luminaries as Shah Waliullah, sәyyid Ahmad of 
Raebareli, ‘Ubaidullah Sindhi, and virtually all of the founding fathers of Deobandism 
(as well as many Barelvi guiding lights), trace their spiritual lineages.  It might be 
argued that the tradition that he established (or at least shored up) of scholarly 
opposition to a regime’s perceived unorthodoxy continues to run strong as of the time 
of this writing, especially as far as the Deobandis are concerned within the political 
context of Pakistan.  In any case, Ahmad Sirhindi’s efforts did not save him from prison, 
where Jahangir eventually threw him; the scholar-Sufi died shortly after his release.  
But in the day-to-day affairs of state, such influence was mild—and informal, in any 
case.  Still, after the Akbar aberration, the Mughal state under Jahangir regained much 
of the “Islamic character” that it had once enjoyed—restoring, for example, the kәlymәħ 
to Mughal coinage (which Akbar had erased), and reinstituting the hyjrәt-based 
calendar.86 
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Even under Shah Jahan, Jahangir’s more religious son, the scholars “did not have 
any say in the policies of administration”; the emperor’s relationship with the most 
eminent ‘alym of the time, one Abdul Hakim Sialkoti, was merely “one of distant 
patronage” (though, admittedly, he did have the man weighed in gold, and he did 
patronize the scholar’s literary talents).87  Still, modern Muslim historians tend to see 
Shah Jahan as a great ruler, for many of the usual reasons.  He was pious—a practicing 
Muslim who observed fasts and regularly said prayers.  He was a man who patronized 
the arts, particularly architecture; under him the Red Fort and jam’y mәsjyd in Delhi and 
the Taj Mahal in Agra were all built, and the Agra Fort reconstructed.  He governed 
“firmly,” leaving a legacy of “magnificence, justice, and prosperity,” to quote one Muslim 
scholar.  He looked upon his subjects with a paternal eye, a contemporary chronicler 
informs us, ever striving for the welfare of peasants and ridding the land of criminals via 
harsh punishment.  He successfully quelled rebellions, expanded the empire into much 
of the Deccan, and played the crusader in punishing the newly arrived Portuguese for 
their alleged Christian “depredations” against the local populace.88  “It can be fairly 
said,” a Pakistani scholar writes, “that [Shah Jahan] surpassed all the Mughal rulers in 
organization and public works and in protecting the life and home of the peasants and in 
suppressing profiteers, exploiters and tyrants.”89  Shah Jahan thus joins the ranks of the 
ideal Muslim rulers in the context of South Asia—and for centuries the magnificent 
structures he left behind would (and continue to?) whisper to the ‘alәma and others 
yearning for a return to Islamic political and cultural greatness. 
Shah Jahan’s successor, Aurengzeb, is similarly looked to as an ideal type, despite 
the disparagement heaped upon his memory by western observers and historians over 
the centuries.  Under this emperor, almost the entire subcontinent—indeed, more 
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territory than in any other South Asian regime from “the dawn of history to the rise of 
British power” (to quote Sarkar)—fell under the Mughal banner.  Muslim historians 
insist that he “never shed unnecessary blood,” but was actually a model of piousness, 
administrative acumen (a trait dominating the first half of his rule), and military 
competence (a trait headlining the second half of his rule).  He is described as having 
lived an austere private life (differentiating himself thereby from his predecessor 
Mughals, especially his father), as a “staunch” Muslim of the Sunni persuasion who 
endeavored to govern as befitted a true Muslim ruler.90  He successfully fought off 
pirates from Southeast Asia, settled eastern Bengal (Bang; this policy would have major 
historical consequences in coming centuries), and heroically battled (though ultimately 
without success) against the infidel Hindu Marathas.  He went from “assured 
administrator” in the pomp of Delhi to “embattled old man” in the military camp of the 
Deccan, gradually assuming the role of “ascetic and sage, spending long hours in 
prayers, fasting, and copying the Holy Qu’ran.”  Where many in the west see Aurengzeb 
as a battle-hardened symbol of intolerance (even incompetence), many Muslim 
historians insist he was “both a most able statesman and a subtle character” more than 
worthy of ideal Muslim ruler status.91 
Even though the door for the ‘alәma to enjoy some limited role within government 
had re-opened slightly under Jahangir and Shah Jahan after the Akbarian low, it wasn’t 
until the reign of Aurengzeb, in the words of H. Khan “the most orthodox of the 
emperors,”92 that the jurist-theologians somewhat regained their “traditional” political 
role as a sort of Islamic council approving or rejecting policy based upon its compliance 
with shәri’at.  Still, this role was greatly curtailed by the emperor, upon whom the 
scholars enjoyed virtually no control nor significant sway.  “No doubt [Aurengzeb] 
  
  55 
made use of the [‘alәma],” A. Ahmad writes, “but there is no evidence that he ever 
allowed them to make use of him even in the slightest degree.”93  Upon gaining the 
throne after defeating his rivals (including his much more religiously open-minded older 
brother), Aurengzeb—typically regarded as the last of the “great” Mughals (though his 
son Bahadur Shah probably deserves a place, too)—instituted a program of Islamization, 
attempting to rule strictly within the confines of Islamic law.  This included the 
appointment of censors to keep public morals in check (in particular to restrain 
prostitution, drinking, and gambling), the abolition of non-shәri’at-approved taxes, and 
even the forbidding of music at his court.  One would assume the ‘alәma would have 
played a prominent role in this effort, but the emperor appears to have set at the task 
through the secular hierarchy of the state rather than through the religious scholars or 
the mosques.  Things become a little clearer, perhaps, when one realizes that 
Aurengzeb’s Islamization included, as a major component, the re-introduction of 
jyziәħ—the traditional tax on non-Muslims; though apologists of this tax are quick to 
point out that the Mughal ruler’s sole purpose in this regard was “to allow non-Muslims 
to buy exemption from military service,” those non-Muslims forced by threat of violence 
to turn over a portion of their property to the state might have regarded it in a different 
light.94  Regardless, it is easy to see why the institution and enforcement of the jyziәħ 
required the participation not of the scholars but of provincial and local officers of the 
state. The ‘alәma under Aurengzeb were used by him, and not vice-versa; when he 
needed his brothers dead, for example, the ‘alәma, “ever ready to oblige,” helped lend the 
murders religious sanctification.  And though the fәtawa-e-әlәmgiri, a collection of 
Islamic juridical statements with which the ‘alәma obviously played a vital role, was 
compiled under his patronage and by his order, the work bears his stamp as much as any 
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scholar’s; it was, in the words of one South Asian academic, “the theoretic crystallization 
of Aurengzeb’s theocratic policies.”95  Still, the emperor seemed to possess a great 
respect for the religious scholars, even if he didn’t accord them much in the way of 
political power; whenever the ‘alәma compiling the fәtawa-e-әlәmgiri entered his court, 
for example, Aurengzeb is reported to have arisen as a show of esteem.96 
But with Aurengzeb’s death and the subsequent decline of the “Muslim” empire in 
India (particularly following the short reign of his son, Bahadur Shah), new threats to 
the faith began to emerge in the sub-continent.  Indeed, the 1700s/1100s were a 
watershed for Islam in South Asia.  The crisis was interpreted both politically and 
spiritually.  To the west, the newly emergent Sikh state threatened Mughal dominance, 
and to the south the Hindu Marathas were eating away at one-time Mughal territory at 
an alarming rate.  All the while, pesky foreigners whose significance was not yet 
understood (in particular the French and the British) were beginning to make waves in 
the south and east.  In addition, the ever-widening political vacuum of the once-mighty 
Mughal Empire was filling up with the fragmented polities of a multitude of “Muslim” 
states (independent in all but name, and sometimes that, too), threatening the unity of 
the ummәt.  As a result, a revivalist spirit began to manifest itself, based at first, perhaps 
predictably, in the waning old center of Delhi.  Here the religious scholars, especially 
influenced by the Naqshbandi Sufi order, attempted to standardize correct religious 
practice and belief (for the ruling and religious elite, it should be noted) and reassert (or 
at least re-emphasize) the proper relationship, as they saw it, between the ‘alәma and the 
Muslim ruler.  By the early eighteenth/twelfth century, Sunni scholar ‘Abd ur-Rahim 
(d. 1718 AD) had established a mәdrәsәħ in Delhi, the Madrasa-e-Rahimiyya, that would 
eventually play a vital role in India’s Muslim revivalist wave.  This wave, in turn, would 
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spread to other Muslim lands, and provide a source to which later revivalists across the 
Islamic world could turn for guidance and inspiration.  “Thus,” Weismann notes, “as 
political decay was faster and deeper in South Asia than in other parts of the Muslim 
world during the past several centuries, it was here that ideas of religious revival and 
reform were first conceived.  When other Muslim countries followed suit, their men of 
religion could draw on the already available reformist ideas of their Indian 
counterparts.”97  Let us look, then, at the sources, as far as can be ascertained, of 
Weismann’s “ideas of religious revival and reform”—in particular those which the 
Deobandi and Barelvi schools claim as intellectual and spirital forbears. 
 
The Waliullahi School . 
What made ‘Abd ur-Rahim’s Delhi mәdrәsәħ unique, among other things, was its 
focus on original sources.  To return to the original purity of the first generation of 
Muslims—and to avoid the pernicious dangers of accretion—knowledge by the ‘alәma 
of the Qur’an and the sunnәt was absolutely essential.  ‘Abd ur-Rahim particularly 
emphasized the study of the latter.  Between the Qur’an and the hәdis, one could find the 
answers to life’s questions, great and small.  Such renewal—for renewal was what it 
was, a striving to restore Islam to its initial spiritual (and, subsequently, political) 
glory—was nothing new; the faith had gone through periods of decline and renewal 
before.  “Islam was always…being re-discovered after being neglected,” one twentieth-
/fourteenth-century Muslim commentator opined.  “…The sense of déjà-vu which 
permeates Muslim society is not so much a reliving as the recreating of the past.”98  
Such a recreation was necessary, ‘Abd ur-Rahim insisted, if the Muslims of India hoped 
to witness a restoration of Muslim power.  The problems facing the ummәt were internal 
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ones, and the answer, as always, lay in the revelation of the Qur’an and the personal 
example and teachings of Muhammad.  It was precisely because Muslims had looked 
elsewhere for answers—to the pagan traditions of their neighbors, to legalisms, to the 
false philosophies of men—that Indian Muslims found themselves in their present 
situation in the first place.  Deobandi scholars would later point to the establishment of 
the Madrasa-e-Rahimiyya as a major stepping-stone toward the “religious emancipation 
of Muslim India” (as well as the “breeding ground” of heroic mujahydin like Syed Ahmad 
and his followers, on whom more later).99 
Foremost among the revivalist ‘alәma in Delhi to be found at the Madrasa-e-
Rahimiyya was Shah Waliullah (d. 1762 AD), ‘Abd ur-Rahim’s son.  Waliullah seems to 
have imbibed an appreciation for original sources both from his father as well as from 
his studies in Medina, a hub for hәdis-research at the time.100 But in order to study the 
original sources, Shah Waliullah contended, one must be able to read and understand 
them.  To this end, he bravely translated the Qur’an into the lingua franca of the time—
Persian—despite the outcry of many of his fellow scholars.  His sons would follow in his 
footsteps in this regard, translating the revelations into Urdu.  This emphasis on 
original sources (called mәnqwlat, or the transmitted [or traditional] disciplines) was 
important, for it would serve later as a major dividing line between Barelvis and 
Deobandis.  Generally speaking, there are two types of Islamic learning to be imbibed at 
a Muslim seminary.  First, there is the aforementioned mәnqulat, including 
commentaries (tәfsir) on the Qur’an, the apostolic traditions (hәdis), and jurisprudence 
(fyqħ).  Second, there is the mәqwlat, or the rational disciplines. These include 
instruction in grammar, logic, philosophy, rhetoric, mathematics, and astronomy.  Shah 
Waliullah considered this second type of Islamic learning (mәqwlat) potentially 
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confusing for students and instead emphasized the first (particularly the Qur’an and the 
hәdis, as previously mentioned).  The Deobandis would follow suit, while the Barelvis 
would lean toward the mәqwlat (plus fyqħ), just as their spiritual predecessors 
(particularly the Khairabadi-Badayuni Group, about which more later) had before them.  
For his emphasis on and elaboration upon the idea that the Qur’an, hәdis, and shәri’at 
were to be the definitive guides to Islamic practice and the attaining of knowledge, Shah 
Waliullah is regarded as the “spiritual and methodological successor” of Ahmad 
Sirhindi; both helped establish a means by which Sufism could be reconciled with a 
scholarly stress on the mәnqwlat (and fyqħ).101  To Shah Waliullah, mәqwlat could never 
be anything more than a means by which to “provide rational proof” to “strengthen 
faith” in what one would learn studying the far more important mәnqwlat.  As such, he 
did not advocate scrapping mәqwlat altogether, but merely using it as a tool in the far 
more valuable study of mәnqwlat.  (He evidently hoped, too, that this synthesis might 
unite Muslims in the face of the Maratha onslaught; it wouldn’t be the last time 
scholarly revivalism failed in an attempt to unify Muslim “schools” in the face of 
common danger—indeed, to some this may be the story of the Deobandi-Barelvi 
rivalry.)102 
Perhaps more importantly, Shah Waliullah propagated several powerful ideas vis-à-
vis the ‘alәma and government.  To more fully appreciate the context of Shah 
Waliullah’s ideas in this regard, however, one must understand the history that the 
revered ‘alym lived through.  When Shah Waliullah was born, the empire of the 
Mughals, Aurengzeb at its head, was still vast and militarily mighty.  But before he was 
even three years old—and in the final days of the emperor’s life—Mughal armies were 
already suffering humiliating defeats in the wake of the Maratha wave.  Over the next 
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several decades, the losses—both military and territorial—continued to pile up.  
Throughout his teens, too, Shah Waliullah would have watched anxiously as various 
claimants for the throne plotted, killed, and wrangled for power.  Then, when he was 
thirty-four, Maratha forces finally reached the Mughal capital—and plundered it.  Just 
two years later, in 1739/1152, the Persian conquistador Nadir Shah sacked the city, too, 
dealing what might be considered the deathblow to the once-hegemonic political entity 
founded by Babur over two centuries before.  Henceforth if the Mughal “empire” 
extended beyond the city of Delhi itself, it did so in name only.  “Not an earthen lamp is 
there where once did chandeliers glow,” lamented one eighteenth/twelfth-century Urdu 
poet on the desolation of once-mighty Delhi.103  To add insult to injury, in 1748/1161 
the founder of the new Afghan dynasty, Ahmad Shah Abdali, raided Delhi, too.  
(Significantly for this narrative, Ahmad Shah later convinced a group of Ahmad 
Sirhindi’s descendants to relocate to Kabul, from where they firmly established the 
Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi line in Afghanistan, enjoyed official patronage, and were granted 
land in Kabul, Kandahar, Jalalabad, Herat, and Kohistan.  The sylsәla was able to gain 
something like pre-eminence among the Pathans of what is today southern Afghanistan 
and northwestern Pakistan, setting the stage for that people’s easy acceptance of 
Waliullahi revivalism and, later, Deobandism).104 
It is easy to see, then, why at least one scholar has dubbed Shah Waliullah the 
“Thinker of Crisis.”105  At the very least, it places his political ideas in historical context.  
As shapers of Waliullah’s political philosophy should be added his time on pilgrimage to 
Mecca, where he likely mixed with such Muslim revolutionaries as Abdul Wahhab and, 
Deobandi historians insist, he “was inspired by a vision to replace the imperialist and 
corrupt administration [of “European imperialism” and “oriental rulers” alike] by 
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establishing a government based on principles of equality and justice.”106  For Shah 
Waliullah, the man who had seen the rapid and violent fall of a once-vast empire, two 
caliphates existed in the world.  There was, first, the “outer caliphate” (xylafәt al-zahyr), 
ruled by a caliph or, under less ideal circumstances, a sultan or some other Muslim 
leader.  Its purpose was practical: to maintain social order in the physical world.  
Second, there was the “inner caliphate” (xylafәt al-batin).  This far more critical realm 
was presided over, crucially, by the ‘alәma.  It was the task of these religious scholars to 
ensure that the sons of Adam and daughters of Eve conducted their lives “in harmony 
with God’s created nature.”  Political decay didn’t occur in a vacuum; no, it was a direct 
result of corruption on the part of the guardian ‘alәma.  Spiritual decay led to political 
decay.  It followed, then, that in order to witness a return of “Muslim” political power in 
the physical world, the ‘alәma must lead the charge.  After all, it must have been the 
scholars’ “neglect in performing their duties properly” that had brought about the 
decline in the “Muslim” political position in the first place.  Shah Waliullah would 
identify some of these areas of neglect, pointing his finger at (among other alleged 
scholarly follies) opportunism, claiming a monopoly on truth, unjustified severity, 
misplaced intellectualism, and disunity.107   
Little did he know, surely, that he was to be the “grandfather” of a whole host of 
revivalist Islamic movements that would crisscross the subcontinent and, eventually, 
much of the world, though he did consider himself “a champion of political Islam.”108  
Notes one Muslim historian: “…Shah Walyullah appeared as the saviour of Muslim 
culture and religion,” “a great reformer of law, morals and politics” who “paved the way 
for the great Jihad movement against the Sikhs and later against the British rule.”109  
His ideas on the role of the ‘alәma in the purification of the ummәt (including the 
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preservation of Islamic knowledge in times of crisis and the impartation of that 
knowledge within the community of the learned), the restoration of Muslim political 
greatness, and the maintenance of the Islamic state would be seized later by the 
Deobandis, not to mention a whole host of other movements.  The dar ul’alwm at 
Deoband would later claim to be the “inheritor” of the “rich legacy” of Shah 
Waliullah;110 its scholars would even interpret the time of his birth—almost exactly one 
century after the advent of the British on the subcontinent—as a token signifying that 
his life was to be dedicated to “the purpose of opposing [the British].”111 
The great man’s spiritual successor was his son, Shah Abdul Aziz (d. 1824 AD), 
who, together with his brothers, studied, taught, and preached in Delhi, enlarging the 
Waliullahi school and serving students from all over India and Central Asia.  In the 
tradition of their father and grandfather, Shah Abdul Aziz and his brothers stressed the 
study of hәdis, and their translation of the Qur’an into Urdu has already been mentioned.  
But perhaps Shah Abdul Aziz’s greatest tool for disseminating knowledge and judgment 
based on shәri’at was through the many fәtawa that he authored.  The translation of the 
Qur’an into Urdu and, especially, the issuance of fәtawa in answer to the queries of the 
faithful marked a turning point in the relationship of the ‘alәma with the people.  
Heretofore the norm had been for juridical decisions to be issued within the context of 
the court (i.e. by a mufti for the benefit of a qazi, and all within the framework of the 
state, thereby excluding many issues of everyday concern for the masses), or at least to 
be asked, answered, and circulated among the learned; even Shah Waliullah had acted 
according to this standard.  With Shah Abdul Aziz at the head of the Waliullahi school, 
however, scholarly knowledge and interest gained, in the words of Metcalf, a “more 
popular focus”—a perhaps not surprising development given the political and social 
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changes then taking place in India.  The new British power was then engaged in what 
appeared to be a relentless swallowing up of  “vast stretches of the Indian countryside.” 
In 1803/1218, Delhi fell in all but name when the British replaced the Marathas as 
protectors of the Mughal emperor.  Over time, these aliens took over the government 
(and land revenues) and the courts, seemed to favor a rising Hindu business community 
over the old Muslim elite, allegedly wiped out the revenue-free grants enjoyed by 
Muslim religious institutions in Bengal, and disbanded local armies so that they might 
be replaced by British-trained forces.  In the midst of such upheaval, Muslims of all 
classes appear to have increasingly turned in on themselves as a community—and the 
fәtwa provided a means for preserving cultural identity and living religion in the 
absence of the state apparatus.  Of course, by using fәtawa in such a way, the ‘alәma had 
assumed the role of popular guide.  This was somewhat new, and it was perhaps Shah 
Abdul Aziz’s most lasting legacy.112  Shah Abdul Aziz also inherited and further 
developed Shah Waliullah’s hostility towards the British, allegedly claiming that the 
foreigners would not be satisfied in merely “taking” the Muslim’s “world, but[would] 
also seize [their] religion” (italics added).113 
Muhammad Ishaq (d. 1846 AD), Shah Abdul Aziz’s grandson (from a daughter) and 
a master of hәdis, oversaw a continued spread of Waliullah’s reform movement before 
relocating permanently to the Hijaz in the early 1840s/late 1250s.114  Before his 
departure, however, he instituted, according to ‘Ubaidullah Sindhi, the agenda he had 
inherited from Shah Abdul Aziz.  The general plan, evidently tracing back to Shah 
Waliullah, might be broken down (as Faruqi does) into two main parts: first, it called for 
the strict adherence of the ummәt to the Hanafi school of Islamic law (necessitating, of 
course, a core social and political role for the‘alәma).  Second, it proposed an alliance, 
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however ambiguously defined, with the sultans of Ottoman Turkey.  The first aspect of 
Muhammad Ishaq’s agenda dealt with the role and power of the ‘alәma in South Asian 
Muslim society.  The second carried implicitly anti-British (and pan-Islamic) meaning.  
Even the great man’s departure to the Hijaz, often depicted as a simple emigration to 
Islam’s “Holy Land,” was actually an attempt to establish contact with the Ottoman 
authorities; indeed, it was in Turkey that Muhammad Ishaq died in 1846/1262.115 
But he left behind a remarkable circle of students—a core group whose actions 
would shape the destinies of millions of Muslims across South Asia.  This group 
included Ishaq’s successor, Abdul-Ghani Naqshbandi (d. 1878 AD), sәyyid Nazir 
Muhaddis of Delhi (d. 1902 AD), Imdadullah (d. 1899 AD), and sәyyid Ahmad Khan of 
Raebareli (d. 1831 AD).  Along with this core group, Muhammad Ishaq’s associate and 
friend, Mamluk ‘Ali, would also play a pivotal role in coming events.  Indeed, Mamluk 
‘Ali had been left as the chairman of a four-person committee, organized by Muhammad 
Ishaq, to continue the propagation of his aforementioned agenda.  It was in following 
Mamluk ‘Ali’s example, too, that the man’s distant nephew, one Muhammad Qasim 
Nanautawi, journeyed to Delhi to pursue his education.  In Delhi, Muhammad Qasim 
befriended a fellow pupil, Rashid Ahmad Gangohi, and together they studied under both 
Abdul-Ghani Naqshbandi and Mamluk ‘Ali, among others.  Under the latter they would 
adopt Muhammad Ishaq’s two-pronged program as their own and eventually 
institutionalize much of it within the school they would found in Deoband.116  They 
would also become xәlifәħ of Imdadullah (indeed, many among the dar ul’alwm’s 
founding generation would count themselves his disciples), who himself had been 
Mamluk ‘Ali’s student, and who had similarly imbibed Muhammad Ishaq’s agenda 
therefrom.117 
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Another defining movement should be mentioned here: that of sәyyid Ahmad Khan 
of Raebareli.  Ahmad Khan, who was at least in part, as mentioned above, a product of 
the Waliullahi school, chose military jyhad as his method of cleansing the subcontinent 
(in contrast to Shah Abdul Aziz’s gradualist emphasis on teaching, the dissemination of 
knowledge, and right practice; Deobandis insist, however, that Shah Abdul Aziz not 
only supported sәyyid Ahmad, but personally encouraged and inspired him in his efforts 
as well).  After years imbibing the teachings of scholars and shixs in Delhi, gathering 
followers across northern India, and learning and teaching in Arabia, sәyyid Ahmad set 
up a base of operations on India’s northwestern frontier with around a thousand fighters 
drawn from his tens of thousands of disciples.118  From here, he launched an ultimately 
unsuccessful jyhad against the Sikh state of Ranjit Singh.  Today Deobandi historians 
are quick to point out that sәyyid Ahmad’s targeting of the Sikh polity in the Punjab was 
motivated first and foremost not by an animosity to the adherents of the faith of Guru 
Nanak at all; no, it was an anti-British move.  Their contention is that Ranjit Singh had 
only been made “governor of the Punjab” with the consent of the British—and that his 
government had gone on to steal Muslim land, kill Muslim scholars, and rape Muslim 
women.  This was why sәyyid Ahmad had chosen to throw his jyhadis against the Sikh 
state first—wholly motivated by a determination to “take steps against the British.”119 
Ahmad’s exploits—first as a student under the Waliullah family, then as a 
cavalryman in the band of Amir Khan, then as a Sufi shix (with both Waliullah’s fiery 
grandson Muhammad Ismail [d. 1831 AD] and Abdul Aziz’s son-in-law Abdul Hayy 
[d. 1828 AD] acknowledging him as their pir), then as a pan-Indian missionary, then as 
a haji, and finally as a jyhad-waging mujahyd—are well-known.  What may be less 
recognized is that sәyyid Ahmad’s activist movement continued through his successor in 
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jyhad, Nasiruddin Dihlawi (and others; see endnote after next paragraph), who would 
later initiate Imdadullah into his Sufi order.  Thus it was through this Sufi line (sәyyid 
Ahmad—Nasiruddin—Imdadullah) that the two most prominent founders of the 
Deoband school, Muhammad Qasim and Rashid Ahmad, themselves traced their 
spiritual lineages.120  In addition, several of the dar ul’alwm’s founding figures boasted 
relatives who had fought with sәyyid Ahmad on the frontier.121  Over the last century-
and-a-half, prominent Deobandis have continued to invoke the memory of sәyyid Ahmad 
(for one especially obvious example, see pp. 408-409).  In addition to this first 
“genealogical” line to the Deobandis, sәyyid Ahmad was able to establish, during his time 
in the northwest, a second line: through the very powerful Akhund of Swat, Abdul 
Ghaffur.  The latter took to the Waliullahi emphasis on mәnqwlat and extra-dәrgaħ 
religious practice and generally helped spread the great Delhi ‘alym’s revivalist ideas 
among his people, where they were warmly received.  Thus sәyyid Ahmad of Raebareli, 
thanks in large part to his association with Akhund Ghaffur, was able to lay the 
groundwork for the future dominance of the Deobandi school of thought among the 
Pathans (especially among the eastern tribes) of northwestern Pakistan and, later, 
southern Afghanistan.122 
sәyyid Ahmad’s headquarters in the northwest were at Sittana (about three miles 
northwest of present-day Haripur in Pakistan’s Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province—and 
now completely covered by the Indus-fed waters of the great Tarbela Dam).  After his 
death in battle in 1831/1246, two of his disciples (who’d survived because they’d been 
sent to Kashmir on a diplomatic mission) continued the Sittana-based jyhad movement 
to destroy the unbelievers and establish a true Islamic state.  The first of these disciples 
was Qasim Panipati, who went on to fuel the idea that sәyyid Ahmad had not, in fact, 
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perished—but had been preserved by God and would return; this inspired many of his 
followers (particularly in Patna, an erstwhile base on the plains) to make the long 
journey to Sittana, where Qasim Panipati was engaged in organizing a regrouped 
military force.  The second disciple was none other than Nasiruddin, mentioned 
previously as sәyyid Ahmad’s successor (and through whom the Deobandi fathers trace 
their spiritual lineages); instead of remaining at Sittana, he traveled back to the plains 
and in 1835/1250 led another force against the Sikhs.  This force was waylaid for six 
years in Sindh, however, only to answer a call by the Afghans for assistance in their 
struggle against the British; about fifty survived the fighting—and these were all 
executed by the puppet king installed by the British in Afghanistan, Shuja Shah.  
Meanwhile, a council of sorts in Patna, initially led by one Shah Muhammad Husain, 
continued to run operations from the plains, recruiting fighters and clandestinely 
sending supplies and cash for the camp at Sittana.  For decades, the Sittana group (or 
“Hindustani Fanatics,” as they were known by some of the locals and the British; the 
latter also simply referred to them, erroneously, as “Wahhabis”), with assistance from 
the Patna group, continued to wage war from the frontier.  The movement would later 
play a prominent role in the British debacle at Ambeyla Pass and be linked to various 
assassinations and assassination attempts.123  The legacy of sәyyid Ahmad within the 
context of the Deobandi-Barelvi rivalry should not be sidenoted, as it injected into 
Deobandism’s very roots the active spirit of jyhad and initiated a tradition of militarism 
based in the subcontinent’s Pathan northwest. 
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The Farangi Mahalis and the Khairabadi-Badayuni Group . 
Around the same time Shah Waliullah was active in Delhi, another movement was 
taking root to the east, in Lucknow (the capital of Awadh, an ascendant successor state 
to the Mughal polity).  Here the ‘alәma of Farangi Mahal, under the leadership of Abdul 
‘Ali (respectfully known as bәhәr ul’alwm, or “Ocean of Knowledge”), similarly strove to 
preserve religious learning in an era of waning patronage, at the same time mirroring 
their Delhi contemporaries’ efforts at emphasizing the proper relationship between the 
religious scholars and the temporal ruler.  A crucial difference in the Farangi Mahalis’ 
approach, however, was their emphasis, not on mәnqwlat, but on mәqwlat; indeed, Shah 
Abdul Aziz would criticize the Farangi Mahalis for their perceived ignorance when it 
came to the Qur’an and hәdis, alleging that their time was misguidedly engaged instead 
in the study of such free-thinking philosophers as Ibn ‘Arabi and al-Razi.124  The 
mәqwlat emphasis was especially marked in the Farangi Mahalis’ creation of the dәrs-e-
nyžami, a standardized curriculum that underscored the rational disciplines (in order to 
prepare students to be administrators within the state apparatus, argues Robinson).  An 
important ‘alym named Fazl-e-Haq Khairabadi (d. 1861 AD) later adopted the Farangi 
Mahali emphasis on mәqwlat, as opposed to Shah Waliullah’s emphasis on the original 
sources like the Qur’an or hәdis.  (The Deobandis would later adopt the Farangi Mahali 
dәrs-e-nyžami, too, but would greatly augment its hәdis offerings.)  And perhaps no other 
family in northern India, apart from the Farangi Mahalis, had a greater impact on the 
spread of this emphasis than the Khairabadis.125  A third family, that of the Badayunis, 
might justly be combined with the latter and more accurately be identified as the 
Khairabadi-Badayuni Group.  By the second half of the 1800s/1200s the Khairabadi-
Badayuni Group had distanced itself significantly from the Delhi scholars, thus laying 
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the groundwork for the future Barelvi-Deobandi schism.126  While Shah Waliullah’s 
espousal of mәnqwlat would be taken up later by the Deobandis, then, the Barelvis’ 
emphasis, following the example of the Lucknow scholars and the Khairabadi-Badayuni 
Group, fell upon the mәqwlat.  (In truth, these emphases, highlighted significantly by 
modern scholars, may have been less important than the more base rivalry between 
different scholar-groups over power and influence, certainly not an uncommon 
phenomenon within the domains of both academia and theology.  In any case, the split 
and subsequent coalescence around these two groups set the stage for the more 
pronounced Deobandi-Barelvi schism of the next generation.) 
Both of these phenomena—the establishment of the Waliullahi School in Delhi and 
the Farangi Mahalis in Lucknow (then that of the Khairabadi-Badayuni Group offshoot 
from the latter)—not only signaled a type of regenerative effort, but also bore witness of 
the role the religious leadership, and particularly the ‘alәma, potentially could play even 
without the patronage of princes, kings, and emperors.  It should be noted that there yet 
remained a few enclaves of Muslim power on the subcontinent where religious scholars 
might obtain direct patronage, like the courts at Awadh, Rampur, and Kabul.  And while 
opportunities for employment in the courts on the plains would mostly shrivel up by the 
mid-nineteenth century AD, the mәdrәsәħ-trained qazis among the Pathans of the 
northwest continued to find patronage within the Afghan state into the twentieth.127 
While the ‘alәma in the cities, near the seats of fading power, strove for renewal, the 
landed Sufi pirs, based around the shrines, also asserted themselves politically; for them 
the struggle was against local leaders who no longer enjoyed the protection of the 
fading Mughal empire.  This rise in local political power and influence naturally 
propped up their own religious authority as spiritual guides.  Picking up where their 
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predecessors from the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries AD had left off, these Sufi 
mәshayx grasped political power as soon as it became available in the absence of imperial 
authority.  The religious scholarship in the cities and towns thus occurred at the same 
time as the renewal of the political power of the pirs rurally.  In the northwest, for 
example, among the Pathan tribes of what is today southern Afghanistan and 
northwestern Pakistan, the pirs became especially powerful.  Among the western 
Pathans, the pirs continued to be used, by virtue of their socio-religious (not to mention 
political) position on the regional level, within the framework of the Afghan state; and 
in a sort of feudal arrangement, the Kabul court even paid some of the pirs among the 
eastern Pathans (technically located outside of the geographical boundaries of the king’s 
practical, temporal authority) in exchange for their contribution of fighting men when 
called upon.  Throughout the eighteenth, nineteenth, and some of the twentieth 
centuries AD, pirs were used by the Afghan state for a wide variety of purposes, from 
mobilizing opposition to Chinese incursions into Turkestan in the 1700s/1100s and 
establishing a standardized legal code for the country in the 1800s/1200s to creating 
and enforcing law at the local level and recording births, marriages, and deaths as 
official registrars.  In the 1830s/1240s-1250s, for example, Afghan ruler Dost 
Muhammad called upon Abdul Ghaffur (later famously known as the previously 
mentioned Akhund of Swat) to help recruit soldiers to fight in his war against the Sikhs 
of the Punjab.  In this the latter was successful and was, in turn, granted large tracts of 
land.  But by the late 1840s/mid-1260s the Akhund of Swat had established his own 
independent Islamic state in the Swat valley, propping up his chosen әmir (Akbar Shah, 
who had acted as a secretary to sәyyid Ahmad of Raebareli) for almost a decade before, 
upon the әmir’s passing, he personally took over command.128  And though, by the early 
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twentieth century AD, the Afghan state from the west had begun to significantly 
encroach upon these local religious leaders’ political sway (especially during the reign of 
Abdur Rehman [r. 1879-1901 AD], when Afghanistan experienced a major increase in 
centralization and bureaucratization), not to mention the ever-encroaching British from 
the east, the pirs continued to weild considerable power.129   
It is perhaps easy to see, then, how Barelvism, born of a Khairabadi-Badayuni 
tradition less focused on the puritan revivalist study of the Qur’an and hәdis, would 
(generally speaking) eventually envelop the more syncretist Sufi pirs of South Asia (with 
rare, Akhund of Swat-esque exceptions, of course), too, in opposition to the orthodox, 
mәnqwlat-focused Deobandis. 
 
Shi’a Inroads in South Asia . 
Another look at Awadh is warranted here.  Like Bengal, Awadh was de facto 
independent by the early eighteenth century AD.  Though most of its Muslims, like the 
Farangi Mahalis, were Sunni, its rulers were not—they adhered, rather, to Shi’a Islam 
(as did Bengal’s, for a time).  Throughout the century in question, Shi’a ‘alәma from 
what is now Iran and Iraq migrated to Awadh, fleeing the instability then rocking 
Central Asia and the Middle East.  Safavid Iran—where the government had been their 
patron, lavishing a monetary endowment upon the ‘alәma and enforcing sectarian 
favoritism by the barrel of the gun—had fallen, and uncertainty plagued many Shi’a 
scholars in Iraq’s shrine cities, too.  The result for Awadh, where Shi’a Islam was the 
state religion, was what one scholar has described as a “constant influx” of Shi’a ‘alәma 
to the court and the region at large.130  The Awadhi state would decline rapidly by the 
end of the century, but the influence of the Shi’ism that it helped more firmly establish 
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in South Asia would live on, with major consequences.  In the context of the Deobandi-
Barelvi rivalry, the presence of a significant population of Shi’a on the subcontinent 
always gave the two schools a “bigger fish to fry,” so to speak; Deobandi thinkers from 
Muhammad Qasim to Ashraf ‘Ali Thanawi and Barelvi guiding lights like Ahmad Riza 
Khan and Naimuddin Moradabadi saved their sharpest barbs, perhaps, for this 
particular sect (one might argue that this specific designation should be attributed not 
to the Shi’a but rather to the Ahmadis, but that is another discussion).  The presence of 
millions of Shi’a contributed, too (after the Iranian Revolution of 1979/1399), to the 
organization of militant (mostly Deobandi) anti-Shi’a outfits—groups that would 
subsequently set their sights on Barelvis, too. 
 
The ‘alәma,  the mәshayx,  and 1857/1273 . 
The half-century following the Company takeover of Delhi witnessed the rapid 
consolidation of British power on the subcontinent and the fall of the last mighty 
indigenous kingdoms to these foreign invaders.  The Marathas fell in 1818/1233, Sindh 
was taken in 1843/1259, and by 1849/1265 even the Sikh kingdom in the Punjab had 
fallen under the Company’s banner.  With these victories came a decreased need to rely 
on local alliances—with the result that the British absorbed some of this territory, too, 
sometimes in violation of treaty arrangements.  The British annexation of Awadh in 
1856/1272 was a particularly grievous act in the eyes of many Indians.  One 
contemporary Muslim witness remembered, for example, that this move on the part of 
the Company “was a cause of dissatisfaction to everybody, and gave rise to a general 
conviction that the Honorable East India Company had violated treaties” (though this 
particular commentator did not believe the Awadh annexation was itself a root cause of 
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the following year’s “revolt”).131  The annexation would have been especially difficult to 
swallow for Muslims, since Awadh’s government, as mentioned previously, was a 
Muslim one.  One third of the Bengal army—among whom the 1857/1273 uprising 
fiercely manifested itself—actually hailed from Awadh.  Such dominance, augmented by 
what were seen as flagrant violations of the Company’s legal obligations, “loosed,” in the 
words of Stein, “a deepening anxiety at the core of Indian civil society.”132  These 
military and political triumphs were coupled with what many Hindustanis regarded as 
British arrogance, as missionaries, administrators, traders, and soldiers seemed to be 
attempting to make Englishmen out of Indians.  There was also an undercurrent of 
resentment among both the Indian peasantry and the alienated landed gentry over the 
new British system’s perceived facilitation of the “unmitigated usury” of a new class of 
moneylenders (dubbed bәndia ka raj, or “rule of moneylender-traders”).133  Indeed, 
almost a century later Jawaharlal Nehru would trace the very “beginnings of the new 
Hindu-Muslim problem” to the loss of land and position in Bengal by the Muslim 
landed gentry to a mostly Hindu monied and business class in the years after Company 
rule had been established there.134  Similarly, Faruqi blamed the “uneven and 
unbalanced development” of Hindu and Muslim middle classes, beginning in Bengal (i.e. 
the growth of a Hindu middle class concurrent with “the absence of the growth” of a 
Muslim one).135  Perhaps the verse of renowned Urdu poet Mir Taqi Mir, writing in the 
1700s AD, could have applied equally in the minds of many Muslims a century later: 
“men of means and money have joined the beggars’ fold.”136  Thus there was room by 
1857/1273 for discontent on all sides—but, the argument could be made, especially 
from within the Muslim camp. 
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The conflict came to a head in 1857/1273, when many of the sepoys—the backbone 
of British power on the subcontinent—revolted, followed by a general civil uprising 
that spread to much of India (though mostly in the north) and lasted into 1858/1274.  
For a time the revolt looked like it would succeed—and the British would be pushed out 
of India forever.  In the end (and after the loss of much life), the “Mutiny” was 
unsuccessful, thanks in large part to the Company’s local allies.  After the uprising (or, 
according to Indian nationalists, India’s “first war of independence”) was over, both the 
British and their Indian subordinates began looking for answers.  One result of the 
failed rebellion was that the Mughal line was finally severed, its last emperor, an old 
man, shipped off to a Burmese prison, and his sons murdered.  Another was that 
Company rule in India ended, as the responsibility for the administration of the 
subcontinent was shifted directly to the Crown.  (In many ways East India Company 
rule had been indirectly administered by the Crown, too—a point all too often 
forgotten—but now the Company had been removed from the political landscape 
altogether.) 
The Deobandi-Barelvi rivalry is in part characterized by a contest over the memory 
of 1857-1858/1273-1274.  Both schools lay claim to having played a major—even 
leading—role in the uprising, despite the haziness of the historical evidence or the 
misgivings of Western scholars.  Historians from both traditions proudly proclaim that 
“the historic revolt of 1857 was led by the ‘alәma,” though they argue over which ‘alәma 
played leading roles.137   The Barelvis single out “their” political and spiritual 
“forefathers,” particularly Fazl-e-Haq Khairabadi, Fazl-e-Rasul Badayuni, and even Riza 
‘Ali, as heroes of the period (and, in the case of Khairabadi, as the leader and chief 
instigator of the revolt itself).  Meanwhile, the Deobandis celebrate the alleged actions 
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of those whom they consider their political and spiritual forebears, especially Imdadullah 
(though Barelvis, significantly, today claim that he was “one of ours,” and that it was his 
two students who went astray), Rashid Ahmad Gangohi, and Muhammad Qasim 
Nanautawi.  The idea that a jyhad had been proclaimed against the British by the 
spiritual leaders of South Asia’s Muslim community held sway for some time after the 
Mutiny had been suppressed (and still does, among both Barelvi and Deobandi 
historians), especially in the weeks and months immediately following the fighting.  
Both traditions, however, consider the same fәtwa to mark the beginning of the 
1857/1273 “war of independence”: that of Fazl-e-Haq Khairabadi.   
But there was another fәtwa, issued a half-century earlier, that is likewise important 
in this regard, and it is here that we must begin.  Indeed, some scholars have identified 
the seeds of 1857/1273 in this 1803/1218 fәtwa issued by Shah Abdul Aziz, in which 
Shah Waliullah’s son characterizes north India as no longer dar ul-yslam: 
 
In this city [Delhi] the Imam al-Muslimin wields no authority.  The real 
power rests with Christian officers.  There is no check on them, and the 
promulgation of the commands of [disbelievers] means that in 
administration and justice, in matters of law and order, in the domain of 
trade, finance, and collection of revenues—everywhere the [disbelievers] 
are in power.  Yes, there are certain Islamic rituals, e.g. Friday and Id 
prayers, әzan [the call to prayer] and cow slaughter, with which they 
brook no interference, but the very root of all these rituals is of no value 
to them.  They demolish mosques without the least hesitation, and no 
Muslim or any źymi [“dhimmi”] can enter into the city or its suburbs but 
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with their permission.  It is in their own interests if they do not object to 
the travelers and traders to visit the city.  On the other hand, 
distinguished persons like Shuja ul-Mulk and Vilayati Begum cannot 
dare visit the city without their permission.  From here to Calcutta, the 
Christians are in complete control.  There is no doubt that in 
principalities like Hyderabad, Rampur, Lucknow, etc., they have left the 
administration in the hands of the local authorities, but it is because they 
have accepted their lordship and submitted to their authority…138   
 
Faruqi describes this fәtwa as “a landmark in the history of India in general and in 
that of Muslim India in particular.  It amounted to a call to religiously conscientious 
Muslims to mobilize themselves, in the absence of any powerful Muslim warlord, under 
popular leadership and rise in defiance of the foreign power.”139  Deobandi historians of 
today likewise place great emphasis on this particular juridical pronouncement, 
attributing many later movements (from sәyyid Ahmad’s “Balakot Movement” and the 
1857/1273 Mutiny to the Silk Letters Conspiracy and the anti-British independence 
movement in general) to Shah Abdul Aziz’s fәtawa.140  But later scholars have argued 
that a stance like Faruqi’s erroneously places the fәtwa’s initiative too decidedly at Shah 
Abdul Aziz’s feet.  In reality, they contend, the learned ‘alym was merely responding to a 
question, in the manner of a mufti, not making a statement originating with himself.  
Others disagree for a different reason: that the fәtawa being issued during this period 
were actually “ambiguous” when it came to India’s political status; their purpose was to 
help people live righteous lives despite the less-than-ideal circumstances then extant on 
the subcontinent, and thus Shah Abdul Aziz’s 1803/1218 fәtwa must be read in context.  
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Moreover, if he had been calling for war, would he not have identified a neighboring 
Muslim state from which jyhad should be launched (or a Muslim ruler to whom the 
faithful might swear political allegiance), as Muslim law required?  A third argument 
posits that Shah Abdul Aziz’s fәtwa was actually written so that Muslims, many of 
whom were suffering in terms of livelihood, could gain in that sphere, for many of the 
economic restrictions by which the ummәt was expected to abide within a condition of 
dar ul-yslam (prohibitions related to employment, interest earnings, and slavery, for 
example) were lifted within dar ul-hәrb.141   
Whatever the ‘alym’s intentions, the fәtwa makes evident that, at least for Shah 
Abdul Aziz—one of the most powerful and influential of the ‘alәma in the world at the 
time—the British presence was more than just a serious concern; it was to be regarded 
as a call to action.  The fәtwa is especially thick with expressions lamenting the loss of 
Muslim political power—indeed, on almost every line; though Shah Abdul Aziz 
acknowledges Muslim freedom to carry out worship and ritual, political “control” has 
been wrested from the faithful in every meaningful respect.  Political power was the 
issue.  Though the fәtwa may not be Faruqi’s “watershed,” it certainly merits attention 
as a gauge, so to speak, on the attitude of arguably the most influential ‘alym 
(particularly in terms of the movements he inspired) in Indian history.  Perhaps most 
importantly, many Muslim historians (and especially those of the Deoband school) trace 
the beginning of India’s “freedom struggle” directly to the 1803/1218 Azizi fәtwa (and, 
consequently, interpret the jyhad of sәyyid Ahmad of Raebareli almost thirty years before 
the Mutiny as the first attempt to execute Shah Abdul Aziz’s edict).142  Other Muslim-
led uprisings (of the Faraizis in Bengal in 1804/1219, by the soldiers at Vellore in 
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1806/1221, of the Faraizis again throughout the 1830s and 40s AD) were similarly 
interpreted.143 
 Company employee (and later Sir) Sayyid Ahmad Khan, in his 1860/1276 essay The 
Causes of the Indian Revolt, rejected the notion that a call for jyhad had played any serious 
role in the uprising of 1857/1273, even resurrecting the memory of the famous mujahyd 
Muhammad Ismail (the grandson of Shah Waliullah and the chief lieutenant of sәyyid 
Ahmad of Raebareli).  Sir Sayyid’s argument was that when Muhammad Ismail had 
called for volunteers to wage jyhad, it hadn’t been to fight the Christian foreigners from 
the British Isles—no, it had been to destroy the Sikh state in the Punjab.  (Many 
Barelvis go one step further, insisting that, far from being anti-British mujahydin, sәyyid 
Ahmad of Raebareli and Muhammad Ismail were actually working for the British; the 
same accusation is directed later towards both Rashid Ahmad and Muhammad Qasim, 
who “from the start” actually “fought for the British” as agents of the Empire).144  If 
jyhad against the British-led government hadn’t been lawful then, Sir Sayyid posited, 
why would it suddenly be so now?  Later Deobandi historians, however, would 
themselves insist that this was not the case—that, in fact, Shah Abdul Aziz himself had 
requested that sәyyid Ahmad join forces with ‘Ali Khan (who had allied with Maharaja 
Jaswant Rao) to fight against the British.  It was only six years later, after ‘Ali Khan’s 
plans to come to an agreement with the British were uncovered, that sәyyid Ahmad split 
with the bandit chief.  His subsequent jyhad against the Sikhs should not be 
disassociated with the struggle against the British either, for, we are informed, the Sikh 
state was itself “an ally of British imperialism.”145  Whatever the truth of the matter, Sir 
Sayyid’s 1860/1276 tract confirms that, at least after the revolt had already begun, 
“certain wicked persons” used the call to jyhad to rile up “ignorant people”—with the 
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result that “large numbers” answered.  In other words, jyhad actually did motivate a 
significant number in northern India to war against the Company, even if it hadn’t been 
one of the initial causes of the revolt (and even if Sir Sayyid himself was loathe to admit 
it).  Deobandi historians claim that a quarter of all those killed by Company forces 
during the course of the revolt were ‘alәma (the figure given is 51,200)—and that five 
hundred ‘alәma were hanged in Delhi alone.146 
Even in the face of these debates over the role of a fәtwa calling for jyhad in the 
Revolt of 1857/1273, the Barelvis unstintingly point to the fәtwa of Fazl-e-Haq 
Khairabadi (as do the Deobandis, though for different reasons) as the uprising’s true 
commencement.  Fazl-e-Haq allegedly played the leading role in the issuance of this 
fәtwa calling for jyhad against the British.  Almost three dozen Islamic scholars and 
Sufis in Delhi affixed their names to this famous ruling, including several of the 
Deobandi founding fathers (hence its importance to them).  Almost a century later, 
during the 1940s/1360s—at the height of pre-Partition nationalist politics in India—
many within the Barelvi leadership began to publicly trace “their” role in the 
independence movement to the fәtwa of Fazl-e-Haq Khairabadi (“Fazl-e-Haq Khairabadi 
was [a Barelvi],” one ‘alym of the Barelvis’ largest Indian mәdrәsәħ informed the author, 
handling a copy of Fazl-e-Haq’s famous autobiography baGi hyndwstan, required reading 
for hundreds of the school’s students).  There are multiple problems with this, not least 
of which lies in the fact that Fazl-e-Haq was, at the time, in the employ of the British 
(the East India Company) and, reportedly, “had hardly any sympathy for the freedom 
fighters.”147  In any case, Barelvi recollection of Fazl-e-Haq’s judgment clearly 
illustrates the movement’s preferred political pedigree, whatever its historical accuracy.   
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Intellectually and philosophically, however, Fazl-e-Haq should certainly be 
considered a forefather of the Barelvi movement, for several reasons.  First, he was 
perhaps the strongest critic of the “Wahhabis” during his lifetime (sometimes applying 
the term to men whom the Deobandis revere as their intellectual and spiritual forbears), 
a role Barelvis would later see themselves as assuming (and often they, too, would label 
Deobandis “Wahhabis”).  Second, he had famously written much against the idea of 
ymkan-e-nažir (the possibility that God could create, if He so wished, another prophet 
equal to Muhammad; his own position he called ymtina’-e-nažir : “the impossibility of an 
equal”), in opposition, again, to scholars that Deobandis would later consider their own 
religious forefathers (specifically Muhammad Ismail).  Decades later, when the debate 
heated up once again, Fazl-e-Haq’s ideas were taken up and given voice by Ahmad Riza 
Khan’s father.  Ahmad Riza was in turn influenced by his father as he, too, adopted more 
or less the same position on the matter.148  After the quelling of the “Mutiny,” Fazl-e-
Haq Khairabadi was arrested by the British, put on trial (famously) in Lucknow, and 
sent to prison on the Andaman Islands, where he died.   
It should be noted that while many Western, Barelvi, and even some Deobandi 
scholars credit Fazl-e-Haq Khairabadi as the chief instigator of the fәtwa against the 
British in 1857/1273, others point to Deobandi predecessor Shah Abdul Qadir 
Ludhianvi, who had been serving as Shahi Imam of the Punjab since 1800/1215.  
According to these voices, it was the venerable mwlana out of Ludhiana who was 
actually the first to issue a fәtwa in 1857/1273 against the Company Bahadur.149  And 
Shah Abdul Qadir Ludhianvi was no stranger when it came to anti-British 
machinations, either; he’d previously been involved in efforts to rid Afghanistan of the 
British presence, and several past Afghan rulers could be counted as his personal 
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disciples.  To this day, his descendants insist that he not only issued a juridical ruling 
against the British before Fazl-e-Haq Khairabadi, but actually led the fighting in and 
around Ludhiana against the European menace, successfully driving the foreigners out 
of the city and holding it for a considerable period.  An engraving on the side of the 
mosque in old Ludhiana, erected in the 1890s/1310s, bears an inscription celebrating 
his deeds, including, among other things, the following:  “He led the forces in the 
Punjab for the freedom movement in 1857.  British troops were forced out from 
Ludhiana.  He is remembered as one of the greatest freedom fighters.”  His successor’s 
successor’s successor: Habib-ur Rehman Ludhianvi, one of the most renowned Deobandi 
“freedom fighters” in the years leading up to independence (about whom more later).150 
Alongside the towering figure of Fazl-e-Haq Khairabadi, Barelvis remember Fazl-e-
Rasul Badayuni—and even Barelvi founder Ahmad Riza Khan’s own grandfather, Riza 
‘Ali Khan, is spoken of in terms of 1857/1273 and its aftermath.  According to one 
story, told by Zafaruddin Bihari, despite the “atrocities” being perpetrated by the British 
in the aftermath of the “Mutiny,” unlike so many others Riza ‘Ali refused to abandon his 
home for “the village”; the same applied to his daily routine, which involved prayer five 
times a day at the local mәsjyd.  Bihari notes that one day several Englishmen showed up 
at the mosque with the intent to “beat up” (pyTna) any Muslims they found there.  
When they looked inside, peering “this way and that,” they saw nothing but an empty 
room, despite the fact that Riza ‘Ali was there, engaged in prayer, at the same time.  
God had thus made Ahmad Raza Khan’s grandfather invisible to his would-be 
attackers.151  Sanyal attributes accounts such as this one to Barelvis’ attempts to 
establish both Riza ‘Ali’s piety as well as his “distance from the British;”152 indeed, the 
story paints Riza ‘Ali as the latter’s “fierce opponent.”153  Incidentally, Riza ‘Ali was also 
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a “fierce opponent” of sәyyid Ahmad of Raebareli and, especially, his disciple Muhammad 
Ismail, and even urged one of his own disciples, Muhammad ‘Ali Khan, to write a book 
disputing Ismail’s teachings, which Muhammad ‘Ali did—certainly a precursor to the 
Deobandi-Barelvi rivalry.154 
Meanwhile, the Deobandis celebrate the alleged exploits of Rashid Ahmad Gangohi 
and Muhammad Qasim Nanotwi, among others.  According to Deobandi historians, 
both of these ‘alәma affixed their names to Fazl-e-Haq Khairabadi’s 1857/1273 fәtwa 
calling for jyhad against the British, as well as an 1856/1272 pronouncement (signed by 
the “remaining ‘alәma,” i.e. those who had not been killed or chased away by the British 
or their stooges) that had called for “steps” to be taken against the East India Company.  
According to the Deobandi narrative, some of the ‘alәma at the 1856/1272 meeting had 
voiced concern about the plausibility of success; after all, their numbers were so small 
compared to the might of the British.  It was at this juncture that young Muhammad 
Qasim is reported to have leapt up and asked, “Are our numbers smaller than that of the 
heroes [Gażi] of Badr?”  He had thus invoked the 1,200-year-old memory of a key 
battle—a crucial turning point for the early Muslims, in fact—in which the Prophet’s 
forces had bested a far greater army; this victory over a numerical superiority had 
reversed the fortune of the Muslims.  Upon hearing Muhammad Qasim’s words, “the 
fire of martyrdom was lit in the hearts” of the wavering ‘alәma and it was agreed that a 
jyhad against the British should indeed be declared.155  This was accomplished the next 
year.  Two other names were also included among these ‘alәma: the Deobandi-revered 
Hafiz Zaman (of whom it was written, “From martyrdom he was made great”; killed in 
battle, his corpse was reportedly carried by Muhammad Qasim to a nearby mosque, 
where the latter read from the Qur’an over his fallen comrade’s body)156 and J’afar 
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Thanisri.157  What happened later, at Shamli and Thana Bhawan (north of Delhi and not 
far from Deoband), is shrouded in uncertainty, though the Deobandis insist that their 
aforementioned forefathers became veterans in the freedom fight there against the 
British.  They have even given the struggle it’s own name: the War of Shamli Field.158   
Thana Bhawan today is non-descript among the highway towns around 
Muzaffarnagar and Saharanpur.  Its single main street is crowded and lined with food-
sellers peddling biryani or curried vegetables as a seemingly endless stream of rickety 
buses, three-wheeled autos, and bicycle rickshaws pass by.  On either side, the old town 
is mostly hidden within a maze of narrow alleyways, and beyond this cultivated fields, 
punctuated by tall trees, stretch as far as the eye can see.  It was here that Imdadullah 
and his disciples, Rashid Ahmad Gangohi and Muhammad Qasim Nanotwi, relocated, 
fleeing Delhi around August 1857/Dhu’l Hijja 1273.  Allen speculates that this move 
may have been motivated by “doubts about Delhi’s religious status as a seat of [jyhad],” 
as well as a waning faith in the ability of the city to withstand the British onslaught.159  
In any case, it was in Thana Bhawan that Imdadullah (upon winning over a powerful 
local landlord named Inayat ‘Ali) established, briefly, an independent government, after 
a council of local ‘alәma had elected him әmir ul-mwmynin (“Commander of the 
Faithful”).  Rashid Ahmad was appointed a qazi within the new village-sized 
“independent Islamic regime,” settling several cases according to shәri’at during his 
brief tenure.160 Muhammad Qasim, who evidently played a crucial role during the 
aforementioned council in having jyhad against the British declared, was appointed a 
military commander (and some say, too, that despite his being the youngest, it was 
Nanautawi who eventually emerged as the “real leader” of the group).161  Deobandi 
historians insist that Imdadullah had to be convinced by others to take up this position 
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of “worldly guidance,” in particular by Rashid Ahmad and Muhammad Qasim, who not 
only acted within their appointed positions but also as assistants to Imdadullah in the 
everyday affairs of the village-state.162  Meanwhile, the Thana Bhawan group retained 
contact with the Delhi rebels via a go-between named Rahmatullah Kairanawi.163 
The seeming concerns of these Deobandi founding fathers about the Delhi rebels 
proved accurate; by mid-September/late Muharram, the old Mughal capital was 
burning, retaken by the British.  Around the same time, the British (actually a force of 
Afghans and Sikhs led by Muzaffarnagar’s British Collector and Magistrate, a Mr. 
Edwards) attempted to take Thana Bhawan, but were repelled after incurring both 
human and material losses (at least one source dates the “outbreak of the Thana Bhawan 
rising” to the end of August/early Muharram).164  This initial attack having failed, 
Edwards’ force turned to nearby Shamli, which he occupied and left in control of about a 
dozen of his soldiers.  When he returned to Shamli later, he found that the Thana 
Bhawan fighters (described by Deobandi historians as “a Muslim army” led by 
Imdadullah himself)165 had “stormed the government buildings” in the town, and killed 
all of the troopers Edwards had left to defend it.166  And so the Collector attacked 
Thana Bhawan, to which more than a thousand fighting men had flocked, a second 
time—but once again he was driven back, with heavy losses.  Along their retreat back to 
Muzaffarnagar, Imdadullah’s men (it is supposed) continued to harass Edwards’ party, 
and a number of his Muslim soldiers deserted.  Finally the desperate Magistrate ordered 
his men to turn around and charge directly at the Thana Bhawan “insurgents.”  The 
ploy worked; the sudden charge scattered Imdadullah’s soldiers and resulted in the 
deaths of many of them (one British witness attested that there were “a hundred” Thana 
Bhawan dead).  Afterwards, Imdadullah (for whom an arrest warrant had been issued)167 
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and Rahmatullah made their way out of India for the safety of Mecca, while Rashid 
Ahmad and Muhammad Qasim went into hiding.  Later, Rashid Ahmad would be 
imprisoned briefly as a suspected rebel, but eventually released for want of evidence.168  
The Thana Bhawan state and the War at Shamli Field were, to Deobandis, “the last 
great attempt…to establish an Islamic government [in a long line of attempts, from 
antiquity] to 1857.”  Afterwards, the English, victorious and thirsty for retribution, 
hunted down many of the country’s ‘alәma.169 
Scholars like Metcalf argue that the account of these Deobadani fathers’ 
revolutionary struggles at Thana Bhawan—including their setting up of an independent 
government, their appointments to position, and their battles against the British—are 
likely a fabrication borne of excitement surrounding “the nationalist movement after 
World War I.”  As evidence, Metcalf argues that such accounts of these figures’ 
involvement in actual fighting didn’t appear until after 1920/1338; before that, she 
points out, Deobandis were arguing the opposite—namely, that while Rashid Ahmad had 
been imprisoned, he had also been set free, and Muhammad Qasim had never been 
arrested at all, both evidence that they had not in fact taken part in the 1857/1273 
fighting.  Pre-1920/1338 biographies actually argue that those accusing these men of 
involvement in the “Mutiny” were simply the enemies of the Deobandi movement 
attempting to stain the reputation of the school and its mission.170  Of course, both 
positions need to be taken in historical context.  The position that the individuals in 
question did not participate in the rebellion may be attributed to the fact that, in the 
decades immediately following the quashing of the uprising, many in India were bent on 
proving they had not taken part so as to avoid prison, the confiscation of property, 
death, or exile.  Later, especially after the First World War, such threats had become 
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obsolete.  Even Metcalf admits that “[i]t is possible that the nationalist accounts are 
correct, and that some of the ‘ulama did play an important role in the Thanah Bhawan 
disorders.”171  Indeed, Assistant Magistrate H. D. Robertson, a witness of and 
participant in the violence in the Thana Bhawan area, like many British officials firmly 
believed the revolt had been instigated by Muslims as an overtly political act.  “Such 
investigations as it was possible to make,” Robertson wrote not two years after the 
Rebellion commenced, “…proved that the Mahomedans in this tract were throughout 
the instigators to revolt.”  According to Robertson, the Muslims recruited Hindus who 
were in debt to moneylenders, who “ swelled their ranks, rendering the rising 
universal…”172 
To this day, Deobandis and Barelvis from Karachi, Pakistan to Azamgarh, India and 
beyond debate the historicity of the 1857/1273 exploits of such figures as Fazl-e-Haq 
Khairabadi, Rashid Ahmad Gangohi, Fazl-e Rasul Badayuni, Imdadullah, Riza ‘Ali 
Khan, and Muhammad Qasim Nanautawi. 
* 
The decline (indeed, fall) of “Muslim” political power was only one—and perhaps 
not the most significant—test facing South Asian Islam in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries AD.  For it was during this period that several “new” strains of the 
religion began making waves among the Muslims of the subcontinent.  Such strains 
might be classified generally into two principle groups: (1) the purifiers—reformists, 
often erroneously lumped together and labeled “Wahhabis,” who blamed political 
Islam’s decline on the corruption of the ummәt, especially in the subcontinent, in part via 
the accretion of pagan ritual and philosophy and other false traditions, and (2) the 
modernists—apologetics who sought to reinterpret Islam in light of “modern” (Western) 
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science and philosophy.  The latter, one might safely assume, appeared as a direct result 
of British rule in Hindustan, as mostly British-educated, upper-class Indian Muslims 
suddenly found themselves questioning certain aspects (or at least traditional 
interpretations) of their faith.  This second category is perhaps best represented by Sir 
Sayyid Ahmad Khan’s Anglo-Oriental Muslim University at Aligarh and the cadre of 
Muslim modernists/secularists that it produced.  Eventually the Deobandis, it appears, 
would be considered by a majority of South Asia’s Muslims as falling within the first 
category, despite the inaccuracy of the term “Wahhabi” as applied to them. 
And rising from this milieu, this diversity of opinion and wide spectrum of 
interpretation, would come the “torch-bearer” (Pakistani scholar Mujeeb Ahmad’s 
term)173 of the aforementioned majority, crusading against both the Deobandis’ alleged 
“Wahhabism” (not to mention that of actual, bona fide Wahhabis) and Aligarh’s 
blasphemous modernism: Ahmad Raza Khan, “founder” of the Barelvi movement. 
But first, a school would be founded at Deoband.  
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2 - GENESIS OF A RIVALRY:  
The Beginnings of  the Deobandi and Barelvi Schools (1866-1921)  
 
 
I’ll tell you, it is easy to pursue asceticism, and live the life of a recluse for years, and 
enjoy its ecstacy.  It is easy to opt for the study of voluminous books for years, and 
demonstrate the power of deep knowledge.  …I’ll tell you, it is difficult to submit before 
God and, with devotion and piety, render selfless service to His Creations, always 
nursing within the heart the desire for people’s wellbeing; that is to say, to have a 
passionate and restless heart that sometimes takes you to the mosque, that sometimes 
takes you to a study circle, that sometimes takes you to the pulpit to preach and caution 
people—[and] that sometimes also takes you to the political platform, for the greater 
well-being of your community and for upholding the truth. 
               SAYYID MUHAMMAD MIAN, IN әSIRAN-E-MALTA1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the months and years after the violence of 1857/1273, the Muslim communities 
of South Asia were generally considered enemies of the British, a sentiment perhaps best 
expressed by Henry Rawlinson in 1875/1292; Muslim enmity in India was, he said, a 
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“seething, fermenting, festering mass.”2  The irony is that Rawlinson’s “festering mass” 
of hostility—the Muslims of India—not seventy-five years later would be referred to 
often by British civil servants as “loyal people” (i.e. loyal to the British) whose friendship 
was to be nurtured and whose allegiance must be maintained.3  Bamfield Fuller, 
Lietenant-Governor of newly created East Bengal, even described the Muslim 
community as the government’s “favorite wife.”4  By then it was the Hindu, represented 
(at least in the eyes of many Britishers) by the Congress, who had become entrenched as 
the Empire’s enemy.  And it wasn’t just in the eyes of the British government that this 
transformation had come about; Abul Kalam Azad speaks of the early twentieth century 
AD revolutionary movements in India, too, as “all…actively anti-Muslim.  They saw 
that the British Government was using the Muslims against India’s political struggle 
and the Muslims were playing the Government’s game… The revolutionaries felt that 
the Muslims were an obstacle to the attainment of Indian freedom and must, like other 
obstacles, be removed.”  Abul Kalam Azad blamed at least a portion of this resentment 
upon the fact that the government had “imported” a number of Muslim political officers 
from the United Provinces to man the police’s Intelligence Branch, evidently out of a 
mistrust of Hindu officers after the partition of Bengal; this highly unpopular move had 
provoked what he described as an “awakening among the Hindus,” and illustrates 
clearly the relational shift that had by then occurred vis-à-vis the Muslim-British 
paradigm.5  One prominent Indian nationalist, writing in 1917/1335, put it more 
succinctly: “The British wished for and tried to create an Ulster among the 
Mohammedans of India.”6  Times had certainly changed from the days of Thana 
Bhawan. 
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In any case, the period under consideration in this chapter covers the transitional 
era described above, from Rawlinson’s perceived “seething, fermenting, festering mass” 
to Fuller’s allegedly “favorite wife.”  It was within the context of these macro-
phenomena—of the “Muslim” search for a place in the new British order as well as the 
perceived British policy substitution of enmity for India’s Muslims for enmity for the 
rising Hindu—that the Deobandi school (grounded in Waliullahi thought) was founded 
and developed, and the Barelvi counter-reformation (a continuation of the Khairabadi-
Badayuni tradition) launched. 
 
A School is  Founded:  the Birth of “Deobandism.” 
After the short-lived founding of the village-sized Islamic state at Thana Bhawan, 
Imdadullah escaped by quickly emigrating to the Hijaz, where he lived out the rest of 
his days (though his connection to the narrative at hand is not quite ended)—but 
Muhammad Qasim and Rashid Ahmad stayed behind.  The former, erstwhile military 
commander of Thana Bhawan’s anti-Company forces, for whom an arrest warrant had 
been issued,7 evaded British capture, hiding as a refugee about eighty miles north of 
Delhi in a picturesque qәSbәħ named Deoband.  The town was a natural hiding place, as 
the one-time rebel enjoyed not only several family connections in the area but also had 
spent time in Deoband as a student; later he married into a family native to the town, 
too.8  It was likely during this period that Muhammad Qasim became familiar with the 
new (i.e. immediately post-Munity) venture of his cousin, Mahtab ‘Ali,9 and two other 
Deoband residents (‘Abid Husain and Nihal Ahmad): the founding of a small school 
(mәktәb), connected to a local mosque.  At least Mahtab ‘Ali had run a school before; in 
fact, it had been to Mahtab ‘Ali’s (previous) “primary school” that the young 
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Muhammad Qasim, before studying in Saharanpur and eventually Delhi, had carried out 
a portion of his own religious instruction,10 mostly in Arabic.11  Regarded as “among 
Deoband’s most distinguished teachers,”12 Mahtab ‘Ali had studied himself at Delhi 
College with the likes of Mamluk ‘Ali and Sadr al-Din Azardah (leading poet, Arabic 
specialist, and, at the time, the longest serving member of Delhi’s judiciary).13  In any 
case, Mahtab ‘Ali’s new school met in “small and dark rooms” and was of the traditional 
type: a simple appendage of the mәsjyd, operating under the guidance of informal 
teachers to whom students, usually with some kinship connection to the teacher or the 
mosque, would come for temporary instruction.14  According to one Deobandi historian, 
Mahtab ‘Ali and his companions had entertained ideas related to the further 
development and expansion of the little mәdrәsәħ, but such thoughts had been “limited 
to their hearts and their tongues.”15  It would take the efforts of another to bring them 
to life—and vastly transcend them. 
It is unclear just when Muhammad Qasim Nanautawi took a personal interest in the 
school, but it seems likely that, beyond preventing his own imprisonment by the now 
seemingly invincible British, he would have been most concerned with carrying on the 
struggle based upon the original aims imbibed by him from his teachers, in particular 
from Imdadullah and, earlier, Mamluk ‘Ali.  The same was almost certainly true for 
Rashid Ahmad, who, though he languished for a period in a British prison as a suspected 
rebel, must have counted the days until he could resume the fight, though in a 
necessarily adapted form.  But Muhammad Qasim and Rashid Ahmad couldn’t do it 
alone; they needed the help of others not explicitly connected to the rebellion of 
1857/1273.  For years after the Mutiny, the ‘alym from Nanauta, whose name was 
included among those of other known mutineers on official government lists, had 
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“passed through thousands of temporary resting places” in an attempt to escape capture 
by the British.16  But after a general amnesty was announced by Governor-General 
Canning (January 1859/Jumada II 1275) for all who had taken a part in the 1857/1273 
revolt,17 Muhammad Qasim felt free enough to travel between Nanauta and Deoband 
out in the open, expressing passionately the need for a new kind of religious seminary.  
He would have to found it through others—individuals not on the British radar—
because he suspected that British plainclothes police monitored his movements, even 
after the amnesty.  Indeed, Muhammad Qasim feared that if he were to found the school 
himself, the government would persecute it relentlessly.  No, he would need 
intermediaries.  Thus it was that, at some point in the decade after the Mutiny, 
Muhammad Qasim, by now a highly respected religious figure, approached the tiny, 
traditional school’s three founders.18 
His vision was simple, grand—and highly unusual.  Nothing like it had ever been 
done before on the subcontinent.  But Muhammad Qasim Nanautawi was adamant; this 
would, with time, be the fulfillment of his original purposes.  It would bring to fruition 
the legacy of his teachers, Imdadullah and Mamluk ‘Ali, who had themselves imbibed 
“the program” (Faruqi’s term) from Muhammad Ishaq, sәyyid Ahmad and Muhammad 
Ismail, and Shah Abdul Aziz—the latter, of course, having succeeded his father, Shah 
Waliullah himself.  What was Muhammad Qasim’s grand vision?  To the 21st-century 
AD mind it seems anything but revolutionary, but within the context of his time and 
place, of local tradition and South Asian Islamic custom, it represented a radical 
departure. 
Muhammad Qasim proposed that the small, mosque-connected school be moved into 
a large new building, that it be independent of the mәsjyd entirely, that it stand on its 
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own as an autonomous institution beholden to no government, no rich guiding patron, 
no princely court; he would later write, somewhat unambiguously, that the 
“participation of government and the wealthy is harmful.”19  Its teachers were to be 
professionals, and regular, who were to be equal (in the sense that all of their opinions 
were to be valued and weighed).  It was to be run, true to Waliullahi principles, by a 
mәjlys-e-shwra (or advisory council)—not according to the dictates of one man or a 
single clique.  It should have classrooms set apart for the teaching of specific subjects, 
and it should have a large, central library.  It should have a fixed curriculum, including a 
fixed course of study and yearly examinations; this latter was important, for it 
established a system of meritocracy.  In short, the proposed institution should be not 
only independent, and not only far larger than any other Islamic institution of learning 
in southern Asia, but it should be organizationally based on, of all things, the British 
model (to which the Deobandi founders had been exposed in multiple forms, whether at 
Delhi College, or in observing Christian missionary organizations, or as employees 
themselves within the British government apparatus).   
From such an institution, the ummәt in South Asia (and beyond) might be preserved, 
the greatness—both spiritual and political—of the Muslims might be restored, and the 
Waliullahi vision might be spread far and wide as the school developed a growing 
network of affiliated institutions.  Indeed, the school should represent, in the words of 
its official twentieth-century/fourteenth-century historian, “the greatest religious 
achievement of the Muslims in [the modern] period,” preserving “the lamp of the 
prophetic knowledge…in spite of the gusts of a contrary wind.”20  “A fundamental 
orientation of [Shah Waliullah’s] work,” one scholar has written, “…had been the hope 
that Muslim political leadership would be restored, with the [‘alәma] carrying on their 
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collective role of teaching and advising the ruler of the state”; later ‘alәma were indebted 
to Shah Waliullah “for a manifold legacy” that included “a sense of their importance as 
leaders.”21  According to Muhammad Qasim’s vision, Deoband was to be the center of a 
vast network of mәdarys (and indeed, almost from the outset of the school’s founding, 
Muhammad Qasim was anxiously engaged in founding or inspiring the founding of 
several other, affiliated institutions).22  The dar ul’alwm would thereby be able to realize 
the original aims of its founders and their spiritual predecessors, including Mamluk ‘Ali, 
Muhammad Ishaq, and Shah Abdul Aziz.  (Thus, as Faruqi concludes, Deobandism’s 
anti-British roots trace to the very foundation of the institution, in harmony, so the 
Deobandis assert, with the Waliullahi tradition).23  M. Ahmad agrees, describing the 
establishment of the dar ul’alwm at Deoband as “founded on the ideals of Shah 
Walyullah” and thus “destined to play a prominent part in the political struggle of the 
Indians against the British rule.”24  Faruqi describes this phenomenon in the following 
words: 
 
The part played by the Darul-Ulum in religious, social and political life of 
the Indian Muslims can be legitimately interpreted in terms of the aims and 
objectives that lay behind the actions of its founders during the days of the 
Rebellion.  Shamli and Deoband are, as a matter of fact, the two sides of one and 
the same picture.  The difference lies only in weapons.  Now the sword and 
spear were replaced by the pen and the tongue.  There, at Shamli, in order 
to secure political independence and freedom for religion and culture, resort was 
made to violence; here at Deoband a start was made to achieve the same 
goal through peaceful means.  There, for the cause of religio-political 
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freedom individuals were used; here for that purpose individuals were to 
be produced.  The roads, though diverging from each other, led towards 
the same destination.25 [Italics added.] 
 
It should be noted that, at least in the beginning, such black-and-white characterizations 
(i.e. freedom through violent means at Shamli versus freedom through peaceful means at 
Deoband) were likely not so clear.  Still, in the early years some mockingly referred to 
the school as the mәdrәsәħ-e-hәrbiyәħ (or “military school,” a pun on the institution’s 
common name, the mәdrәsәħ-e-‘arәbiyәħ) on account of its unique physical education 
curriculum, which included military-like drills and exercises.26  Perhaps Muhammad 
Qasim and Rashid Ahmad still harbored some lingering hope that a cadre of soldiers 
might be developed with the power to oust the British.  Even so, within a few years such 
martial displays had been more or less dropped from the curriculum entirely, and 
viewed from within the context of Muhammad Qasim’s other pronouncements around 
this time, it appears that the drilling was genuinely introduced as a form of physical 
education after all.  Such echoes of the transitory Islamic state at Thana Bhawan also 
included a shәri’at court set up by Muhammad Qasim, through which was settled a wide 
range of community disputes.  The one-time military commander himself served as qazi 
in the court, and for a time the official government court of Deoband tehsil “had a real 
rival in it.”  Though the court, like the army-esque drills, would fade with time, its 
establishment further underscored “the spirit of non-cooperation” that the school’s 
guiding lights had displayed in the years leading up to its inception.27 
Earlier in this work, the two-pronged agenda passed on by Muhammad Ishaq to his 
disciples, and in particular Mamluk ‘Ali and his committee-of-four, was mentioned.  
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This, the Deobandi fathers insisted, was the Waliullahi vision.  Indeed, over a century 
after the founding of the institution, in 1978/1398, the dar ul’alwm’s vice-chancellor, 
Muhammad Tayyib, would confirm the perpetuation of these original aims, identifying 
two key issues addressed by the Shah Waliullahi program and dealt with via the school: 
(1) the preservation of Muslim faith and practice and (2) the deliverance of India from 
the foreign yoke.28  Muhammad Tayyib’s two-pronged mission statement for the school 
more or less mirrors that of Muhammad Ishaq’s charge to Mamluk ‘Ali, passed on to 
Imdadullah, Rashid Ahmad, and Muhammad Qasim, and built into the core philosophy 
of the dar ul’alwm at Deoband.  The school’s official history likewise frames the 
institutional mission of the dar ul’alwm within the context of these early visions and this 
“original” agenda, writing that the school “has been a dauntless standard-bearer of 
Islamic life, calling people to ymam Abu Hanifa’s mәslәk [the first of Muhammad Ishaq’s 
two-part program], the preacher of the thought of Shah Waliullah of Delhi, the 
commentator of Shah Abdul Aziz’s knowledge, and the greatest trustee of mwlana 
Muhammad Isma’il shәhid’s sentiments of liberty [the second of Muhammad Ishaq’s 
two-part program].”29  
The Deobandi argument that the two-pronged “Waliullahi” mission was largely 
fulfilled—first via the institution, its graduates’ influence, and the subsequent network 
of affiliated schools, and second through its leadership’s role in the independence 
movement—is a strong one.  The first half of the program was in a sense carried out via 
the school’s adoption and adaptation of the Farangi Mahali-inspired dәrs-e-nyžami 
curriculum, which contained both mәnqwlat (which, as previously mentioned, was the 
specialty of the Delhi scholars, including the Waliullahi line) and mәqwlat (the special 
domain of the Lucknow scholars and the aforementioned Khairabadi-Badayuni Group).  
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The Deobandis, true to their Waliullahi leanings, placed far more emphasis on hәdis-
study, however, substituting the one text of hәdis selections in the traditional 
curriculum with all six authoritative collections, in their entirety, in their own version.  
Indeed, hәdis was considered “the crowning subject” to be studied at the institution—
and only the best and the brightest were encouraged to pursue it.30  The other, more 
political prong of the agenda was met through a series of anti-British political schemes 
spearheaded by university leaders, and by the heavy involvement generally of the 
school’s teachers, administrators, and students in the pre-Partition politics of 
independence in India, which shall be addressed later in this work. 
Some historians and other scholarly commentators, perhaps within the context of a 
post-“nine eleven” world, have seen in the founding of the school and the projection of 
its mission a layer of foreboding.  Allen writes ominously, for example: “The end result 
[of the establishment of the school at Deoband] was a seismic shift in the Sunni Islam 
of South Asia, which became increasingly conservative and introverted, less tolerant, 
and far more inclined to look for political leadership to the madrassah and the 
madrassah-trained political leader committed to the cause of leading the umma back to 
the true path.”31  But however it’s founding has been interpreted, it is clear that, even for 
Allen, the event represented more than the construction of a new kind of Muslim 
school; it was the birth of a paradigm-shifting movement—or, rather, the continuation 
of said movement via much more effective means.  Faruqi, M. Ahmad, even the school’s 
detractors (like Allen), and others thus see in the school’s founding—and by means of its 
operation—an endeavor with overtly political ends.  The dar ul’alwm was, in the words 
of Goyal, “the offshoot of the inspiration that had motivated the [‘alәma] to actively 
participate in the 1857 uprising to throw the British out of the country.”32 
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But there are formidable scholars who oppose this view outright, and some mention 
of their reasoning should be included.  Barbara Metcalf, without question Western 
academia’s leading scholar of Deobandism, has argued that the school’s political ties 
have been “distorted” by scholars and others due to the later role many of its ‘alәma 
would play in independence politics.  The result of such distortion has been that, in the 
context of academic writing, the dar ul’alwm has come off as “anti-British and 
revolutionary” in character.  With more than a little finality, Metcalf stated 
unequivocally in a 1978/1398 article, “[T]he school’s concerns were entirely a-
political.”33  Other scholars, like Francis Robinson, have faithfully towed this line as 
they cast doubt on (or simply outright deny) any militant motives on the part of Shah 
Abdul Aziz, any political (much less militant) role for the Deobandi fathers in the events 
of 1857/1273, or any political motivations in the founding of the school—all the while 
citing “the conclusions of Barbara Metcalf’s deep study of the school…”  As evidence, 
Robinson points out that the school’s founders “were careful to steer clear of 
government” and “stressed that it should not accept government help and that its 
associates should not have recourse to government courts of law.”34  In so doing, 
however, Robinson only demonstrates the very political nature of the Deobandi 
endeavor; the British government was, ultimately, the enemy (however one might be 
forced to “work with,” or at least tolerate, such an entity in the short run)—thus the 
school would “steer clear” of it as far as practically possible, refrain from accepting, 
much less soliciting, financial or political aid, and set up a righteous alternative to its 
inferior (even wicked) legal system.   
By the early 1980s/1400s, however, Metcalf would characterize the early Deobandi 
movement (in her masterful Islamic Revival in British India) as “quasi-sectarian,” 
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concerned more than anything else with “issues of the Law,” and involved in a struggle 
of “identifying popularly based ‘ulama as the foci of religious leadership.”  In addition, 
the Deobandis, while “discreet in their political stance,” nevertheless “in fact held the 
foreign rulers in deep contempt.”35  Even Robinson admits that “[p]ossibly the ‘ulama 
of Deoband, having noted the problem of resisting British military might, were biding 
their time.”36  Taken together, it is difficult not to interpret at least one strand of the 
early Deobandis’ motivations in political terms, even when one is limited to using the 
Metcalf-Robinson interpretation only.  After all, it is widely recognized that the 
Deobandis represent a successor movement to the Shah Walliulahi tradition, whose own 
reformist movement, as Robinson himself has pointed out, was directly motivated by the 
great eighteenth-century AD Delhi scholar’s “distress” at “waning Muslim power”—and 
the hope that with such reforms in place “divisions would end and power would return” 
(italics added).  Indeed, Robinson rightly framed the founding of the school at Deoband 
as representative of the shifting focus of the mәdrәsәħ—from a place to train scholars for 
work within the state apparatus (up to the eighteenth century/twelfth century) to a 
place wherein “training for Islamic survival in a world where Muslims had no power” 
was the goal (an echo of Metcalf).  The mәdrәsәħ had always been political to one degree 
or another, and Deoband was no different.  In fact, the university there stood as a 
symbol—even the symbol—of the “institutionalization” of the above-mentioned focus 
change, standing on that shift’s “leading edge.”  “The training for empire built up over 
800 years faded away,” Robinson wrote, to be replaced by an emphasis on survival and 
internal, even individual, reform.37  And while it might be true that the Deobandis’ 
“were coping with the challenge of an infidel government by turning inwards and 
fashioning the machinery of an Islamic community which need owe nothing to the 
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state,” it would be absurd to think that the political goals of the mәdrәsәħ simply 
disappeared altogether, especially given the Muslim religious leadership’s general 
disdain for their alien rulers.38  No (and Deobandi historians are adamant on this point): 
the goal was always political—and nothing less than the eventual establishment of 
Islamic government.39  “After the failure of the 1857 uprising,” wrote Muhammad Mian 
Ansari, a close associate of Mahmud Hasan (d. 1920 AD), “the desire arose to establish a 
center under whose influence people would be prepared to exact retribution for the 1857 
failure” (italics added).40 
It likewise would be absurd to interpret the university’s very limited (perceived) 
cooperation with (or, more accurately, some perceived lack of explicit hostility towards) 
the British government as proof of some sort of apolitical position, a kind of approving 
toleration, or any kind of endorsement on the part of the Deobandi movement’s 
leadership.  On the contrary, the focus shift that certainly took place within the 
institution of the South Asian mәdrәsәħ never removed the seminaries’ overarching 
objective—that is, the propagation of Islamic Law (within the framework of an Islamic 
order), facilitated by able, moral, wise ‘alәma, with the purpose of establishing 
righteousness upon the earth.  The difference was that now Muslim society had to be 
reformed first, from within, before political power could be obtained.  This goal in no 
way transformed the ultimate aim; rather, it inserted an additional step in that aim’s 
achievement.  “Islam envisages its adherants as a religious and political community,” 
wrote Mujeeb Ahmad, “therefore, [‘alәma] claim for themselves a socio-political role 
along with their religious functions.”41 
Combined with the above, one final point (previously touched upon in Chapter 1) 
might be repeated briefly here.  That is: Islam is an inherently political system, a definition 
  
  101 
offered by its very own intellectuals.  From the days of Muhammad, this was so.  To 
quote religious scholar Karen Armstrong at length: 
 
In Islam, Muslims have looked for God in history.  Their sacred 
scripture, the Quran, gave them a historical mission…  A Muslim had to 
redeem history, and that meant that state affairs were not a distraction 
from spirituality, but the stuff of religion itself.  The political well-being of 
the Muslim community was a matter of supreme importance.  Like any 
religious ideal, it was almost impossibly difficult to implement in the 
flawed and tragic conditions of history, but after each failure Muslims 
had to get up and begin again. 
Muslims developed their own rituals, mysticism, philosophy, 
doctrines, sacred texts, laws and shrines like everybody else.  But all these 
religious pursuits sprang directly from the Muslims’ frequently anguished 
contemplation of the political current affairs of Islamic society.  If state 
institutions did not measure up to the Quranic ideal, if their political 
leaders were cruel or exploitative, or if their community was humiliated by 
apparently irreligious enemies, a Muslim could feel that his or her faith in 
life’s ultimate purpose and value was in jeopardy.  Every effort had to be 
expended to put Islamic history back on track, or the whole religious enterprise 
would fail, and life would be drained of meaning.  Politics was, therefore, what 
Christians would call a sacrament: it was the arena in which Muslims 
experienced God and which enabled the divine to function effectively in the 
world. (italics added)42 
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Afghan outfit Jamiat Islami mujahydin leader Burnhanuddin Rabbani would later 
illustrate this concept when he told western reporters that he preferred the term 
“Islamicist” to the oft-repeated “fundamentalist.”  “For us,” he explained, “Islam is a 
dynamic that concerns all aspects of human life.”43  With this understanding, and set 
within the context of the decline and fall of “Muslim” power on the subcontinent, the 
very political Shah Waliullahi tradition, the political violence of 1857/1273, the 
university’s obvious contempt—from the very beginning—for dependence upon the 
British government, and the subsequent, undisputed major role of many of the school’s 
students and teachers (if not that of its founders) in the pre-Partition politics of India, 
perhaps scholars can take the university’s leaders at their word when they proclaim the 
founding of the great dar ul’alwm at Deoband to have been motivated in large degree by 
the highly political Imdadullahi “program.”  Indeed, Mahmud Hasan—more familiar 
than perhaps anyone when it comes to the school’s founding and early development, as 
the nephew of one of its founders, its very first student, personally the disciple of 
Muhammad Qasim and Rashid Ahmad, and the undisputed leader of the university’s 
“second generation”—once stated that, as far as he knew, “this institution [the dar 
ul’alwm at Deoband] was established after the failure of the 1857 uprising with the aim 
of preparing a cadre for avenging that defeat.”44 
The local reaction to Muhammad Qasim’s grandiose vision was, perhaps predictably, 
not entirely positive.  ‘Abid Husain, who more than anyone else actually ran the little 
mәktәb that Muhammad Qasim proposed to transform, rejected the scholar’s vision 
entirely.  But the mwlana from Nanauta eventually convinced even ‘Abid Husain, and 
the project commenced.45 
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So it was that the school that would become the great dar ul’alwm, originally known 
popularly as mәdrәsәħ-e-‘arәbiyәħ,46 was founded in one of Deoband’s six mosques built 
by the Delhi kings over the centuries, the mәsjyd-e-chhәttәħ, “where,” Metcalf informs us, 
“the great Sufi Hazrat Baba Fariu’d-Din Ganj-i Shakar was said to have meditated.”  
Deobandis still proudly motion visitors towards a pomegranate tree within the original 
mosque’s grounds, said to have been the very one under whose shade the school’s first 
instruction took place.47  But the school quickly branched out from this more traditional 
setting to realize the Qasimi vision, acquiring a library, classrooms, and a permanent, 
professional staff of administrators and teachers.  Its students need have no familial tie 
to the school in order to attend; all were welcome and invited to study there.  The 
institution was dependent on no government, court, or wealthy family, but relied, 
instead, on private donations (typically as annual pledges) from a wide variety of 
people—some rich, some poor, some socially connected, others virtually unknown 
outside of their own neighborhoods; donations might be given in kind too—in food, 
clothes, books, etc.48  (This same pattern of financing continues to this day; the 
grandson of the Deobandi scholar Muhammad Shafi proudly displayed the donation 
boxes in the main offices of the dar ul’alwm Karachi to the author in the summer of 
2012/1433, while the grandson of Barelvi great Muhammad Hussain Naeemi did much 
the same in the front office of the Jamia Naeemia in Lahore that same year).  Donations 
didn’t flow one-way, either; monies garnered via these collection efforts allowed 
students to receive a religious education at the dar ul’alwm (plus clothes, laundry 
money, shoes, medical care, a quilt, and oil and matches for light)49 more or less gratis, 
and multitudinous are the stories of generous teachers or administrators, whose own 
salaries were purposefully kept small, donating money, books, or other gifts to needy 
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students.50  Eventually (by the 1890s/1310s) a boarding house was established, 
replacing the old system of housing students in family homes or mosques; the new 
arrangement facilitated the formation of bonds that transcended kinship or geography, 
bonds based upon common experience within the dar ul’alwm system.  Metcalf sees in 
the boarding house brotherhood preparation for the “mutual cooperation” required for, 
among other endeavors, future political undertakings.51 
An organized hierarchy, drawn up along British-inspired lines, included the sәrpәrәst 
(which Metcalf equates with “rector,” but which might also be translated as “guardian”), 
a sort of “patron and guide” with no direct administrative role; a muhtәmim (Metcalf: 
“chancellor,” though the school as of this writing refers to the muhtәmim as “rector”), the 
institution’s head administrative official; an әrbab-e-yhtymam (or “vice-chancellor”), 
perhaps the most important administrative officer in terms of day-to-day decision-
making; a Sәdәr mәdarys (or “principal,” though a more exact translation would be “head 
teacher”), upon whom lay the chief responsibility for the school’s instruction (and 
scarcely less important in decision-making than the vice-chancellor); a mufti (from 
1892/1309), responsible, of course, for the juridical rulings emanating from the dar 
ul’alwm (a dar ul-yfta, or center for juridical rulings, was formally established in 
1893/1310, and between 1911/1329 and 1951/1370, almost one hundred fifty thousand 
fәtawa emanated from the school);52 and, perhaps most importantly of all, a mәjlys-e-
shwra (or “advisory council”) composed of administrators, teachers, and seven others.  
This last was given a central role in major decision-making for the school, thereby 
preventing a single individual, family, or clique from dominating its affairs (with mixed 
success).53  Still, though the school was organizationally British, the old personal ties 
between teacher and gifted student—the shix-disciple relationship, the heart and soul of 
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the traditional mosque-centered schools—were maintained, as students became disciples 
of Sufi shixs (often their teachers).  The Sufi shix especially cared for his disciples 
thereafter; both shared a lifelong bond.54 
Interestingly, neither Muhammad Qasim nor Rashid Ahmad held official posts 
within the newly founded institution at Deoband for its first three years; indeed, in the 
case of Rashid Ahmad, he never held any sort of permanent, day-to-day position at the 
school.  Rather, Muhammad Qasim is credited with informally though firmly guiding 
the school’s founders during this early period from his printing house in Meerut fifty 
miles away, in particular through his good friend Rafiuddin (d. 1890 AD), who held top 
posts within the dar ul’alwm’s administration for almost two decades.  His influence was 
likewise felt through several other family connections he enjoyed with the school, 
including his cousins, Muhammad Ya’qub (the institution’s principal from 1867-
1886/1284-1303), Zu’l-Faqar ‘Ali (a member of the advisory council for forty years), 
Muhammad Munir Nanautawi (the school’s chancellor from 1894-1895/1311-1312), 
and, of course, Mahtab ‘Ali (who also served as a council member).55  “Leadership in 
Deobandi institutions has traditionally been influenced by clan and family loyalties,” 
wrote one scholar, and this was true from the beginning; such a phenomenon was not 
uncommon (and remains so) in the subcontinent among educational institutions of all 
stripes.56  It should be noted, however, and evident from the aforementioned description 
of the school’s genesis, that despite this role of informal influencer, Muhammad Qasim 
was, in the words of Faruqi, “the guiding spirit of this venture,”57 and he did hold the 
somewhat informal position of sәrpәrәst until his 15 April1880/5 Jumada I 1297 death 
(perhaps to keep a healthy distance so as not to potentially “taint” the school in the eyes 
of the British authorities, considering his 1857/1273 actions).  Even with this family 
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clique fully invested in the school, the administrative mechanisms set in motion by 
Muhammad Qasim himself prevented the institution’s out-and-out “takeover” by the 
family. 
Meanwhile, Rashid Ahmad lived as a jurist, Sufi shix, and teacher of hәdis in Gangoh 
(about thirty miles from Deoband); his opinions about the dar ul’alwm, however, “were 
followed,” particularly as they pertained to the “organizing and shaping of the school,”58 
and he would “succeed” Muhammad Qasim as sәrpәrәst after the latter’s passing.  Not 
infrequently the aged mwlana made visits from Gangoh to the university at Deoband, 
counseling teachers and students and generally guiding the institution’s direction.  
When students desired more advanced instruction in fyqħ or hәdis, they would often 
travel to Gangoh to learn at the feet of the old scholar.  It was here, too, that Rashid 
Ahmad continued to initiate the best and the brightest into the four great South Asian 
Sufi orders, as he had been initiated years before by his own murshyd, Imdadullah.59 
Present during the weeks and days of Muhammad Qasim’s final illness was the dar 
ul’alwm’s first student, who had studied hәdis under Muhammad Qasim in the Meerut 
printing houses: one Mahmud Hasan.60  After the subsequent death of Rashid Ahmad 
(who, along with Muhammad Qasim, had represented the dar ul’alwm’s “first 
generation” of leadership), it was Mahmud Hasan—born in 1851/1267 and head of the 
institution from 1890/1307—who would be considered the undisputed leading 
personality of the institution’s “second generation.”61  In time, the young student-
turned-mwlana would become arguably the school’s most celebrated political activist 
and one of India’s most revered Muslim shixs; indeed, his title, by which he was and 
continues to be known to millions: shix ul-hynd, or “The Scholar-Jurist of Hindustan.”  
Meanwhile, the old agenda, passed on down the Shah Waliullahi line, and inherited by 
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Mamluk ‘Ali, Imdadullah, Muhammad Qasim, and Rashid Ahmad, was taken up now 
with a vengeance by the dar ul’alwm’s first țalyb when his time came to lead.  The 
“program” may have been passed on as far back as 1877/1294, when Mahmud Hasan 
accompanied Muhammad Qasim on the hәj to Mecca.  In the holy city the future shix ul-
hynd met with Imdadullah himself, receiving bi’at under his hand—thereby “vowing 
allegiance” to the one-time leader of the short-lived Islamic mini-state at Thana 
Bhawan—and becoming his xәlifәħ.  Around a hundred men, including Rashid Ahmad 
as well as Muhammad Yaqub Nanautawi (Mamluk ‘Ali’s son and, at the time, the 
principal of the dar ul’alwm; Mahmud Hasan would succeed him a few years after his 
1884/1301 death), and Ahmed Hasan Kanpuri likewise participated in this special hәj 
journey.62  We shall return to Mahmud Hasan and the political initiatives he 
spearheaded shortly. 
As the school developed throughout its formative decades, students began to flock 
to the institution from all over the Muslim world.  One observer (writing around 
1917/1335) noted of the dar ul’alwm, “[S]tudents from Russia, China, Balkh and 
Bukhara, Kabul, Turkey, Syria and Arabia and Persia—indeed, from every country and 
city—are present there.  By now more than a thousand scholars, graduated from the dar 
ul’alwm, have spread throughout the country…”63  By the early twentieth 
century/fourteenth century, the Muslim religious leadership had attained such elevated 
status that even Muslims educated in the West  began taking on religious titles (such as 
mwlana), and were addressed as such by the public at large.64  And thus it was that, 
along with its growing prestige, the school’s teachers and graduates began to exert a 
noticeable influence on the day-to-day Islamic practice of the subcontinent’s Muslims, 
especially concentrating on stamping out the “impurities” that had crept into the faith 
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through its centuries-long contact with (indeed, through Deobandi eyes, the near-
complete encirclement by and infiltration of) local, mostly Hindu customs and ritual.  
Practices of which the Deobandis were critical included the charging of interest on 
loans, the array of rites and ceremony associated with the tombs of Muslim saints, the 
forbidding of widow remarriage, and extravagant feasts and weddings.  (For the 
Deobandis, as discussed in Chapter 1, this did not include a rejection of Sufism, though 
the movement clamped down, as mentioned previously, on what it considered the 
inappropriate spiritual elevation of Sufi saints, among other sufistic “excesses”).  For 
Metcalf, for a group to qualify as an “Islamic reform movement” it must accept the 
“period of the life of the Prophet and the first decades of Islam as providing the 
fundamental examples of behavior and belief; all [Islamic reform movements] seek self-
consciously, by a wide variety of means, to relive that pristine time.”65  This is precisely 
what the ‘alәma of the dar ul’alwm sought to achieve—the very aim of Muhammad 
Ishaq’s two-pronged program—through these criticisms, in the tradition of their 
spiritual forbears, going back to Shah Waliullah and beyond.  The “accretions” that had 
developed within South Asian Islam had to be removed, as they clearly represented 
post-Muhammad, post-Rashidun innovations.  Many Muslims in India and even beyond 
became adherents of the new, more puritan (or “reformist”) school based in the little 
qәSbәħ north of Delhi. 
Others, however, pushed back. 
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Counter-Reformation:  The Birth of “Barelvism.” 
The same year that the dar ul’alwm in Deoband was founded under the direction of 
Muhammad Qasim Nanautawi, a Muslim holy man approached the dwelling of a noted 
(but far from famous) ‘alym in the small western-U.P. town of Bareilly, one hundred fifty 
miles east of Delhi.  His knock brought the ‘alym’s ten-year-old son to the door; the boy 
opened it.  He looked up into the face of the fәqir, at which, Zafaruddin Bihari informs 
us, the holy man abruptly placed his hand upon the boy’s head and said, “You are a great 
scholar.”66  The ten-year-old boy was the young Ahmad Raza Khan, son of mwlana Naqi 
‘Ali Khan and grandson of mwlana Raza ‘Ali Khan.  The incident with the holy man 
wasn’t the first time a pronouncement of spiritual or scholarly greatness had been made 
about the child, either.  Indeed, a decade before, shortly after Ahmad Raza’s 1856/1272 
birth, his venerated grandfather had laid him on his lap and uttered very nearly the 
same words.  “This son of mine will be a great scholar,” he had said about the newborn. 
Ahmad Raza Khan was of Pathan stock, his ancestors hailing from the Kandahari 
region of what is today southern Afghanistan.  During the Mughal era, some of the 
family had moved to Lahore, then Delhi, eventually settling at the qәSbәħ of Bareilly in 
Rohilkhand.  Throughout their migrations, Ahmad Raza’s ancestors benefitted from 
Mughal rule by fulfilling various government appointments, both military and civilian.  
In Bareilly, the family continued to benefit from state employment, as well as the 
income derived from government-endowed properties.  Beginning with Ahmad Raza’s 
grandfather, Raza ‘Ali Khan, however, a new family tradition was initiated: that of the 
attainment of religious scholarship.  Raza ‘Ali Khan was known in his day, according to 
one Barelvi historian, as not only an “unparalleled scholar” but a “perfect saint,” thus 
juxtaposing Ahmad Raza’s predecessors with those of the Deobandi fathers and 
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declaring the former’s spiritual heritage the superior one.  (It was Raza ‘Ali Khan, too, 
who, it was said, had been made invisible to British thugs following the repression of the 
Mutiny.)  His son, Naqi ‘Ali Khan, a contemporary of Rashid Ahmad and Muhammad 
Qasim, followed in the footsteps of his father, and was likewise recognized as a 
“glorious, holy scholar” and, significantly vis-à-vis his Deobandi counterparts, an 
“unequalled writer and critic [of deviant practices within Islam].”  Thus the foundation 
was laid by his fathers for Ahmad Raza not only to become a great scholar and teacher, 
but also a critic, reformist (or counter-reformist), and opponent of “the enemies of Allah 
and the Prophet.”67 
Ahmad Riza’s father tutored him in religion at home; the two enjoyed a close 
relationship. Stories abound concerning Ahmad Raza’s childhood and youth—about 
how he had memorized the entire Qur’an by age four, that he was addressing 
worshippers at the mosque by age six, that he had surpassed his scholarly and 
distinguished father in knowledge and wisdom by his early teens (when he was already 
issuing fәtawa).  By age twenty Ahmad Riza was debating with and contradicting (and, 
according to his followers, soundly defeating) several of India’s most prominent ‘alәma, 
including those representing the Deobandi wave.  When he was twenty-one years old, 
Ahmad Riza (along with his father) became the disciple (murid) of Sufi pir and sәyyid 
Shah Al-e-Rasul of Marehra, a small town southeast of Aligarh.  Shah Al-e-Rasul was 
affiliated with the Baghdad-born Qadiri order, belonging to the Barkatiyya branch of 
that sylsәla.  The Barkatiyya, renowned for its spiritual heritage, had sprung up in the 
United Provinces town of Bilgram, about sixty miles southeast of Badayun, and was 
named after the Aurengzeb-era Sufi master Shah Barkatullah, based in Marehra.  
Marehra was one of several proto-Barelvi centers in what is today the northwestern 
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sector of the Indian state of Uttar Pradesh—centers that included Badayun, Rampur, 
Pilibhit, and, of course, Bareilly itself.68 
Shortly after attaining official discipleship under Shah Al-e-Rasul (and being named 
his xәlifәħ), Ahmad Riza went on pilgrimage to Mecca, visiting Medina as well and 
receiving recognition and authority from several powerful Muslim leaders and scholars.  
By 1900/1318, Ahmad Riza was being referred to by most non-Deobandi ‘alәma in 
India generally (and even by some ‘alәma in the Middle East) as the mujәddyd (or 
“renewer”) of the present (fourteenth) Islamic century.69  In 1905/1323 he went on a 
second pilgrimage to Mecca, spending several months there; during this visit, he was 
treated with the utmost respect—as one of the Muslim world’s leading scholars and 
teachers. 
By the turn of the twentieth/fourteenth century, then, Ahmad Raza Khan was in a 
position to seriously compete, as the leader of a rival “movement” that had “come into 
its own,” with the Deobandis for the spiritual supremacy of the subcontinent’s Muslims.  
Indeed, the counter-reformational sect had been identifiably distinct since the 
1880s/1300s, “when,” explains Sanyal—certainly Western academia’s most renowned 
scholar of Barelvism to the time of this writing—“the movement began to take shape.”  
Throughout the 1890s/1310s, too, its core principles solidified, its tenets spread, and 
the number of its adherents “grew steadily” across India (especially in the north).70  
Ahmad Riza certainly viewed himself as the leading Muslim authority in India, too.  
Once, he unilaterally appointed Amjad ‘Ali A’zami the judge of Islamic law for “the 
entire Indian nation,” subsequently appointing his own son, Mustafa Riza Khan, and 
Burhan ul-Haqq as the new judge’s assistants.71  (Amjad ‘Ali A’zami will be further 
scrutinized later in this work.)  Ahmad Riza’s disciples established several notable 
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seminaries in which the Barelvi point-of-view was promulgated.  The Barelvi counter-
reformation, like its Catholic predecessor, was itself reformist, but “central to the 
formation of Ahl-e-Sunnat [i.e. Barelvi] ideology” was the “debate and rivalry amongst 
the [‘alәma],”72 particularly the populous Deobandis; this is what made it a counter-
reformation.  That debate was carried out in person and in print, in the case of the latter 
via the Barelvis’ numerous journals, newspapers, and books.  Indeed, during this period 
(the turn of the century to 1921 AD, or from about 1318 to 1339 AH), the Barelvi-
Deobandi rivalry was characterized almost exclusively by the presentation of arguments 
via the written word or the formal debate.  Nothing like the political battles of later 
years (and certainly not the murderous enmity displayed in 1990s and 2000s AD 
Pakistan) surfaced during these early years, when the debate, though heated, remained 
nevertheless “gentlemanly.” 
 
The Early Disputes I :  fәtwa War of 1902/1320. 
Since the days of Shah Abdul Aziz, the fәtwa had been used as a popular form of 
intercourse between the ‘alәma and regular Muslims—and also as a means of 
discrediting, or striving to discredit, rival scholars and their schools of thought.  
Perhaps no one ever wrote more fәtawa than Ahmad Raza Khan, however, who used the 
juridical ruling as his chief weapon of choice within the context of his many scholarly 
battles.  At the same time, Ahmad Raza’s fәtawa earned him an unprecedented 
reputation among thousands of South Asia’s Muslim scholars (as well many from 
Central Asia, the Middle East, and beyond) as an eminent ‘alym, all the while serving to 
expand his influence far and wide among ordinary Muslims across the subcontinent.  
“Fatwa-writing was to be Ahmad Riza’s single most important scholarly activity,” noted 
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Sanyal, who elsewhere described the pursuit as the “hallmark” of the man’s ‘alymi career; 
indeed, the Barelvi “founder” was said alone to have produced the work of ten muftis.  If 
one were forced to place Ahmad Raza within a single occupational category, that of 
fәtwa-writer might be the most accurate, as he was to spend the majority of his days 
engaged in the activity.  He is said to have interrupted his work composing fәtawa only 
rarely, and then only to attend religious (and especially “Barelvi”) ceremonies like ‘urs.73 
In 1902/1320, Ahmad Riza Khan kicked off a fәtwa war between the Deobandis 
(based around the university) and the newly dubbed “Barelvi” ‘alәma (based around 
Ahmad Riza).  The initiatory event was the publication of a fәtwa, authored by the 
tireless scholar out of Bareilly.  Certainly, he’d previously published pronouncements 
condemning this or that idea, or even this or that group or movement, as heretical, 
Satanic, or otherwise erroneous.  But in this ruling, Ahmad Riza did something he hadn’t 
done before; that is, he named names.  In all, he listed five individuals—all prominent 
Indian ‘alәma—and declared them kafyr (“infidel” or “unbeliever”).  Of the five men 
listed, fully four were Deobandi.  The fifth, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad of Qadiyan, was the 
founder of the much-maligned “Ahmadiyya” or “Qadiyyani” movement (more on this 
movement later).  Thus not only had Ahmad Raza singled out four of the Deobandis’ 
most renowned scholars as infidels, he’d grouped them together with a man who was, 
quite possibly, the most detested “Muslim” leader in all of South Asia. 
The four Deobandis (all described using the catch-all term “Wahhabi”) thus singled 
out included the school’s very “founders,” Muhammad Qasim Nanautawi and Rashid 
Ahmad Gangohi.  Muhammad Qasim, Ahmad Riza asserted, had denied the finality of 
the Prophet (xәtәm-e-nәbәwwәt, i.e. that Muhammad was the last, or “seal,” of the 
prophets); all who followed Muhammad Qasim, then, must have allowed Satan to plant 
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“deceit in their hearts.”  And Rashid Ahmad, in the tradition of Muhammad Ismail  
(against whom Ahmad Riza had already written many fәtawa), believed that Allah could 
lie—and additionally held that Satan’s knowledge (in particular his “knowledge of the 
unseen” [ylm-e-Gaib]) was greater than had been Muhammad’s.74  These were 
obviously very serious allegations, and clearly stemmed from the enormous emphasis 
placed by Barelvis on respect—bordering on worshipful adoration—for the Prophet, as 
well as for God.  To lay such a juridical ruling at the feet of the Deoband school’s two 
greatest guiding lights was akin to throwing down the gauntlet.  “He who doubts that 
they are kafyrs is himself a kafyr,” declared Ahmad Riza, with some finality.75  But the 
deceased Muhammad Qasim and the still-leading Rashid Ahmad weren’t the only 
Deobandi targets of Ahmad Riza’s ire.  Ashraf ‘Ali Thanawi, who would go on to 
become one of the school’s most prolific writers (and who Robinson has described as 
“the most influential Sufi of his day”),76 also attracted the Bareilly scholar’s literary 
darts.  His alleged crime: refusing, like Rashid Ahmad, to grant Muhammad ylm-e-Gaib, 
thus, in Ahmad Riza’s eyes, equating the Prophet’s knowledge with that of any other 
human or beast.  (The Barelvi divine would author at least three book-length treatises 
specifically denouncing Ashraf ‘Ali Thanawi, condemning the Deobandi for the content 
of his juridical rulings and for his alleged disrespect of the Prophet).77  Along the same 
lines, a fourth Deobandi scholar, Khalil Ahmad, was charged with believing that Satan’s 
knowledge was greater than that of the Prophet.  Both Ashraf ‘Ali Thanawi and Khalil 
Ahmad, the fәtwa severely declared, confused Satan with God.   
As in his allegations against Muhammad Qasim and Rashid Ahmad, Ahmad Riza’s 
emphasis in these last two anti-Deobandi decisions rested entirely on perceived 
disrespect toward the Prophet (of whom they “decrease[d] the glory”) and, to a lesser 
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degree, to Allah (to whom they “ascribed lies”).  Thus was put into words the very 
foundation of the theological Deobandi-Barelvi conflict; “it was the differing conceptions 
of the Prophet,” wrote Sanyal, “…that lay at the heart of the Ahl-e-Sunnat [Barelvi] 
denunciation of the Deobandis.”78  After Barelvi bodyguard Mumtaz Qadiri assassinated 
Punjab governor Salman Taseer in 2011/1432, he admitted that he had been motivated 
to do so after listening to the speeches of Barelvi cleric Hanif Qureshi Qadiri; in his 
description of the speech, which he evidently heard in person, he described the scholar’s 
behavior as well as the audience’s response—a perhaps powerful demonstration of the 
Barelvi devotion to Muhammad.  “Delivering the sermon, Hanif Qureshi expressed his 
love for the prophet so passionately that his turban fell off, his hair got disshevelled, and 
the microphone, too, fell off.  The congregation was overwhelmed by grief and burst 
into tears.  Carried away by their love for the holy prophet, I, too, was in tears.”79  To 
the Barelvis, emotionally and spiritually invested as they were in the Prophet as an 
object of devotion, the Deobandi position seemed to smack of the worst form of 
disrespect. 
Heretofore, however, the proto-rivalry had been played out mostly indirectly, as the 
two loosely organized scholarly groupings vied for influence and the right to speak for 
truth and righteousness among South Asia’s Muslims.  Now, finally, it had come head to 
head.   
It is interesting to note that these original arguments against Deobandism’s leading 
figures have remained potent barbs within the Barelvi arsenal to the present day.  For 
example, observe the very same accusations, against the very same individuals, in the 
following paragraph, taken from one Barelvi publication published over half a century 
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after Ahmad Riza Khan’s original ruling (and consistently published in updated editions 
to the time of this writing): 
 
mwlwi Ashraf ‘Ali sahyb Thanawi, in [his book] hәfiz ul-iman [equated] 
the knowledge of the Holy Prophet with the knowledge of animals.  
mwlwi Khalil Ahmad sahyb Anbitwi makes the knowledge of Satan and 
the Angel of Death [mәlәk ul-mwt] greater than the knowledge of the 
Holy Prophet in his book bәrahin qaț’aah.  mwlwi Ismail sahyb of Delhi 
wrote that, during prayer, the thought of the Holy Prophet is worse than 
the thought of a donkey or an ox.  mwlwi Qasim sahyb Nanautawi, in [his 
book] tәhźir ul-nas, denied the finality of the Holy Prophet—and said 
that if other prophets come after the Holy Prophet, it would in no way 
contradict that finality; “final” denotes the “True Prophet,” while other 
prophets would only be temporary [‘aarżi].  On this, even Mirza Ghulam 
Ahmad Qadiani said, “I am a prophet.”  Thus [even] Mirza Ghulam 
Ahmad is their student when it comes to this issue.80 
 
In this modern-day Barelvi denunciation of Deobandism, the scholar (in this case a 
learned and well-respected Pakistani) has accused both Ashraf ‘Ali and Khalil Ahmad of 
disparaging the knowledge of the Prophet Muhammad, just as Ahmad Riza Khan had 
done in his groundbreaking 1902/1320 ruling.  Similarly, Muhammad Qasim here 
stands accused of denying the Prophet’s finality—the same indictment directed toward 
him by Ahmad Riza.  Additionally, a characteristic jab is taken at sәyyid Ahmad’s 
companion, Ismail (more on this later), while the final insult lies in the grouping of the 
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four men named with the Ahmadiyya prophet-founder, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad; in this 
last, too, the scholar has followed the lead of Ahmad Riza, who had done just that many 
decades before.  Not long after the publication of his 1902/1320 fәtwa, Ahmad Riza 
applied for confirmatory signatures from esteemed ‘alәma in Mecca and Medina.  The 
signatures came.  Perhaps with such an indictment, confirmed by the greatest scholars 
of the holiest sites in Islam, the scourge of Deobandism might be finally stamped out. 
But the Deobandis responded.  Deobandi ‘alәma across north India were recruited to 
gather signatures of their own in an attempt to countermand Ahmad Riza’s original 
juridical ruling; the list of signees was impressive.  This prompted a counter-response 
from the Barelvis, who, in turn, gathered Indian signatures of their own to nullify the 
opinion of the Deobandis.81  The fәtwa war drew thousands of Indian Muslim scholars 
into its orbit, more or less compelling them to take a stand: either behind famed ‘alym 
Ahmad Riza and the Barelvis or behind the ‘alәma trained at the great Deobandi dar 
ul’alwm.  Thus the line was drawn between the two camps, as scholars of various stripes 
stood in support of one or the other position.  Surely neither side would have guessed 
that the same division, over the same issues, utilizing the same arguments, and leveling 
the same accusations, would exist largely unchanged over a century later. 
 
The Early Disputes II :  the Battle for History.  
For the Deobandis, the years after the fall of Muslim power on the subcontinent 
literally represented a dark age, when “paganism and apostasy” (shәrk w byd’at) rose up 
to engulf the land in the east and the west, in the north and the south.82  True religion 
had only been saved—and not in a figurative sense—during the long night of Muslim 
political fragmentation and British rule by the Deobandi fathers and the university they 
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had established.  Without these towering personalities and the institution that they 
created, Islamic knowledge would have ceased to be a force in the lives of South Asia’s 
Muslims (later Deobandi writers would interpret non-Muslim victories over Muslim 
populations in Albania, Bosnia, and Kosovo in much the same way).83  Fortunately for 
religion in the subcontinent, however, figures like Shah Waliullah, sәyyid Ahmad of 
Raebareli and his loyal companion Muhammad Ismail, Imdadullah, Muhammad Qasim, 
Rashid Ahmad, and the dar ul’alwm as an institution—perhaps not unlike the monks of 
Ireland’s crag-clinging monasteries after the fall of Rome (or, later, the Muslim Arab 
conquerors of Iberia)—had served as critical cultural and theological preservers.  
“Muhammad Qasim Nanautawi,” one dar ul’alwm Deoband graduate told the author, 
“was greater than your Voltaire.”  Whether Muhammad Qasim can be compared to the 
witty French writer-philosopher (let alone whether or not Voltaire qualifies as “the 
author’s”) is up for debate, yet the fact remains that to the Deobandis, men like 
Muhammad Qasim Nanautawi were not just pious religious scholars but among the 
great movers and shakers of human history.  To the Prophet Muhammad the final great 
Revelation had been revealed, but it had been the founders of Deobandism who had 
preserved the purity of the faith during a time of crisis that had threatened the very 
existence of true religion.84  The university at Deoband played a redemptive role within 
Islamic history; “this was certain—that here there was a way, a place where Muslims 
could go to dispel the darkness from their hearts and minds”: thus proclaims the 
Deobandi historical narrative.85 
Moreover, Deobandi historians insisted that not only was their tradition the 
standard-bearer for the rightful Sunni position, but that the Barelvis, and especially 
Ahmad Riza Khan, should be equated with the ever-present opposition to the truth—
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with “groups originat[ing] from amongst the Muslims themselves whose distinction was to 
deny the faith…” (italics added).86  From the very days of Muhammad, there had always 
been those who, despite their own great knowledge and understanding, yet turned from 
pure religion and persecuted its faithful adherents.  The inhabitants of Mecca—the 
Prophet’s own people—had rejected that greatest of men virtually wholesale.  Not many 
years later, the Shi’a sect had broken away from the ummәt and criticized the righteous 
Abu Bakr, ‘Umar, and ‘Usman.  The Khawarij and the Nawasib sects had, in turn, 
sharply condemned ‘Ali—then murdered him in cold blood, all the while sure that they 
were in the right.    “Intellect-defying deviance like this,” proclaimed one Deobandi 
writer, “can be found in abundance in the later periods of Islam also.  And such people, 
who made it their chosen pastime to oppose, [criticize] and offend the best and the most 
pious people of their time continued to appear in different eras.”87  Ahmad Riza Khan 
and his followers, then, were just the latest in a long line—even a tradition—of 
“deviancy” that stretched all the way back at least as far as seventh-century/first-
century Arabia. 
To buoy up this claim, the Deobandi historians dug deeply into Ahmad Riza Khan’s 
past, where they emphasized the allegedly dubious ties of his genealogy (which, it is 
pointed out, certainly did not include any of “India’s great families”) to the Persian 
pillager Nadir Shah and, more importantly, the Shi’a sect.  For Ahmad Riza Khan’s 
family, so the Deobandi narrative asserts, descended from actual members of Nadir 
Shah’s “Shi’a army”—an army responsible for numerous and sundry wicked acts, 
including the sacking of Delhi and the murder of tens of thousands.  Perhaps worse than 
the mayhem meted out by his troops, however, was the fact that Nadir Shah was himself 
a Shi’a, and his foray into Hindustan had been carried out not only in a quest for booty 
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but out of a desire to crush the dominant Sunni faith of the subcontinent.  Ahmad Riza 
Khan’s family “was included among the Shi’a heretic’s [rafżi] army”—indeed, “they 
came to fight”—and thus deserved a share of the ignominy associated with the Persian 
raider’s Indian invasion.88 
And in the Deobandi narrative, the alleged links to Shi’ism don’t end with Nadir 
Shah.  Deobandi historians also claim strong connections between the Shi’a nawabs of 
Awadh and Ahmad Riza Khan’s ancestors.  The Shi’a dynasty that ruled Awadh after 
the fall of the Mughals has been briefly addressed already in this work, but Deobandis 
emphasize that the royal family had displaced Sunni rule, besides exhibiting an 
administrative style characterized by  “unfair governance.”  Most significantly of all, 
however, they interpret the still-strong presence of the Shi’a minority in South Asia as a 
distinctly Awadh-driven phenomenon; it was during this period that “this sect [the 
Shi’a] was disseminated more than during any other time,” one Deobandi historian 
declared.  The Shi’a nawabs, in effect, had opened a floodgate and were thus directly 
responsible, perhaps more than any other group or institution, for the “spread of the 
Shi’a sect.”  And in the midst of all of this, the Deobandis argue, Ahmad Riza Khan’s 
family remained “highly sympathetic” to the Awadhi ruling family; the Bareilly scholar’s 
great-grandfather, Kazim ‘Ali Khan, is particularly singled out in this regard as a Shi’a 
sympathizer and a beneficiary of the Awadhi state.89 
The Barelvi ‘alema, of course, look at Islamic history through a very different lens.  
Among western academics, Sanyal has perhaps written the most concerning Barelvism, 
though others, including Metcalf, have also touched upon the movement at some length.  
Metcalf’s work focused on what she called “the reformist ‘ulama,” the “most important” 
of which were the Deobandis.  But she adds the following:  
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Their opponents, the Barelwi ‘ulama or the Ahl-i Sunnat wa Jama’at 
adhered to a more custom-laden religious practice and a more 
intercessory style of religious leadership linked to the pirs of the medieval 
tombs.  In fact, however, they also thought of themselves as reformist 
(that is, as scholars engaged in tәjdid or renewal) and indeed—even if I 
and the Deobandis begrudge them the title of reformers—in their self-
consciousness and their concern with disseminating familiarity with the 
Law, they were, in the end, close to those they opposed.90 
 
Thus the Barelvis, too, saw themselves (and particularly their movement’s guiding 
light, Ahmad Riza Khan) as reformers and renewers of the faith.  But their 
interpretation of the historical threats to South Asian Islam differ significantly from 
that of their Deobandi counterparts.  For starters, Ahmad Riza Khan looked upon the 
Deobandi guiding lights in much the same way as they looked upon him—as “the latest 
in a line of kafyrs that went all the way back to the Prophet’s and ‘Ali’s own time.”91  
Ahmad Riza and his followers attacked those movements and personalities considered 
by Deobandis to be integral parts of their religious heritage. 
Perhaps their most notable proto-Deobandi target: the jyhad movement of sәyyid 
Ahmad of Raebareli and his top lieutenant and most trusted disciple, Muhammad Ismail.  
The Barelvi narrative particularly singles out the latter as a deviant and a kafyr—and an 
unabashed convert to the clearly un-Islamic Wahhabi movement launched in Arabia 
under the leadership of Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab.  As proof, the Barelvis point to 
Ismail’s book tәqwiәt ul-iman (“Strengthening of the Faith”), published in Urdu in India, 
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claiming that Ismail simply plagiarized and summarized (xulasәħ kia) Abdul Wahhab’s 
own kytab al-twhid (“Book of [God’s] Oneness”), a fundamental Wahhabi text.  The 
long-held assertion that Deobandis are nothing but Wahhabis in disguise is thus buoyed 
by associating one of their predecessor-heroes directly with the Nejdi movement.  Ismail 
is further denigrated by the Barelvi assertion that he was not martyred in a sacred 
struggle with the infidel Sikhs at all, but rather died unjustly fighting fellow Muslims, in 
this case Pathans, who had rightly taken offense at his aforementioned book.  
Meanwhile, sәyyid Ahmad is pilloried as a fraud whose first jyhad was not targeted 
against the Sikhs, but against the Muslims “of Yaghistan” (i.e. the Pathans).92 
Both schools likewise tend to view their own historical roles—essentially that of the 
‘alәma—quite differently.  While the Barelvis point to the heroic deeds of Fazl-e-Haq 
Khairabadi and others during the Mutiny, this is rarely emphasized.  The ‘alәma are not 
portrayed, generally speaking, as political heroes, but rather as saints—and particularly 
as anti-“Wahhabi” crusaders.  This is the emphasis, mostly devoid of any overarching 
“liberty” narrative (as opposed to the Deobandis, who tend to stress their scholars’ 
pivotal roles in the “independence movement”).  The direst threat to Islam was from 
within (i.e. not from the British), and it is thus the struggle against apostate groups like 
the Deobandis, as well as the Ahl-e-Hadis, out-and-out Wahhabis, and the Shi’a sect, 
that takes center-stage in the Barelvi (post-Mughal) “political” history of the ‘alәma.  On 
the other hand, the Deobandi histories and biographies tend to support a radically 
different worldview, one in which it is a “fact [that] cannot be denied” that in the “effort 
for independence in Hindustan, no other group can boast of being a rival to the proud 
position held by the ‘alәma.”  Indeed, the scholarly divines’ struggle stretched back to 
the “first war of independence” in the mid-nineteenth/mid-fourteenth century: 
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After the turbulent revolution of 1857, only this party [the ‘alәma] kept 
the concept of independence alive.  In the end, their continual endeavors 
spread the spirit of freedom across the entire country.  hәżrәt 
[Muhammad Qasim] Nanotvi was the greatest instigator of [the spread 
of] this concept, and the greatest preacher of this movement.  With this 
enthusiasm he nurtured this concept [India’s liberty].  It is a pity that 
the writers of the history of the war of independence have not done 
justice to him.”93  
 
The Deobandi perception of India’s history thus places the ‘alәma, from Shah Waliullah, 
not only at the center of the much-needed South Asian Islamic revivalist movement, but 
also—and just as critically—at the very head of the subcontinent’s liberty struggle 
against the tyranny of Britain.  According to this Deobandi narrative, it is thanks to the 
‘alәma that those who traditially have received credit for liberating India from its 
British rulers (by leading the nationalist movement) were inspired to do so at all—the 
“passion for freedom” kept alive by Muhammad Qasim after 1857/1273, infusing into 
much of Muslim India (and beyond) by Mahmud Hasan, and, having “passed over from 
the Muslims to the [other] sons of the nation [әbna’-e-wәtәn]” in the course of the 
Khilafat movement (italics added).94  This is perhaps aptly illustrated by the cover art of 
one Deobandi history, entitled tәhrik-e-rishmi-e-rwmal (“The Silk Handkerchief 
Movement”), a tome chronicling the shix ul-hynd’s attempt to mount a Muslim-led 
invasion of British-controlled India from that country’s northwest frontier (covered 
later in this work).  A map of the subcontinent is shown weighed down by four massive 
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chains, while the Union Jack waves over it triumphantly from atop a flagpole planted in 
the middle of India.  Only one place-name (apart from the Indian Ocean and the Bay of 
Bengal) graces the cartograph: Deoband—and flames are rising therefrom.95  Deobandis 
see themselves, their scholar-jurist leaders, and the revivalist movement out of the dar 
ul’alwm as the liberty spark that eventually set fire to British machinations on the 
subcontinent. 
 
The Early Disputes III :  “Rationalist” versus “Transmitted” Traditions . 
Meanwhile, both schools continued to espouse different emphases when it came to 
the various Islamic sciences (as reflected in the curricula of their respective mәdarys).  
An introduction to mәnqwlat (the “transmitted,” or traditional, sciences) and mәqwlat 
(which Sanyal calls the “rational position”) was given previously.  While the Deobandis, 
like Shah Waliullah and the “Delhi Group,” emphasized mәnqwlat (and especially the 
study of hәdis), Ahmad Raza Khan and the Barelvis, like the Khairabadi-Badayuni 
Group, favored an emphasis on mәqwlat (plus the study of fyqħ).  The debate over which 
group of subjects should take precedent in a given curriculum had flared up repeatedly 
over the years, long before the establishment of either school, with scholars like Fazl-e-
Haq Khairabadi carrying the mәqwlat standard in the 1820s AD (1220s and 1230s AH), 
especially against his Delhi-based academic opponents.  By the 1850s and 1860s AD 
(from the mid-1270s to the mid-1280s AH), Ahmad Raza’s father, Naqi ‘Ali Khan, had 
entered the fray, echoing much of what Fazl-e-Haq had said several decades earlier.  
From the 1890s/1310s into the early twentieth/fourteenth century, the mantle, so to 
speak, of leadership among the mәqwlat scholars had fallen upon the formidable 
shoulders of Ahmad Raza Khan himself, despite his family’s relative obscurity—even 
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when it might “naturally” have been carried by the sires of, say, the Khairabadi or 
Farangi Mahali families.  But it just so happened that Ahmad Raza’s light shone 
brighter; it was Ahmad Raza, after all, who is said to have bested the more senior ‘Abd 
ul-Haqq Khairabadi, son of the great Fazl-e-Haq, in a debate at the Rampur court when 
he (Ahmad Raza) was only twenty years of age.96   
In any case, the same debate over curricula and emphases that had raged among 
scholars for years was inherited by the Deobandi-Barelvi rivalry and taken up by its 
divines.  Deobandis continued to battle perceived Barelvi disregard for hәdis instruction 
by augmenting the traditional dәrs-e-nyžami curriculum with half a dozen hәdis 
collections of their own, in their entirety, and continued to hold up mastery of hәdis as 
the crowning achievement of one’s education. 
 
The Early Disputes IV: Other Points of Doctrine . 
True to the reformist spirit of their time, the early ‘alәma associated with the dar 
ul’alwm at Deoband opposed a number of doctrines and customs that had, they asserted, 
crept into the practice of many Muslims on the subcontinent.  Such allegedly impure 
elements were condemned as innovations or as synthesized Hinduism.  One of these was 
the celebration of the anniversary of Muhammad’s birthday.  Deobandis renounced such 
events as encouraging “the belief that a dead person was actually present.”  Celebrating 
mwlyd, these scholars noted, “elevated the importance of a fixed day” and “resembled 
practices of the Hindus.”97  Though Deobandis and other reformists opposed many 
“Barelvi” practices, such as ‘urs (literally “wedding” [Arabic], but in South Asia a ritual 
observance of the death anniversary of a pir), controversy over mwlyd was the most 
heated.98 
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What did a Barelvi mwlyd celebration look like during this formative period?  
Employing as her source a Rampur-published newspaper (dәbdәba-e-sikәnderi), Sanyal 
describes a mwlyd celebration in 1916/1334 as commemorated by Ahmad Riza Khan.  
After dawn bathing and the donning of new clothes, Ahmad Riza’s disciples, admirers, 
and others “hurried to the mosque to greet him,” hoping for a chance to kiss the man’s 
hand.  Thereafter began a poetic recitation of the Prophet’s qualities, after which the 
crowd all stood in remembrance of Muhammad’s birth.  Ahmad Riza then delivered a 
sermon in which many of the doctrines embraced by Barelvis (but reprehensible to 
Deobandis) were uttered; in particular, he spoke of Muhammad as the first of Allah’s 
creations, formed of the very light of Allah himself—and, as the first light, the 
originator of all light, including that of the sun.  In this, one might observe the mystical 
sheen Barelvis place upon Muhammad, much to the chagrin of their Deobandi 
counterparts.  After Ahmad Riza’s sermon, another poetic reading “calling down Allah’s 
blessings…on the Prophet” concluded the meeting and was immediately followed by a 
feast.99 
The concept of nwr-e-muhәmmәdi—positing Muhammad as pure light, or a “being 
with his own natural light”100—is distinctly Barelvi, as opposed to the Deobandi 
position that Muhammad, though God’s true and greatest Messenger, was yet a man 
(however perfect he might have been).  Echoes of the Barelvi stance, however, can be 
heard in Ibn Ishaq’s eighth-century/first-century biography of the Prophet, later 
encapsulated by Lings in his Muhammad.  “Aminah’s [the mother of Muhammad] one 
consolation was the unborn child of her dead husband,” we are informed, 
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and her solace increased as the time of her delivery drew near.  She was 
conscious of a light within her, and one day it shone forth from her so 
intensely that she could see the castles of Bostra in Syria.  And she heard 
a voice say to her, “Thou carriest in thy womb the lord of this people; and 
when he is born say: ‘I place him beneath the protection of the One, from 
the evil of every envier’; then name him Muhammad.”101 
 
Ahmad Riza would write several book-length treatments on the subject of Muhammad 
as a source of light (and hence a being without shadow); some are listed in the footnotes 
to this work.102 
In any case, from the initial emergence of debate between Barelvi and Deobandi 
adherents over doctrine in the late nineteenth/early fourteenth century, it has been the 
sects’ relative stance on the attributes of the Prophet Muhammad that have most 
widened the divide.103  The ritual of the Barelvis compounded this doctrinal difference, 
particularly as they celebrated the birth of the Prophet.  Indeed, mwlyd is often 
characterized by processions in the streets, massive gatherings, the recitation of 
religious poetry, prize-giving, sweets-giving, prayers, and feasting (in Pakistan the date 
has traditionally been marked as a public holiday, typically complete with speeches by 
high government officials at both the national and provincial levels—and even the 
screening of films with “morale-building themes” in place of the “usual movies”),104 
much of which is considered “innovation” by Sunnis of the Deobandi persuasion.  More 
recently, several deadly clashes between Deobandi and Barelvi groups have taken place 
on this significant date of the Islamic calendar. 
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But Barelvi rituals associated with mwlyd were not the only ones with which the 
Deobandis took issue.  The Barelvi celebration of ‘urs also sparked the ire of the school 
out of Deoband.  A typical Barelvi ‘urs celebration, centered on the saint’s dәrgah, lasted 
three to five days and included night-long reading of the Qur’an, the recitation of n’ats 
(poetic compositions praising the Prophet) and other verse lauding various religious 
figures, sermons delivered by the ‘alәma, and possibly a pilgrimage to visit relics of the 
Prophet, saints, or other Sufi predecessors.  The last day of the ‘urs celebration included 
Gwsәl—the washing of the saint’s tomb (though, outside of the context of ‘urs, Gwsәl 
refers to a full-body ablution necessary in some circumstances before prayer, among 
other rituals).105  Barelvi observation of ‘urs as of this writing follows much the same 
pattern.  The ninetieth ‘urs of Ahmad Riza Khan himself, for example, for which his 
dәrgah served as venue, took place between 20 and 22 February 2009/24 and 26 Safar 
1430.  The celebration involved numerous speeches from some of Barelvism’s greatest 
guiding lights and boasted some five hundred thousand attendees gathered in the UP 
town of Bareilly. 
On the other hand, the Barelvi denunciations of the Deobandis mostly rested on 
theological matters rather than ritual or practice.  Some of Ahmad Riza Khan’s 
objections vis-à-vis the Deobandi founding fathers and their disciples—dealing with the 
finality of the Prophet and the Prophet’s “knowledge of the unseen”—have been 
touched upon briefly, above.  But the issues brought up in Ahmad Riza’s 1902/1320 
juridical ruling were not the only ones dividing the Deobandi and Barelvi schools of 
thought.  Some other points at which the Barelvis took offense include: 
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• The issue of mәsәlәħ ymkan-e-kәźb—that is, whether or not God can tell a lie.  
Barelvis point to several works, notably Khalil Ahmad’s aforementioned 
bәrahin qaț’aah, as well as Mahmud Hasan’s jahәd ul-mәqal, as evidence that 
the Deobandis do indeed believe that it is possible for God to lie.  The 
Barelvis hold that a lie, being “an evil, like theft,” could never be associated 
with God.  Besides, God’s attributes are constant and unchanging (wajyb), 
thus the idea that He might “possibly” lie is absurd. 
• The issue of the Prophet’s place as the most excellent of all mankind.  
Barelvis claim that the Deobandis believe that any member of the ummәt may 
attain the same level of excellence in deed that Muhammad enjoyed—and 
even excel beyond the Prophet’s level in this regard.  In this, Barelvis point 
to Muhammad Qasim’s tәhźir ul-nas. 
• The issue of referencing the Prophet.  Barelvis insist that Muhammad must 
not be called by “ordinary names,” but should always be referred to as ya 
rәswl allah or some similarly respectful designation.  The Deobandis, they 
claim, teach that Muhammad, being just “a man,” may be referred to as 
“brother.”  The writings of Muhammad Ismail, as well as Khalil Ahmad’s 
bәrahin qaț’aah, are often used to support this claim.106 
• The issue of the application of the classifications dar ul-hәrb and dar ul-yslam.  
For Deobandis, Hindustan had been dar ul-hәrb since at least the days of 
Shah Abdul Aziz, whose famous 1803/1218 fәtwa, it will be remembered, had 
more or less propagated this view.  It should be noted that the issue is not 
black-and-white, and differences have existed even within the most elite of 
Deobandi circles on this issue.  For example, while Muhammad Qasim had 
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ruled that India was dar ul-hәrb (or at least “gave preference” to such a 
position), both Rashid Ahmad and Ashraf ‘Ali Thanawi indicated that India 
was in fact dar ul-yslam (though in the context of other questions rather than 
in answer to direct queries concerning India’s status).  Later Deobandi 
opinion (especially from the first decade of the twentieth century AD) clearly 
indicated that India was dar ul-hәrb.  Meanwhile, Ahmad Riza Khan was 
consistent and unambiguous in his ruling that India was absolutely dar ul-
yslam; since Muslims could freely worship according to shәri’at, it must be so.  
The Bareilly divine would write several books on this subject alone (some of 
which are listed in this work’s endnotes).107  Thus the early Barelvis, 
generally speaking, did not support either the hyjrәt or jyhad movements in 
which Deobandis and others took active part.108 
 
Muslims,  Hindus,  and Politics :  c .1875—1916/c. 1292—1334 .  
The seemingly endless speculation surrounding the great 1947/1366 partition of a 
subcontinent began years before the event itself even occurred, and continues to 
fascinate scholars to the present day.  Was the episode that gave birth to Pakistan, 
ripping two wings off of India—West Pakistan in the west, East Bengal (later East 
Pakistan, then Bangladesh) in the east—inevitable?  If not, what event or series of 
events are to blame for setting in motion the greatest schism of the twentieth century?  
Was it the refusal of the princes to join the All-India Federation, provided for under the 
constitution of 1935/1354?  After all, it was this decision that caused the British 
government to place its hopes, previously invested in the princes, firmly in the lap of 
Jinnah and the League, certainly a major turning point that receives relatively minor 
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notice.109  Or was it the resignation of the Congress’s provincial ministries in 
1939/1358?  This move, in hindsight almost certainly a major blunder, created a power 
vacuum in the country—of which Jinnah took full advantage (and which pushed Viceroy 
Linlithgow to lean ever more heavily on the League).  Speaking of Linlithgow, was it 
the Viceroy’s conviction, and actions to that end, that Jinnah should be built up as the 
“sole spokesman” of all of India’s Muslims that led, eventually, to India’s great split?  
Linlithgow himself had stated, after all, that his goal was to “shepherd all the Muslims 
into the [Muslim League] fold.”110  Along these lines, was it the British tactic of playing 
off the Muslims, in the form of the League, against the Congress, thus “[creating] the 
conditions on the ground that made partition possible” just a few years later?111  Or was 
partition born, as some scholars insist, of the British need to preserve an imperial 
foothold in South Asia (one that could protect India from Soviet influence and Central 
Asia from Soviet designs on oil), a need that led to the Anglo-Muslim League alliance 
and, eventually, the emergence of a separate (British-friendly) state called Pakistan? 
Whatever the answer to this highly controversial interrogative, one thing is certain: 
at least some of the more significant roots of Partition can be clearly identified several 
decades before any of the above-mentioned phenomena—within the politics of Hindu-
Muslim unity (and disunity) in the quarter century between about 1890/1307 and 
1915/1333, and particularly in the year 1905-1906/1323-1324.  For it was over the 
course of that brief latter period that several major developments emerged, 
developments that would push Muslims of varying stripes into a seemingly single 
“Muslim” fold in the name of sticking together against what was perceived as a rising 
and even militant Hindu tide.  Indeed, one could make a strong argument (and many do) 
that the “Hindus” of “Hindustan” were largely indifferent “towards Muslims as 
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Muslims,” until the very period in question—when “a separateness began to be asserted 
by the Muslims themselves.”  Enter Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan, Barelvi guiding light 
Ahmad Riza Khan, poet-philosopher Muhammad Iqbal, and, eventually, League head 
Muhammad ‘Ali Jinnah.  This alleged prior Hindu indifference “suggests that [the] 
political question of whether ‘Muslims are a separate nation’ was fundamentally 
misplaced, which is why it became and still remains so divisive.”112  In any case, 
something happened over the course of this period (c. 1890/1307 and c. 1915/1333) that 
abruptly made Muslims highly aware of their own “separateness.” 
In the Deccan, Tilak’s “strictly Hindu” cultural nationalism had roared to life in the 
1890s/1310s through a combination of his Marathi-language political paper (Kesari, 
meaning “The Lion”) and the revival of a centuries-old Hindu festival commemorating 
the birth of one of India’s most popular figures of worship: Ganesh, Shiva’s elephant-
headed son.113  The latter became an annual affair lasting ten wild days, as rural 
peasants poured into central India’s towns and cities to sing, dance, eat, and experience 
“patriotic” presentations based on stories from ancient Hindu scripture.  The dark side 
of these “Ganapati festivals,” however, lay in the communalism that they fostered, 
particularly in the form of the “Ganesh guards,” organized groups of armed young 
Hindus who sought to disrupt the worship of Muslims by means of raucous 
demonstrations outside of mosques.  Such displays obviously alienated the local (and 
sizable) Muslim communities.  Things got worse for the cause of Hindu-Muslim unity 
after 1895/1312, when Tilak inaugurated a second major festival, this one 
commemorating the birth of the great Maratha soldier-king Shivaji, who had fought so 
relentlessly against both the Bahmani sultans of the Deccan and the Mughals to the 
north.  Shivaji was cast as a heroic warrior for Hinduism crusading against the evil 
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forces of Islam (like the British cast as invading aliens), and while millions of Indians 
became caught up in the nationalist movement by means of such symbolism, millions of 
Indian Muslims—a quarter of the subcontinent’s population—found no comfort, and 
more than a little trepidation, in this explosion of stringently Hindu nationalism.  In 
1897/1315, that nationalism produced its first act of violent terrorism when one of 
Tilak’s disciples, almost certainly inspired by Tilak’s appeal to Hindu scripture as 
potential justification for killing, assassinated a British official. 
Similar Hindu nationalist surges were then occurring in Bengal, where, by the turn 
of the century, “bәnde matәrәm” (“I bow to thee, Mother”)—an explicitly Hindu 
equivocation of India with the Hindu goddess, or “Mother,” Durga—had become the 
clarion call for Hindu nationalists both in Bengal and beyond to struggle for 
independence against the British yoke.  “Bande Mataram…was the cry of the day,” 
wrote one Indian nationalist of prominence.  “It was chanted in schools, in colleges, in 
streets, in houses, in public squares, almost everywhere.”114  (In 2009, the dar ul’alwm at 
Deoband issued a fәtwa forbidding Muslims to utter the phrase, despite its patriotic 
symbolism, setting off a firestorm of controversy and prompting some Indians to call for 
the Deobandis’ immediate expulsion from the country).115  Meanwhile, members of the 
Hindu revivalist Arya Samaj (a phenomenon one British observer predicted could 
become “the most important religious movement in the whole of India”), founded in 
1875/1292 in Bombay, were highly active across Hindustan—and often regarded as the 
bane of both “the Musulman Mullah and the Christian missionary” as a result of their 
often successful efforts aimed at the “reconversion” of formerly Hindu (and now mostly 
Muslim) populations.116  By the first decade of the twentieth/fourteenth century, the 
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movement would motivate Hindu nationalist political activists, too, particularly in the 
Punjab. 
Set within this context, perhaps the divided “Muslim” reaction to the organization of 
a pan-“Indian” entity challenging (however gingerly at first) British authority is not so 
surprising, especially given the fact that the entity in question was widely regarded as a 
Hindu one.  In 1885/1302, less than two decades after the founding of the dar ul’alwm at 
Deoband, a group of sixty-nine British-educated Indians (mostly Hindus from the 
Madras and Bombay presidencies), one Englishman, and two Scots gathered together at 
Bombay’s Gokuldas Tejpal Sanskrit College.  Their purpose: the founding of an 
organization that would stand as a voice (nay, the voice) of the Indian people; they called 
it the Indian National Congress.  The group attracted scant attention at first, relative to 
its later importance, but by 1888/1305 its activities had elicited a response—highly 
negative—from the great Islamic reformer and founder of the Muslim university at 
Aligarh, the aforementioned Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan.  Decidedly a man of action, the 
modernist Muslim leader—who had supported the British during the 1879-1882/1296-
1299 Ahmed Arabi-led Egyptian revolt, and would do so again when the British more 
or less backed the Greeks in their quarrels with the Ottoman empire in 1897/1315—
created his own organization, clearly meant to be a “Muslim” alternative to the mostly 
Hindu Congress, which he named the United India Patriotic Association.  The group 
was explicit in its opposition to the Indian National Congress—and, just as importantly, 
was committed to actually “strengthen[ing] British rule in India.”117  “The bulk of the 
educated Mohammedans has opposed the Congress,” wrote Lala Lajpat Rai, “in order to 
please the Government and win their gratitude.”118 
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The Deobandis responded to the INC-UIPA division quickly.  In an 1888/1306 
fәtwa written by Rashid Ahmad Gangohi, and despite the communalist tensions 
brewing in various parts of India at the time, the aged mwlana declared that, when it 
came to worldly affairs (like politics), cooperation with the Hindus was permitted.  As long 
as said cooperation did not cause “damage to the faith,” the Deobandi leader could find 
no fault in it.  Additionally, Rashid Ahmad warned the Muslims of India that they 
“should not unite [themselves] with Sayyid Ahmad,” his organization, or his political 
movement and philosophy.119  The Deoband-Aligarh breach that grew mostly from this 
incident would create in the minds of historians and scholars of later generations the 
idea that the major political rivalry within the pre-Partition Muslim community was 
between these two parties.  There is some truth in this, certainly—but the divide 
foreshadowed the political schism between Deobandi and Barelvi that was soon to 
follow (and which, it could be argued, would have far more significant and lasting 
implications).  After all, it was from the ranks of the Aligarh school that the leaders of 
the Muslim League would come, and the Barelvis would throw their weight, however 
reluctantly, behind them.  The Deobandis, by and large, chose to cooperate with the 
Congress; by 1916/1334, J. T. Sutherland could write that the INC was “the most 
important political organization in the country.”120  It might be said that the seeds of the 
Deobandi-Barelvi political rivalry were thus sown when Sayyid Ahmad Khan decided 
not to embrace the INC, but to oppose it. 
(Incidentally, if any group could claim political leadership of India’s Muslims in the 
early twentieth century/1320s, it was, thanks to their position and organization, 
probably the Aligarh party, whose stance, generally speaking, was one of loyalty to the 
British regime and aloofness from the nationalist movement.  But the tenuousness of the 
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Aligarh group’s position was revealed beginning in 1912/1330 with the publication of 
Al Hilal, Abul Kalam Azad’s highly nationalist Urdu journal; its high circulation—
reportedly twenty-six thousand per week after only two years—and popularity were 
evidence that a significant number of educated Muslims did not, in fact, feel politically 
represented by the Aligarh party.)121 
In any case, and even in the face of a rising Hindu consciousness enmeshing itself 
into the pan-Indian nationalist movement, the Deobandis had proclaimed that 
cooperation with the Hindus, however limited by appropriate bounds, was the proper 
course of action.  This was to mark the first major political schism between Deobandi 
and Barelvi, for though the very name “Pakistan” wouldn’t emerge until 1933/1352, 
Barelvi leader Ahmad Riza Khan was a staunch advocate of his own “two-nation 
theory,” one predating Jinnah’s, Iqbal’s, and even Choudhary Rahmat ‘Ali’s by several 
decades.  In the words of one of his supporters, “[Ahmad Riza] raised the voice against 
composite nationalism at a time when Iqbal and the Qaid-e-Azam were captives of [the 
idea]…  One might say that Imam Ahmad Riza was the leader while these two noble 
individuals were the followers with the respect to the Two-Nation Theory.”122  In the 
midst of Tilak’s politicization of Hindusim, the founding of the mostly Hindu INC, the 
Deobandi call for Hindu-Muslim unification within the political realm, and Sayyid 
Ahmad’s plea against any sort of Hindu-Muslim political cooperation, Ahmad Riza 
Khan argued that India was essentially composed of two very distinct groups: (1) the 
idol-worshippers (but pәrәst) and (2) the idol-breakers (but shykәn; incidentally, this title 
is popularly applied to Mahmud of Ghazni as the destroyer of a major idol at 
Somnath).123  In so doing, Ahmad Riza was applying a term that had been used to refer 
to India’s pagan population since ancient times.  Indeed, the term but pәrәst had 
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probably first been applied by the Central Asian Zoroastrians, in reference to Buddhist 
(hence but) penetration into the region.  By the time Muslim armies began pouring into 
the subcontinent via the northwest, but pәrәst had come to refer to an “idol-worshipper” 
generally, without distinction between sects or religions.124  Unification of these two 
diametrically opposed groups into a single polity, Ahmad Riza argued, would be 
impossible—indeed, it violated shәri’at, since Hindus were clearly to be looked upon as a 
people with whom to be at war, making any sort of united front with them forbidden.125  
When, decades after Ahmad Riza’s death, the call came for just such a division (and 
despite its source), perhaps it was only natural for most Barelvis to interpret the 
League’s demand for Pakistan through this lens—and lend their voices to those 
advocating Partition.  After all, their movement’s greatest teacher had promoted 
something similar.  It may not be an overstatement to say that Ahmad Riza’s own 
political philosophy had thus laid the groundwork for a general Barelvi acceptance of 
the demand for Pakistan a quarter-century after his passing.  The challenge, of course, is 
that, should Ahmad Riza Khan and Muhammad ‘Ali Jinnah ever had had the chance to 
sit and chat about their separate visions for a Muslim homeland on the subcontinent 
after winning the Partition battle, they likely wouldn’t have agreed on much at all.  Still, 
to the time of this writing, Barelvis continue to accuse Deobandis of “generally being 
with the Hindus”; Deobandis, according to the Barelvi argument, literally “hate” (nәfrәt 
kәrna) Muslims, against whom “their attacks” are “always” aimed.126  This position 
traces back to the original political positions taken by Rashid Ahmad Gangohi and 
Ahmad Riza Khan.  To this day, too, a common Barelvi claim is that the Pakistan 
Movement may never have been born if not for Ahmad Riza’s original denunciation of 
composite nationalism—and any meaningful cooperation with Hindus whatsoever.127 
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In any case, Ahmad Riza’s stance was strictly communal, forbidding Hindu-Muslim 
political cooperation.  But his reasoning went beyond the idea that the two communities 
were simply too different—indeed, opposed—to ever practically unite within the 
context of politics.  Indeed, Ahmad Riza’s definition of religious community was spelled 
out in “cultural rather than political terms” (italics added), according to Sanyal.  Within 
this cultural framework, Ahmad Riza Khan explicitly advised his followers not to engage 
in political action against British rule in India.  The British, he argued, had not 
interfered in the internal affairs of the Muslim community over which they governed.  
He pointed out that Muslims were still free to practice their religion, in private and in 
public.  And he backed up his arguments with examples from classical Islamic sources.  
Ahmad Riza’s teachings in this regard naturally rubbed up against strong opinion to the 
contrary, even among his own followers, and, sure enough, a schism developed; some 
followed his entreaty while others rebelled.128  Despite this, Ahmad Riza maintained 
what one renowned scholar of South Asian Islam described as “his normal stance of 
support for government…”129  But many Muslims disagreed with Ahmad Riza’s 
assertion that the British had not interfered in the Muslim community’s ability to 
practice their faith.  This was particularly true when it came to the law.  Early company 
officials (under Warren Hastings), like well-known Orientalist Sir William Jones, for 
example, strove to specifically delineate “Mohammadan” law as a basis for its practical 
application within British courts.  Whatever the intention of such efforts, this almost 
certainly had a rigidifying effect on what had most likely been a far more fluid system, 
with the several Islamic legal schools and their variants being variously applied across 
the subcontinent according to local conditions.  Indeed, the British invested “almost 
exclusive authority” in a small handful of medieval Islamic legal texts that they 
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considered authoritative.130  Later, an 1860/1277 penal code effectively prevented 
Islamic criminal law from being applied in British courts altogether; the move was 
justified in the name of “unity, precision, and simplicity,” as central authorities are apt to 
do.131  Many Indian courts went without a Muslim qazi, or judge of Islamic law, forcing 
some ‘alәma (both Deobandi and Barelvi) to create their own shadow court system. 
In any case, Ahmad Riza Khan’s assertion that “there was no religious justification 
for Indian Muslims taking an anti-British stand” drew hisses from many rival ‘alәma, 
who accused him of being pro-British.132  Many Deobandis even came to regard Ahmad 
Riza as an out-and-out British agent, a charge consistently leveled against the Bareilly 
scholar to the time of this writing, despite the lack of any hard evidence.  These 
allegations aside, Sanyal describes Ahmad Riza’s more complicated relationship with 
British authority as follows: 
 
Ahmad Riza indicated his distance from the British Indian state in a 
number of small but nonetheless significant ways.  He himself cited some 
of these.  He had written anti-British poems, he said, in some works he 
named; he had spoken out against the Nadwa [who were close to the 
Deobandis], which enjoyed British support; he had opposed ‘Abd ul-
Bari’s fatwa on the Kanpur mosque affair of 1913, in which ‘Abd ul-Bari 
had said that the demolition (by the British civil authorities) was 
permissible as it had taken place outside the mosque proper, and so on.  
When mailing a postcard he would deliberately affix the stamp (which 
had a picture of Queen Victoria on it) upside down as a mark of disrespect 
to the Queen.  More importantly, his refusal to attend a British-run court 
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in 1916 showed that he did not acknowledge its authority over himself.  
But he never made the British a target of his writings—as he did 
numerous contemporary Muslim movements and even, to some extent, 
Hindus—because they did not really matter to him.  Had the British had 
an active anti-Muslim policy in terms of interference in religious affairs, 
however, Ahmad Riza would undoubtably have become very anti-
British.133 
 
Thus, according to Sanyal, Ahmad Riza’s aloofness to the politics of British rule in 
India was rooted in the fact that he and all Muslims remained free to practice their day-
to-day religion.  British interference here would likely have driven him to agitate 
against the government, though, unlike the Deobandis, such agitation would almost 
certainly not have included any sort of joint effort with India’s Hindu communities.  It is 
possible, too, that Ahmad Riza’s seemingly gentler attitude towards the British had 
something to do with the political situation in which he was raised—circumstances that 
were quite different from the Deobandi fathers’.  After all, Ahmad Riza’s home territory 
of Rohilkhand had fallen under British East India Company rule more than half a 
century before he had even been born (1801/1216; Ahmad Riza was born in 
1856/1272).  Perhaps British rule was, for him, “normal”—or at least the only sort of 
government he had ever known, as opposed to the experience of military and political 
loss felt firsthand by the founders of Deobandism. 
It was also during this period that the Indian Councils Act (1909/1327)—known 
commonly as the Morley-Minto Reforms—was passed, among other things granting 
Indians (of privileged class) a layer of self-government, however thin.  Such Indians 
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could now elect other such Indians to seats on provincial legislative councils, where 
previously such seats had been either held by a British person or by an Indian appointed 
thereunto.  Crucially, the Act granted Muslims reserved seats on these provincial 
legislative councils out of proportion to their population, a decision borne of the Muslim 
fear that without such safeguards, they would be reduced to second-class citizen status 
in a Hindu-dominated country.  The reforms are relevant to this study in that they 
paved the way for further reforms in 1919/1411 and 1935/1354, galvanizing the ire of 
Indian (mostly Hindu) nationalists who viewed separate electorates as a communalistic 
measure that would prevent the sort of Hindu-Muslim Indian nationalism they were 
ostensibly trying to foster.  By institutionalizing separate electorates, the Act pushed 
the Congress, in 1916, to accept the arrangement in the Lucknow Pact—and when, with 
the coming forth of the Nehru Report, the separate electorates system was dismissed, it 
led to a permanent breach both between many Hindu and Muslim political leaders and 
their parties and organizations and between Muslims who had, up to that time, been 
supporting the Congress. 
* 
Meanwhile, events overseas contributed to the development of a sort of pan-Islamic 
resurgence among Muslims of otherwise diverse political worldviews.  In particular, the 
Balkan Wars (1912-1913/1330-1331), which saw various once-Ottoman polities 
attacking the Ottoman empire (claiming that their territory, based on ethnic 
considerations, should extend further into the Ottoman domain), motivated Muslims 
around the globe to rally to the cause of the Turks against what was interpreted as a 
mostly Christian attempt to hack away at a once-proud Muslim empire.  Deobandi 
leaders enthusiastically united their voices with those advocating pan-Islamic solidarity 
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in the face of non-Muslim incursions; Mahmud Hasan and other divines of Deoband 
were particularly vocal in this regard.  On the other hand, Ahmad Riza and many of his 
Barelvi acolytes shied away from such advocacy, and indeed, many of the subcontinent’s 
‘alәma followed suit.  Several fәtawa began circulating around India, arguing against 
any sort of pan-Islamic intervention into the affairs of the Turks.  These dissenting 
scholars saw the conflicts then embroiling the Ottoman Empire as more of a civil war—
one that certainly did not affect Indian Muslims.  In any case, they argued, the war was 
a political one, not a religious one; not even Islam’s holy sites (over which the caliphs 
had long been the guardians) were in danger.  Finally, these juridical rulings pointed 
out, as did Ahmad Riza Khan explicitly in 1913/1331, that the Ottoman sultanate was 
not the true Islamic caliphate—and thus Muslims were under no spiritual obligation 
whatsoever to go running to its defense.  On multiple occasions, Mahmad Hasan 
harshly criticized such fәtawa (in particular one written by ‘Abdul Haq and signed by 
many others, which was brought to his attention several times and evidently received 
wide publicity); their writers criticized back, and the issue remained divided.134  Still, for 
millions of Muslims around the globe, including in India, the events rocking the 
Ottoman regime drove solidarity more than division. 
The next year (1914/1332), Turkey entered the Great War and Sultan Mehmed V 
issued a proclamation of jyhad against the Allies (including the British, of course)—a call 
that the British tried to squelch by assuring the Muslims under its rule that Islam’s holy 
sites would under no circumstances be harmed.  In India, Muslims of all stripes rushed 
to affirm their fealty to London (though, in the case of some who did this—like 
‘Ubaidullah Sindhi—such affirmations should be taken with a grain of salt, especially 
considering their political machinations at the time, not to mention their subsequent 
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anti-British activities).  Once again, too, the Deobandi-Barelvi dynamic was made 
evident when the British government induced leading loyal ‘alәma, including Ahmad 
Riza Khan, to issue juridical rulings supporting loyalty to the British government, in 
opposition to such “extremists” as Mahmud Hasan and Farangi Mahal’s ‘Abdul Bari.135  
The rulings echoed those of previous years advocating for Indian Muslims to leave the 
Turkey issue well enough alone.  Still, such events drove millions of Muslims into a 
more explicitly anti-British camp, one that would facilitate cooperation even with 
Hindus in order to rid the subcontinent of its foreign overlords. 
Perhaps the greatest force influencing Barelvi rejection of Muslim-Congress 
cooperation was the ardent devotion that its founder demonstrated towards the self-
reliance of the Muslim community.  In fact, according to one fәtwa, written in 1913/1331 
(one which Sanyal asserts may have been his only juridical ruling, from among 
thousands, dealing strictly with practical, political issues rather than purely religious 
ones),136 Ahmad Riza encouraged the adoption of a four-pronged program aimed at 
insulating the Muslim community of India from both potential Hindu predators and the 
British Raj.  In effect, he was offering an alternative to the Deobandi approach.  The 
fәtwa suggested Muslims should: (1) boycott British Indian courts, instead relying on 
local Muslim law; (2) purchase what they needed only from fellow Muslims (and never 
go into debt to Hindu moneylenders); (3) if wealthy and city-dwelling, open up interest-
free banks for the use of fellow Muslims; and (4) acquire additional light and knowledge 
pertaining to their faith, thereby strengthening the Muslim community as a whole.137  If 
the fәtwa represents Ahmad Riza’s political philosophy vis-à-vis the political situation 
facing the Indian Muslim community of the time, it may be highly instructive.  For it 
reveals, first, a desire to see the Muslim community function separately from all others; 
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in other situations, as previously mentioned, Ahmad Riza and his followers would go 
further, refusing to work even with fellow Muslims if they belonged to “lost” groups or 
espoused “bad” doctrine.  Second, it suggests that Ahmad Riza did not feel that the 
Muslims were in any state to take an active role in the politics of the time; they needed 
first to shore themselves up, both temporally and spiritually.  Third, it demonstrates a 
desire on the part of Ahmad Riza to see a restoration (even elevation), however slowly, 
of the traditional role of the ‘alәma within the Muslim community.  A boycott of a major 
pillar of the British Raj—that of the court system—was a bold move, one that he would 
take himself in 1917/1335.  All of this goes a long way in explaining Barelvi opposition 
not just to standard Deobandi political positions, but to Deobandi involvement in 
nationalist politics in the first place. 
But perhaps the most important event in its long-term ramifications for the 
possibility of Hindu-Muslim unity came in 1905/1323.  It was in this year that the great 
partition of Bengal into more or less Muslim and Hindu sections took place.  The action, 
described by Gokhale as “concocted in the dark and carried out in the face of the fiercest 
opposition,” would foreshadow the far greater partition that would follow around forty 
years later.  Viceroy Curzon insisted that the move was strictly practical, meant to deal 
with what otherwise represented the bureaucratic nightmare of administering a 
province of almost ninety million inhabitants.  But to the Bengali-speaking Hindus of 
Bengal, and particularly the bhadralok of Calcutta, whose fearless opinion had so long 
irked the Crown’s representatives on the subcontinent, the move was clearly meant to 
isolate and nullify any influence they might have enjoyed as a majority constituency.  By 
dividing the province down its middle, with the new border just to the east of Calcutta, 
the British—whether by coincidence or by design—had neatly created a Muslim 
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majority province to the east (in Eastern Bengal and Assam) and a Hindu-majority 
province to the west in which Bengali-speakers suddenly found themselves a minority in 
their own bifurcated country (outnumbered by the combined Bihari- and Oriya-speaking 
peoples inhabiting the newly created political zone). 
While Hindus across Bengal and Hindustan protested vociferously, the Muslims of 
newly created Eastern Bengal and Assam, previously dominated politically by Calcutta, 
suddenly found themselves un-beholden to the Hindu moneylenders and landowners to 
the west, and their one-time backwater of Dhaka abruptly elevated to provincial capital 
status.  Indeed, to these millions, it was difficult not to interpret the hotly contested 
partition of Bengal as a very good thing.  But beyond the political freedom that came 
with the move, it was the Hindu reaction across India that really isolated many 
Muslims, causing them to band together in opposition to their fellow Indians of Hindu 
persuasion.  Muslim leaders in Dhaka and Aligarh reached out to one another as a 
result, and in October of 1906/Sh’aban of 1324, a delegation of said leaders under the 
nominal headship of the twenty-nine-year-old third Aga Khan—ostensibly representing 
the community of Islam in Hindustan—met Viceroy Minto.  Their purpose: to lobby for 
the political rights of India’s Muslims.  This initial delegation would later evolve into 
what the world would come to know as the All-India Muslim League, officially 
organized and founded (significantly, in Dhaka) two months later, on 30 December 
1906/14 Dh’ul Q’adah 1324.  The partition of Bengal had thus awoken the Muslim 
minority—or at least the most financially, socially, and politically elite among them—
and provided the stimulus necessary for their initial political organization.  From now 
on, the fate of the independence movement would, in large measure, be dictated by the 
dynamic between these two now-politically-organized groups.  The battle lines had 
  
  146 
been drawn, and the Deobandis and the Barelvis, by and large, would choose to stand on 
opposite sides.   
With the anullment of the Bengal partition in 1911/1329 under largely “Hindu” 
pressure, “Muslim” disappointment only increased.  Indeed, the British decision to 
restore Bengal “annoyed the Muslims” and was “a clear breach of assurances and 
commitments made by the British regarding the inviolability of the partition.”  And the 
following years clearly demonstrated that a sort of political “turning point” in the 
history of Indian Muslims had occurred.  “It could be argued,” one Pakistani legal 
commentator would opine decades later, “that the seeds of Pakistan were sown by this 
one event.”138 
With the passing of a couple years, however, there were signs that the communalism 
might actually be ebbing in the face of a common enemy.  A younger cadre of 
Aligarhists (whence came the core of the League), disaffected by Sir Sayyid’s old loyalist 
policy, pushed a more ardently anti-British agenda.  Many of these had been influenced 
by a rationalist-traditionalist scholar from Azamgarh, mwlana Shibli (d. 1914 AD), 
whose passion for the glorious Muslim past seemed veritably contagious and whose 
politics lined up more or less with the Deobandi leadership’s.139  Under this pressure 
from within, in 1913/1331 the Muslim League adopted a position much like that of the 
Congress’s, advocating for a level of self-government in India, albeit still under the 
auspices of the British Crown.  This shift in stance opened the way for a brief period of 
communal unity, generally speaking, exemplified by the Lucknow Pact of 1916/1334 
(according to which the Congress agreed to the League demand for separate communal 
electorates) and the subsequent cooperation of the Muslim League with the Indian 
National Congress.  One of the most dedicated proponents of Hindu-Muslim unity was 
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a young London-trained lawyer named Muhammad ‘Ali Jinnah.  Ahmad Riza Khan and 
many of his Barelvi followers, meanwhile, were fierce opponents of the Pact; the divine 
out of Bareilly characterized Deobandi cooperation with the Hindus as nothing more 
than a disgraceful “sell-out.”140 
 
Spreading the Rivalry :  the Proliferation of mәdarys Networks . 
Rashid Ahmad Gangohi passed away in 1905/1323, and with him the last of the 
major “first generation” founders.  The Deobandi university’s first student, Mahmud 
Hasan, easily slipped into the role of the revivalist movement’s leader.  Described by one 
of his more illustrious students as “of spare frame, unassuming” (and even “skeletal, 
frail,” though in his capacity as a teacher or lecturer reportedly able to assume the 
presence of “a lion of God”)141 Mahmad Hasan had, to quote Faruqi, “drunk deep in the 
spirit and the ideas underlying the foundation of the [dar ul’alwm]” and was a “man of 
action.”142  Virtually since birth, Mahmad Hasan—by virtue of his family—had been 
tied to the institution at Deoband and the movement that grew out of it.  His father, 
Zulfiqar ‘Ali (d. 1904 AD), had studied at Delhi College with the great Mamluk ‘Ali and 
Sadr al-Din Azardah, as had his uncle, the aforementioned Mahtab ‘Ali.  Later, Mahtab 
‘Ali would be numbered “among Deoband’s most distinguished teachers,” while Zulfiqar 
‘Ali, who worked as a professor at Bareilly College and as deputy inspector of mәdarys in 
Meerut before relocating to Deoband, would gain a significant reputation as a great 
scholar himself, particularly of Arabic (but also of Farsi and even “western knowledge”).  
At Deoband, Zulfiqar ‘Ali’s family acquired a sort of scholarly distinction in the area, 
despite the proliferation of both noted local ‘alәma and great families for whom religious 
scholarship was a long tradition; his three younger brothers, mwlana Hakim 
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Muhammad Hasan (who worked in the service of Rashid Ahmad in Gangoh, studied at 
the dar ul’alwm in Deoband, and later served as a teacher there for over four decades), 
mwlana Hamid Hasan, and mwlvi hafyž  Muhammad Mahasan, all achieved impressive 
levels of scholarship.  Both Mahtab ‘Ali and Zulfiqar ‘Ali had served as teachers to the 
young Muhammad Qasim Nanautawi, both were among the Deobandi university’s most 
distinguished and active founders, and both became “pillars” of the dar ul’alwm’s mәjlys-e 
shwra.  In fact, Mahmad Hasan’s “entire household participated in this scholarly 
movement [the founding of the dar ul’alwm at Deoband].”143   Thus it was perhaps only 
natural that under Mahmad Hasan—evidently the xәlifәħ of Imdadullah himself—the 
Deobandi movement would enter its first explicitly political, even anti-British, phase.  
Concurrent with that development was the establishment and spread of a Deobandi 
“network” of associated mәdarys, typically run by former students of the dar ul’alwm at 
Deoband and dedicated to the spiritual (including political) vision of the school’s 
founders and current leadership.  During Mahmud Hasan’s tenure as the university’s 
Sәdәr mәdarys, the student population is reported to have tripled, from around two 
hundred when he first took office to over six hundred when he passed away.  Around a 
dozen schools associated themselves with the institution at Deoband by 1880/1297, ten 
years before Mahmud Hasan began as principal.  By 1900/1317, a decade into his 
tenure, there were around forty. 
Indeed, by the turn of the twentieth century AD (a decade after Mahmud Hasan was 
made principal) the dar ul’alwm had associated schools established as far east as 
Chittagong, and in Dhaka, Calcutta, Patna, Arrah, Darbhanga, Benares, Ghazipur, 
Mubarakpur, Jaunpur, Fatehpur, Shahjahanpur, Karnal, Lahore, Gujranwala, and as far 
south as Madras.144  In the northwest (especially in Peshawar) among the Pathan tribes, 
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Deobandism quickly established itself, too.  Thanks in large part to the groundwork laid 
by the combination of Naqshbandiyya-Mujaddidi dominance (set in motion after the 
1748/1161 Afghan raid of Delhi) and the influence of sәyyid Ahmad and, later, the 
powerful Akhund of Swat, many among the tribal ‘alәma—and particularly those of the 
eastern Pathan, in what is today northwestern Pakistan—looked to Deoband for 
religious inspiration and spiritual guidance.  After all, Akhund Ghaffur had acted as a 
major player in what might be considered a nineteenth-century/thirteenth-century 
microcosmic precursor to the Deobandi-Barelvi rivalry: the feud between the divine of 
Swat and the Kotah Mullah, Muruf Bey.  The latter had supported the British (as did, in 
the eyes of many Deobandis as of the time of this writing, Ahmad Riza Khan, however 
tacitly) even as the Akhund actively fought against them.  In addition, the Akhund was 
a dedicated revivalist, while the Kotah Mullah, according to Abdul Ghaffur, 
incorporated un-Islamic ritual into his religious practice (the same charge, of course, 
leveled by Deobandis against Barelvis a few years later).  Later, too, the pir of Manki 
Sharif would split with the Hadda Mullah, by far the Akhund’s most prominent spiritual 
successor, over similar religious differences; the schism would foreshadow the divide, 
half a century later, between the pir of Manki Sharif (now classified as Barelvi and a 
hard-core Muslim League supporter) and the (mostly Deobandi, INC-supporting) “Red 
Shirts” in the years before Partition.  As the Akhund’s “pedagogic line” was the 
“dominant one” among the eastern Pathans, perhaps it was only natural that 
Deobandism would find such ready acceptance there.145  Thus, to quote Haroon, 
 
The pirimuridi line of the Akhund Ghaffur-Hadda Mulla, unified by the 
bait and directed by the Hadda Mulla into the twentieth century, became 
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the vehicle for the dissemination of a revivalist ideology of religious 
practice through the eastern Pakhtun regions, and, with its creation, the 
Tribal Areas.146 
 
The continuity that existed between the Akhund Ghaffur’s line of authority and the dar 
ul’alwm at Deoband—a continuity that resulted in the widespread establishment of 
Deobandi mәdarys among the Pathans—may be demonstrated by the example of the 
Hadda Mullah’s “most important” disciple, Fazal Wahid (d. 1937 AD), later known as 
Haji Turangzai.  Fazal Wahid initially studied under one of the Akhund’s murids, then 
in a Waliullahi mәdrәsәħ in Tehkal, before relocating to Deoband in order to study at 
the now-famous university there.  Just the fact that he chose to make the long journey 
to the UP to study at Deoband demonstrates, perhaps, the institution’s powerful pull in 
the Pathan northwest.  In any case, at Deoband he became friends with Mahmud Hasan, 
with whom he performed the hәj to Mecca.  While in Arabia, Fazal Wahid met with and 
received bi’at from none other than Imdadullah, to whom he swore to carry on the 
legacy of sәyyid Ahmad of Raebareli—to “promote revivalism and opposition to the 
British,” specifically among the Pathans.  After returning home, Fazal Wahid became a 
student of the Hadda Mullah, only to become a famous ‘alym himself, helping to spread 
Deobandism in the tribal areas.147 
A number of other prominent Deoband graduates moved to the Pathan northwest 
after the completion of their religious training, along with several Pathan ‘alәma who 
likewise received their education at the dar ul’alwm.  Many of these former students 
established Deobandi seminaries of their own in the frontier region.  One of these 
Pathan Deobandis (described by Haroon as “the most important”) was Saifur Rahman, 
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from Mathra.  After studying at Deoband, Saifur Rahman taught for some time in an 
‘Ubaidullah Sindhi-founded school near Delhi, where he (Saifur Rahman) recruited 
many other Pathan students to join him.  After 1914/1332, he moved back to the 
northwest frontier (followed by many of his students) to carry on the revivalist 
endeavor among his fellow Pathans.148 
* 
From the very beginning, the Barelvis lagged behind their Deobandi counterparts 
within the domain of mәdrәsәħ-building.  Sanyal attributes Ahmad Riza Khan’s seeming 
lack of emphasis on the religious seminary (at least in its revivivalist form, as in the case 
of the Deobandi dar ul’alwm or even Sir Sayyid’s college at Aligarh) to his own 
educational experience, gleaning as he did the vast majority of his own knowledge by 
himself from books, or at the feet of a small handful of teachers in the traditional, one-
on-one setting.  Still, by 1920/1338 the movement could claim a number of institutions 
as adhering strictly to the “Ahl-e-Sunnat” (i.e. Barelvi) way.  In 1904-1905/1322-1323, 
with Ahmad Riza Khan’s personal approbation, one of the great man’s students—
Zafaruddin Bihari (later to become one of Ahmad Riza Khan’s authorized 
biographers)—together with Ahmad Riza’s young son Hamid Riza (d. 1943 AD) and 
brother Hasan Riza (d. 1908 AD), founded the mәdrәsәħ Manzar al-Islam.  It would 
never become a great dar ul’alwm (in this early period the school graduated a mere four 
to ten students per year), much less the institutional hub of the movement, but as 
Ahmad Riza Khan acted personally as its sәrpәrәst and his son Hamid as its chief 
administrator (with their descendents—to this day—running the school attached to the 
mәsjyd Bibiji), the seminary quickly acquired, from the beginning, a sort of symbolical 
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status as an Ahl-e-Sunnat center.  Indeed, as early as 1908/1326, its graduation 
ceremony was attracting scholars and Sufis from hundreds of miles away.149  
But there were other, grander schools (mostly in northern India), which, by the 
early twentieth/fourteenth century, had established themselves as belonging to the 
movement.  These included the centuries-old mәdrәsәħ ‘Aliyya in Rampur, where, 
perhaps appropriately, Barelvi predecessors Fazl-e-Haq Khairabadi and ‘Abd ul-Haqq 
Khairabadi (d. 1899 AD) both had taught; the mәdrәsәħ al-Hadis in Pilibhit, founded in 
1893/1310 by Wasi Ahmad Muhaddis Surati; the mәdrәsәħ Shams al-‘Uloom in 
Badayun, founded by ‘Abd ul-Qayyum (d. 1900 AD) in 1899/1317; and the mәdrәsәħ 
Hanafiyya in Patna, established by ‘Abd ul-Wahid Firdausi Azimabadi (d. 1908 AD) in 
1900/1318.  Other schools, too, associated with Ahmad Riza Khan and Barelvism, 
proliferated across the subcontinent, especially from the 1920s/1340s (like the Jamia 
Naeemia in Moradabad, about which more later).  Each of these institutions was 
formulated with an express purpose: to combat the pernicious spread of “Wahhabism,” 
including more than any other sect that of the Deobandis.  To illustrate the point, one 
Barelvi commentator, lauding the efforts of Didar ‘Ali Alwari (who founded the dar 
ul’alwm Hizb al-Ahnaf in Lahore in the 1920s/1340s), wrote that, if not for his (Didar 
‘Ali’s) endeavors, “the whole Punjab would today be full of ‘Wahhabis’.”  Such 
sentiments reinforce the status of Barelvism as a counter-reformational movement.  In 
any case, as Sanyal concludes, these early-twentieth-century AD Ahl-e-Sunnat 
seminaries were nonetheless “instrumental in creating a network of personal links 
between ‘ulama’ and in producing new leaders.”150  Still, the early characterization of 
Barelvi efforts to build mәdarys as trailing that of the Deobandis would continue to be an 
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accurate portrayal through Partition, in Pakistan, and into the twenty-first/fifteenth 
century to the time of this writing. 
* 
Given the now-established preponderance of Deobandism in the northwest frontier 
region—plus its long history of insurgency against the encroaching British leviathan, 
especially via Deobandi forebear sәyyid Ahmad of Raebareli and his various jyhadi 
successors—perhaps it is only natural that the Deobandi leaders, no longer fearful of 
being associated with a long past “Mutiny,” would select this very area as the staging 
ground for their first major anti-British scheme since the school’s founding.  After all, 
Mahmud Hasan himself had long been establishing “rapport” with the religious scholars 
of the northwestern frontier regions, many of whom were former students of the dar 
ul’alwm.151  Remarked one official at the Deobandi university in 1947/1366 of Mahmud 
Hasan and his compatriots, 
 
[T]he passion of these great men against British power was neither for rank nor 
station, was not for ministerial chairs, was not for the power of any one party, 
but it was only for this: that the oppressed country be taken out from an 
oppressive nation’s grasp…  
  
The principal pastime of these great men was always talk and anxiety—[about] 
how to throw from [their] shoulders the yoke of the British.  This was the focus 
of their predictions and revelations…152 
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In addition, “large groups” of the Sәdәr mәdarys’s associates, including teachers, former 
students, disciples, and other contacts, many of whom had taken part in the countless 
clandestine meetings held in the dar ul’alwm principal’s own house, had already “fanned 
out in India and abroad…striving ardently and with temerity to put into action 
[Mahmud Hasan’s] prepared plan.”  Present at those secret meetings were “some men 
of the northwest border.”153  The future president of the tens-of-thousands-strong 
Pathan xuda-e-xydmәtgar (also known as the “KKs”), Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan (later 
dubbed the “Frontier Gandhi”), would visit Deoband in 1914/1332 after receiving a 
personal invitation by letter from Mahmud Hasan.  In Deoband he met with several of 
the university’s most eminent scholars to discuss the establishment of a base (or 
“center”) within one of the northwest frontier’s “free areas”—a base from which to 
launch the movement that would finally free Hindustan from British tyranny and pave 
the way for an Islamic resurgence.154 
The Deobandi leader’s idea was simple, grand, and infused with the hope of 
generations for the return of Islamic power on the subcontinent.  Today it is described 
by Deobandi historians as more or less naturally occurring within a succession of 
political action whose players included, in order, “hәżrәt Shah Waliullah, hәżrәt Shah 
‘Abdul ‘Aziz, hәżrәt sәyyid Ahmad shәhid, and hәżrәt Shah [Muhammad] Isma’ail 
shәhid… and hәżrәt Nanautawi and hәżrәt Gangohi.”155  This was to be shix ul-hynd’s 
contribution to the great struggle as the spiritual and political successor of the 
aforementioned freedom-fighting scholars.  Mahmud Hasan’s plan (evidently in 
incubation since at least 1905/1323):156 to start a tribal insurrection against British 
authority among the Pathans of the frontier, with the aid and support of Britain’s 
enemies—namely Afghanistan, Ottoman Turkey, and, to a lesser extent, Iran, imperial 
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Germany, and even Russia.  Islamic law demanded that military jyhad be launched from 
the base of a Muslim state; in this case that state was to be Afghanistan.  The British, 
fully invested in the violence of the Great War, half a world away, would be unable to 
quash the seemingly spontaneous militant movement, and Muslims across India would 
thereby be inspired to join the ranks of their frontier brethren in a pan-Indian Islamic 
revolt that would ultimately drive the foreign scourge from the subcontinent altogether.  
The “banner of Islam” would be planted in Hindustan once again, and Muslims would 
finally be free to practice their religion—including, essentially, the institution of its 
political structure.  This was the plan.  But first, the governments of Afghanistan, 
Turkey, Iran, and Germany would need to be convinced of its feasibility. 
With this in mind, in October 1915/Dh’ul Hijja 1333 Mahmud Hasan sent one of his 
most trusted disciples, the “highly trained” and indefatigable ‘Ubaidullah Sindhi, to 
Kabul.157  Sindhi was a converted Sikh who had worked on political projects before—
like the mysterious jәm’aiәt ul-әnsar,158 and the establishment of the Nazaratul Ma’ariful-
Quraniyya school in old Delhi.  The latter endeavor was designed to increase the 
‘alәma’s influence among the more Westernized segment of Muslims.159  Working 
under Mahmud Hasan’s direction, Sindhi (who, according to one London newspaper, 
had “infected some of the [dar ul’alwm’s] staff and students with his own militant and 
anti-British ideas”)160 would spend the next seven years in Afghanistan’s capital city, 
meeting with disaffected Indians and other enemies of the British presence in Hindustan 
(by December 1915/Safar 1334 he had already met with the Berlin-Indian Committee), 
organizing them into an effective resistance, helping to establish an Indian government-
in-exile (including individuals tied to the Ghadr Party),161 and even setting up a branch 
of the Indian National Congress, himself at its head and officially affiliated with the 
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main organization in India.  (It is interesting to note—and characteristic of the 
Deobandi modus operandi, that the head of the Sindhi-organized provisional government 
featured a prominent Hindu, Mahendra Pratap, as its president).  On the way to Kabul, 
too, Sindhi had met with the still-active remnants of the Indian fighters originally 
organized by sәyyid Ahmad of Raebareli around eighty-five years previously—the 
“Hindu Fanatics” as they were known by some (or, as a British report put it, “the 
fanatical India party of fighters”), originally based around Sittana.162  Sindhi hoped that 
from his Kabul base, he would be able to organize a great Muslim army, headquartered 
in the Hijaz (more specifically Medina, where Mahmud Hasan was to be commander-in-
chief) but with regional command centers in Istanbul, Tehran, and Kabul (where he 
himself would act as regional commander).  And though the әmir of Afghanistan never 
fully committed himself to out-and-out supporting an anti-British uprising among the 
Pathans—crucial to the success of Mahmud Hasan’s original plan—’Ubaidullah Sindhi 
was able to build very warm relations with the royal court, and played a significant role 
(sometimes directly, often indirectly) as an influencer of Afghanistan’s India-related 
foreign policy. 
Meanwhile, Mahmud Hasan (some say to avoid arrest)163 traveled to western 
Arabia, to Islam’s holiest cities, ostensibly to perform the hәj.  The Hijaz was mostly 
intended as a springboard, however, from where he might journey to Istanbul to meet 
with representatives from the Turkish government.  Such travel became unnecessary 
when, in 1916/1334, Turkish War Minister Anwar Pasha met with the Deobandi leader 
in Arabia.  Mahmud Hasan also met with Ghalib Pasha, the Turkish governor of the 
Hijaz.  Both officials seemed open to the idea of supporting Mahmud Hasan’s plan to 
incite insurrection in India’s northwest frontier areas.  In fact, the high-ranking Anwar 
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Pasha even penned a letter, subsequently distributed widely by ‘Ubaidullah Sindhi and 
others (including one of Mahmud Hasan’s traveling companions, Muhammad Mian 
Ansari, who had acted as messanger in actually bringing the letter back to the 
subcontinent from Arabia and who was later charged with “inculcat[ing] jihad”164 
amongst the Pathan tribes)165 in Afghanistan and northwestern Hindustan, promising 
Turkish support and calling for a general Muslim uprising against the British in India.  
All seemed to be going according to Mahmud Hasan’s original plan.  It was now time 
for him to return to India’s borderlands to rescuscitate the old jyhad of sәyyid Ahmad. 
Unfortunately for the movement, the whole anti-British scheme—which would have 
been hard-pressed to work anyway without full support from Kabul, let alone help from 
a soon-to-be ousted government in Istanbul—went up in smoke when the the British 
government in India, through its secret police network (the CID), intercepted 
communications from Sindhi meant for Mahmud Hasan, relating to his progress in 
Afghanistan.  Thus the great pan-Islamic plan was discovered in 1916/1334, almost as 
soon as it had been set in motion, and a flurry of arrests followed in India.  Later that 
year, Sherif Hussein bin ‘Ali launched the Arab Revolt against Ottoman Turk rule in 
Arabia; and through the Arabs—for now, allies of London—the British were able to 
capture Mahmud Hasan (in fact, he and four of his associates were first arrested by the 
Arabs themselves, and only later handed over to British authorities).166  Eventually he 
was interned at St. Clement’s Barracks, a British prison on the island of Malta, where 
the old Deobandi cleric and anti-British activist was “among the world’s most renowned 
political prisoners.”167  Here he received some comfort through letters from home, 
particularly those written by his little brother, Muhammad Mahasan, who kept him 
apprised of goings-on in the outside world.168  The whole affair was painted by the 
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British media as a Berlin-directed conspiracy (the headline screamed, “German Plots in 
India”); the one-hundred-fifty-page “Rowlatt Report,” too, commissioned by the 
Government of India, characterized the “Silk Letters’ Plot” as “an amazing story of 
sedition” that “equaled any romance of Robert Louis Stevenson”—behind which lurked 
the inciting Germans.169 
 
Khilafat :  Ephemeral High Point of Hindu-Muslim Unity . 
By 1920/1338, when the British set Mahmud Hasan free in Bombay (the old man, 
suffering from a debilitating case of tuberculosis, evidently no longer seemed like much 
of a threat), most signs indicated that the future would be characterized by united 
Hindu-Muslim activism.  For long, many Muslims, as members of a minority 
community, had remained at least implicitly loyal to the British, more wary of the 
perceived threat of the majority Hindu population.  But the first two decades of the 
twentieth century AD saw the British government’s foreign policy continually 
ostracizing its Muslim subjects, especially as the Russian threat—for long the British 
impetus for maintaining the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire—began to 
subside in the wake of a new, German one.  During the 1911-1912/1329-1330 Tripoli 
War, London had been more interested in good relations with Rome than the negative 
repercussions its actions might induce across Muslim communities worldwide (despite 
Viceroy Hardinge’s warning of “considerable effervescence” on the matter among 
India’s Mohammedans), and similar results came of Britain’s overtures to Greece in the 
subsequent Balkan Wars (Hardinge: “In all these wars against Turkey, it is we out in 
India who in reality have to pay the piper”).170  Indeed, one prominent Indian nationalist 
would write in 1917/1335, “Turkey’s war with Italy followed by her struggle with the 
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Balkan States, has done wonders in nationalising the Indian Mohammedans.  At the 
present moment the Mohammedans perhaps feel even more intensely than the 
Hindus”—certainly a wind change in Indian politics.171  Later, during the Great War, 
Turkey made the disastrous decision to forego neutrality in order to side with the 
Central Powers, prompting a secret 1916/1334 agreement between London and Paris 
(with the consent of St. Petersburg) to carve up a post-war Ottoman empire between 
them; this, of course, famously contradicted previous British promises to the Arabs of 
the Hijaz, who expected to inherit a large, independent Arabia when the fighting was 
over.  After the war, the “hated” Treaty of Sèvres (1920/1338) threatened the 
geographical integrity of Turkey by adding once-Ottoman territory to several 
neighboring states, including Greece; the agreement also tore all non-Turkish 
territories from the empire.172  These incidents caused trepidation among Muslims 
worldwide, who feared not only for the caliphate, but also for other Middle Eastern 
“Muslim” lands then under the control of non-Muslim powers.  As a result, Muslims in 
India launched the Khilafat (xylafәt) Movement, protesting these developments, calling 
for the preservation of the integrity of the caliphate, and generally rallying Muslims 
against non-Muslim intervention in Muslim lands.  The movement, organized in large 
part by the ‘Ali brothers and Abul Kalam Azad, joined forces with the Indian National 
Congress; Gandhi agreed to support Khilafat and the Khilafatists agreed to support the 
INC’s non-cooperation movement.  (Jawaharlal once opined that, though there was 
certainly “no lack of vulgarity” when it came to the addresses of Congress leaders to one 
another during their various conferences, “some of the minor Khilafat leaders probably 
led the rest” where the use of the expletive was concerned).173  Thus by “declaring his 
support for the Khilafat, Gandhi secured the allegiance of an impressive array of Muslim 
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ulema and political activists for his policy of non-violent non-cooperation.”174  One 
western newspaper correspondent observed that the British were by now “so 
unpopular…among Indian Mahomedans…that if an Indian Musulman cannot find an 
obvious cause for a political evil he [n]aturally blames it on Lord Curson [sic] as a sort 
of fons et origo of the evils that beset the Mahomedan world.”175 
At the same time, the British government had created a detested common enemy for 
both Hindus and Muslims alike to hate (i.e. itself) through a succession of highly 
unpopular domestic moves.  The generally detested Press Act of 1910/1328 (recalling 
smoldering memories of the Vernacular Press Act of 1878/1295) had threatened the 
forfeiture of a press’s security deposit as well as the seizure of all copies of any offensive 
(i.e. “allegedly seditious”) publications.  Meanwhile, newspapers considered loyal to the 
regime were subsidized in order to provide “wholesome literary food for the masses.”176  
The result, according to one Hindu commentator of the period, on Muslim newspapers: 
“All the independent Muslim papers have either been wiped out or are dragging on a 
lifeless and miserable existence.”  Many of these publications were Deobandi, or at least 
tended to be Deobandi-leaning in tone and political philosophy.  “The Comrade is gone.  
The Hamdard has been strangled to death, the Muslim Gazette ceased to exist long ago, 
Al-Hilal is no more, the Zamindar is carrying on its colorless existence with a sword of 
Damocles always hanging over its head.”177  Then, during the Great War, the 
government passed the Defence of India Act (1915/1333), legislation that greatly 
curtailed civil liberties, among other things bypassing due process.  The act was an 
attempt to deal with pesky nationalist “schemes” during a time of war (similar 
legislation was passed in Britain itself), and its “emergency powers” were to remain in 
force for six months after the war ended.  It was during this period that the 
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aforementioned Lucknow Pact, uniting Muslim League and Congress efforts, was 
forged.  Perhaps the words of the League’s newly elected president Mazhar ul-Haq, 
spoken on the occasion of the party’s December 1915/Safar 1334 conference in Bombay, 
best exemplify the wind change in Indian politics during this period.  “We are Indian 
Muslims,” he said. 
 
These words, “Indian Muslims,” convey the idea of our nationality and of 
our religion, and as long as we keep our duties and responsibilities 
arising from these factors before our eyes, we can hardly go wrong.  
Indian Muslims are Indians first!178 
 
Considering the party’s major course adjustment only a few years later (not to mention 
its hard-line separatist position later on), such sentiments may seem out of place at a 
Muslim League conference, yet they are illustrative of the sort of united, nationalist 
feeling then extant within such circles during and immediately after the Great War.  
For now, the pendulum was swinging the Deobandis’ way, even if the League’s 
pronouncements stopped far short of denouncing its loyalty to the British 
government.179 
When, with war’s end, the time came for normalcy to be restored after the 
imposition of the Defence of India Act, the Imperial Legislative Council refused to enact 
the promised restoration (despite Montagu’s 1917/1335 assurances to the contrary), 
and on 10 March 1919/7 Jumada II 1337, the tyrannical measures enacted four years 
previously (including indefinite detention sans trial, two years’ incarceration for those 
merely suspected of being terrorists, warrantless arrests, juryless trials, and a curtailment 
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of freedom of speech vis-à-vis the press) were extended indefinitely.  The 1919/1337 
legislation—known as the Rowlatt Act, named after the chief of the committee who had 
recommended the measures—prompted wide criticism from Indian political leaders and 
activists, and Gandhi organized a nationwide fast and strike (the “Rowlatt sәtyagrәhә,” 
the latter meaning “truth-force”), to be held on 6 April/5 Rajab, in protest.  But the 
Mahatma, an integral part of whose strategy was the use of non-violence as a moral 
means of struggle, was unable to contain the pent-up frustration felt by millions of 
Indians at these political developments; a series of riots in the Punjab caused him to 
suspend the sәtyagrәhә only days later.  Then on 13 April/12 Rajab, one hundred fifty 
troops led by British General R. E. H. Dyer opened fire on a crowd of around twenty 
thousand Indians gathered in Jalianwalla Bagh, Amritsar, to protest the Rowlatt Act; 
the volley continued at least six minutes without pause, resulting in piles of bodies: over 
three thousand civilian dead and one thousand five hundred wounded.  If the 
nationalists—Hindu, Muslim, and otherwise—hadn’t been fired up and united before, 
this event (and the follow-up violence meted out by the British government in the 
Punjab in the days following) fueled the movement like none before it.  Even many 
Barelvis joined the fray, despite their leader’s stance to the contrary.  “The most 
significant development of Nationalism,” wrote Arya Samajist and Indian activist Lala 
Lajpat Rai three years after the end of the Great War, was “the unity between Hindus 
and the Mohammedans on the question of self-government.”180 
When Mahmud Hasan arrived in Bombay, then, it was this show of unity that 
greeted him.  The news of his freedom had been published in “all the great newspapers 
of Hindustan,” and immediately Khilafatist and Cogressite leaders alike scrambled to 
arrange a grand reception for him upon disembarkation.181  Indeed, Gandhi himself 
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traveled down from Ahmedabad just to meet the Deobandi leader—and to explain the 
political situation, much to shix ul-hynd’s approbation.  Soon thereafter, Farangi Mahal’s 
‘Abdul Bari likewise met with Mahmud Hasan, outlining for him the joint Khilafatist-
Congressite plan.  In response, Mahmud Hasan penned a fәtwa (whose “each and every 
word spilt fire,” opined one Deobandi commentator)182 in support of Khilafat and non-
cooperation; it would be signed by almost a thousand Muslim scholars.183  The 
Deobandis were officially on board the Khilafat/non-cooperation program.  To continue 
to garner support, Mahmud Hasan—despite his worsening condition—embarked on a 
tour of the United Provinces, delivering speeches and meeting with Muslim political 
and religious leaders to encourage them to buoy up the Khilafatist (and non-
cooperation) effort.184  Mahmud Hasan had no problem working with Hindus (and 
others) in accomplishing the shared goal of bringing down the British government.  “If 
the people of another community come forward and help in your pious mission and 
extend support in crisis, you should cooperate with them,” he urged fellow Muslims in 
1920/1338.  “You should be equally courteous to them.  [In fact], you should act more 
generously.”185 
But the Barelvi guiding lights did not support the Deobandi position on the Khilafat 
issue.  Indeed, Ahmad Riza Khan of Bareilly had a completely different take on the 
situation then embroiling what was once the mighty Ottoman Empire.  The Barelvi 
divine opposed the Khilafat movement outright—though not necessarily because he 
disagreed with its aims.  Instead, Ahmad Riza, who interpreted the actions of the 
Khilafatists as mere “political fuss and noise,”186 approached the matter practically (as he 
saw it); he felt that, given the state of the Indian Muslim community, there was not 
much it could do to really help its Turkish counterpart in any functionally useful way 
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(eventually he would admonish Indian Muslims to donate a month’s salary to Turkish 
relief).  Mostly the Ahl-e-Sunnat leader thought all of the Khilafatists’ travels and 
meetings and goings-on were a big waste of money.  Indeed, once he himself had been 
charged by a Deobandi political organization (called the Jamiat Ulema-e-Hind; jәm’aiәt 
‘alәma-e-hynd, or “Assembly of Indian Clergy,” hereafter JUH) ) of doing nothing for the 
cause of the Turks or the Muslim holy sites; in reply, Ahmad Riza countered that, 
simply put, neither had the Jamiat Ulema-e-Hind—the difference was that the latter had 
taken large sums of money from Muslims in the process!187  He also took issue with the 
general Muslim defense of the “caliphate,” arguing that the sultan of Turkey, not even 
of the Quraysh line, could not rightfully enjoy the title of caliph.  Besides, Ahmad Riza 
argued, the whole Khilafatist issue was a front; its members were insincere at best and 
manipulators at worst—for, said he in one 1920/1338 fәtwa, the movement’s leaders 
were merely using the issue of the Ottoman caliphate as a smokescreen for their real 
aim: political independence from the British.188  Gandhi was a charlatan anyway; after 
all, how could a man embroiled in a nationalist cause genuinely adopt an internationalist 
movement with explicitly pan-Islamic aims?  The Barelvis interpreted the Mahatma’s 
maneuverings vis-à-vis the Muslim Khilafatist leaders as nothing more than shrewd 
politics—and shame on the Deobandis and their cohorts for being so easily duped into 
the Gujarati’s game.  Some amongst the Khilafatist leadership even seemed, through 
Barelvi eyes, to lavish praise upon Gandhi fit only for a bona fide prophet of Islam; once, 
Ahmad Riza is reported to have compared the esteem which Khilafat leaders granted 
Gandhi to that which the leaders of that most apostate group, the Ahmadiyya, accorded 
their own false prophet.  “Neither can Gandhi be an ymam, nor [Mirza Ghulam Ahmad] 
Qadiani a mujәddyd,” he reportedly told one Deobandi with whom he was acquainted.  
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Of course, any perceived affront to Muhammad (as the Khilafatist attitude toward 
Gandhi was interpreted) only further alienated the two groups politically.189 
Most of all, however, Ahmad Riza opposed the Khilafat movement because he refused 
to work together with many of those associated with it.  In his view, a significant number 
among the Khilafat leadership were “bad” Muslims, or those who had “lost their way.”190  
Such exclusion would characterize the Barelvi attitude towards Deobandi cooperation 
with the Indian National Congress through the Partition period; such a united front was 
simply unacceptable “Hindu-Muslim unity.”  In the words of Sanyal, 
 
Ahmad Riza Khan believed that the relationship between Hindus and 
Muslims being advocated by the non-cooperators was one of love, 
intimacy, even unity, all of which, being forms of muwalat, were 
forbidden; while, on the other hand, worldly or social relations with the 
British were being forbidden although they had shar’i approval.191 
 
Once again, Ahmad Riza’s exclusionary social worldview was made manifest, an outlook 
perhaps best illustrated by one incident involving the INC’s most famous icon.  At the 
advice of several of his high-ranking Muslim counterparts—including the ‘Ali brothers 
and ‘Abdul Bari—Gandhi reportedly tried to arrange a meeting with Ahmad Riza to 
attempt to win the Barelvi divine over to the Khilafat cause.  Upon hearing that the INC 
leader was looking to meet, Ahmad Riza is alleged to have said, “What would he speak 
about?  Religion or worldly affairs?  If it is wordly affairs, how could I partake—for I 
have [chosen to] abstain from the world, and have no interest in it.”192  In fact, Ahmad 
Riza took a great interest in the world, but refused to meet with Gandhi or align himself 
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with his allegedly Hindu-dominated movement.193  To Ahmad Riza and his followers, 
the Khilafatists were striving for “nationalist” (qwm pәrәst) goals while ignoring the 
potential such action possessed—the potential, quite literally, to “destroy the true faith.”  
In such a threat to Islam they were playing an active part, since, in the words of one 
Barelvi commentator, “swәraj means Hindu Raj.”194 
It is interesting to note the difference in philosophy here, generally speaking, 
between Ahmad Riza Khan and his disciples and the Deobandi leadership.  The latter 
saw no contradiction in their position as ‘alәma, dedicated to the acquisition and 
communication of religious knowledge, and their participation in Ahmad Riza’s 
“worldly” (i.e. political) affairs.  On the other side of the rivalry, Ahmad Riza emphasized 
his own personal detachment from such things—an implicit jab at his scholarly rivals 
who participated in the political arena.  But Muhammad Mian would later justify the 
Deobandi position in this regard in his book әsiran-e-malTa (“Prisoners of Malta”), in 
his preface to the work’s mini-biography of Husain Ahmad Madani.  To Muhammad 
Mian, the elders of Deoband had taken the more difficult road, while the Barelvi head 
and his kind had elected for the path of least resistance.  It is obvious, reading 
Muhammad Mian’s words, whose path he considers worthier of praise.  “It is easy to opt 
for the study of voluminous books for years…[but] it is difficult to submit before your 
Creator and, with devotion and piety, render selfless service to His Creation…”  Often, 
Muhammad Mian argued, such submission involved going to the mosque, or leading a 
study group, or preaching from the pulpit.  But sometimes, too, it meant standing upon 
“the political platform, for the greater well-being of your community and for upholding 
the truth.”  Such action often earned such men “abuse” from their “own people” (an 
obvious reference to the literary barbs of Ahmad Riza and others)—and even “fetters 
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and a dark cell from your oppressive enemy.”  Such a man, willing to selflessly endure 
the privations heaped upon him by both friend and enemy: this was “the true follower of 
the Prophet,” Muhammad Mian insisted.  After all, religious leaders had always played a 
political role in Islam, from the beginning.  For a religious scholar to become a recluse 
(a form of “asceticism”) when his community needed him far more urgently in another 
capacity was, certainly, the less noble path.195 
Thus, as one scholar of political Barelvism has noted, in 1920/1338—the very 
height of the Khilafat movement—“no one was ready to listen [to] any anti-Khilafat 
and anti-non-cooperation statements,” even from the likes of Ahmad Riza Khan.196  
While this statement is obviously an exaggeration if taken literally, it nevertheless 
captures to a degree the general feeling of the period, or at least the way the political 
winds were blowing.  In time, however, that wind would change, as many Muslims 
became disillusioned with Khilafat, the politics of the Congress, the Congress’ 
leadership, united political efforts with the Hindus, and/or the Deobandi political 
leadership—and turn to voices like Ahmad Riza’s.  In a sense, over the coming decades, 
the denunciations by the Barelvi “founder” of both Khilafat’s ineffectuality and a united 
Hindu-Muslim India would be more or less vindicated by history; whether or not such 
vindication was “natural” or merely self-fulfilling is, of course, open for debate. 
In any case, as Deobandis rallied behind the anti-British Khilafat-INC banner, 
Ahmad Riza and his followers more or less supported the British government of India 
throughout the Great War years and throughout the Khilafat movement period.197  
(Remember, Ahmad Riza considered India, without question, a dar ul-yslam.  At least the 
British were Christian; would it not be worse to be led by a government of pagans—i.e. 
Hindus?)  And though Nehru would later describe the Khilafat Committee of 1920/1338 
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as “powerful and far more representative” than the League198 (which also opposed 
Khilafat), it must be pointed out that the Barelvis, by and large, were not represented 
therein.  On the contrary, they would form their own Turkish relief groups and 
organizations; the most prominent was the Ansar al-Islam, an association made up of 
Ahmad Riza’s inner circle, including Muhammad Mian Marahrawi, Zafaruddin Bihari, 
Naimuddun Moradabadi, and Didar ‘Ali Alwar.  The organization was formed according 
to the admonition of Ahmad Riza Khan (outlined in his 1913/1331 juridical ruling): to 
avoid association with Muslims who had, in their view, spiritually lost their way—and, 
of course, to avoid “unity” with Hindus outright.  Most of its tenets involved the 
implementation of Ahmad Riza Khan’s (predominantly economic) reforms.  But 
unfortunately for the Ansar al-Islam, the group was constantly fighting off the charge of 
being a British front organization.199  In fact, Barelvi self-imposed insulation from other 
groups during the 1910s/1330s and 1920s/1340s, at that time centered mostly around 
helping the Turks, foreshadowed the movement’s general behavior during the late 
1930s/1350s and 1940s/1360s.  Over the course of the latter period, too, Barelvi 
organization—even whilst supporting the call for Pakistan—tended to include only 
other Barelvis (or at least Barelvi-leaning scholars and pirs—the “proto-Barelvis” of 
today’s Barelvi majority among South Asian Muslims), and certainly not Deobandis or, 
heaven forbid, Hindus.  This would have serious political consequences for the 
movement later, in the new state of Pakistan, despite its numerical majority. 
When, in 1919/1337, the Congress held its special session in Calcutta, partisans of 
the Khilafat movement, fueled by the admonitions of the Deobandi ‘alәma, played a 
major role in propelling Gandhi into the position of uncontested leader of the INC.  
Indeed, thousands of the Mahatma’s Muslim Khilafatist supporters flocked to the 
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gathering, making up a considerable portion of the approximately fifteen thousand 
observers present (five thousand official delegates from across the country additionally 
were in attendance).  This groundswell of popular support, made up in part by Deobandi 
or Deobandi-leaning Muslims seeking to protect the Ottoman caliphate, marked a 
turning point for the Indian National Congress; henceforth the party’s base would be 
swelled with Indians of the lower classes, not just those of the upper-middle-class elite.  
By December of the same year (Rabi I 1338), the new-look Congress (during its Nagpur 
conference, attended by fourteen thousand delegates) was shouting down the 
aristocratic Muhammad ‘Ali Jinnah and his warnings about sәtyagrәhә.  Politics was a 
gentleman’s game, as the League leader was apt to say, and Gandhi had dirtied the 
party with his appeal to the unwashed masses, not to mention his infusion of religion 
into what should be preserved as a strictly secular arena.  (Ironically, this is, in effect, 
precisely what Jinnah would do from the late 1930s/1350s as League head.)  The 
Khilafat movement, which had “swamped the politics of the Muslim League,” together 
with the ascent of Gandhi and his quasi-spiritual form of resistance, had changed 
politics, dragging it out of the smoking rooms and marble chambers and onto the 
streets.200  Thanks to Khilafat, wrote one Indian commentator in 1917/1335, “the 
political influence of the Muslim League among the people was…little as compared with 
the influence of the Pan-Islamic party.”201  That party had already alienated the Barelvi 
religious leadership, and this new political development alienated the more secular-
minded elites like Jinnah.   
After the December/Rabi I conference, the future qayd-i-ә‘ažәm abruptly left the 
Congress “in disgust,” never to return.202  Khilafat, wrote one noted South Asian 
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historian, “by one of those quirks of Indian history had put the Mahatma into the saddle 
of the Indian National Congress.”203 
* 
The Barelvis had a difficult time jumping onto the non-cooperation bandwagon, too; 
Ahmad Riza’s attitude towards Gandhi has already been mentioned.  Such involvement, 
after all, would be unacceptable Hindu-Muslim unity.  It would also mean working with 
those (Muslims) of “bad” faith, in particular the Deobandis.  In 1920/1338, leading 
Barelvi alym Naimuddin Moradabai—who would, in the coming decades, play a major 
role in the political promotion of the Barelvi religio-political agenda—issued a fәtwa 
that out-and-out forbade Muslims from participating in the non-cooperation movement 
(warning the ummәt, for example, of the dangers of working together with the Hindu 
majority).204  That year Ahmad Riza Khan did the same, accusing the non-cooperation-
supporting Muslims (like the Deobandi leadership) of confusing that which was neutral 
(represented by the Christian British) with that which was expressly forbidden 
(represented by the pagan Hindus).  After all, the Muslim non-cooperationists were 
loudly denouncing a government that was not interfering in Muslim worship (the 
British one) in favor of one that would invariably be led by those already meddling in 
that worship (the Hindus; this was a reference to the cow slaughter controversy then 
rocking the subconinent, in which some Hindu groups sought strict legislation banning 
the sacrifice of cows, a regular Muslim ritual).205  It should be noted, however, that such 
declamations as these were not unanimous among Barelvis; there were a handful of 
dissenters.  For example, xәwajәħ Muhammad Ziauddin Sialvi went along with 
Gandhi’s program, at least as far as non-cooperation was concerned; the xәwajәħ went 
so far as to reject all gifts from any of his disciples working for the police or the British 
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Indian Army, a move that clearly supported the Congress-led non-cooperation 
movement.206  Another Barelvi leader, Abdul Majid Badayuni (elements of whose family 
had been involved in a sort of power struggle with Ahmad Riza for some time) actually 
helped found the Jamiat Ulema-e-Hind.  Similarly, powerful pir Jama’at ‘Ali Shah, who 
would later help found the mostly Barelvi All-India Sunni Conference, supported the 
Khilafat movement with his time, money, and speeches—and went so far as to 
characterize anyone who didn’t do likewise as “non-Muslim.”207  But generally speaking, 
Barelvis fell in line behind Ahmad Riza and his disciples.  (This went both ways; one of 
the Deobandi greats, Ashraf ‘Ali Thanawi, evidently opposed non-cooperation along 
lines similar to those of Ahmad Riza Khan).208 
The heads of both schools (Deobandi and Barelvi) would issue at least one highly 
circulated fәtwa supporting their positions on the Khilafat issue, including views on 
non-cooperation.  Mahmud Hasan’s 1920/1339 juridical ruling (though technically he 
did not consider it to be a true fәtwa; “I am not a mufti,” he wrote, “[thus] to write a 
fәtwa is the work of other ‘alәma [who are muftis]”)209 has already been mentioned, but 
it is worth examining at greater length, revealing as it does much in terms of Deobandi 
political philosophy and worldview.  Ahmad Riza Khan’s own 1920/1338 ruling 
likewise sheds critical light on the general Barelvi approach to politics and British 
rule—and on their position vis-à-vis the Deobandis, who, in supporting the “Hindu” 
Congress, according to Ahmad Riza, were merely “running from the rain only to enter 
the drainpipe.”  It may be useful, then, to compare and contrast these two diametrically 
opposed fәtawa.  
To buoy up his argument that cooperation with the Hindus was futile (not to 
mention hәram) Ahmad Riza emphasized what he described as the “oppressive 
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viciousness” of Hindus generally.  As examples, he pointed to recent communal 
tragedies in Katarpur, Arrah, “and elsewhere.”  Three years earlier, Katarpur—a two-
third Hindu, one-third Muslim village where tensions had long been simmering on 
account of the cow slaughter issue—had been the scene of a brutal mass killing.  The 
Hindu perpetrators, allegedly motivated by the report of a Muslim individual who had 
assaulted a Hindu untouchable, had set fire to a mosque and houses after burning thirty 
Muslims alive; a later court decision confirmed the Hindus’ guilt when one hundred 
forty-two of them were convicted for the crime, their punishments ranging from a 
couple years’ imprisonment to the death penalty.210  Around the same time, the cow 
slaughter issue had likewise ignited an anti-Muslim riot in Bihar’s Arrah district (as 
mentioned earlier, a Barelvi stronghold, and thus naturally on Ahmad Riza’s radar), 
where, in the words of nationalist leader M. A. Ansari, “Muslims…suffered untold 
miseries” at the hands of the hooligans.211  Deobandis and other composite nationalists 
insisted that such incidents were the work of individuals, anomalies vis-à-vis the general 
Hindu whole.  Ahmad Riza rejected this.  The individuals and groups involved in the 
Katarpur and Arrah riots, and countless others, were most certainly representatives of a 
larger “Hindu nation.”  The Deobandis were kidding themselves if they believed 
otherwise.212 
 Both Deobandis and Barelvis cited the Qur’an as the ultimate proof that their 
respective positions were God-sanctioned, and, of course, such citations could be found 
in abdundance in their respective fәtawa.  Mahmud Hasan cited Surah 60 (Al-
Mumtahanah), verses 8-9: 
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8 Allah does not forbid you from those who do not fight you because of 
religion and do not expel you from their homes—from being righteous 
toward them and acting justly toward them.  Indeed, Allah loves those 
who act justly. 
9 Allah only forbids you from those who fight you because of religion and 
expel you from your homes and aid in your expulsion—[forbids] that 
you make allies of them.  And whoever makes allies of them, then it is 
those who are among the wrongdoers.213 
 
Ahmad Riza answered back with another Qur’anic reference, earlier in the scripture 
but chronologically received by the Prophet later—and thus, according to the most 
generally acceptic theory, considered more authoritative and, in the case of 
contradiction with earlier revelations, possessed of an annulling power.  The reference 
was Surah 9 (At-Tawbah), verse 73: 
 
73  O Prophet, fight against the disbelievers and the hypocrites and be 
harsh upon them.  And their refuge is Hell, and wretched is the 
destination. 
 
The trouble was that such verses held an entirely distinct meaning for the 
Deobandis, who interpreted “disbelievers” in a different light altogether.  Observe, for 
example, the following Qur’anic citations, used by Mahmud Hasan in his fәtwa. 
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O you who have believed, do not take the Jews and the Christians as 
allies.  They are [in fact] allies of one another.  And whoever is any ally 
to them among you—then indeed, he is [one] of them.  Indeed, Allah 
guides not the wrongdoing people.  (Surah 5:51) 
 
Let not believers take disbelievers as allies rather than believers.  And 
whoever [of you] does that has nothing with Allah, except when taking 
precaution against them in prudence.  And Allah warns you of Himself, 
and to Allah is the [final] destination. (Surah 3:28) 
 
Give tidings to the hypocrites that there is for them a painful 
punishment—Those who take disbelievers as allies instead of the 
believers.  Do they seek with them honor [through power]?  But indeed, 
honor belongs to Allah entirely…  O you who have believed, do not take 
the disbelievers as allies instead of the believers.  Do you wish to give 
Allah against yourselves a clear cause?  (Surah 4:138-139, 144) 
 
These examples, cited by Mahmud Hasan to buoy up his argument against 
cooperation with the Christians (i.e. the British), clearly illustrate the disconnect 
between the Deobandis and the Barelvis.  Indeed, for Ahmad Riza, the above citations 
would only strengthen his own position; “disbelievers,” after all, referred to pagans like 
the Hindus, not the Christian British.  As for the verse from Surah 5, few Barelvis would 
have considered the British an “ally” in any true sense of the term; a lack of desire on 
their part to agitate against British rule did not make them the Christians’ “friends.”  
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No, their motivation lay strictly in action based on shәri’at (as they interpreted it).  The 
same interpretational disengagement could be applied to the other Qur’anic verses cited 
by Mahmud Hasan in his ruling; “how wretched” that “many of them [become] allies of 
those who disbelieved” (Surah 5:80), “[y]ou will not find a people who believe in Allah 
and the Last Day having affection for those who oppose Allah and His Messenger” 
(Surah 58:22), “O you who believed, do not take My enemies and your enemies as allies” 
(Surah 60:1)—and so on.  Each of these verses might be used by both groups, the 
Barelvis interpreting “disbeliever” as “Hindu” and the Deobandis interpreting 
“disbeliever” as “Britisher.”  When Mahmud Hasan asserted that “cooperation with 
infidels [kuffar, which might also be translated as “idolaters,” “deniers,” or 
“unbelievers”] is not permissible,” Ahmad Riza would have agreed wholeheartedly.  The 
question revolved around the identity of the kuffar—the British or the Hindus?  The 
Deobandis insisted on the former (especially given the political situation of the 
subcontinent; had not the British made war upon the Muslims?), while the Barelvis 
vehemently pointed to the latter.214  
Mahmud Hasan considered Muslim quietism in the face of British tyranny a 
refutation of the “the first duty of every Muslim.”  Indeed, Muslims who harbored such 
positions (like the Barelvis) had simply been fooled by “a cunning trick”—one that, 
without shame, would steal the “most precious wealth of the Muslims”: that is, their 
very faith.  Thus Ahmad Riza and his ilk were only playing the British game, like 
pawns.  The great threat to Islam wasn’t Hinduism; Hinduism could be dealt with 
peaceably over years of proselytization.  Islam’s greatest threat was the theft of its faith, 
led by the British by means of tyrannical government.  A cursory look at the Muslim 
world (and the vast portions of it then under the direct sway of London) should have 
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been enough to convince any Muslim of this reality.  Amongst a Hindu majority for a 
thousand years, Islam had yet experienced major growth; under the British yoke for 
barely a century-and-a-half, the faith had been battered and beaten by a waide variety of 
forces, including political and social ones.  And now, Mahmad Hasan lamented, “Iraq, 
Palestine, and Syria” were “the targets of greed of the enemy of Islam,” while “the honor 
of the caliphate” lay “in tatters.”  Truly, there was no doubt in his mind about who the 
real enemy of Islam was; that enemy certainly wasn’t the Hindu, however religiously 
misguided Hindus might be.  Was it because of the Hindus that the Muslims had “lost 
their dignity, their honor, and their self-respect”?  No—the British were the enemy, 
combined with the Muslims’ own “ignorance and over-indulgence in frivolities.”  That 
Mahmud Hasan’s stance in this regard was adopted generally by the Jamiat Ulema-e-
Hind was expressed at that party’s October 1920/Muharram 1339 conference; during 
the event the organization declared unequivocally, “The greatest enemy of Islam and 
Muslims is the British.”215  And now Barelvi Muslims like Ahmad Riza Khan and 
Naimuddin Moradabadi had the audacity to forbid their brothers from assisting fellow 
Muslims—“the eagerness to earn the goodwill and friendship of a kafyr has led a brother 
to chop the head of his own brother.  Muslims have drunk the blood of Muslims.”  
Indeed, the condition of the caliphate had much to do with Muslim collaboration with, 
of all things, the British behemoth.  
 
You know it better than me that the thunder and fire that burned the 
tents of the Islamic world and set fire to the castle of the Islamic 
caliphate came from the hot blood of Arabs and Indians.  And a great 
portion of…the wealth with which the Christians have succeeded in 
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subjugating Muslim nations came from your hard labor.  Thus, is there 
any stupid and thick-headed Muslim who won’t understand the results of 
cooperation with the Christians? (Italics added.) 
 
Among Mahmud Hasan’s “stupid and thick-headed” was the Barelvi leadership.  To 
them he said, “[This] is the time to act with Islamic spirit for the honor and prestige of 
our religion.”  And then the olive-branch: “I fear that differences, big or small, among 
‘alәma might dampen [our] spirit and courage.”  Despite those differences, then, they 
should work together—not necessarily by “grab[bing] a sword and go[ing] to Iraq 
and Syria for jyhad,” but to prevent at all costs the “strengthen[ing of] the hands of 
[the] enemies of Islam.”216 
* 
Non-cooperation and Khilafat enjoyed initial success, organizing demonstrations, 
strikes, protests, and general civil disobedience across Hindustan.  When Mahmud 
Hasan died on 30 November 1920/18 Rabi I 1339 (eleven months before Ahmad Riza 
Khan, his true contemporary), things were looking up.  The passing of shix ul-hynd, 
leader of the second generation of Deobandi scholars and the inheritor of the Qasimi 
program, occurred just months after his being released from prison and in the midst of 
carrying out the political agitation for which he was known.  He was buried at the small 
cemetery adjacent to the school that had played such a central role in his life, next to the 
grave of his own mentor, Muhammad Qasim.  But shix ul-hynd didn’t give up the ghost 
before presiding over the second annual conference of the JUH in Delhi, and traveling 
to Aligarh to lay the foundation of the Jamia Millia Islamia.217  The latter school would 
later move to Delhi, where it is located at the time of this writing. 
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The meeting in Delhi was momentous; an estimated five hundred scholars from all 
over India—hailing from as far afield as the northwest frontier and border areas, Sindh, 
Punjab, Bihar, Bengal, and Assam—there resolved to call upon Muslims across the 
subcontinent to cease any form of support for the British government.  This was clearly 
a move inspired by the non-cooperation program, tied up in the efforts of the Khilafat 
movement.  The presence of the old Deobandi head, who served as the assembly’s 
presiding officer, added to the meeting’s importance; for those assembled it must have 
been thrilling, injecting a psychological boost to morale, to see the aged Mahmud, fresh 
from his Malta prison but now free and politically active once more, seated on the 
platform before them (little did they know, surely, that he would pass away only days 
later).  In the end, the November 1920/Rabi I 1339 Delhi conference of the JUH 
produced a juridical ruling, signed by four hundred seventy-four religious scholars, 
forbidding Muslim employment in any capacity whatsoever within the British 
government structure—whether as a municipal council member, a soldier, or even a 
businessman engaged in a transaction with the “enemies of the faith.”  The ruling was 
distributed far and wide across Hindustan.  (The next year, 1921/1339, the British 
government reportedly confiscated all copies of the fәtwa that it could find, while many 
of its signers were arrested and incarcerated, sentenced to two-year imprisonment.)218 
Immediately after the Delhi JUH conference, in an initiatory speech at the Jamia 
Millia Islamia inauguration at Aligarh, Mahmud Hasan described the institution as “an 
independent university which has nothing to do with government subsidy and 
interference [an obvious jab at Sir Sayyid’s school, as well as some Barelvi educational 
institutions then accepting grants from the British ruling power as Ahmad Riza had 
instructed] and whose organization is based on Islamic principles and national 
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aspirations.”  He may as well have been describing the dar ul’alwm at Deoband.  It was 
fitting, perhaps, that he would eulogize such an establishment—like the one around 
which his own life had revolved—in the final hours of his life. 
Accompanying him on this, his final journey, was one of the leaders of Deoband’s 
“third generation”—a middle-aged ‘alym who had helped him write his masterwork (a 
multi-volume commentary on the Qur’an) and who had been as politically active and 
ardently loyal as anyone at the university in Deoband.  His name was Shabbir Ahmad 
Usmani.
 
 
  
  180 
3 - THE IDEA OF PAKISTAN: The Rivalry in Pre-Partition 
Politics ,  1921-1947 
 
 
‘See for yourself,’ Bakshiji said.  ‘In our group there are Sikhs, Hindus and 
Muslims.  There stands Aziz.  Here is Hakimji.’ 
‘Aziz and Hakim are the dogs of the Hindus.  We do not hate the Hindus, but we 
detest their dogs.’ 
                EXCERPT FROM BHISHAM SAHNI’S TAMAS 
 
 
 
 
 
The year 1921/1338-1339 was, in the words of Jawaharlal Nehru, “a year of great 
tension,” with “much to irritate and annoy and unnerve the official” and “a strange 
mixture of nationalism and politics and religion and mysticism and fanaticism.”1  Such 
was the atmosphere when the political aspect of the Deobandi-Barelvi rivalry came into 
its own within the context of pre-Partition independence politics in India.  In order to 
faciliate an in-depth examination of the rivalry during the period in question, the reader 
will be presented with the brief biographies of four ‘alәma (two Barelvi, two Deobandi) 
in addition to the continuation of the central narrative.  Each of the four scholars was 
born between 1879/1296 and 1886/1303, and each passed away not long after the 
  
  181 
subcontinental Partition, between 1948/1367 and 1957/1376.  Most importantly, each 
played a major role within their respective communities in the religio-political battles 
waged across the Indian subcontinent before 1947/1366.  It is hoped that their histories 
might bring the political contest between Deobandi and Barelvi—and the intra-sect 
divisions that accompanied it—to life. 
* 
By the early 1920s, “it was Hindu-Musalman ki jai everywhere,” according to one 
eyewitness, though behind the ambiguous Indian nationalism “could be distinguished a 
Hindu nationalism” and “a Moslem nationalism partly looking beyond the frontiers of 
India,” though “for the time being they overlapped and all pulled together.”2  As Britain 
pushed back the implementation of any meaningful reforms in government that might 
allow for “Indian governance over India,” the “feeling against Great Britain” was 
“aggravating…every day.”3  The frustration over seeming British intractability was 
thus the glue holding the two communities together.  Meanwhile, the JUH continued to 
campaign for the protection of the caliphate.  In December 1922/Rabi II 1341, the JUH 
held a conference at Gaya, conferring upon Mustapha Kemal the grand title of “Savior 
of the Caliphate,” at the same time passing a resolution requesting the Kemalists to “try 
to keep the Calpih’s prestige and power intact.”  Critically, the JUH officially 
acknowledged Sultan Abdul Medjid as Islam’s one and only xәlifәħ (in stark contrast to 
the Barlevi position, aforementioned).4  The JUH may have truly believed that Atatürk 
would protect the caliphate (though it was clear from some of the conference’s speeches 
that Mustapha Kemal’s curtailment of the sultan’s powers had the ‘alәma worried), but 
it seems more likely that the organization was simply hoping that an ego-stoke might 
soften the Turkish leader’s attitude towards the sultan.  In any case, the JUH enjoyed 
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the Congress’ support in these efforts.  Indeed, the “Moslem Conference” (as it was 
known) of December 1922/Rabi II 1341 was more or less a Congress meeting for 
Muslims only; its resolutions were even submitted afterwards to the Congress “for final 
decision.”  The arrangement underscored the Muslims’ resolve for joint action with 
Hindus against the common British threat.  Indeed, along with the conference’s Turkey-
centric agenda, the Muslim assemblage advocated “the formation of a national pact to 
secure Hindu-Moslem unity.”5 
And Muslim members of the Congress weren’t only interested in the caliphate issue.  
Some of the most radical elements within the Congress were Muslims—like 
Muhammad ‘Ali (at the time, Deobandi-leaning, though this would change later when 
he “repented” at the feet of Barelvi leader Naimuddin Moradabadi).  On 1 January 
1924/23 Jumada 1342, for example, Muhammad ‘Ali declared that “a demand for swәraj 
is impossible without complete independence,” and that independence was “essential 
whether Indians were within or without the British Empire.”  India must, ‘Ali 
contended, “cut the cackle”—in other words, stop all the chattering and actually do 
something.  ‘Ali was tired of all the talk; it was time for action.  “By merely shouting for 
liberty Indians [make] themselves the laughing stock of the world,” he said.  Perhaps it 
was time to “walk out of their [the British] Empire” for good.  With this position, 
Muhammad ‘Ali had surpassed even Gandhi in his demands.  Just over a year after the 
JUH’s December 1922/Rabi II 1341 Conference, the party met again (1 January 
1924/23 Jumada I 1342) for a conference in Cocanada (present-day Kakinada) on India’s 
east coast, where delegates continued to express confidence in the new Turkish regime.  
Still, it was clear that patience was running thin—shouldn’t this issue have been put to 
rest by now?  An idea was presented: the ‘alәma, as guardians of the ummәt, should hold 
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a global conference “of Muslim divines and leaders from all parts of the world” in order 
to finally settle the question of the caliph’s political position “in light of the injuctions of 
the Koran.”  This was necessary because the caliph “must be a link between Moslems 
throughout the world” (a poisition that obviously flew in the face of Ahmad Riza’s 
rulings).6  The Muslims of India, too, “must owe him allegiance.”  In all of this, and 
despite the pan-Islamic nature of Khilafatism (including their calls for allegiance to a 
technically foreign politico-religious figure), the Congress continued to support the 
Khilafatists and the JUH.  Had the caliphate been preserved, it likely would have 
remained a hot-button Deobandi-Barelvi issue, widening the gulf between the two 
schools. 
But this soon became a moot point—as did Hindu-Muslim unity, which unraveled 
quickly when Khilafat became a non-issue.  On 9 March 1924/2 Sh’aban 1342, the New 
York Times headline, TURKS STIR ALL ISLAM BY DEPOSING CALIPH, signaled the abrupt 
removal of the Khilafat phenomenon’s central purpose; just like that, the movement to 
protect and restore the caliphate came crashing down.  There was no caliphate.  This 
meant, of course, that the hoped-for world conference of Muslim scholars proposed by 
the JUH never took place, and it was soon made evident that any confidence in the 
Turkish government had been seriously misplaced.  In the end, Barelvi leader Ahmad 
Riza Khan’s warnings about the practical inability of the Indian Muslims to affect the 
Ottoman caliphate situation proved annoyingly correct. 
The 1924/1342 collapse of the Ottoman caliphate pushed Muslim politics in India 
into a state of confusion.  The Muslim League was still more or less a non-entity, made 
seemingly insignificant by the Khilafatists over the previous several years.  With the 
Turkish sultan’s fall, the Khilafatists themselves lost the proverbial wind in their sails.  
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As for the Congress Muslims, these were “in disarray” without the propellant of the 
Khilfatat issue driving their base.7  It was a time of regrouping, of licking wounds and 
figuring out where to go from here.  For many, the zeal of the last several years 
wouldn’t return until Gandhi’s relaunch of the non-cooperation movement in 
1930/1348.  The “fall[ing] apart” of 1920s/1330s-1340s national Muslim politics was 
helped in part, too, by the Government of India Act of 1919/1337, which 
institutionalized the concept of diarchy, shifting politics away from the center (and from 
pan-Indian issues) to the provinces.  The shift helped bring local issues to the fore, 
issues that were less likely to be split along broad, communal lines—which might have 
resulted in less communal politics at the national level.  But with separate electorates, 
elites continuted to stress their “Muslimness.”  After all, the reforms that had granted 
the Muslims an official, state-sponsored separateness motivated such individuals to step 
forward and claim to be the legitimate representatives of the community (and thus 
deserving of the new government’s “patronage”).8  And while it may be exaggerating 
the effect of the 1919/1337 Act to say, as some scholars of South Asian history do, that 
it was the legislation that was mostly responsible for terminating the united Hindu-
Muslim political activism of the 19-teens/13-thirties (Khilafat remained a force, for 
example, years after the act was made law), the Act did pander to influencial Muslim 
elites, many of whom continued to be—or quickly became—loyal to the British 
government. 
Even before this, however, the joint Hindu-Muslim movement engineered by the 
Khilafat Committee and Gandhi’s Congress had suffered a set of debilitating losses from 
which it would never recover, at least in terms of presenting a unified front.  The 
Mahatma’s own languishing in prison (arrested for “sedition”) for almost two years, 
  
  185 
from early 1922/mid-1340 to early 1924/mid-1342, removed a key facilitator of Hindu-
Muslim cooperation; for years after he emerged, too, the symbolic leader of the 
nationalist movement distanced himself from politics significantly (despite his being 
made president of the Congress in 1925/1343), preferring instead to concentrate on 
local, internal efforts for social reform rather than on grand, nationwide political 
agitation.  Then there was the Muslim League; it had never embraced Khilafat, and held 
fast to its position.  Some Hindu organizations, too—including the now-powerful Hindu 
Mahasabha—were critical of the Khilafat movement’s goals and of the Congress for 
seeking out partnership therewith.  Meanwhile, Muslim scholars like Ahmad Riza and 
his disciples had continued to criticize both the effort itself as well as the movement’s 
cooperation with Hindus; their arguments struck home to many, who watched new 
developments—like the highly successful recoversion efforts (usually from Muslim to 
Hindu) across India of Swami Dayanand Saraswati’s disciples engaged in shuddhikәrәn 
and sәngәTәn (popularly known as the Shuddhi Movement, and considered by many 
Muslims as nothing more than an “armed terrorist” phenomenon).9  In 1921/1339, 
Muslim peasants in India’s Malabar region (known as Mohplas), who “became 
convinced that the rule of the Khalifa had been established in India,” violently rioted 
against their Hindu landlords; thousands died, mostly among the Moplahs themselves, 
during the six-month-long government attempt to quell the uprising.10  This was a 
period, too, when the Urdu-Hindi conflict was flaring up again (provoking Gandhi to 
push for a single, merged language—Hindustani—written in either script; his efforts 
failed).  The Muslim hyjrәt movement, in which thousands of Muslims had migrated out 
of India to Afghanistan only to be turned back, penniless, by the Afghan government, 
had resulted in numberless cases of Muslim families returning home only to find their 
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property occupied by erstwhile (and mostly Hindu) neighbors; tension over the issue 
turned violent in several instances.  To top it off, many of the Hindu and Muslim leaders 
who had helped foster inter-communal unity—and might have continued to do so had 
they been free—were locked up in British prisons, having organized demonstration after 
demonstration in the wake of the highfalutin November/Rabi I visit to India of Britain’s 
Prince of Wales.  Indeed, by year’s end some twenty thousand Indians had been 
imprisoned in the British backlash to these and other anti-government protests.11 
But worst of all, just before Gandhi’s March 1922/Rajab 1340 arrest, two dozen 
policemen were burned alive by a mob at Chauri Chaura; the event prompted Gandhi to 
completely suspend his non-cooperation movement, a move that stunned thousands of 
already-jailed non-cooperation activists and led to bitter criticisms against the Mahatma 
from Khilafat leaders like the ‘Ali brothers.  Indeed, after the Chauri Chaura incident, 
the ‘Alis disassociated themselves from Gandhi altogether (they would later join the 
League—and many Muslims would follow their lead in this regard).  Later that year, 
the police and military were forced to occupy Multan, where the “tension” was “acute,” 
in order to stop the deadly communal riots rocking the city;12 many Hindus would 
subsequently rally to the cry of “Malabar and Multan” as part of this revitalized 
“communal resurgence.”13  Indeed, almost a full year before the Ottoman caliphate was 
scrapped, W. G. Tinckom-Fernandez, a New York Times correspondent who had been 
born in India and toured the subcontinent between 1921 and 1922/1339 and 1340, 
described “Moslem Indian” support of Gandhi as “half-hearted,” anyway.  “Even as I 
write,” said Tinckom-Fernandez, “Moslem and Hindu communities at Ahmedabad, at 
Multan and other places in India are being kept from doing each other violence by 
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British troops and police.”  The subtitle of his May 1923/Shawwal 1341 article: “Bonds 
With Hindus Weakening.”14 
Indeed, Atatürk’s abolishment of the caliphate was simply the deathblow to any 
comparable future Hindu-Muslim cooperation.  In the words of Tinckom-Fernandez, 
“the Treaty of Sèvres wrecked Gandhism.”15  He was half-right. 
* 
Naimuddin Moradabadi :  father of political Barelvism . 
Many of Ahmad Riza Khan’s inner circle (his xәlifәħs) would, in the decade 
following his death, play leading roles as representatives of the Barelvi movement 
during Khilafat’s heyday, in the face of a surging Indian nationalist movement.  Sanyal 
describes this group as Ahmad Riza’s “lieutenants or right-hand men who could be 
counted on to debate with an opponent, run a newspaper or school…and generally 
promote the goals of the movement in their hometowns.”16 
One of these men was Naimuddin Moradabadi.  Born in 1882/1299 in what is today 
the northwestern corner of Uttar Pradesh (about a hundred miles from Delhi) in 
Moradabad, young Naimuddin had, by age twenty, memorized the Qur’an, learned 
Persian and Arabic, trained in traditional medicine (țybb), completed the dәrs-e-nyžami, 
and trained as a writer of fәtawa.  Most of his education had taken place in a school 
called Madrasah Imdadia, located within a stone’s throw of the Muhammad Qasim-
founded Jamia Qasimia Madrasah-e-Shahi; “what impact this proximity to a Deobandi 
school may have had on the young Na’im ud-Din is unknown,” writes Sanyal.  What is 
known is that his father was a disciple of Muhammad Qasim—until, so the story goes, 
he read Ahmad Riza Khan’s 1902/1320 juridical ruling harshly condemning the chief 
founder of Deobandism.  It is likely that Naimuddin Moradabadi played a role in his 
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father’s rejection of the Deobandi school, considering that he (Naimuddin) was in his 
twenties at the time and already a devoted follower of the Bareilly divine.  In any case, 
Naimuddin early on published works in defense of Muhammad’s knowledge of the 
unseen, in addition to works attacking “Wahhabism,” and thereby quickly gained the 
notice and admiration of Ahmad Riza Khan.  Naimuddin also rapidly developed a 
reputation as a skilled debater, taking on Deobandis and others as his opponents.  
Indeed, just as the fәtwa was Ahmad Riza Khan’s forte, the debate became Naimuddin’s, 
and Ahmad Riza would often ask the young Moradabadi, a quarter-century his junior, 
to represent the Barelvi side in such contests all over India.17  But by the time of 
Naimuddin Moradabadi’s 1948/1367 death, he would be known for much more than his 
semantic skill. 
After the passing of Barelvism’s “founder,” Naimuddin Moradabadi quickly moved 
into a powerful position of leadership within the movement, partially (some would say 
mostly) filling the vacuum left behind by the larger-than-life Ahmad Riza.  One of his 
first moves was to found the Jamia Naeemia (around 1920/1338, perhaps before the 
divine out of Bareilly died), arguably his most long-lasting legacy, and certainly so 
outside of the political realm.  (This was around the same time that Naimuddin had 
issued the famous Barelvi fәtwa, aforementioned, opposing non-cooperation, forbidding 
Muslims from participating in it, and warning them of the dangers of Hindu-Muslim 
cooperation.)  The school was located in Naimuddin’s hometown of Moradabad and 
became a regional center for Barelvi activism.  At least three years before the founding 
of the school however—in 1917/1335—Naimuddin organized the Jama’at-e-Riza-e-
Mustafa, a group whose mission was to curb, and if possible reverse, the tide of 
reconversions threatening the Muslim community in the wake of the Shuddhi 
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movement;18 it would also act as a quasi-political organ when required (as in opposition 
to the Deobandi-dominated JUH, for example).  The Jama’at-e-Riza-e-Mustafa is 
credited with preventing around four hundred thousand reconversions to Hinduism, 
especially among the poor Muslims of the eastern UP and in the area known today as 
the Indian state of Rajasthan.19  His reputation as a Barelvi divine was such that both 
‘Abd ul-Bari and Muhammad ‘Ali—major Muslim religious and political figures in their 
own right, of course—came to him to perform twbәħ, or repentance; this was partially to 
absolve them of sins they had ostensibly committed as leaders of the Khilafat 
movement.20  Indeed, on this occastion ‘Abd ul-Bari explained that he had “accepted the 
viewpoint of Ahmad Riza Khan,” and his statement in this regard was published on 20 
May 1921/12 Ramadan 1339 in a Lucknow newspaper.  Muhammad ‘Ali’s own 
“repentance” came almost a decade later, in 1930/1349, towards the end of the year.21  
This is significant in that these two well-known leaders, in denouncing their “old ways” 
(including intimate cooperation with both Deobandis and Hindus), came to one of the 
most visibly “Barelvi” figures (perhaps the most “Barelvi,” along with Ahmad Riza’s own 
son, Hamid Riza Khan) in all of Hindustan.  In the mid-1920s/1340s, Naimuddin 
Moradabadi—who warned his fellow Muslims that the rising Hindu generation would, 
in the coming decades, “play Holi with [Muslim] blood”—invited “Sunni” (i.e. Barelvi 
and Barelvi-leaning) religious scholars and pirs “from all parts of the country” to gather 
together in a grand meeting in his hometown.22  It was time to deal with the Deobandi 
threat to the ummәt . 
But before examining this meeting, a quick note on what might be called “the 
Hindu-Muslim political spectrum” may be in order.  Over the coming years, the various 
parties populating the Hindu-Muslim political spectrum might generally be classified 
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into four groups—two Muslim, two Hindu (see figure 3.1).  The first Muslim group 
(M1) might be called the “Islamic exclusionists,” made up of the retooled Muslim 
League (especially from the 1930s/1350s), most Barelvis, and generally any Muslim 
who refused to work with the Hindus in any political capacity.  At first, this group 
sought power and security by means of its relationship with the British; as long as the 
latter were in charge, the Muslims’ vulnerability as a minority people surrounded by the 
majority Hindu population remained more or less a non-issue.  Later, as the 
independence movement heated up and it became clear that the expulsion of the British 
from the subcontinent was no longer a wishful nationalist dream (but was, in fact, a 
likely scenario), this group would advocate the partition of Hindustan into completely 
independent Muslim and majority-Hindu zones as the solution to the minority-majority 
problem.  This first Muslim group would be mirrored on the other end of the spectrum 
by a similar Hindu one (H1), the “Hindu exclusionists,” made up of Hindutva-inspired 
entities, the Hindu Mahasabha, its offshoots, and other explicitly Hindu nationalist 
Figure 3.1.  The Muslim-Hindi political spectrum within the context of pre-
Partition independence politics. 
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organizations—groups that would, like their Muslim counterparts in M1, refuse to 
work with Muslims.  It was largely the actions of these two groups that fueled each 
other, driving Hindus and Muslims alike (who otherwise might have found a place 
among the “inclusionists” of their spheres) into the exclusionary camps.  In the middle, 
M2 and H2 represented the “Muslim inclusionists” and the “Hindu inclusionists,” 
respectively; the former was made up of Congressite Muslims, most Deobandis, and 
other Muslims who felt that the risks of working together with Hindus were far 
outweighed by the danger posed to Islam, the Muslim community, South Asian Islamic 
culture, and the future prospects of Islam on the subcontinent by the creation of 
Pakistan.  At first many of these Muslims would be driven by a hatred of the British, 
deep-seeded and passed on over several generations since the collapse of Muslim power 
in the eighteenth/twelfth century.  Later that animosity would be supplemented by a 
belief that Islam could flourish (and her cultural centers be preserved) best in a united 
India, as well as by the resolution that if a “Pakistan” were to be created in South Asia, it 
would only give the British a continued foothold in the region. 
Sentiments expressed by Ahmad Riza Khan’s son, Hamid Riza Khan, illustrate well 
the early position of the Muslims of M1, and it is here that we return to Naimuddin 
Moradabadi’s seminal meeting.  The year was 1925/1343, and the occasion was the All-
India Sunni Conference’s first summit; the AISC was a Barelvi-dominated organization 
whose aims included the unification of “the Sunni majority” under a single political, 
economic, and socio-religious platform.  The four-day gathering, from 16-19 March/20-
23 Sh’aban, was held at Naimuddin Moradabadi’s recently founded Jamia Naeemia, and, 
as previously mentioned, the more than two hundred and fifty religious scholars in 
attendance (like the influential Punjabi pir Jama’at ‘Ali Shah) came at his personal 
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invitation.23  Just a few months before, Moradabad had been the scene of serious 
communal riots, as “a large number of Mohammedans” had attacked and seriously 
injured a group of Hindus, then desecrated several Hindu temples.24  This communal 
schism only served to reinforce what seemed to be the consensus of the conference.  
Facing the voluminous crowd of religious scholars gathered together in this volatile 
district, Hamid Riza argued that political independence from the British for India would 
only lead to Hindu domination over the Muslim minority.  As long as British power was 
secure, so, too, was Muslim security in an India populated mostly by Hindus.  Remove 
that power and the Hindus would lord over the Islamic community, among other 
depravations enacting legislation—enforced by the guns of government—repugnant to 
shәri’at.  No: Muslim religious leaders should stop wasting their time working with the 
nationalist movement in the vain dream of pushing out the British (in essence digging 
their own graves) and instead focus, as Ahmad Riza Khan had always admonished, on 
bettering the economic situation of and improving education within the Muslim 
community.  Hamid Riza’s statements at the 1925/1343 All-India Sunni Conference 
meeting clearly reveal M1’s loyalist preferences—a loyalty not borne of any sense of 
real fealty to the British, but rather out of a practical anxiety for what a Hindu-
dominated Indian state might do to Islam’s prospects on the subcontinent.  For now, 
independence was far from a certainty; once that changed, however, the Barelvi call, like 
that of the rest of M1, would be for complete political and territorial partition.  Other 
themes prevalent at the gathering included the Muslim migration option, the Khilafat 
movement, right-wing Hindu groups, and “the final fate of the Muslim community’s 
independent identity.”25  Barelvi scholars and pirs were determined to set up branches of 
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the All-India Sunni Conference, as well as a mәdarys network to rival their Deobandi 
counterparts, all over India. 
The All-India Sunni Conference (or, as it was officially known, the Jamiat-e-‘Aliyah 
al-Markaziah) arose as a mostly Barelvi response to the Deobandi-dominated JUH and 
the Khilafat movement.  The group was “the first political platform of the Barelvi 
[‘alәma].”26  Membership criteria were kept strict so as to prevent any Deobandi from 
becoming one with the party; indeed, only a true (or “orthodox”) “Sunni” could join its 
ranks, with orthodoxy explicitly defined by the group on the organization’s membership 
form.  A true Sunni, the AISC held, was one who followed the mәslәk of the great 
Jahangir- and Shah Jahan-era Islamic scholar and Sufi Abdul Haqq Dehlavi; 
seventeenth-century/tenth-century Farangi Mahali scholar Abdul ‘Ali (the 
aforementioned bәhәr ul’alwm); the aforementioned Fazl-e-Haq Khairabadi; Fazl-e Rasul 
Badayuni (who, mentioned briefly in Chapter 1, was a contemporary of Fazl-e-Haq 
Khairabadi, a chief “Barelvi” Mutiny figure, and a fierce opponent of Wahhabism); and, 
of course, first “Barelvi” Ahmad Riza Khan of Bareilly.27  The Conference admonished 
Muslims everywhere against joining the Indian National Congress.  And though Hamid 
Riza Khan would participate as a speaker, and influential Muslim leaders like Jamaat 
‘Ali Shah (the pir of ‘Alipur Sayyidan Sharif) take prominent roles (the sәyyid was elected 
the organization’s president at the 1925/1343 meeting), the true founder of the 
organization was Naimuddin Moradabadi, at whose institution the conference took 
place.  Naimuddin would be elected the group’s first general secretary (nazym-e-‘alәħ). 
The All-India Sunni Conference came away from its first meeting with a set of 
specific objectives, touched upon by Hamid Riza and outlined in the organization’s six 
official aims.  First and foremost, the Conference would strive to act as a vehicle of 
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unification for the subcontinent’s Sunni community.  “Sunni” here was, as always, a 
(Barelvi) catchword for the Barelvis themselves, or “Ahl-e-Sunnat wal Jamaat” (defined 
by one Barelvi group as “the largest group of Muslims and the only group whose beliefs 
and teachings are truly in accordance with the Holy Quran and Sunnat of the Holy 
Prophet”);28 perhaps more accurately, though, the label might be considered an 
exclusionary term, discounting not only the Shi’a but also Sunnis possessed of a more 
“Wahhabi” bent—by far the most prominent (and populous) among them the 
Deobandis.  By using the term, the Barelvis were pushing the Deobandis and others out 
of the Sunni umbrella altogether.  The goal to unite Indian “Sunnis” was to be brought 
about through a variety of means.  These included the establishment of regional and 
local religious organizations, active in their areas but linked to the subcontinent-wide 
All-India Sunni Conference; the organization of proselytizing efforts (especially aimed 
at Muslims who might otherwise fall under Deobandi sway); and the founding of 
religious schools—certainly a reaction to successful Deobandi efforts in this regard.  
The rest of the Conference platform dealt with the improvement of Muslim social 
conditions vis-à-vis the promotion of intra-community (i.e. Muslim community) 
business and trade, the fulfilling of the employment needs of Muslims, and the freeing of 
Muslims from the shackles of debt. 
The AISC would meet at least four more times between 1925/1343 and 1930/1349, 
with conferences in Bihar (16-18 May 1927/14-16 Dh’ul Q’adah 1345; it was during this 
gathering that Hamid Riza was elected the organization’s next president), again in 
Moradabad (in August 1928/Safar 1347), a month later (September/Rabi I) in the same 
city, and in Bengal (20-21 May 1930/21-22 Dh’ul Hijja 1348).  The September 
1928/Rabi I 1347 conference in Moradabad was particularly significant in that the 
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AISC came out strongly and formally against the Nehru Report (about which more 
later).  The Congress-produced document was proof, alleged the Barelvis, that the 
Hindus were only manipulating their Muslim co-activists for their own political 
advantage.  A resolution passed (“unanimously”) by the conference on this regard stated, 
“This meeting considers the Nehru Committee Report as dangerous for the interests of 
the Muslims, and condemn it.”29  The 1930/1348 Bengal conference went further, 
admonishing Muslims to stay away from the INC, out-and-out condemning the JUH for 
its pro-Congress stance, and describing its (the JUH’s) leadership as “working like 
puppets in the hands of the Hindus.”  The Deobandis, the Sunni Conference had 
officially asserted, had lost any mandate it might have once possessed as representatives 
of Islam or the ummәt in South Asia.30  By 1930/1348, then, it can be accurately stated 
that the Barelvis and the Deobandis, heretofore engaged in what might be called a 
political cold war among the subcontinent’s Muslim communities for religio-political 
supremancy and “sole spokesparty” status, now faced one another as explicit political 
enemies.  
In December of 1930/Rajab of 1349, the Muslim League held its all-India 
conference at Allahabad, none other than Muhammad Iqbal presiding.  The poet-
philosopher emphasized what would become the underlining facet of the League’s 
Pakistan pitch: “The principal of European democracy cannot be applied to India 
without recognizing the fact of communal groups.  The Muslim demand for the creation 
of a Muslim India within India is, therefore, perfectly justified.”  Indeed, Iqbal went on 
to call for just that—and got specific, proposing the creation of a separate, Muslim state 
on the subcontinent, carved out of the northwestern regions (more or less equivalent to 
Pakistan’s present-day boundaries).  “I would like to see the Punjab, North-West 
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Frontier Province, Sindh, and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single State.”  This, he 
said, was “the final destiny of the Muslims, at least of North-West India.”31  Around the 
same time, of course, Choudhary Rahmat ‘Ali and his friends—students at Cambridge—
used the designation “Pakistan” for the first time.  Their fantasy state, like Iqbal’s, 
essentially included what one would recognize as Pakistan as of the time of this writing.  
Interestingly—and perhaps significantly—neither Iqbal nor ‘Ali included Bengal in 
their hoped-for scenarios for a new Indian Islamic state.  And at least one Pakistani 
historian has identified Naimuddin Moradabadi as “most probably” the first Barelvi 
scholar to embrace the propositions of Iqbal’s 1930/1349 Allahabad address.32  
Thousands would follow suit, even if their collective vision for the exact nature of a 
future Pakistan almost assuredly differed from that of Iqbal himself.  (One historian has 
deftly observed that “there is no quintessential national culture, only mythic images of it,” 
an idea that seems to aptly describe the various “images” of a future Pakistan; the big 
question was this: whose “mythic images” would serve as the true reflection of 
Pakistan’s “quintessential national culture?”)33  Most Pakistan supporters seem to have 
been driven less by an animosity against the British (one Pakistani scholar has noted 
that even into the early 1930s/1350s, the Muslim League continued to be “dominated 
by pro-British elements”)34 than anxiety about how Muslims might fare in a Hindu-
majority (and therefore Hindu-controlled) western-style democracy—just as Iqbal had 
said.  Some, too, were driven to support Pakistan despite opposition to the League (and 
to Congress, for that matter).  “Already there is no justice and much faction,” one 
Muslim subedar near Shewa told an English observer in 1946/1365.  “We don’t want 
either League or Congress.  What we want is tranquility, so there must be division” (italics 
added).35 
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Speaking of Iqbal and the League, it should be noted that later Barelvi scholars 
would appropriate the legacies of Iqbal and even Jinnah as part of their own narrative.  
While Deobandi histories write of the “freedom movement,” expounding upon the 
religio-political exploits of figures like Mahmud Hasan, Husain Ahmed Madani, and 
even (in Pakistan) Shabbir Ahmad Usmani, they remain mostly quiet when it comes to 
Iqbal and Jinnah (and, of course, any of the Barelvi leadership).  Meanwhile, Barelvi 
historians write of the “Pakistan movement,” granting space to Iqbal and Jinnah as well 
as Ahmad Riza Khan, Naimuddin Moradabadi, and the All-India Sunni Conference.  
Iqbal’s positions vis-à-vis the Khilafat movement, as well as his two-nation theory, are 
prominent and underscored in the Barelvi narrative (often including verse he composed 
to communicate his political views).  Jinnah’s role as a model Muslim—a devout Sunni, 
it is insisted, not a Shi’i—who has unfairly been labeled a secularist is also highlighted 
in the Barelvi histories.36  The Aligarh movement revolving around Sir Sayyid’s Anglo-
Oriental University is similary treated as part and parcel of the Barelvi story.    
Deobandi historians are less kind to Jinnah, the League, and the Aligarhists—a 
phenomenon that is especially true in India. 
The rumblings for a separate state surely lent added political emphasis to the All-
India Sunni Conference’s second subcontinent-wide gathering in 1935/1354 at 
Badayun, a town that, as previously mentioned, had long been a seat of Barelvi 
influence.  It had been a decade since the organization’s first gathering in Moradabad, 
and five years since Iqbal’s statements to the Muslim League, but the AISC under 
Naimuddin Moradabadi (and pir Jamaat ‘Ali Shah, who was again elected the 
organization’s president on this occasion)37 had decided the time had come to make 
several formal pronouncements.  First, the Barelvi organization officially declared its 
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support for the “two-nation theory” (though the gathered scholars were apt to trace the 
idea to Ahmad Riza rather than to Jinnah or Iqbal).  Second, and perhaps more 
importantly from a political point-of-view, the Sunni Conference called for outright 
independence for the subcontinent’s Muslims—independence not so much from the 
British as from Hindu-dominated India.  Geographically, that independence should 
resemble the proposition put forward by Iqbal and subsequently adopted by the All-
India Muslim League.38  Though the Conference kept its distance, technically speaking, 
from the League (not declaring itself, for example, an official ally of the secular AIML, 
nor seeking out Jinnah to organize united efforts in support of their joint political 
goals), it unambiguously fell in line with the League’s political agenda, even as the 
Deobandis, under the leadership of the JUH, were striving for “composite nationalism” 
and a united India.  Such “falling in line,” however, was not done without reservation—
and conditions.  Yes, the Barelvis at Badayun had articulated their vision, however 
broadly, of a South Asian Islamic state.  But they would support the League “only to the 
extent that, in one part of Hindustan, the free governance of the Qur’an, of Islam, will 
prevail.”  Should the League pursue a different course, “no Sunni [Barelvi] will accept 
it.”  The League’s secular roots obviously clashed with the Barelvi ‘alәma’s goal of the 
establishment of an explicitly and unambiguously Islamic state.  Such fears were 
articulated at the conference, too; those “professing the [kәlymәħ]” yet are “irritated by 
the thought of an Islamic authority” should meet with disfavor in Pakistan, it was 
argued.  Thus the AISC’s support of the League was conditional, even if its call for 
Pakistan was officially unequivocal.  In a formal resolution adopted at the Badayun 
conference, the Barelvi guiding lights announced that the AISC “fully supports the 
demand for Pakistan,” an “Islamic state” for which the Barelvi ‘alәma and mәshayx were 
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“prepared for whatever sacrifice may be necessary.”  Pakistan, they maintained, would 
be guided by “the Qur’an, hәdis, and the principles of fiqh.”39  These were the Barelvis’ 
“mythic images,” the symbols of their “quintessential national culture,” whatever the 
League’s might be.  (Jawaharlal Nehru would touch upon the ambiguous idea of 
“Moslem culture” around this time, too, writing, “Is [Muslim culture] a kind of racial 
memory of the great deeds of the Arabs, Persians, Turks, etc.?  Or language?  Or art 
and music?  Or customs?  I do not remember any one referring to present-day Moslem 
art or Moslem music.  …[T]he influence of Persian has no element of religion about it.  
…[Persian language and culture] is a common and precious heritage for all of us in 
India.  I have tried hard to understand what this ‘Moslem culture’ is, but I confess that I 
have not succeeded… The Moselm peasantry and industrial workers are hardly 
distinguishable from the Hindu.”)40 
After the Congress’s landslide electoral victory in 1937/1356, the face of Indian 
politics began to change quickly.  This was, in some part, the fault of the INC itself, 
which, flush with victory, rejected Muslim League participation in government 
(actually, the League had demanded that any Muslim considered for governmental 
position be vetted by itself—as self-appointed spokesparty of India’s Muslim 
population—but the Congress had refused to recognize this foundational League claim).  
Muslim leaders and their parties all over India looked on with mounting trepidation at 
such developments, which seemed to confirm Jinnah’s long-time assertion that the 
Hindu majority would be an abusive ruler.  In the face of this perceived “Hindu” 
arrogance, one by one these influencial figures (among them “large numbers” of Barelvi 
or Barelvi-leaning pirs, ‘alәma, and other religious leaders) and Muslim parties began to 
align themselves with Muhammad ‘Ali Jinnah and his party.  All-India Sunni 
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Conference leader Jamaat ‘Ali Shah, for example, in 1938/1357 launched a tour of the 
largely Congress-controlled northwestern frontier in support of Jinnah, the League, and 
Muslim separateness, addressing “huge gatherings” in Rawalpindi, Kohat, Sialkot, and 
Peshawar.  This major figure within the predominantly Barelvi AISC condemned the 
Deobandi ‘alәma who had sided with the Congress, praying “to God to unite the 
Muslims and save them from the clutches of [the] pro-Hindu coterie of the so-called 
Muslim scholars.”  (By 1945/1364 he would characterize the Congress, with direct 
allusion to its Muslim supporters, as “the party of infidels and apostates” and “the worst 
enemy of the Muslims.”)41  Thus, and thanks in significant measure to Barelvi support, 
the great electoral loser of 1937/1356 was transformed into “the champion of free Islam 
against Hindu dominance.”42 
From the late nineteenth century/thirteenth century, the division between the 
Barelvis and the Deobandis was, in the words of Jaswant Singh, “exploited by the 
British to neutralize the Deobandis and to entrap the Barelwis in the loyalist camp: 
Quad Erat Demonstrandum.”43  This may have been true, but became more complicated 
after the October 1921/Safar 1340 death of Ahmad Riza Khan, when a Barelvi split—
which had commenced in the volatile political climate in the decade before the great 
man’s passing—saw many younger Ahl-e-Sunnat leaders move to the overtly anti-
British camp.  But the British soon found an answer for that, too.  In August 
1938/Jumada II 1357, Muhammad ‘Ali Jinnah met with India’s acting British viceroy 
and offered his foreign overlord a deal.  Simply put, the League leader promised that his 
organization would remain loyal to the British—if the government recognized the 
League as the sole mouthpiece of India’s Muslims (something Minto had agreed to back 
in 1906/1324, when the League was founded, but had subsequently carried little weight 
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due to realities on the ground, until recently).  It was a wry move, but one that would 
pay off, despite the viceroy’s initial dismissal of the offer, for after the breakout of World 
War II the government of India readily agreed to Jinnah’s proposal, in line with its 
long-established policy of setting up “the Muslim minority” as “the hope of the British 
Government in India,” in the words of one Indian commentator writing many years 
before the Jinnah-Linlithgow meeting.44  For decades, the British government had been 
rewarding loyal Muslims with educational grants, a disproportionate number of 
government posts, titles, honors, disproportionate representation in the councils, and 
separate electorates, to name a few.  Now the government had identified what it viewed 
as the premier Muslim organization in India (or at least the one it preferred the most) 
and offered its patronage in order to ensure its loyalty.  Jinnah thus won his place as the 
“sole spokesman” of South Asia’s Muslims—a position on which he would never 
compromise, despite South Asian Islam’s multiplicity of communities, interests, and 
divergent parties, and despite the fact that others claimed to possess similar status (or at 
least a more legitimate claim to it); among these could certainly be counted the AISC 
Barelvi leadership, who saw themselves as the standard-bearers of Indian Islam’s 
majority (their foundational claim), as well as the JUH, who had long viewed itself as 
the premier ‘alәma party in South Asia and who pointed to its central role in many a 
national (and even pan-Islamic) movement for almost twenty years as compelling 
evidence.  (The idea that Jinnah could be the sole spokesman of India’s Muslims could 
only have been motivated by political considerations, since it was obviously a ludicrous 
claim.  Even within the League, there were powerful voices opposing Jinnah’s 
separatism.  In fact, the Muslim League premiers in the two major provinces claimed by 
Jinnah for Pakistan—the Punjab and Bengal—both stood adamantly against the idea; 
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the Punjab’s Sikandar Hayat Khan mockingly referred to it as “Jinnahstan.”45  Right up 
to independence, in August 1947/Ramadan 1366, the League was unable to win 
absolute majorities in any of the Muslim-majority provinces.  In the words of one 
historian personally close to these events, “Jinnah’s scheme would foist Pakistan on 
those not interested in it and leave out those who might welcome it.”)46  The terms of 
the League head’s offer fit more squarely with the general Barelvi political position, 
obviously, than with the Deobandi one.  From the beginning, Ahmad Riza had preached 
Muslim reform from within, and had identified the subcontinent’s Hindus (and its 
apostate Muslim collaborators) as subcontinental Islam’s greatest threat.  Viewed from 
this perspective, Jinnah’s proposition entailing loyalty to the British was justifiable, and 
it was therefore natural that so many Barelvis would fall into line behind the wiry 
Karachi-born politician (something many of their leaders had done at the 1935/1354 
Badayun conference of the AISC), while so many Deobandis, reared within the context 
of a virulently anti-British tradition, would reject him entirely, especially after this 
latest treachery. 
That so many Barelvis, including several of its most notable leaders, had in fact done 
exactly that vis-à-vis Jinnah and the League (that is, fallen in line behind them) was 
demonstrated powerfully on 22 December 1939/10 Dh’ul Q’adah 1358, when Muslims 
across India observed the Jinnah-inspired “Day of Deliverance” in celebration of the 
resignation from provincial and national government office of Congress position-
holders across the country.  The Congress move—supported strongly by Nehru but 
only reluctantly by Gandhi—was meant as an INC protest against both not having been 
consulted before Indian resources and military forces were committed to participation in 
the Second World War as well as for the usual lack of any sort of independence promise 
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from the government.  As usual, Jinnah (who was reportedly “overjoyed” at the news of 
the INC’s decision) took full political advantage of what was probably a rash move on 
the part of the Congress, utilizing the situation to consolidate his position relative to the 
British by promising “honorable” Muslim support while calling for an increase in 
protection for Muslims by the government.  His call for a Day of Deliverance—that is, 
deliverance from Congress “tyranny”—was hailed by a segment of Muslims (including 
many Barelvis) but condemned strongly by others (notably, the Congress’s Deobandi 
supporters).   
On the occasion of the controversial Day, two-time AISC president and influential 
pir Jamaat ‘Ali Shah addressed a crowd in his hometown of ‘Alipur.  “There are two 
flags [in India],” he said, “one of Islam and the other of kufәr.”  This would be the sharp 
diametric presented by advocates of Pakistan in the months running up to Partition.  “O 
Muslims,” the great pir continued, “under which flag will you stand?”  The crowd 
reportedly answered, “Under the flag of Islam!”  Jamaat ‘Ali then asked, “If anyone 
standing under the flag of kufәr died, [would] you bury him in the Muslim graveyard?  
[Would] you pray at his funeral?”  “No! No!” came the multitude’s answer.  And then 
the critical statement: “The flag of the Muslim League,” proclaimed the eminent pir, “is 
the flag of Islam.”  His final enjoinder: “We must all join the League.”47  (Jamaat ‘Ali 
Shah reportedly made similar statements even before the “Day of Deliverance.”  On 22 
April 1938/21 Safar 1357, he had addressed a crowd in Sialkot thus: “Dear Muslims, 
today there are two banners.  One belongs to Islam and the other to infidels.  Which 
will you choose?”  The gathering allegedly “vowed to close their graveyards” on 
Deobandis and other “co-religionists who have gone under the non-Muslim banners.”  
Several other reports confirm that the old pir routinely equated rejection of the League 
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with kufәr, or “disbelief.”  “It is binding,” he told a gathering on 11 May 1938/11 Rabi I 
1357, “on all the Muslims of India to join the Muslim League.”  Such language would be 
repeated by Jamaat ‘Ali in the critical years leading up to Partition, from 1945/1364 to 
1947/1366).48  The effect on public (Muslim) opinion by such calls is difficult to 
measure, of course, but was likely considerable.  Indeed, without the League’s change of 
strategy—without the co-opting of the pirs and mәshaix, of men like Naimuddin 
Moradabadi and Jamaat ‘Ali Shah (not to mention, later, some key Deobandis like 
Shabbir Ahmad Usmani)—it is difficult to see how Jinnah would have secured the 
victory he eventually won. 
General Barelvi support for the League was further cemented by that organization’s 
formal adoption, in March 1940/Safar 1359, of the Lahore Resolution—a clear-cut 
statement of purpose on the part of Jinnah and his party.49  As Hindus and Muslims 
were two different nations, “the only course open to us,” Jinnah declared on the occasion 
of the resolution’s passing, “is to allow the major nations separate homelands.”  The 
goal was now an unambiguously separate, absolutely independent (i.e. from Hindu 
India) Muslim polity (or polities) on the subcontinent; “[t]he Muslim-majority 
provinces in North Western and Eastern Zones of India should be grouped to constitute 
Independent States,” the Resolution announced, “in which the constituent units shall be 
autonomous and sovereign.”50  Before this momentous resolution, the idea of Pakistan 
had been the domain of a small group, and the destiny of India’s Muslims had remained 
a hotly contested topic possessed of a long spectrum of opinion voiced by a wide variety 
of both secular and religious leaders.  Post-Lahore Resolution, however, an increasing 
number of Muslims appear to have been drawn to the League’s new, simple, and 
infinitely measurable aim.  This trend continued despite efforts by the JUH, the Ahrars, 
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Shi’a political groups, and others to challenge the League’s claim to represent all 
Muslims.  In April 1940/Rabi I 1359, for example, the JUH—together with the Shi’a 
Political Conference and the Majlis-e-Ahrar—organized an Azad [“Free”] Muslim 
Conference, accusing the AIML of ignoring the real Muslim minority in the Hindu-
majority areas of India in favor of the Muslims who already enjoyed majority status in 
their respective areas; Jinnah responded that these minority Muslims would be 
minorities whether Pakistan was created or not—it was a choice between all Muslims 
under Hindu Raj, or only some.51  Perhaps these challenges from within the Muslim 
community didn’t matter, since the British had already selected the League as its 
approved Muslim voice. 
Most Barelvis, it seems, could be counted among those supporting the League, at 
least as far as the organization’s call for a separate homeland (i.e. separate from the 
Hindu majority) was concerned, however their visions of a future subcontinental Islamic 
state might have diverged from Jinnah’s in other respects.  The AISC, under the 
direction of Jamaat ‘Ali Shah and Naimuddin Moradabadi, sent delegates to the 
League’s annual session on the occasion of the Resolution’s passing (Abdul Hamid 
Badayuni and Abdul Ghafur Hazarvi, both actually League members), and Jamaat ‘Ali 
himself issued a statement in the decision’s favor: “The Muslim League is the only 
Islamic organization,” he said, taking a swipe at the Deobandis and their JUH.  
“Therefore, I advise the Muslims [of India] to join it [the League], as no other party is 
a well-wisher of the Muslims.”  And then the final jab, a la Ahmad Riza: “It is futile to 
think that the Hindu-dominated Congress can be sympathetic to them and support their 
cause.”52  For his part, after the passage of the Lahore Resolution, Naimuddin 
Moradabadi crisscrossed north India, delivering speeches in favor of Pakistan and the 
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All-India Muslim League.53  In April 1941/Rabi I 1360, the Lahore Resolution’s call for, 
essentially, the creation of Pakistan (Jinnah would say as much in an April 1941/Rabi I 
1360 statement)54 was strengthened and clarified by the Madras Resolution (as it was 
passed in a session of the League in that city), demanding “completely independent 
States” carved from India’s northwest and eastern regions that together would 
constitute “Muslim Free National Homelands.”  Two years later (April 1943/Rabi II 
1362) Jinnah would specifically admonish the pirs of India “to pray and exhort their 
followers” to be willing to lay down their lives, if necessary, for the attainement of an 
independent Islamic state on the subcontinent.55  The League’s appeal motivated many a 
Barelvi leader to take to the road to campaign for Jinnah and Pakistan; Jamaat ‘Ali Shah, 
for example, “despite old age and deteriorating health [being over a hundred years old 
at the time],” toured eastern Punjab in 1944/1363 on just such a platform.  The next 
year he and other Barelvi scholars and shixs stumped for the League in, among other 
places, Amritsar, where their party (dubbed by followers “the caravan of light”) was 
greeted with the slogan-shout, “Long live әmir-e-myllәt [Jamaat ‘Ali Shah’s honorary 
title], long live the Muslim League, and long live qayd-i-ә‘ažәm [Muhammad ‘Ali 
Jinnah]!”  An AISC meeting at the Jama mәsjyd in Amritsar saw Naimuddin 
Moradabadi, along with several other powerful scholars (plus pir Jamaat ‘Ali Shah), 
deliver “forceful” addresses in support of Pakistan.56   
In January 1946/Safar 1365, thousands of Barelvis, including many scholars and 
shaixs, traveled to Bareilly in order to commemorate the death anniversary of Ahmad 
Riza Khan (who had passed away exactly twenty-five years before).  It was normal, of 
course, for throngs of disciples to assemble for the great divine’s ‘urs, but this particular 
gathering in Bareilly evolved into a political meeting of sorts.  The massive assemblage 
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produced a formal expression of support for Pakistan.  Perhaps more significantly, the 
meeting clarified just what that meant—a state in which shәri’at must be established and 
enforced.  Anything less was unacceptable.  A similar meeting, this time officially under 
the aegis of the AISC, took place the next month in Etawah district, about ninety miles 
due south of Badayun.  Its call matched that of the Ahmad Riza ‘urs gathering.57  The 
spontaneous nature of the political meeting brought forth by the annual ‘urs gathering 
in Bareilly makes clearly recognizable the way the religio-political winds were blowing 
among Barelvis across India.  The general support for Pakistan was there, yes—but for 
Pakistan as an explicitly Islamic state established according to the Sunni (i.e. Barelvi) 
interpretation of Islamic law.  Such powerful expressions underscore, perhaps, the 
future disappointments of the Barelvis and their leaders when the Deobandis were given 
an official place at the constitution-crafting table in independent Pakistan—while the 
Ahl-e-Sunnat ‘alәma were left seemingly out in the cold.  That perceived exclusion 
would be even more painful given the fact that, four months later, on the occasion of the 
All-India Sunni Conference’s largest gathering to date, Naimuddin Moradabadi would 
be appointed chairman of an official AISC committee created to formulate a plan for 
enshrining Islamic law within the Pakistani constitution.  The result of this committee’s 
work, largely undertaken by Naimuddin himself, was known as the “Eleven Points.” 
The mega-gathering took place four months after Ahmad Riza Khan’s ‘urs and the 
spontaneous political meeting that had accompanied it.  According to Barelvi reports, 
some five hundred Sufi shixs were joined by around seven thousand Barelvi or Barelvi-
leaning ‘alәma and not less than two hundred thousand other attendees.  Led by 
Naimuddin Moradabadi, as well as Zafaruddin Bihari and Ahmad Riza’s younger son 
Mustafa, the conference’s focus was familiar to those who had attended the 
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organization’s first two India-wide gatherings: on the spiritual uplift of Indian Muslims 
through, among other things, preaching and missionary work (tәbliG) and the extension 
of the Barelvi (or “Sunni”) mәdrәsәħ network through the establishment of more 
mәdarys.  But what made this mega-conference different, apart from the sheer number of 
its attendees, was its enunciation of a hoped-for goal, the very purpose of such self-
improvement efforts.  That goal was “Pakistan,” or a land of purity—a play on the 
meaning of the word that would shortly become the name of a new Islamic state.  “The 
meaning of ‘Pakistan,’” newly elected AISC president Muhammad Ashrafi Kachhuchhavi 
(d. 1961 AD) told the assembled thousands, “is an independent state of Islam and the 
Qur’an, in a small part of India...”  And then the crux of Muhammad Ashrafi’s point: 
“[B]ut we [the AISC] are working for a grand ‘Pakistan’…the rule of Islam all over the 
world.”58  This was where Muslim League goals diverged from those of the Barelvis 
(and where Deobandis, in a future independent Pakistan, could later find some common 
ground with their long-time theological rivals).  What debate may have occurred at the 
conference vis-à-vis Pakistan we may never know (there were, after all, some Barelvi 
scholars and pirs who opposed the establishment of Pakistan, and certainly cooperation 
with the Muslim League; support of the latter, according to one scholar of Barelvism, 
was “the subject of considerable controversy” among Barelvi ‘alәma),59 but the 
overarching message of the Varanasi (then called Benares) gathering was that the 
Barelvis had much more revivalist (or, depending on one’s point-of-view, anti-revivalist) 
work to do, especially in light of Deobandi and other “Wahhabi” gains among South 
Asian Muslims; all this was to be done with the goal of “Pakistan” in mind.  If the 
League was to be the vehicle to accomplish the latter, it seems most Barelvi leaders 
were willing to accept it as such.  In any case, the resolution in favor of Pakistan at the 
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1946/1365 Benares AISC gathering represented, in the words of M. Ahmad, “the climax 
of support of the Sunni [Barelvi] [‘alәma] for the cause of Pakistan”—though the 
Barelvi contribution on the frontier and in the Punjab (two crucial provinces the League 
could ill-afford to lose) might arguably lay claim, too, to the Pakistani historian’s 
classification.60 
Naimuddin Moradabadi’s “Eleven Points” showcase what might be considered the 
general Barelvi point-of-view, at the time, vis-à-vis Pakistan as an Islamic state.  The 
document defined “Pakistan” as a “free Islamic government” in Hindustan, established 
“according to shәri’at and the principles of fyqħ.”  What this meant in practical terms 
was outlined in Moradabadi’s eleven points, which underscore not only the role of the 
‘alәma in government, but also the right kind of ‘alәma.  In fact, the first nine points, if 
implemented, would have effectively shut out any meaningful Deobandi participation in 
Pakistan’s governance.  Point #1 (“This government will be ruled by a Sunni әmir”) 
would have placed a “Sunni” (read: Barelvi) әmir at the head of the state.  That an әmir 
of the proper sectarian persuasion be elected would be ensured by Point #2 (“This әmir 
will be elected by the majority of the Sunni [әhl-e-sunnәt ] Muslims”), which not only 
excluded non-Muslims, but also Shi’a Muslims and, potentially, all “Sunni” Muslims 
who failed to meet a state requirement of orthodoxy.  Based on the AISC’s membership 
criteria, the Deobandis would have fallen far outside such a requirement and may 
therefore have been unable, under Naimuddin Moradabadi’s constitution, to vote for the 
әmir.  Once a Barelvi (or “Sunni”) әmir had been elected, he would create a shwra 
(“advisory council”), as per Point #3 (“That әmir will appoint a group of pious 
[Muslim] people and statesmen for a shwra”), almost certainly, of course, stacked with 
those of the Ahl-e-Sunnat persuasion—and traditionally made up mostly of ‘alәma.  
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Point #4 (The jәma’at-e-shwra will be directed by the әmir) and Point #5 (The suggestions 
of the jәma’at-e-shwra will be considered final after the әmir’s acceptance) assured the Barelvi 
religious leadership a powerful place within the political apparatus—that is, direct 
access to the ear of the head of state, with that head’s general compliance with their 
suggestions (as implicit in Point #5) constitutionally binding.  Point #6 further ensured 
that a Pakistani government would be in good “Sunni” hands by having the (almost 
certainly Barelvi) әmir in charge of appointing a Prime Minister with “responsibility” 
(nәžәm w nәgrani) over “all internal and external affairs” (according to Point #7).  
Department heads would be nominated by the Prime Minister (as per Point #8)—but 
only after approval by the әmir himself (Point #9).  Rounding out the “Eleven Points,” 
#10 and #11 dealt with taxes and the status of non-Muslims, respectively.  
Moradabadi’s constitutional framework underscores the Barelvi leadership’s belief that 
they did indeed represent the “Sunni majority,” and could thus rest easy that in a true 
Islamic state like the “Pakistan” they envisioned, one incorporating democratic 
mechanisms (like voting), they would naturally emerge electorally victorious and thus 
occupy high places of power.  The draft made no mention of bicameral or unicameral 
assemblies, provincial assemblies, or any other republican-style entity, emphasizing 
instead rule by a righteous әmir (under the firm guidance of his ‘alәma-filled shwra) or 
әmir-approved officers and their respective departments.61 
Na’imuddin Moradabadi never migrated to Pakistan, either at the time of 
Partition or afterward.  He did visit the new Islamic state, however, meeting with 
Barelvi leaders and others in Lahore, Karachi, and elsewhere.62  (Naimuddin 
Moradabadi’s activities in Pakistan during his final months are addressed at some 
length in Chapter 4).  But lasting influence within the Barelvi school even in Pakistan is 
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demonstrated by the achievements of his many students there, hundreds of whom went 
on to establish schools of their own in the new “Muslim” state.  Muhammad Hussain 
Naeemi, for example (born in Uttar Pradesh’s Moradabad District in 1923/1341), was 
one of those disciples.  Muhammad Hussain’s father had died young—at only nineteen 
years of age—so Muhammad Hussain had been left in the care of his sister and her 
husband, who had eventually enrolled him into Naimuddin Moradabadi’s Jamia Naeemia 
mәdrәsәħ in Moradabad.  He was ten years old, and the Jamia Naeemia, as 
aforementioned, was one of Barelvism’s most influencial institutions on the 
subcontinent (and still listed, as of the time of this writing, on the Raza Academy’s list 
of “Prominent Sunni [Barelvi] Madresas in India”).63  Muhammad Hussain would have 
witnessed Moradabadi’s many pro-Pakistan activities over the years first-hand, and the 
impression that these early years under Moradabadi’s tutelage made on the young man 
is difficult to overstate.64  But the critical moment came when Naimuddin Moradabadi 
asked Muhammad Hussain to move to Lahore, despite the fact that all of his 
(Muhammad Hussain’s) siblings and his parents opted to remain in the Moradabad area 
(even after Partition; Raghib Hussain Naeemi, Muhammad Hussain’s grandson in 
Lahore, lamented in 2012/1433, “We are alone here”).  For a while he stayed at the old 
Chowk Dalgirah mosque, about a quarter-mile west down the road from the Lahore 
train station, but eventually he would found his own institution.  Within six years, 
however, space at the newly established school no longer sufficed and he was forced to 
publish an advertisement asking for land to build something bigger.  His efforts were 
rewarded when the real estate upon which the Jamia Naeemia of Lahore (named, of 
course, after Naimuddin Moradabadi’s school) currently resides was gifted to him.  
Work began on the new site in 1959/1378.  The mәdrәsәħ’s alumni would eventually be 
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found leading prayer or otherwise filling positions in mosques and mәdarys across the 
world, while the Jamia Naeemia is considered one of the most important Barelvi 
institutions of learning in Pakistan (and even the target of deadly Deobandi violence).  
Hundreds of Naimuddin Moradabadi’s other students followed paths similar to 
Muhammad Hussain Naeemi’s. 
Naimuddin Moradabadi died in 1948/1367.  In his early years, his reputation had 
been that of a great debater.  But by the end of his life, he was described by one of his 
followers as “hәżrәt, priest of Islam, [the] dignity of religion…unparalleled learned 
man, incomparable orator, [the] embodiment of inward and outward virtues…[and 
the] Defender of [a] strong religious code of life.”  One eulogy included the following: 
“The eye of India [had never seen] such an eloquent speaker…whose every word 
captivated the heart.”65  Unfortunately for the old Barelvi ‘alym, his organization, which 
would basically become the Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan (on which much more later), as 
well as his thirteen-point draft for a Pakistani constitution would be sidelined in the 
new “Islamic” state in favor of a mostly western, qausi-secular system—one that tended 
to favor Deobandism, anyway. 
* 
Husain Ahmad Madani :  Taking up the Mantle of Mahmud Hasan . 
In 1879/1296, Husain Ahmad Madani was born in Bangar Mau, a village fifty-five 
miles west of Lucknow where his father, Habibullah, was working as school headmaster.  
Habibullah set him upon the path of religious scholarship and imbued within him a 
hatred of the British government.  From his mother he learned Arabic and a love for the 
Qur’an.  Both brought him up in an environment of strict discipline; despite his 
“inclination to playfulness” he was not allowed to frolick with the other village children 
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and only occasionally was able to steal a few minutes for marbles or playtime with a 
nearby cousin.  Even these tiny infractions were enough to worry his father, who 
eventually sent him to the dar ul’alwm at Deoband to keep him out of trouble. He was 
twelve or thirteen years old,66 but due to his “weak constitution and short stature” the 
boy didn’t “look more than eleven.”67  In time millions would know him as shix ul-yslam: 
“the Spiritual Leader of Islam.” 
Husain Ahmad Madani’s ancestors (led by one Shah Noor ul-Haq) were sayyids who 
had come to India sometime around the beginning of the sixteenth/tenth century, 
subsequently establishing a xanәqaħ on the banks of the Ghagra River about a hundred 
miles east of Lucknow (near present-day Tanda in India’s Uttar Pradesh).  For several 
generations Shah Noor ul-Haq’s descendants enjoyed prominence, wealth, and the 
notoriety of being a pir family, living off of generous revenue grants from the Mughal 
government (garnered from no less than twenty-four villages) and generally enjoying 
the patronage of the state.  But the family’s fortunes began to decline in the 
nineteenth/fourteenth century, and by the time of the Mutiny, the number of villages 
from which the house drew revenue had been reduced almost by half.  The downward 
trend continued late into in the century, underscored by the drowning in the Ghagra of 
family head Akbar ‘Ali, the deaths of several of his heirs, and the loss of virtually all of 
their property.  As a result, little Habibullah—Akbar ‘Ali’s grandson and the future 
father of Husain Ahmad Madani—grew up very differently than had his ancestors, 
raised on the earnings of his adoptive mother, who herself spun cotton to put food on 
the table.68 
Habibullah possessed the natural inclinations of the scholar.  As a student, he 
memorized the Qur’an, learned Persian, and composed poetry in Persian, Urdu, and 
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Bhasha.  After the completion of his studies, he took up a job as a primary school teacher 
in a small town a few miles outside of Tanda.  Some time later he earned a teaching 
diploma from a school in Lucknow and won a headmastership at a middle school in 
Safipur, a village fifty miles west of Lucknow.  In time he was transferred to Tanda, 
where he was able to slowly but surely re-possess some of his ancestral land and build 
an independent house for himself.  At one point he was “tempted” to learn English—a 
move that likely would have opened up more lucrative career opportunities—but, he 
told his son later, a dream in which his hands were covered in excrement (which he 
interpreted as a sign that learning English was “dirty”) convinced him not to embark on 
such a path.  The story hints at a hatred for the British, then recently and firmly 
established as a more or less invincible power on the subcontinent (his choice to send his 
sons to the university at Deoband also suggests such an aversion).  Apart from the 
dream, he’d been told by his mother and other family members since he was a boy that it 
was largely due to British machinations that the family’s land had been lost around the 
time of the Mutiny.  Much of Habibullah’s animosity towards the British would be 
passed on to his son.  Once, he told Husain Ahmad and his brothers (at the time all 
adults), “I have brought you up with the aim that you should perform jyhad in the path 
of God and attain martyrdom in the process.”  Not long after this pronouncement 
(probably in 1898/1316),69 Habibullah migrated with his entire family to the Hijaz, 
never to set eyes upon India again.70  
Speaking of Husain Ahmad’s brothers, each of them attained prominence as religious 
scholars—just as their father had hoped.  His oldest brother, Muhammad Siddiq, 
attended the dar ul’alwm at Deoband, impressing Mahmud Hasan and becoming a 
disciple of old Rashid Ahmad Gangohi.  (Later, the British would imprison Muhammad 
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Siddiq’s son, Wahid Ahmad—who had also attended the dar ul’alwm—with his uncle 
Husain Ahmad and Mahmud Hasan on the island of Malta after the latter was caught up 
in the “Silk Letters Conspiracy”).  Another brother, Ahmad, attended the university at 
Deoband, likewise became a disciple of Rashid Ahmad, and was later imprisoned during 
the Great War in Turkey while his brother and nephew were languishing in Malta; 
afterwards, he set up a combined orphanage-school in the Hijaz.  A third (and Husain 
Ahmad’s younger) brother, Mahmud Ahmad, would become qazi of Jeddah, and 
Mahmud Ahmad’s son Habib Ahmad would go on to run the orphanage-school set up 
by his uncle.  Still, some of Habibullah’s five scholar-sons, including Husain Ahmad 
Madani, would re-migrate to India from the Hijaz, a move that would have major 
consequences for the political situation in Hindustan, the political dynamics within the 
Deobandi school, and the history of the Deobandi-Barelvi rivalry.71 
As a student at the dar ul’alwm, Husain Ahmad Madani studied under Mahmud 
Hasan (reportedly receiving considerable personal instruction therefrom on account of 
his exceptional abilities as a promising young scholar) and, like his older brother, 
eventually became the disciple of Rashid Ahmad Gangohi.  The latter is significant in 
that the brothers had first requested that Mahmud Hasan be their Sufi shix—but 
Mahmud Hasan had recommended them instead to the much-revered Rashid Ahmad.  
Such a turn of events was rarely seen, but in this case Rashid Ahmad, on Mahmud 
Hasan’s personal and fervent recommendation, agreed to be the brothers’ mentor.72  
Afterwards, Husain Ahmad migrated with the rest of his family (at his father’s request) 
to the Hijaz.  But the continuity he’d already experienced with the Deoband movement’s 
founders continued even in Arabia, for it was here that Husain Ahmad trained for a time 
under Muhammad Qasim’s and Rashid Ahmad’s own spiritual mentor: Imdadullah.  The 
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great shix died just weeks after making Husain Ahmad’s acquaintance, but the 
connection had been made between Deobandism’s grandfather figure and a leader from 
its “third generation.”  The period was financially a rough one for Madani’s family, but 
Husain Ahmad was able to obtain work as a religious teacher in Medina.  Eventually he 
achieved some renown as a lecturer at the Mosque of the Prophet—probably Islam’s 
most sacred site apart from the holy sanctuary in Mecca—where, for ten years, he 
reportedly taught hәdis for twelve hours a day;73 the fact of his position at such a 
prominent location would hold significance for the entire Deobandi movement later on, 
after his return to India.  “The reason for such powerful attraction toward and general 
popularity of an Indian religious divine in the holy land of Hejaz[,] especially in the 
Prophet’s Mosque,” explains one official biography of Madani, “should be attributed to 
[the peculiar method] of teaching that he had imbibed and inherited from the teachers 
[from] the [dar ul’alwm ].”74  Upon receiving an invitation from Rashid Ahmad 
Gangohi to visit him in India, Husain Ahmad and his older brother Muhammad Siddiq 
returned to India.  While in Gangoh visiting their aged shix, Rashid Ahmad 
distinguished the brothers as among his foremost spiritual successors.75  Soon 
afterwards, Husain Ahmad returned to the Hijaz, where he remained between 
1913/1331 and 1916/1334. 
And it was during this three-year period that Husain Ahmad Madani’s world 
changed.  He would later identify the very year; “I have been associated with 
Hindustan’s freedom movement since 1914 [1332],” he reportedly said.  What drove 
such an association?  In short: a determination to expel the British entirely from the 
subcontinent.   “I consider it the religious duty of every Muslim to oppose the British” 
(italics added).76  It was no coincidence, either, that this stage saw Husain Ahmad pick 
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up the anti-British charge; Mahmud Hasan, it will be remembered, arrived in the Hijaz 
during the same period.  One official historian of the JUH would later record that 
Husain Ahmad “took to revolutionary activities” while Mahmud Hasan was in Mecca; it 
seems, too, he accompanied the great ‘alym when the latter met with Turkish War 
Minister Anwar Pasha and Medinan governor Jamal Pasha.77  Indeed, when, in 
1916/1334, the shix ul-hynd was arrested by British authorities and eventually placed in 
the Malta prison, Madani went with him—despite his not being charged of any crime.  
The move was a voluntary one, a demonstration of support for his teacher and political 
mentor.  It would cost him three years and seven months confined to a prison cell.78 
Upon his release (together with Mahmud Hasan) and return to India, Husain 
Ahmad Madani quickly agreed to the Khilafat and, especially, non-cooperation platform.  
In June of 1920/Shawwal of 1338, Husain Ahmad agreed to back Khilafat at the 
movement’s pre-launch conference in Allahabad; Khilafat officially commenced that 
August/Dh’ul Q’adah.  When Mahmud Hasan passed away in November/Rabi I, 
Husain Ahmad Madani “was unanimously acknowledged,” according to one official 
biography, as the shix ul-hynd’s successor.79  Then in 1921/1339, this time at a 
conference organized by Muhammad ‘Ali in Karachi, Husain Ahmad earned a reputation 
as a particularly passionate champion of collective Hindu-Muslim action.  Indeed, after 
the Karachi meeting, the up-and-coming mwlana was praised not just by Muslims 
within the Khilafat movement but Hindu religious and political leaders as well, 
including the Jagadguru Shankaracharya of Puri, Swami Bharati Krishna Tirath.  But 
the British were none too amused; for his sentiments of “sedition” (and for his 
distribution of the now-banned Mahmud Hasan-authored juridical ruling in support of 
non-cooperation and Khilafat, discussed earlier)80 Ahmad Husain Madani, so recently a 
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British prisoner on Malta, was put behind bars, this time in his own land.  He was 
locked up for two more years.81   
Imprisonment seemed only to drive the one-time student of Mahmud Hasan to 
further pursue his anti-British purposes.  Indeed, upon his release one of the first things 
Husain Ahmad did was address the fifth annual conference of the JUH at Cocanada 
(over which he served as president; this was the same meeting mentioned previously at 
which confidence was expressed in the Turkish regime and the idea of a worldwide 
conference of Muslim scholars put forth), in January of 1924/Jumada I of 1342.  The 
mwlana’s message hadn’t changed; it had only gained in strength.  An excerpt from his 
presidential address to the assembled Muslim clergy and others aptly demonstrates this. 
 
Hindu-Muslim unity is a prerequisite to freedom in this country.  It is the 
religious and political duty of the Muslims that they should work for the 
freedom of India and continue this struggle until the government accedes 
to their demand.  It is their duty, which they must do with or without 
companions—it is the order of the Almighty.  If non-Muslims extend to 
you the hand of friendship, you too must extend yours, for compromising 
for the right cause will establish you as true believers in God.  And, if 
they [non-Muslims] turn their back on you and leave you alone, you 
should not complain about it because God is your biggest supporter.82 
 
The general Deobandi point-of-view, borne of the juridical ruling of Rashid Ahmad 
Gangohi (and alive and well, some Deobandis would argue, since the days of Thana 
Bhawan, when Hindus had fought side-by-side with Muslims against the British to 
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defend Imdadullah’s mini-state) and developed by Mahmud Hasan, had now come into 
its own, and Husain Ahmad Madani was its standard-bearer.  In March 1926/Sh’aban 
1344, the JUH officially adopted Husain Ahmad’s position when it passed a resolution at 
its seventh conference (in Calcutta) for India’s complete independepence. 
Madani and the majority of his Deobandi brethren cultivated a nationalism tied as 
much to the land as to the faith.  This allowed Deobandis to identify with both Islam 
and India.  “Our religion tells us that Adam descended in India,” he would write later, in 
a booklet well known in its time called “Our India and Its Glories” (hәmarah hyndustan 
әwr uske fәżail).  Adam, then—the father of the human race—had been sent by God to 
India first.  “He inhabited this land and it was from here that his race spread… It is 
necessary for the Muslim to understand that this country is his ancient home.”  “Our 
India” reminds the South Asian Islamic community that Muslim remains have been 
buried in Indian soil since time immemorial—and while Hindus and other Indian 
communities cremated their dead, the Muslim dead still lay in the Indian earth (and 
would till the Day of Judgment).  Indeed, “it is an unchallengable fact that from the very 
beginning India has been the land [vәtәn] of Islam.”  Even from a historical point-of-
view, Husain Ahmad argued, and taking into account all of the subcontinent’s invading 
populations (Aryans, Greeks, Parthians, Huns, etc.), Muslims could stake a more ancient 
claim to the land, as so many Indian Muslims were descended from the subcontient’s 
aboriginal, pre-Aryan populations, subsequently converted to the one true faith.83  
Husain Ahmad and the Deobandi fathers thus strove to tie Muslims to India specifically; 
a Muslim could be as strong and fervent an “Indian” as any Hindu—indeed, stronger.  
In any case, Deobandi support for the Congress and a united India came not from “ideas 
of parliamentary democracy” or faith in some other “modern” political system.  No—the 
  
  220 
scholars “still thought in terms of the self-regulated millat.  In direct continuation of the 
position of the earlier ‘ulama, they believed that with independence they could in fact 
form their own community, with their own shar’iat-based courts and their own 
educational institutions, inhabiting the same space as Hindus but culturally apart—until 
such time, at least some of them thought, as their example would win the Hindus to 
Islam at last.”84 
The (general) Deobandi view of the Muslim place vis-à-vis the Indian subcontinent, 
elucidated above, stood in stark contrast to that of the Barelvis, who by and large saw 
“nationhood” in more ummәt-based terms—as a space (any space) governed by shәri’at.  
The emphasis for the self-styled Ahl-e-Sunnat was not geographically demarcated, 
bordered on the north and south, the east and west, by mountains, deserts, and seas.  
No, Barelvi “nationalism” was based soley on the Islamic concept of the pure society (as 
interpreted by Barelvis).  It was defined by faith, existing in the minds of its people, 
however scattered amongst the non-Muslim population they might be.  Possessed of 
such an emphasis, it was only natural for the Barelvis to look not towards cooperation 
with Hindustan’s non-Muslim communities but rather towards a sort of strict self-
segregation.  In time, of course, that self-segregation would evolve into a more complete 
separation—and culminate in the Indian subcontinent’s extraordinary Partition.  
Ironically, it was out of the Barelvi, ummәt-based conception of “nationhood” that the 
necessarily geographically demarcated Pakistan call would emerge. 
Now recognized by many as Mahmud Hasan’s most likely heir, Husain Ahmad was 
appointed Sәdәr mәdarys, or head teacher, of the university at Deoband in 1927/1345 
(when Anwar Shah Kashmiri resigned amidst a political rift that saw several of the 
school’s teachers expelled, followed by scores of its students, addressed later in this 
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work), as well as head of the hәdis department (a decision that did not come without 
consequences for intra-Deobandi unity, either), in 1924/1342.85  (It was tradition at the 
school that the head teacher also teach hәdis).86  He would hold both of these positions 
until his death in 1957/1377.  (Husain Ahmad taught off-and-on, too, at the Jamia 
Qasmia Madrasah-e-Shahi in Moradabad for a decade-and-a-half—the school mentioned 
previously as being only a stone’s throw from the institution attended by Barelvi leader 
Naimuddin Moradabadi, the Madrasah Imdadia.)  As Mahmud Hasan’s seeming political 
heir, as well as the head of the Deobandi movement’s central religio-educational 
insititution, Husain Ahmad Madani, all in a few years, abruptly and fortuitously found 
himself poised to finally institute Mahmud Hasan’s political vision (one he’d inhereited, 
in large degree, from his own spiritual mentors) for India’s Muslim millions.  This 
position was strengthened when his own faction within the school at Deoband won out, 
in 1927/1345, against the Anwar Shah Kashmiri-led faction (the latter allegedly seeking 
an apolitical stance for the institution); teachers belonging to the Kashmiri group were 
expelled (or resigned), and scores of students followed them, many to a new school in 
the village of Dabhel near the Gujarati coast. 
From 1924/1342 to 1929/1348, in addition to the numerous duties connected to his 
positions at the dar ul’alwm in Deoband, Husain Ahmad led “hundreds” of public 
meetings across India (not to mention literally thousands of political discussions with 
smaller groups; the teacher of hәdis was known for rarely eating dinner with less than 
“ten or fifteen guests” at his table).87  His emphasis, as always, was communal unity 
against the subcontinent’s number one threat: the British.  These two emphases—(1) 
Hindu-Mulsim cooperative action and (2) the British as Islam’s biggest threat—were 
fully in line with the political philosophy of Husain Ahmad’s mentor, Mahmud Hasan.  
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(The Barelvis, of course, differed with Madani and the Deobandi mainstream on both 
counts.)  At one JUH conference in Saharanpur, Husain Ahmad elucidated on the British 
threat.  London’s policy in India, he explained, was to divide and rule; as long as the 
major communities remained divided, the British could rule.  Thus parties like the 
Hindu Mahasabha and the Muslim League played right into the hands of the British 
authorities.  Such groups actually served the British purpose, prolonging the English 
presence on the subcontinent and ensuring Indians’ continued subjugation.  The British 
political method of divide-and-rule was, Madani insisted, the single greatest danger 
facing India.  The only way to fight it was to make such division impossible—and that 
meant Hindu-Muslim political unity.88  Interestingly, both Gandhi and Jinnah made 
similar appeals during this period—at least in terms of the importance of Hindu-Muslim 
joint action—calling for a revitalization of the spirit of 1916’s/1334’s Lucknow Pact.  
But the two leaders’ own incompatibility vis-à-vis one another symbolized the deaf ears 
with which their calls were met by their own constituents, not to mention the Hindu 
and Muslim communities at large, and such a revitalization never took place.  As if to 
make the point, Hindus and Muslims in Calcutta were at one another’s throats for 
weeks in 1926/1344; the riots were so bad that around a hundred were either killed or 
injured and the city ground to a halt for a month-and-a-half.  Incidentally, the violence 
happened to coincide with the arrival of Lord Irwin, India’s new viceroy. 
Nationalist tempers flared across India in 1927/1345 after the Secretary of State for 
India, Lord Birkenhead, announced the makeup of a special commission charged with 
the task of making recommendations for the establishment of a more “responsible 
government.”  Part of that task entailed finding ways to further develop the country’s 
representative institutions.  Perhaps the establishment of such a commission might have 
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brought nationalist Indians hope that much-needed change was on the way, but the 
group’s makeup suggested that the British weren’t interested at all in what Indians 
thought about their government, let alone hoped; all seven members of the commission, 
led by Sir John Simon, were British.  It was, to borrow a phrase from Motilal Nehru, 
simply “eye-wash,” nothing more.  Husain Ahmad Madani agreed wholeheartedly, and 
said as much at the JUH’s Peshawar Conference that year.  He urged fellow Muslims 
and “composite nationalists” to boycott the commission—to refuse to speak or otherwise 
cooperate with its members.  In this, the Congress eventually followed Husain Ahmad’s 
lead,89 organizing black flag demonstrations and strikes all along the commission’s path 
after it arrived in 1928/1346; “Simon go back!” was the slogan of the day.  Many of the 
demonstrations were joint Congress-JUH affairs; many demonstrators were arrested, 
imprisoned, and beaten—some even killed.  Mounted police charged into Indian crowds, 
hammering at demonstrators with metal-tipped bamboo lathis or trampling them down.  
(This was Nehru’s first personal experience with physical injury at the hands of 
government; at least one of his own wounds, sustained at the time, would ail him for the 
rest of his life).90   Meanwhile, ever prepared to fill a vacuum left by the Congress, the 
Muslim League (albeit only a section), plus several smaller parties, did meet with and 
make reccomendations to the commission.91 
After the Simon Commission left India, having earned the abhorrence of millions of 
Indian nationalists (though its recommendations would largely be used as the 
foundation for the Government of India Act of 1935/1354), the British government 
turned the tables.  If the Indians didn’t want their European overlords to recommend an 
improved government for India, perhaps they themselves could offer one.  Of course, 
British authorities were confident that such a challenge would never be met, divided as 
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Indian politics remained.  The differences between the Hindus and the Muslims, the 
Hindu/Muslim nationalists and the composite nationalists, the Deobandis and the 
Barelvis, the Congress and the League—all of these schisms would virtually guarantee 
that any Indian attempt to come up with their own consititution (and one that they 
would all agree to) would end in colossal failure.  The Indians needed the British.  Much 
to the dismay, perhaps, of the colonial government, however, Indian political parties 
representing a wide variety of opinion—from the Hindu Mahasabha to the Muslim 
League, and including the Congress and the JUH—met in an All-Parties Conference in 
mid-May 1928/late Dh’ul Q’adah 1346 in Calcutta.  But British worries soon 
evaporated; Indian schismatics did win the day, for the result of this brief episode was 
the Nehru Report—a document which, to the relief of the British government, did 
indeed fail to bring the subcontinent’s divergent communities together.  (Indeed, it was 
probably the last real chance for Hindu and Muslim leaders to restore the unity of the 
Lucknow Pact era—and that opportunity had been lost.)  Unfortunately for the 
Deobandis, the report was not to their satisfaction, either.  The biggest complaint 
among the Deobandi leadership was that the Nehru Report failed to include any 
substantive provisions safeguarding the rights of minorities.  Thus something of a split 
occurred, however temporary, between the two parties (Congress and JUH) for the first 
time, almost, since the days of Khilafat.   
What provisions was the JUH actually seeking in an Indian constitution?  For 
starters, the party insisted upon a truly federal system possessed of highly autonomous 
states.  Certain specifically enumerated powers would be granted to the center, but all 
residual powers would be reserved to the states and the people.  The JUH additionally 
desired a sort of US Bill of Rights-style constitutional guarantee that the federal 
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government would never interfere in the realm of Muslim education, Muslim religious 
institutions, religious traditions, and Muslim personal law.  Muslim religious cases 
should only be decided by Muslim religious officers, they maintained, and Muslim areas 
like Baluchistan and Sindh (both singled out by name) should receive state status, on par 
with any other Indian state.  The autonomy of the states was to be further reinforced by 
a provision that any change to the federal consitution must be approved not by a 
majority or a super-majority but by full-fledged unanimity.  Interestingly, the JUH did 
not demand reservations for Muslims in either Bengal or Punjab, a major policy 
difference between the Deobandi party and the League.92  (Compare this to Jinnah’s 
reaction to the Nehru report: the League leader stormed out of Calcutta and traveled 
straight to Delhi—the venue of the Aga Khan’s All-India Muslim Conference.  This 
latter gathering resolved absolutely to stand firm on its bid for separate electorates.)93 
The JUH-INC divide was somewhat bridged on Christmas Day 1929/23 Rajab 
1348, when the Congress passed a resolution calling for complete independence.  (In 
1927/1345, Nehru had visited the Soviet Union—on invitation from the Stalinist 
regime—to celebrate the Russian Revolution’s tenth anniversary.  The experience 
evidently thrilled him, and he returned to India seemingly charged with added vigor, 
energizing the leftist elements within the Congress.94  Thus, the next year, and together 
with quasi-communist Subhas Chandra Bose, Nehru organized the Socialist 
Independence for India League, which quickly demanded complete Indian independence, 
as opposed to the official Congress demand—including that of Gandhi and Nehru’s own 
father, Motilal—for Dominion status within the British Empire.  Astutely measuring 
the way the political tides were turning, however, Gandhi and the Congress later 
adopted Nehru’s position as the party’s goal.)  In such a declaration the JUH, “largely 
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due to the efforts of Madani,” could offer its strong support.  After all, the JUH’s official 
stance—since 1926/1344—had been to demand complete independence.   
But after the Nehru Report, things were never quite the same between the Congress 
and the JUH.  Indeed, even at the Jamiat’s ninth conference (at Amroha), in May of 
1930/Dh’ul Hijja of 1348, there were considerable murmurings against a continued 
alliance with the INC; the Nehru Report had sown the seeds of mistrust among some 
within the upper echelons of Deobandism.95  Despite the opposition, the party was able 
to pass a resolution for full cooperation with the Congress, moved by Hafizur Rahman 
and supported loudly by Husain Ahmad Madani.96  Once again, Husain Ahmad 
demonstrated through his actions that he really did consider Hindu-Muslim unity in the 
quest to free India from the British the number one priority.  Despite the reservations—
some quite vehement—that plagued several of his brethren, Husain Ahmad had argued 
that the overarching goal was worth a rapprochement.  Most Deobandis would follow 
him, but the rumblings of dissent within the movement had begun to sound, as a small 
faction of the school began agitating for Muslim separatism.  Some of the loudest 
Deobandi dissidents were Ashraf ‘Ali Thanawi and his two students, Shabbir Ahmad 
Usmani and Muhammad Shafi (on whom more later),97 a split that would have major 
repercussion for both Deobandism and the political structure of South Asia.  Thus even 
the Congress’ adoption of complete independence as its goal didn’t fully heal the wounds 
inflicted during this brief period of division.  The Congress had gone back on its word 
(in 1916/1334, it should be remembered, it had committed to separate electorates, for 
example, but the Nehru report had run roughshod over the idea, dismissing it 
completely), and for some Deobandis their trust in the mostly Hindu INC had been 
permanently removed. 
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On 12 March 1930/11 Shawwal 1348, now sixty-one-year-old Mohandas Gandhi 
left Sabarmati Ashram with seventy-eight personally selected men and set out on what 
would become a twenty-four-day, two-hundred-forty-mile journey to the sea.  It didn’t 
take long for the whole world to notice.  In the end, the prolonged demonstration 
resulted in the “Gandhi-Irwin Pact” (through which the government agreed, among 
other things, to release all non-violent political prisoners, lift the ban over the Congress, 
and restore confiscated property to political activists), the eventual repeal of the Salt 
Act, and the galvanization of tens of thousands of nationalists in their opposition to the 
British.  The Gandhi-led “Salt March,” supported by Husain Ahmad and the JUH, did 
much to rekindle the fire of Indian nationalists, including some Deobandi Muslims.  The 
JUH did much to publicize the event, especially through its newspaper, al-jәm’aiәt.  
Many respected Deobandi ‘alәma actively participated in the Salt March (like Hafizur 
Rehman, who would, a couple months later, help pass the resolution affirming JUH 
cooperation with the Congress at the Jamiat’s Amroha conference, and who marched to 
Dandi from the village of Dabhel—home to the recently erected Deobandi mәdrәsәħ 
mentioned previously.98  Some Deobandi and Deobandi-leaning leaders were arrested 
and imprisoned for their involvement in the Dandi march, including Abul Kalam Azad, 
Hafizur Rehman, Fakhruddin, Muhammad Mian, and Bashir Ahmad Bhatia.99  Other 
Deobandi and Deobandi-leaning figures, notably Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, were 
arrested in other parts of India, having participated in or organized demonstrations 
connected to the march; indeed, in the northwest, between two hundred and two-
hundred-and-fifty Muslim Pathans were massacred as British troops and armored cars 
opened fire on a crowd of non-cooperators demonstrating in support of Abdul Ghaffar 
and Gandhi.  (The agitation was so effective—and the ire of the Pathans so white hot—
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that British control over Peshawar didn’t resume until May/Dh’ul Hijja.)100  But the 
march also demonstrated that a large section of Muslims (including, generally speaking, 
the Barelvis) were not interested in any Gandhi-led resistance; as a result, Muslim 
participation in the Salt March and its aftermath has been described by some historians 
as “paltry.”101  Such descriptions, however, ignore the involvement, active participation, 
and support of many notable Deobandi leaders, the JUH, Abdul Ghaffar’s Servants of 
God (xuda-e-xydmәtgar) organization, and the hundreds of Muslims who perished in 
Peshawar on 23 April/24 Dh’ul Q’adah. 
At the same time, Gandhi launched a massive civil disobedience operation—his first 
major attempt at non-cooperation since the “embarrassingly abrupt withdrawal” of the 
original campaign after the Chauri Chaura incident of 1922/1340.102  Indeed, the Salt 
March had only been the launch event of the new round of non-cooperation, agitation 
that would last (with a temporary hiatus in 1931/1349) through 1934/1353.  
Churchill’s “half-naked fakir” was able to energize hundreds of thousands who hadn’t 
readily taken part in the first non-cooperation efforts a decade before, including women, 
populations in central India, and Indians from the south (by the mid-thirties the INC 
would replace the Justice Party as the latter region’s foremost political organization), 
and the period saw the emergence, too, of the “Red Shirts”—or, more correctly, the 
aforementioned xuda-e-xydmәtgars (sometimes referred to as the “KKs”) in the Pathan 
Muslim northwest.103  These last were led by Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, the “Frontier 
Gandhi,” and his brother Khan Abdul Jabbar Khan (or “Dr. Khan sahyb”).  The brothers 
and their organization (which, by 1930/1348, counted around fifty thousand members) 
worked closely with the Congress; its supportive action connected to the Salt March has 
already been mentioned, and in 1931/1349, Abdul Ghaffar was even offered the position 
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of Congress president, but he humbly refused.  (Ironically, KK envoys had previously 
been sent to the Muslim League in an attempt to obtain support from that body for Red 
Shirt endeavors in the northwest frontier areas, but the ML rejected Abdul Ghaffar’s 
organization and the opportunity to bring it into the League fold; League leaders likely 
regretted this decision after their party’s overwhelming loss to the Congress in the 
Muslim-majority NWFP, thanks largely to KK efforts.  At the same time, the Congress 
embraced the movement—as long as its members joined the INC—and for the next 
decade-and-a-half the two parties worked hand-in-hand.)104   But the Gandhi-led civil 
disobedience campaign of 1930-1931/1348-1349 also led to around one hundred 
thousand arrests (including Gandhi’s own).  Both JUH president Kifayatullah and party 
general secretary Ahmad Sayeed Dehlawi were likewise arrested and imprisoned for 
civil disobedience.  While the Deobandis actively participated in non-cooperation, the 
Barelvis played little to no meaningful role, relatively speaking, in Gandhi’s India-wide 
movement to paralyze the British Indian machine. 
In November 1930/Jumada II 1349, the first Round Table conference on India’s fate 
took place in London.  But devoid of even a single Congress represetative (Gandhi was 
in a British prison at the time as punishment for the aforementioned civil disobedience 
campaign, then in full swing in India), the gathering was almost certainly doomed to 
failure from the start.  Indeed, the whole affair was rather “like trying to stage Hamlet 
without the Prince of Denmark,” in the words of one historian.105  Muslim princes, the 
Aga Khan, and Jinnah participated (indeed, the League’s delegates outnumbered those of 
any other party by a large margin, not counting those of the many princely states), but 
neither the Barelvis nor the Deobandis could claim any real place at the conference’s 
table.  In terms of political demands, at least the Barelvis could mostly count on the 
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League to push for “their” general positions.  Even if they’d wanted to attend, many of 
the Deobandi leadership were in prison for their participation in the salt sәtyagrәhә 
earlier in the year.  The only result of the first Round Table conference was a vague 
resolution to work out an All-India Federation plan.   
In early 1931/mid-1349, Gandhi met with Viceroy Irwin.  The result of these 
deliberations would be known to history as the Gandhi-Irwin Pact, aforementioned.  
According to their agreement, the government would set all political prisoners free in 
exchange for Gandhi’s assurance that the Congress would call off the civil disobedience 
campaign.  Gandhi additionally agreed to act as the INC’s lone representative at the 
second Round Table conference later that year.  Many celebrated the pact as an Indian 
victory, but others viewed it as an unnecessary concession to the enemy.  Indeed, to 
some the agreement was nothing less than a betrayal of Congress’ bedrock principles, 
not to mention its official position in support of outright Indian independence.  Nehru 
reportedly shed tears of grief upon hearing news of the pact.106 
And so the second Round Table conference (held in late 1931/mid-1350) did include 
a Congress representative—Mohandas Gandhi himself.  Before leaving to attend the 
deliberations in London, Gandhi sought earnestly for a compromise with Muslim 
leaders.  The Mahatma was convinced that unless Muslims and Hindus (or, in this case, 
the Congress and other Muslim parties) could arrive in Britain under the banner of a 
joint platform, the talks would be useless—even an embarrassment.  Indeed, he made 
this his motto in the run-up to the London talks: that “London was out unless unity was 
in.”  As such, Gandhi attended the JUH’s annual conference in Delhi, emphasizing the 
futility of any Round Table discussion without “a communal agreement,” and essentially 
handed the non-Congress Muslims “a blank check”; let them name their demands, and if 
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it meant unity, Gandhi would accept.  Even so, the communal oneness that the 
Mahatma sought was not forthcoming, in part thanks to the intractability of some 
Congress Muslims.107  In the end, the loincloth-clad “fakir,” who claimed that the 
Congress was the political voice of India, was alone at this second London gathering—
and the INC’s political rivals easily shouted him down.  This second round table attempt 
was a non-success like the first.  A year later, a third conference was attempted, but 
without any Congress representative (not to mention the absence of Jinnah) the meeting 
ended in yet another failure.108  Perhaps the only development of significance was 
Choudhary Rahmat ‘Ali’s use of the term “Pakistan” during the conference’s 
proceedings—a first. 
After Gandhi returned to India from the second Round Table talks, he decided to 
relaunch the civil disobedience campaign, which had been put on hold under the terms 
of the Gandhi-Irwin pact.  Civil disobedience would thus resume from January 
1932/Ramadan 1350.  As part of the effort, the Deobandi JUH set up a sub-organization 
called the daira-e-hәrbiyya, or “Circle of War,” to recruit activists and generally organize 
resistance in support of the nationwide non-cooperation movement.  The Circle’s first 
president, former JUH head Kifayatullah, was arrested after leading tens of thousands of 
demonstrators (Deobandis claim a full one hundred thousand) in procession through 
Delhi.  Leadership then fell on Husain Ahmad Madani, but he was arrested in turn on 
his way to Delhi from Deoband.  The pattern continued, too; Ahmad Saeed Delhawi, 
Hafizur Rahman Ludhianvi, and others were all arrested soon after becoming daira-e-
hәrbiyya chief.  Most were jailed for one to two years, along with thousands of their 
followers.109  To add to the loss of these influential men, in September 1934/Jumada II 
1353 Gandhi himself resigned from the Congress; he would go on to suffer a set of 
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nervous breakdowns, become estranged from his wife, and move to a one-room hovel in 
the middle of nowhere in central India. 
The year after Gandhi’s resignation, the British enacted the 1935/1354 Government 
of India Act—legislation that was viewed by many Deobandi nationalists and others as 
simply one more British exercise in delaying the inevitable.  The Act produced no new 
preamble, instead retaining the ambiguous introduction to the old 1919/1337 Act 
(which had vaguely defined the purposes of the Act as the “gradual” establishment in 
India of self-governing institutions and responsible government—all as an “intergral” 
part of the British Empire, of course).  To Madani and other Indians of similar political 
bent, the Act smacked of insincerity and the usual British deception.  And despite the 
Act’s dismantling of the dyarchy system in the provinces and its veneer of increased 
democracy, it actually granted the Viceroy and his appointed (British) provincial 
governors the authority, when considered necessary, to seize the government within 
their spheres and act, for all intents and purposes, as quasi-dicatators (something some 
governors did from 1939/1358, after the Congress ministries resigned).  As part of its 
divide-and-rule strategy—meant to curb the influence of parties like the Congress while 
simultaneously increasing the power of “collaborator” groups—the British via the 
1935/1354 Act widened the voter base and, crucially, granted separate electorates not 
only to Muslims, but also to Sikhs and Christians.110  Of course, only members of the 
community tied to those reserved seats could vote for them, thereby fostering both a 
dependence on government among minorities and a communal spirit in politics.  The 
League, many Barelvis, and others applauded such measures as necessary for the 
protection of minority populations; the Congress, most Deobandis, and their allies did 
not. 
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The 1935/1354 Government of India Act also set the stage, to the dismay of Husain 
Ahmad Madani, for a very brief alliance between the All-India Muslim League and the 
JUH, signaling a win (however brief) for the aforementioned Deobandi faction opposed 
to the Congress.  This faction was led by Ashraf ‘Ali Thanawi, who was not only known 
for his support of the League and League positions, but had, the same year the 
Government of India Act came into being, cancelled his patronage of the dar ul’alwm—a 
major act of dissent.  His reason?  In a resignation letter sent at the time of his 
cancellation, he explained that he deemed unacceptable the “Madani group’s” 
introduction at the school of “the Congress ideology.”111  But since the Act had widened 
the voter base and further institutionalized separate electorates for Muslims, it made 
little sense for the JUH to continue to campaign with the Congress, as the majority of 
Congressites were Hindu and thus could not vote for its candidates.  Seeing that only 
Muslims could vote for Muslims where the reserved seats were concerned, the JUH 
leadership reluctantly agreed to join forces with the League after passage of the Act.  
Signs of a JUH-League rapprochement had been visible as early as November 1932/Rajab 
1351, when the working committee of the JUH met with the Council of the AIML in 
Delhi.  The occasion was the repudiation of a Hindu-Muslim-Sikh “Unity Conference” 
organized, at least in part, by the Congress in Allahabad to demand joint electorates.  
But the repudiation of the Allahabad meeting was less important than this rare show of 
solidarity between the Deobandi ‘alәma and the Muslim League.  It was, wrote one 
newspaper correspondent covering the event, “the most impressive demonstration of 
Moslem unity seen in India for many a long day.”112  The reporter’s remark is telling in 
that it speaks not only of the sudden appearance of apparent unity among two of that 
community’s most politically relevant organizations, but also of the politically, 
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regionally, theologically, and even linguistically fractured nature of the state of affairs 
among South Asia’s Muslims previous to the Delhi conference.   
In any case, the period of League-JUH unity, throughout which the latter worked 
under Jinnah’s leadership, was short-lived.113  At a JUH conference in April 
1936/Muharram 1355, Jinnah addressed the JUH personally, urging its members to 
“organize separately” from “the Hindus,” and then—only after this separation—could 
the two groups “together tread the path of cooperation.”114  What this meant in practice 
was unclear, but the new separate electorates system naturally engendered a new level 
of political mudslinging between the League and the Congress that weakened the 
strength of Jinnah’s call, much less any contrivance of Hindu-Muslim unity, however 
“separate” their organization.  For many in the JUH, the blatant communalism of the 
campaign became too much to bear.  Jinnah, too, disapproved of the JUH’s continued 
ties with the INC.115 Eventually, the Deobandi ‘alәma leading the Jamiat, fearing that 
they were being used, decided enough was enough, and after the 1936-1937/1355-1356 
elections (in which the Congress came to power in every province but Bengal, Punjab, 
and Sindh, and in which the League failed to form a government in any province, 
including a pathetic showing in the Muslim-majority provinces) the short-lived alliance 
was broken.116  The exact date of the fateful break may have been 15 July 1937/6 
Jumada I 1356, when Congress leaders formally asked League leaders, via an Abul 
Kalam Azad-delivered letter (dubbed a “death warrant” by some), to consider dissolving 
their party and uniting with the INC; the JUH subsequently broke with the League—an 
act later Pakistani historians described as “a political abduction,” and its participants as 
“political turncoats.”117  Jinnah had thus lost both the election as well as the support of 
the influential JUH. 
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Perhaps as a reaction to the League’s non-success, as well as the JUH’s passing stint 
as ML ally (a move he had almost certainly opposed loudly), in 1938/1357 Husain 
Ahmad Madani published his groundbreaking muttәhydәħ qwmiәt әwr yslam (“Composite 
Nationalism and Islam”).  The book prompted “an instant reaction” from Muhammad 
Iqbal and produced a years-long controversy over the nature of South Asian Muslims’ 
separate identity.  Madani’s position, in his own words, was that in “the modern age, 
 
nations are founded on homelands; nations are not founded on the basis 
of race or religion.  The dwellers of England are recognized as one 
nation, whereas they have Jews and Christians as their citizens, and such 
is the case with America, Japan, and France.118 
 
Iqbal would compose his own refutation—in verse, of course—directed unswervingly at 
Husain Ahmad Madani: 
 
Hasan from Basrah, Bilal from Abyssinia, Suhayb from Rome; 
Deoband produced Husayn Ahmad, what monstrosity is theirs? 
He chanted from the pulpit that nations are created by homelands; 
What an ignorance regarding the position of Muhammad! 
Take thyself to Muhammad, because he is the totality of Faith; 
And if thou [dost] not reach him, all [thy knowledge] is Bulahabism.119 
 
(Bulahab was a wealthy Arab man whom the Prophet cursed for rejecting the message 
of Islam; he is a symbol of rejection.)  One of Ashraf ‘Ali Thanawi’s students (his 
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nephew, in fact), one Zafar Ahmad Usmani, in the late 1930s/1350s put together an 
attempted refutation of the concept of composite nationalism, too, highlighting the 
intra-Deobandi schism in this regard.  The effort, included in Zafar Ahmad’s yla al-sunan 
(a legal commentary on hәdis), was evidently undertaken under the direct guidance of 
Ashraf ‘Ali himself and reportedly motivated, at least in part, by a dream he (Zafar 
Ahmad) had had in which he had seen the Prophet Muhammad.  Muhammad had given 
him “glad tidings” of a “near victory for the Muslims,” which Zafar Ahmad’s admirers 
have interpreted as an obvious allusion to the creation of Pakistan ten years later.120  
Thanawi himself was so opposed to Madani’s decision to work for composite 
nationalism (and that with the Congress) that he issued a juridical ruling in 1939/1358 
stating that the only shәri’at-worthy course for Muslims was to join with the All-India 
Muslim League; thereafter the prolific Deobandi scholar, as mentioned previously, 
resigned from the dar ul’alwm at Deoband—and immediately joined the League.  His 
fәtwa, wrote one Pakistani scholar, “had a far reaching impact on Muslim politics.”121  
Probably thanks to this faction’s continued influence within Deobandi circles, JUH 
leaders were attempting, as late as 1940/1359, to find some sort of common ground 
with the AIML—a shared overarching goal, something—but Jinnah insisted that the 
only way such cooperation could be forthcoming was for all JUH members to resign 
from the Congress.  This was too much, of course, and the gulf dividing the two parties 
remained permanently unbridged.122  Incidentally, Thanawi’s break with the main dar 
ul’alwm was a permanent one.  His grave lies within the grounds of his old Thana 
Bhawan mәdrәsәħ on the outskirts of town, surrounded by cultivated fields.  A small 
blank slab of stone marks the muddy mound, nothing more.  Outside of the diminutive 
cemetery, affixed to the wall of the dilapidated seminary, is a plaque engraved in Farsi 
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lettering.  Ashraf ‘Ali Thanawi lived a modest life, it declares, and he left this world in 
similarly humble circumstances.  When asked about any remnants of the scholar’s life 
that might remain in and around the old mәdrәsәħ, the aged custodian informed the 
author that, after all, in terms of material possessions Husain Ahmad Madani’s political 
nemesis, Ashraf ‘Ali Thanawi, never had much. 
In any case, the tide turned relatively quickly for the League when, in 1939/1358, 
the Congress ministries across India resigned over Britain’s committal of India to the 
war effort without consulting Indian leaders, as well as the British declaration of 
Dominion status as India’s goal—something to be discussed as soon as the war was 
over.  More vague promises were not what the Congress leaders had had in mind, and 
so the Congress ministries stepped down in protest.  With no ministries, under the 
terms of the 1935/1354 Government of India Act the provincial governments fell into 
the hands of the British governors.  Jinnah couldn’t have been happier, and celebrated 
this turn of events on 22 December/10 Dh’ul Q’adah as the aforementioned “Day of 
Deliverance.”  Combined with the League’s new emphasis on wooing the ‘alәma and pirs 
to its side, an endeavor for which the party had made “serious efforts” since 
1937/1356,123 the move marked the turning point of the League’s fortunes as a political 
force in India.  By March of 1940/Safar of 1359, newspapers were describing “Moslem 
India” as being “on guard” against the alleged “dangers of Hindu ‘democracy,’” painting 
“Mr. Jinnah” and his League as a veritable catch-all for India’s Muslims.  (British 
newspapers like The Times of London jumped at the League position, decrying Congress 
control of the provinces under its ministries as “a dictatorship.”  The INC’s electoral 
victories, winning eight of eleven provincial ministries, had “warped the judgment of 
Congress leaders,” whose subsequent attempts, via its “mass contact” campaign, to 
  
  238 
attract Muslims to the Congress fold had only succeeded in pushing them further away.  
The Congress was trying to divide the Muslims—this was the allegation, and for many 
Muslims it was enough to drive them to the League and its Pakistan demand.  The 
effect was to deligitimize the JUH and place the erstwhile loose-knit and hapless 
League, abruptly, on a pedestal as the chief representative organization for India’s 
Muslims.)124 
On 11 March 1942/22 Safar 1361, Winston Churchill announced another special 
mission to be sent to India, this one led by Sir Stafford Cripps.  Its mission: to “rally the 
forces of Indian life to guard their land from the menace of the invader” (by promising 
each province the post-war opportunity to remain united with or secede from British 
India, the latter as independent Dominions within the Empire).  Considering the 
independence agitation then extant in India against what was perceived as the long-
entrenched British invader, Churchill’s choice of terminology seems odd indeed.  But the 
invader of which he spoke, of course, was of the Japanese variety.  A “crisis in the affairs 
of India” had arison “out of the Japanese advance,” and thus the time had come to solve 
the Indian question once and for all, and then get to work defeating the enemy.  One 
contemporary Indian commentator described Churchill’s statement as merely another 
“sweet nothing,” and most Indian nationalist leaders were likewise skeptical.  Husain 
Ahmad Madani no doubt fit within this latter category.  Still, he would listen to what 
the old man had to say.  Several weeks later, Cripps arrived in Hindustan. 
Stafford Cripps met in turn with Abul Kalam Azad (then serving as the president of 
the Congress), then Muhammad ‘Ali Jinnah, then Mohandas Gandhi.  It is interesting to 
note that Cripps’ choice of audience vis-à-vis the Muslim political leaders—meeting 
with both Azad, a Congress-supporting (and Deobandi-supported) Muslim and Jinnah, 
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the (generally Barelvi-supported) League leader, was a tacit acknowledgement of the 
schism that existed within South Asia’s Islamic community.  Soon afterwards the British 
representative proposed (via radio broadcast from Delhi) that India obtain 
representation on both the British war cabinet and the Pacific War Council, then offered 
Indians (once again) a chance to write their own constitution—along the road to 
Dominion status, of course.  But the general reaction to Cripps’ proposal was one of “too 
little, too late.”  Gandhi famously described the offer as a “post-dated check,” and at a 
conference of the JUH in Lahore, Husain Ahmad likewise rejected the proposal, 
characterizing it as a last, futile British attempt to meddle in purely Indian affairs.125  On 
10 April/23 Rabi I, the Congress formally rejected Cripps’ proposal, a move followed by 
most every other Indian political party (though each for their own reasons).  Cripps left 
India in shame, having utterly failed in his quest, two days after the formal Congress 
rejection.126  But the event, underscoring as it did the opposition from seemingly every 
quarter to Britain’s belated attempts to preserve some vestige of empire on the 
subcontinent, left London and Delhi more dependent than ever on Jinnah and the 
League.  It also gave “greater strength to the Pakistan demand in that the offer of the 
British government brought discussion of partition into the open,” in the words of one 
Pakistani historian.127 
During the Second World War—and despite Gandhi’s admonishments to assist the 
British against what he perceived as the greater, Nazi evil—the JUH, led by Husain 
Ahmad Madani, condemned the war effort, vehemently opposing any support from the 
Indian quarter for Britain in her struggles against Hitler in Europe, Africa, and the 
Middle East and Tojo in Asia and the Pacific.  The crippling of British power was a 
good thing; let the great colonialist powers pound themselves to dust.  The greatest 
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threat to India wasn’t Hitler—it was the British foreign policy of imperialism.  The call 
for independence must not be suspended out of deference to yet another war.  Besides, 
the memory of broken British promises dating back to the first Great War still 
smoldered in Indians’ collective memory.  The JUH’s Bachar Ayun conference (23-25 
April 1942/6-8 Rabi II 1361)—convened as the Japanese were making serious headway 
in British-occupied Burma, German subs were sinking British vessels in the Atlantic, 
and British bombers were flying missions over Germany, and just days after Cripps left 
India—saw Husain Ahmad call, once again, for Hindustan’s complete independence.  
Such a declaration, in the middle of the war, was certainly not welcomed by British 
authorities, who by now had been monitoring JUH activities for years.  As a result of his 
independence and liberation rhetoric and obvious sway over a large population, Madani 
was arrested (during the conference’s very proceedings) and thrown into prison.  
(Ironically, the arrest occurred on the same day that Churchill, addressing the British 
House of Commons, declared that the “main war plan” of the country was the liberation 
of Europe.)  Except for a very brief moment of release six months later, Husain Ahmad 
would remain behind bars until August 1944/Sh’aban 1363—almost two-and-a-half 
years.128 
Between late June and early July 1945/mid- to late Rajab 1364, British Viceroy 
Wavell met with Indian leaders at Simla to discuss his future plans for India.  The 
Muslim League delegation, led by Jinnah, made discussions all but impossible when it 
demanded recognition as the sole spokesparty for India’s Muslims.  The Congress, in a 
wily move, had sent its delegation (the Congress working committee) under the 
personal leadership of a Muslim: Abul Kalam Azad.  To further buoy up the Congress’ 
own claim that it, too, represented a sizable proportion of Muslim opinion—and should 
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therefore be regarded as representative of not one Indian community but all Indians—
the JUH, in the form of its president, also attended at least a portion of the conference, 
specifically the deliberations of 4 July/23 Rajab.  (This was the same day that, quite by 
accident, Jinnah and Nehru crossed paths in the Hotel Cecil lounge nearby; evidently 
these two political opponents “had a couple of minutes’ friendly conversation” before 
moving on to their separate business.)  In any case, the intractability of both sides led to 
the breakdown of the talks, and on 14 July/3 Sh’aban Wavell announced that his 
attempt at negotiating a plan with India’s leading political parties had failed.129 
In September of 1945/Shawwal of 1364 (just over a year after his release from 
prison), Husain Ahmad tried to address the League threat by hosting a conference of 
Muslims on an all-India level.  One hundred fifty Muslim representatives of other 
political parties and organizations (i.e. non-League) reportedly attended the gathering.  
The conference produced what Husain Ahmad called the Muslim Parliamentary Board, 
a body (ultimately of little significance) meant to reinforce to the now many wavering 
Muslims that they were not alone—that a strong section of the South Asian Islamic 
community was, in fact, made up of composite nationalists.  But the divide between 
Leaguers and composite nationalists was apparent even in Deoband.  One prominent 
Deobandi cleric remembered joining a “children’s Muslim League” in the town at the 
age of eleven, a group that was composed of some six hundred kids.  “Every Friday,” he 
recalled years later, “we took out a procession through the bazaars and important 
places.”  But the youngest composite nationalists—or “children from the Congress”—
would come out in full force, too, marching through the streets and competing with the 
young Leaguers for decibal supremacy.  “[S]ometimes we hurled stones at one 
another,” the League-supporting cleric remembered.  One or the other procession would 
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raise “faith-inspiring slogans,” stopping in front of the police station or the revenue 
office to chant raucously.  “The officers of the British Government locked the gate from 
the inside on hearing the slogans from a distance which prompted us to become more 
vociferous and we stayed there for a long time.”  The composite nationalists would 
shout, “Hindu, Muslim, brother, brothers!” to which the Leaguers would answer, 
“Muslim, Muslim, brother, brothers!  We will not stop till we divide India!  We will 
create Pakistan!  At the cost of our head, we will create Pakistan!  Will bear the bullet 
on our chest, but create Pakistan!  Rivers of blood will flow, but we will create Pakistan!  
Pakistan, zyndabad!”  Both sides practiced the South Asian martial art of club-fighting 
(bynnwt) in preparation for the coming violence (according to Muhammad Shafi’s son, 
bynnwt was even incorporated into the dar ul’alwm’s curriculum during this period); 
apparently the local Hindus “stood in awe” of their Muslim neighbors’s skills in this 
regard.130   For the adults, however, the Pakistan-India tug-of-war was more than a 
competition to see who could shout the loudest, and even in the children’s words more 
than a mere hint of future violence might be clearly discerned. 
Given Husain Ahmad’s uncompromising position when it came to preserving a 
united India, it came as a shock to the old ‘alym when, on 14 June 1947/25 Rajab 1366, 
the Nehru-led Congress formally accepted a plan of partition.  The sense of betrayal 
must have been acute, for Madani—long a staunch supported of the INC, even in the 
face of opposition from his Deobandi brethren—railed against it.131  But it was too late.  
On 14 August 1947/27 Ramadan 1366, the state of Pakistan came into existence, sawn 
asunder from the now-separate state of India.  As for the latter, it officially emerged 
from under British paramountcy the next day. 
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That night (15 August 1947/28 Ramadan 1366), the vice-chancellor of the dar 
ul’alwm at Deoband addressed the students and faculty of that institution.  Mention of 
Pakistan was brief.  The focus, as always, was on the freedom narrative based on the 
Waliullahi program kept alive and, eventually, spread far and wide by the Deobandi 
movement.  “It is the mujahyd party of Shah Waliullah’s daring disciples that, for two 
hundred years, has been lighting the path in this effort [to bring freedom to India]—
not only with pen and ink, but also with sword and blood. 
 
hәżrәt Shah Abdul Aziz gave a fәtwa against the British and [therein] declared 
that Hindustan was dar ul-hәrb.  hәżrәt haji Imdadullah sahyb and hәżrәt mwlana 
Muhammad Qasim sahyb Nanautawi used this fәtwa, and drank this prescription 
for recovery, [albeit] their own special mixture—and gave [it to others] to 
drink.  hәżrәt shix ul-hynd preserved this same prescription, [this] compounded 
medicine, and made it so that anyone could use it.  Thus, having begun to be 
used, [such use] became widespread.  In the Khilafat movement, too, everyone 
used it despite [the fact that] the prescription was bitter.  And anyhow, having 
begun to be used generally, the passion for freedom passed over from the 
Muslims to the [other] sons of the nation and they too became zealous, and [the 
fruit of] the sacrifices and joint Hindu-Muslim efforts [is] before us in the form 
of the independence of the country...132 
 
The Deobandi worldview—with the (Deobandi and proto-Deobandi) ‘alәma playing the 
central role in the Indian independence struggle—is clearly evident here, but so, too, is 
an emphasis on its culmination: the “efforts” and “sacrifices” of a joint Hindu-Muslim 
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front.  Such a speech would have been highly unlikely to be uttered from a Barelvi 
xuțbәħ gaħ, but even now, in the midst of only a half-victory, Deobandi leaders 
underscored Indian independence as a product of Hindu-Muslim unity (albeit inspired 
originally by their own tradition). 
But the issue of Pakistan was yet to be addressed.  “The independence of India is the 
independence of the entire Islamic world,” the vice-chancellor continued.  And then the 
delicate topic was broached: “Both the states of India and Pakistan deserve our 
congratulations,” he said, in conciliatory fashion.  Now that Pakistan was a reality—and 
the fight for a united India finished—a paradigm shift was in order.  The League, with 
the help of its mostly Barelvi supporters, not to mention a handful of key Deobandi 
dissenters, had prevailed; it was time to move on.  “We congratulate Pakistan as 
Muslims and India as our native land.”133  It was possible to celebrate both the 
expulsion of the British (and the subsequent independence of India) as well as the 
emergence of Pakistan, whatever the “Deobandi” position might have been before this 
momentous day. 
After India won its independence from the British, Husain Ahmad Madani withdrew 
to a large extent from politics, preferring instead to concentrate on his routine at the 
dar ul’alwm (prayer, zykr, fulfilling chancellor duties, Qur’an reading, tea and breakfast, 
hәdis-teaching, lunch, prayer, answering mail, entertaining guests, prayer, more hәdis 
instruction, recitation of the Qur’an, prayer, dinner, prayer, and still more hәdis-
teaching until midnight).  In 1957/1377, while traveling in Madras, Husain Ahmad 
suffered a heart attack, but survived.  Upon his return to Deoband, he was seen by 
doctors, experienced what seemed to be a general improvement in his health, and then 
suddenly passed away in his sleep on 5 December/12 Jumada I.134 
  
  245 
 
Amjad ‘Ali A’azmi:  Chief of Islamic Law . 
Amjad ‘Ali A’azmi’s educational pedigree was impressive—and very Barelvi.  Apart 
from his blood tie to both a scholar-grandfather and a scholar-brother, it was the 
connection to his renowned teacher, the great Hidayatullah Khan Rampuri (d. 1908 
AD), which stood out most.  Hidayatullah had studied at the feet of none other than the 
famous spiritual forefather of Ahmad Riza’s movement, Fazl-e Haq Khairabadi, and 
during Amjad ‘Ali’s formative years taught in Jaunpur.  The journey from Azamgarh, 
where Amjad ‘Ali lived, to Jaunpur, where the young man studied—a distance of about 
forty-five miles—was one bereft of any sort of regular transportation option, so Amjad 
‘Ali made the trip mostly on foot, catching a camel cart part of the way when he could; 
but the arduous back-and-forth, spread out over years, foreshadowed the redoubtable 
‘alym’s future career, marked as it would be by much journeying in the cause of the Ahl-
e-Sunnat wal Jamaat, often on the errand of its spiritual head, Ahmad Riza.  After 
completing the dәrs-e-nyžami under Hidayatullah Khan Rampuri’s supervision, Amjad 
‘Ali studied under another distinguished scholar, Wasi Ahmed Surti (d. 1916 AD), in 
Pilibhit, just over twenty miles northeast of Bareilly.  Ahmad Riza Khan had once 
referred to mwlana Surti as Hindustan’s premier expert on hәdis (a compliment that 
doubled as a jab at the hәdis-emphasizing Deobandis)—a good thing, since Amjad ‘Ali 
aspired to follow in Wasi Ahmad’s footsteps in this regard.  Thus Amjad ‘Ali’s education 
brought him progressively closer, both academically and geographically, to the spiritual 
guide whose impact upon his life would be greatest.135 
Indeed, it didn’t take long for the separate paths of Ahmad Riza and Amjad ‘Ali not 
only to cross but to unite; soon after Amjad ‘Ali A’azmi’s 1902/1320 graduation at 
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Pilibhit, Ahmad Riza selected him to fill a teaching position at his fledgling Bareilly 
seminary, the aforementioned “dar ul’alwm” Manzar-e-Islam, and Amjad ‘Ali was only 
too happy to accept.  His responsibility at the school quickly widened to include the 
issuance of juridical rulings (including at times the writing of fәtawa at the dictation of 
Ahmad Riza himself; the Barelvi leader would later describe Amjad ‘Ali as his “most 
skilled” student in the writing of juridical rulings)136 and a supervisory position over a 
major Barelvi printing press, and he soon developed a reputation for being a “work 
machine.”  But it was his purely spiritual responsibilities, obtained during this period, 
which held deeper meaning for the Azamgarhi; he took bi’at at the hands of Ahmad Riza 
Khan, helped the latter produce his translation of the Qur’an (under the title kәnz ul-
әiman), and then, after some time, was honored as the Barelvi founder’s xәlifәħ.  One 
Muslim scholar later characterized Amjad ‘Ali as “probably the best loved and most 
erudite xәlifәħ of [Ahmad Riza Khan].”137  Over time Amjad ‘Ali A’azmi thus earned 
the title by which he would be known by future generations: Sәdәr ul-shәri’at, meaning 
“Chief of Islamic Law”; many of his rulings would be gathered and published as the four-
volume fәtawa әmjәdiәħ, and his bhar-e-shәri’at (written over the course of three decades 
and only completed after his death by family members and former students) is 
considered by Barelvis to be a veritable encyclopedia of Hanafi jurisprudence.138    
It was here in Bareilly, too, where Amjad ‘Ali A’azmi became politically active, 
faithfully towing the line of his mentor, Ahmad Riza Khan.  Part of that activism was 
manifest in his capacity as president of the education wing of Naimuddin Moradabadi’s 
aforementioned Jama’at-e-Riza-e-Mustafa.  For example, one Thursday in March 
1921/Rajab 1339, the Deobandi-Barelvi political antagonism came to a head in 
Bareilly—where the JUH had decided to hold its convention in this, Ahmad Riza’s 
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hometown.  The gathering was dubbed “the Khilafat Conference,” and Congress 
stalwart Abul Kalam Azad (who, two years later, would become the Congress’s 
youngest president) was just one of many prominent “nationalist” Muslims in 
attendance.  Of course, Deobandis dominated the organization itself.  Four months 
before, it should be remembered, the JUH had held its second major gathering in Delhi, 
with none other than Mahmud Hasan presiding.  On this day, the old Deobandi head 
had been dead for three months, but the party very evidently lived on.  By now a leading 
Barelvi scholar, Amjad ‘Ali (following the example of his shix) strongly opposed the sort 
of “Hindu-Muslim unity” espoused by the Deobandi jәm’aiәt, and his ire may have been 
exacerbated by the fact that one of the Barelvis’ own, mwlana ‘Abd ul-Majid Badayuni 
(whose rivalry with Ahmad Riza has already been touched upon), was at that moment 
acting as the conference’s secretary.139  In any case, on this occasion the Sәdәr ul-shәri’at 
Amjad ‘Ali personally approached the JUH convention with a seventy-point 
questionnaire dealing specifically with the communal issue—and demanded a reply.  
The Barelvis would later insist that the JUH “failed to send even one reply to the 
questions posed,” despite “repeated reminders.”140  According to Naimuddin Moradabadi 
(who considered Amjad ‘Ali’s questionairre so “inspired” as to leave the Deobandis with 
“[no] room for a convincing reply”), Abul Kalam Azad himself addressed the issue of 
the questionnaire at the Bareilly train station before his departure.  “All the various 
objections raised in the questionnaire are real and correct,” he is purported to have said, 
before allegedly admitting that the JUH had made indefensible “errors” that the Barelvis 
could now “seize.”141  Amjad ‘Ali’s opposition to cooperation between Muslims and 
Hindus clearly demonstrated continuity with the views of his aged teacher, Ahmad Riza 
Khan, who, as mentioned previously, felt strongly that “political alliances forged with 
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Hindus for the sake of overthrowing the British were misplaced.”142  As previously 
mentioned, too, Ahmad Riza Khan had just appointed Amjad ‘Ali ‘Azami qazi for all 
India, with Ahmad Riza’s son Mustafa and Burhan ul-Haqq Jabalpuri to assist him as 
muftis.143  His formal and highly visible opposition to the JUH on this occasion, 
therefore, was significant—and appropriate, given his new appointment. 
But the Deobandis were intent on convincing their Barelvi counterparts that 
political unity, at least within the context of opposing the British, was necessary.  The 
next month, another meeting was called by the JUH, likewise in Bareilly—this time 
chaired by none other than Abul Kalam Azad (casting some doubt, perhaps, onto the 
details of Naimuddin Moradabadi’s train station story).  The JUH delicately invited a 
group of Barelvi dignitaries, including the aforementioned mwlana Muhammad Burhan 
ul-Haqq Jabalpuri, mwlana Sayyid Sulayman Ashraf, and Ahmad Raza Khan’s own 
grandson, mwlana Hamid Raza Khan.  It is likely Amjad ‘Ali attended as well.  This 
invitation was a more or less unprecedented opportunity for the two sides to come to 
some sort of rapprochement.  But the Deobandi effort to win over these pious scholars 
failed, in part because the Barelvis seemed intent only on proving the other side wrong.  
To make the point, mwlana Sulayman Ashraf addressed the gathering personally, 
contending that the JUH and others of their ilk were acting without religious 
sanction—and that, in fact, no such sanction existed justifying cooperation with Hindu 
people.144  Hindus and Muslims were two separate nations—an idea promulgated by 
Ahmad Riza and even at this early stage ingrained into the political philosophy of the 
movement—and thus Barelvi historians continue to label the Deobandi scholars and 
leaders of the JUH “pro-Hindu.”  Meanwhile, Amjad ‘Ali stood as a stalwart even at this 
early date for “Muslim nationhood” and the “Muslim entity,” having “defended and 
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extolled the Islamic nation.”145  Thus the meeting ended without resolving the issue; or, 
rather, resolving in the minds of both parties that the respective differences dividing 
them were more or less irreconcilable.  The Deobandis apparently made no effort, 
either, during this second Bareilly conference to answer Amjad ‘Ali’s seventy-point 
objection delivered to them at the first, though the very fact that they invited the 
Barelvi scholars indicates some desire on their part to develop warmer relations with 
their Barelvi brothers.  Unfortunately for the Deobandis, and perhaps for the history of 
the subcontinent, the opportunity was squandered and no rapprochement was 
forthcoming.  When the conference ended, the Deobandis and the Barelvis were as 
divided as ever.  For Amjad ‘Ali’s part, he left the next year (1922/1340) to perform the 
hәj to Mecca.146  He would return to Bareilly almost every year afterwards (for the ‘urs 
of Ahmad Riza Khan), dutifully met and welcomed at the train station on each occasion 
by Ahmad Riza’s son (and eventually spiritual successor), Mustapha Riza.147 
In 1924/1342, Amjad ‘Ali A’azmi left Bareilly to accept an appointment as head 
teacher at Ajmer’s dar ul’alwm Mu’iniyah Usmaniyah.  The desert town of Ajmer, long 
a pir center and place of Muslim pilgrimage (remember Akbar) in Rajasthan, would be 
his home for almost a decade.  Here the mufti’s talents as an organizer and administrator 
were put on display, both in his capacity as head teacher and, especially, in his 
spearheading of an impressive tәbliGi movement whose purpose was to revitalize and 
reform the “nominal” faith amongst the region’s formerly Hindu descendants of 
Prithviraj Chauhan (d. 1192 AD).  Evidently this specific population practiced Islam 
only superficially, having kept on or adopted many of the old Hindu worship customs (a 
charge, ironically, leveled by Deobandis against the Barelvis).  Many in the community 
were falling prey, too, to the seemingly ever-present Shuddhi movement.  Apparently 
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the efforts of Amjad ‘Ali and his cohorts had “pleasant effects,” in that the Muslims of 
the area “clustered around these enthusiastic preachers” and “resolved to act upon [their 
admonitions].”148  Such action is instructive in the context of the Deobandi-Barelvi 
rivalry, as it illustrates that both groups were reformist in nature (often the Barelvis are 
portrayed as staticly traditional and thus not revivalist in the true sense of the term), 
seeking to reinvigorate the subcontinent’s Islamic community, rooting out innovation 
and revitalizing the faith.  One aim of Amjad ‘Ali’s missionary endeavors, certainly, was 
to prevent Muslim communities like Ajmer’s from falling prey to such “deviant” sects as 
that represented by the Deobandis. 
A quick note on the place of the anti-shuddhi activities of the Muslim scholars and 
their students and disciples is in order here.  The Barelvi historians, in particular, tend 
to place a heavy emphasis on the efforts of the Ahl-e-Sunnat ‘alәma in combating Hindu 
reconversion.  Interestingly, such activism on the part of the Barelvi fathers is set 
within the context of the pre-Partition “Pakistan movement.”  (Such placement stresses, 
perhaps, the religious lens through which the Muslim scholars viewed history in 
general, even what was otherwise strictly political history.)  Deobandi histories may 
make mention of the Shuddhi movement, but it is typically given short shrift, if it is 
treated at all.  The reason?  Perhaps the Deobandis have plenty of other political 
material to cover—from their front-and-center involvement in the Khilafat movement 
to the organization and activism of the JUH, not to mention the life stories of political 
crusaders like Mahmud Hasan, ‘Ubaidullah Sindhi, and Husain Ahmad Madani.  Indeed, 
Deobandis would later look back on this period—this time of pre-Partition political 
struggle—as a badge of honor, particularly vis-à-vis their Barelvi opponents.  After 
Habibur Rehman Ludhianvi’s great-grandson, speaking to the author, had finished 
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extolling the sacrifices of the Deobandis as an integral part of the freedom movement, 
he asked rhetorically (and sarcastically), “How many Barelvis spent time in prison?”149  
This, according to many Deobandis, is why the Barelvi histories of the freedom 
movement spend so much time dealing with seemingly non-political things like 
combating the shuddhi movement.  But to Barelvis such activities were wrapped up with 
the renewal of the faith in the subcontinent along the road to establishing Islamic 
government in a free and independent Muslim state.150 
Another issue that features prominently in the Barelvi version of the “Pakistan 
movement” (as opposed to its near-absence in the Deobandi “freedom movement” 
narrative) is the Shahid Ganj mәsjyd incident, which took place while Amjad ‘Ali was 
back in Bareilly on a brief three-year teaching stint (1933-1936/1352-1355).  The 
incident stands as another example of a less explicitly political issue being inserted by 
Barelvi historians into an (or “their”) explicitly political narrative.  Built as a Muslim 
mosque in Lahore in the early eighteenth/twelfth century during the Mughal period, 
the compound was captured forty years later—along with the rest of the city—by 
victorious Sikh troops of the western Punjabi Bhangi mysәl (a state within the Sikh 
Confederacy), trading hands again (though those hands remained Sikh) in the wake of 
the establishment of Ranjit Singh’s empire.  Muslims were subsequently forbidden to 
worship at the mәsjyd, and soon it had been converted into a Sikh gwrdwara, the main 
mosque edifice serving as housing quarters for Sikh priests.  When, in the mid-
1800s/mid-1200s, the British in turn conquered Lahore, some Muslims began agitating 
for a restoration of the mosque, but the Sikhs were allowed to retain the property.   
Then, in 1935/1354, Muslims got wind of Sikh intentions to demolish the mosque 
(“owing to its dangerous condition”),151 and Muslim groups around the country, led in 
  
  252 
large part by Barelvis, but including important (usually Barelvi-leaning) pirs (including 
erstwhile Sunni Conference president Jamaat ‘Ali Shah) and religious scholars from both 
sides, rallied around the issue of saving Shahid Ganj from destruction.  One Barelvi 
group, the Anjuman Hizb al-Ahnaf—connected to Lahore’s Wazir Khan mosque, tied to 
a number of powerful Sufi pirs, and set up as an opposition organization to the JUH and 
other Deobandi groups active in the city—played a prominent role in the affair.152  As 
per the general Barelvi position, the Anjuman Hizb al-Ahnaf (which typically reserved 
its activities to internal behavioral and spiritual reform within Lahore’s Muslim 
community) “seems to have been far more sympathetic to the British administration,” 
but in the case of Shahid Ganj came out strongly against it (or, perhaps more accurately, 
against the Sikhs whose claims were supported by the government).153  In particular, 
Barelvis point to the involvement of Ahmad Riza Khan’s son, Hamid Riza, as well as 
“other Ahl-e-Sunnat ‘alәma” including Amjad ‘Ali (who was with Hamid Riza at the 
time) in the movement to restore Shahid Ganj mәsjyd to Muslim control.  “The effort to 
recover the mosque,” Hamid Riza is reported to have proclaimed, “was, from an Islamic 
point of view, a…[religious] duty,” one for which it was worth laying down one’s life; 
such a potentiality would, “with certainty,” earn one holy martyr status.154  This may be 
compared to the position of the major Deobandi leaders and organs in the city, who 
seemed to cultivate more of a hands-off policy when it came to the issue of the mosque.  
The heavily Deobandi Majlis‐e‐Ahrar‐e‐Islam (hereafter MAI), for example, “shied 
away” from the spirited agitation that centered around Shahid Ganj; once, hundreds of 
Muslim demonstrators amassed threateningly outside the party’s Lahore office, 
protesting the organization’s lack of enthusiasm—indeed, its perceived complete 
indifference—on the issue.  Lahore’s leading Deobandi scholar, the famous Ahmad ‘Ali 
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Lahori (who had been imprisoned by the British in 1914/1332 for his role in the 
Mahmud Hasan-led “Silk Letters Conspiracy”), likewise played no active role in the 
campaign.  Neither did his Anjuman Khuddam al-Din, a group (still functioning as of 
the time of this writing, under the leadership of Ahmad ‘Ali’s grandson) not unlike the 
Barelvi Anjuman Hizb al-Ahnaf (but which more strongly focused on the personal 
application of the message of the Qur’an).  Notable MAI/Deobandi leaders like Ataullah 
Shah Bukhari did not, like their Barelvi counterparts, come running to Lahore to take 
part in the Shahid Ganj campaign, but stayed away.  Such leaders would later explain 
their actions by enunciating a desire to have seen the issue dealt with via constitutional 
means.  (By 1937/1356, it should be noted, the MAI had caved to pressure and joined in 
the fray over the mosque, very much on the table as the issue had stubbornly remained; 
the party’s non-intereference had evidently been causing it real political damage).155  In 
any case, the attitude of the Ahrars vis-à-vis the Shahid Ganj episode, in the words of 
one commentator of the time, “lessened its prestige among orthodox Muslims.”156 
Led by such parties as the Barelvi Anjuman Hizb al-Ahnaf, Muslims gathered in 
front of the one-time mosque by the thousands (between four and five thousand, to be 
more precise, many of them armed with sticks and hatchets), creating an armed human 
wall protecting the edifice.  The British governor of the Punjab did attempt a Sikh-
Muslim negotiation—and even obtained Sikh assurances that the demolition would be 
postponed—but to no lasting avail; a week later some Sikhs involved with the gwrdwara 
began demolishing it by night, much to the shock and dismay of the city’s Muslims, as 
well as Muslims around the country.  Communal riots, Muslim versus Sikh, erupted in 
Lahore’s streets, prompting a quasi-military response from the British.  Indeed, by the 
8th of July/6th of Rabi II, planes were “circling the city,” British soldiers were “patrolling 
  
  254 
the streets with armored cars,” and a curfew “proclaimed by the beat of the drum” had 
been enacted.157 158  In mid-July/mid-Rabi II, a march was organized, beginning at 
Lahore’s mighty Badshahi Mosque and culminating in the procession’s arrival at Shahid 
Ganj.  Unfortunately for the demonstrators, however, the British met the crowd with 
bullets; by the time the Royal Scots had stopped firing, around a dozen Muslims lay 
dead in the streets, and several British soldiers lay wounded or dead as well, victims of 
stoning, trampling, beating—or some deadly combination.  By 21 July/19 Rabi II, the 
crowd was still “menacing” and “refused to leave the streets” despite the curfew,159 
though the next day the multitude reportedly dispersed (after “sitting in the same place 
for 36 hours”) at the injunction of their religious leaders.160  By the 29th/27th the British 
Official Wireless could report that “the situation in Lahore was…quiet,” and that the 
Muslims had decided to pursue the matter via “constitutional methods.”  This last 
referred to a plan to appeal through the British Indian court system.161  (This had been 
tried before, for years directly following the British occupation of the city; British 
authorities had ruled in favor of Sikh ownership).  In any case, the most serious phase of 
the crisis had passed. 
After his threee-year residence in Bareilly, Amjad ‘Ali took up another head teacher 
position, this time at the dar ul’alwm Hafiziah Shervani in Aligarh.  He worked in this 
capacity for seven years (also serving as a curriculum advisor at Sir Sayyid’s Anglo-
Oriental College), and one of his fellow teachers would later describe him as one who 
had “full command over the profession of teaching.”  Even as a writer of fәtawa (it was 
in Aligarh that he came to be known as Sәdәr ul-shәri’at), a debater, a Sufi shix, and a 
political agitator, Amjad ‘Ali was first and foremost a teacher; many of the religious 
scholars, on both sides of the Deobandi-Barelvi divide, would likely view themselves in 
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much the same way.  Even so, and despite his multitude of responsibilities, the political 
questions facing Muslims in India weighed heavily on the mufti’s mind.  In 1939/1358, 
on the occasion of a major All-India Sunni Conference gathering, Amjad ‘Ali—like 
hundreds of other prominent Barelvi ‘alәma—made the trip to Naimuddin Moradabadi’s 
hometown of Moradabad, where the meeting took place.  None other than Ahmad Riza’s 
son and xәlifәħ ul-әwwәl (“number one successor”) Hamid Riza Khan chaired the 
conference on this occasion, while “hәżrәt Sәdәr ul-shәri’at [Amjad ‘Ali],” wrote one 
Barelvi historian later, “was prominent by his august presence.”162  The respected 
Azamghari was now sixty years old. 
In 1943/1362, Amjad ‘Ali moved to Varanasi for a year before returning once more 
to Bareilly.  In 1946/1365 another major All-India Sunni Conference convention took 
place (the organization’s last pan-Indian gathering) in Varanasi.  This last assembly, as 
previously mentioned, was the Sunni Conference’s largest by far, with an estimated five 
thousand scholars and pirs in attendance, plus another two hundred thousand of their 
students and disciples.  Of course, Amjad ‘Ali (now sixty-seven and beginning to suffer 
from a series of serious physical ailments) attended, too, weighing in often on the topic 
about which the conference mostly revolved: the practical creation and functioning of an 
Islamic government on the subcontinent, now that the real emergence of an 
independent Pakistan glistened on the horizon.  In order to facilitate the production of a 
formal resolution, the Conference created a committee to draft a blueprint for an Islamic 
state.  Naturally, Naimuddin Moradabadi served as a member of said committee, along 
with Ahmad Riza’s son, Mustapha Riza—and Amjad ‘Ali.163  Their production—
Moradabadi’s “Eleven Points”—has already been mentioned. 
  
  256 
The mega-conference in Varanasi was in large part organized by mwlana Abdul 
Hamid Badayuni (d. 1970 AD), a scion of the famed Khairabadi-Badayuni Group and a 
fourty-eight-year-old Barelvi leader whose association with the Muslim League dated 
back to 1918/1336.  In March of 1940/Safar of 1359, Abdul Hamid had voiced his 
support for the League’s Lahore Resolution—when the ML, that same month, had 
called for the creation of a federation of “autonomous and sovereign” Muslim states in 
the subcontinent, later interpreted as the League’s first formal demand for Pakistan.  
Thereafter Abdul Hamid had campaigned hard within the Barelvi community of South 
Asia in a highly successful attempt to see the idea of a separate Muslim state accepted 
generally.164  Perhaps it was natural, then, for the AISC to appoint him as its Secretary 
of Propaganda.165  A fәtwa out of Bareilly’s Manzar-e-Islam supporting the League, 
authored by a murid of Hamid Riza named Ijaz Wali Khan (a future head of the hәdis 
department at a major Barelvi school in Lahore), had also experienced significant 
circulation at that time.166  To see so many scholars, pirs, and regular “Sunnis”—Amjad 
‘Ali among them—now gathered together in Varanasi signified the culmination of 
Badayuni’s years of effort.  Significantly, on the occasion of the Varanasi conference the 
Badayuni mwlana endeavored hard to convince his fellows to actually merge the AISC 
with the League—a move that would likely have had major consequences vis-à-vis 
direct Barelvi influence in the future Pakistani state (and especially in a constituent 
assembly), particularly as it was measured against that of the Deobandis’.  But Abdul 
Hamid Badayuni’s efforts were in vain, his idea batted down by the many Barelvi 
guiding lights who looked to the League only circumspectly (not to mention a few 
whose attitude thereunto was nothing short of hostile), and valued their trademark holy 
separation.167  (Even Naimuddin Moradabadi, in a letter to a fellow AISC leader in the 
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Punjab around 1946/1365, wrote, “Jamhurriyyah-e-Islamiah [a name adopted by the 
Conference in the 1940s/1360s, though the organization continued to be referred to as 
the All-India Sunni Conference] in no circumstances can give up the demand for 
Pakistan, whether Mr. Jinnah himself remains its supporter or not.”168  The statement 
illustrates the distinction in the eyes of some Barelvi leaders between support for an 
Islamic state and support for the political means to create it.  The end was to be 
Pakistan.)  In any case, it is perhaps a testament to the lack of unity on the issue of 
Jinnah and the League among Ahl-e-Sunnat leaders that Badayuni’s proposal was 
rejected.  “We did not think it proper for [the ‘alәma ] to come on the platform of the 
Muslim League,” Naimuddin Moradabadi explained, of the AISC’s decision in this 
regard, “but we countered the activities of the opponents of the League [i.e. 
predominantly, among Muslims, the Deobandi JUH].”  (“This was not to oblige the 
League,” Moradabadi would add, somewhat tellingly, “as our attitude was always 
governed by the dictates of Islam.”)169  The decision to deny Abdul Hamid this 
additional victory (and the AISC’s general attitude of maintaining some distance, 
however small at times, from the League) cleared the way for Shabbir Ahmad Usmani 
and the better-organized Deobandi network to assume a more powerful (not to mention 
official) political role within the soon-to-materialize Pakistani state.  Still, the general 
assembly’s decision not to officially join with the League didn’t stop a core group of 
fifty-six scholars and pirs at the Benares conference from issuing a joint statement 
supporting the ML.170 
Perhaps it is not coincidental, then, that that same year two other events occurred 
which helped bring the Muslim League and the Barelvi mәshayx and ‘alәma together.  
The first was the sending of an official AISC delegation overseas—to the Arabian 
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peninsula and elsewhere within the Islamic world—to present the pro-Pakistan 
argument to fellow Muslims abroad and thereby garner an increased base of 
international Muslim support for the cause.  Abdul Hamid Badayuni led the delegation 
himself.  When the group returned to India, it met with Jinnah (on 3 May/1 Jumada II), 
who lauded its international efforts.  (The meeting with Pakistan’s qayd-e-ә’ažәm seems 
to have fired up Abdul Hamid, who, just three days later, reportedly declared before a 
sizable Lahore audience, “For us, Pakistan is a matter of life and death.”)171  The second 
event was the organization, spearheaded by the Muslim League, of a committee of 
mәshayx made up of prominent Muslim religious figures to help drum up support for the 
party and for Pakistan (a move in line with the League’s now Islam-centric policy, a 
policy that made it possible for ML leaders to go over the heads of regional politicians 
and admonish religious power-holders across the country); the committee included 
powerful individuals like the pir of Manki Sharif, Makhdum Riza Shah of Multan (whose 
father had been mayor of Multan, and who himself served, from 1946/1365, as a 
member of the provincial legislative assembly after beating out the Unionists),172 AISC 
leader Jamaat ‘Ali Shah (who, among his many other pro-League activities, was heavily 
involved in the “condemnation of pro-Congress Muslims and Muslim groups,” like the 
Deobandis),173 and the powerful pir of the far western Punjabi shrine city of Taunsa 
Sharif.  Other influential pirs or sajjada-nishins, especially in the Punjab (a province 
where League victory was vital to the establishment of any sort of meaningful 
“Pakistan”), were likewise swayed to Jinnah’s side, including those tied to the shrines at 
Sial Sharif, Golra Sharif, Pakpattan Sharif, Jabalpur Sharif, and Chura Sharif.174  The 
next year, of course, all this effort would pay off, and the Sunni Conference’s political 
goals—if not its spiritual ones—would see fruition.  “The Sunni [‘alәma] fully 
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participated in the freedom movement,” wrote M. Ahmad, with particular emphasis on 
the AISC, “and played an important role in the last and final phase of the Pakistan 
Movement.”175 
Unfortunately, it was around this time that, combined with his advancing age, a 
series of personal setbacks (the deaths, in a short three-year span, of eleven of his family 
members) took a serious toll on Amjad ‘Ali.  Indeed, by 1946/1365, the Azamgarhi 
scholar had lost his sight completely; for the first time since childhood the prolific 
scholar was bereft of the ability to read and write.  His published works thus all pre-date 
this pivotal year.  His condition prevented him, too, from traveling to the northwest 
frontier during the controversial “Frontier Referendum,” but many other Barelvi ‘alәma 
and pirs made the trip (joining those already based in the region) in order to garner 
support—and critical votes—for the League.  The Referendum will be discussed in 
more detail in the following section (following the career of Shabbir Ahmad Usmani), 
but it should be noted here that, if not for Barelvi support, it is doubtful that Jinnah 
would have been able to eke out a victory in the NWFP (indeed, minus fervent Barelvi 
cooperation a victory would have been almost certainly impossible).  One Barelvi whose 
participation remains legendary was the pir of Manki Sharif who, in October 
1945/Shawwal 1364, organized the Jamiat al-Asfiah, an organization made up of 
hundreds of scholars and mәshayx.176  That organization’s support of the Muslim League 
was critical in the region; without it, opined both M. Ahmad and K. Sayeed, “the Muslim 
League could not have [built] up its position in the Frontier,” let alone gone on to win.  
It is clear, too, from Jinnah’s letters that he had used promises hinting at the 
implementation of shәri’at in a future Pakistan to woo the pir and his party to his side; 
this was in line with League policy aimed at the Muslim religious leadership since the 
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1937/1356 election debacle.  Notice the wily politician’s ambiguous, non-committal 
language, from an oft-reproduced November 1945/Dh’ul Hijja 1364 letter to the 
abovementioned pir: “It is needless to emphasize that the constituent assembly which 
would be predominantly Muslim in its composition would be able to enact laws for 
Muslims, not inconsistent with the Shariat laws and the Muslims will no longer be 
obliged to abide by the Un-Islamic laws.”177  Other big-name “Sunnis” played a similarly 
major role in stumping for the League, including the aged but seemingly indomitable 
Jamaat ‘Ali Shah, whose “whirlwind tours” helped mobilize considerable support for 
Jinnah and Pakistan.178 
  The League’s Referendum victory was a critical stepping stone in the achievement 
of its ultimate aim—the establishment of Pakistan—and Barelvi backing, with the 
perhaps equally critical help of some dissident Deobandis, made that win possible.  The 
issuance in both the Punjab and the NWFP of a handbill containing a juridical ruling in 
favor of Pakistan and the League and signed by thirty-five ‘alәma illustrates this 
phenomenon well.  The pamphlet, entitled hәżrәt-e-Swfi-e-kyran ka ә’alan-e-hәq: Muslim 
League ki hymayәt kәrin (“Eminent Sufis’ and Honorable Ones’ Declaration of the Right 
Way: Support the Muslim League!”), included mostly Barelvi signatories; however, 
three Deobandi ‘alәma could also be found among the scholars listed thereon.179  A 
Frontier Referendum loss in this critical Muslim-majority province would have been a 
crushing blow to the League—an organization claiming to be the sole spokesparty for 
India’s Muslims; in the end, the support of the (mostly Barelvi) ‘alәma and pirs ensured 
victory.  Barelvi leaders likewise helped secure a League win in the east, where a 
referendum at Sylhet (in what is today the far eastern corner of Bangladesh) decided, in 
early July 1947/mid-Sh’aban 1366, in favor of joining East Bengal; here Barelvi notable 
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Abdul Hamid Badayuni, for example, campaigned hard for the ML, delivering 
passionate speeches in favor of Pakistan.180 
Even in Amjad ‘Ali’s debilitated state, the old ‘alym set out with his wife and a small 
party (including Ahmad Riza’s son Mustapha Riza Khan) on 1 September 1948/26 
Shawwal 1367 for Mecca to perform his second hәj.  Hundreds gathered at the railway 
station to see him off, surely wondering if this might be the last they’d set eyes on the 
great mufti.  Unfortunately for Amjad ‘Ali, the fever that developed soon after 
embarkation turned into full-fledged pneumonia by the time his party reached Bombay.  
He remained mostly unconscious for a year. Before Mustapha Riza continued on to the 
Arab peninsula he is reported to have recited an Ahmad Riza-authored poem of praise 
for the Prophet to the ailing and unresponsive Azamgarhi; Amjad ‘Ali evidently opened 
his eyes immediately, was propped up by means of a pillow, and listened intently to 
Mustapha Riza’s words.  When he finished, Ahmad Riza’s son is said to have whispered, 
“Go on [to the next life], I shall follow behind you.”181 
Then, a year to the day, almost, since his departure from home, Amjad ‘Ali Khan 
passed away on 2 September 1949/9 Dh’ul Q’adah 1368, aged seventy-one.  His dәrgaħ 
is in Ghausi, near Azamgarh, and every year, as of this writing, pilgrims continue to 
flock to the spot on the anniversary of his death to pay the crusading ‘alym homage. 
 
Shabbir Ahmad Usmani:  Jinnah’s Gamechanger . 
Previously it was suggested that the dar ul’alwm at Deoband could boast first-
generation leadership under Muhammad Qasim and Rashid Ahmad and second-
generation leadership under Mahmud Hasan.  With the latter’s death, a third generation 
of leaders was now pushed to the forefront, most notably including Husain Ahmad 
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Madani, hafyž  Muhammad Ahmad, Anwar Shah Kashmiri, and Shabbir Ahmad Usmani 
(the latter aided by his indomitable relative, mufti Muhammad Shafi).182  Of this group, 
it was perhaps Shabbir Ahmad whose actions would have the most lasting effect on the 
movement—and on the political evolution of South Asia.  Despite Husain Ahmad 
Madani’s tireless efforts to keep Deobandism firmly beneath the Congress umbrella, it 
was Shabbir Ahmad’s breakaway Deobandi faction that would eventually ensure the 
emergence of Pakistan and, ultimately, dominate Deobandi politics in the new “Muslim” 
state.  
Shabbir Ahmad Usmani was born on 27 September 1885/17 Dh’ul Hijja 1302, about 
one hundred miles from Delhi in the north Indian town of Bijnor.  His father, Fazl al-
Rahman Usmani, was a gifted poet and “a great Islamic scholar of his time.”  After 
completing an elementary Islamic education in Deoband, Fazl al-Rahman especially 
excelled at Persian and poetry while at Delhi College, where he was a stand-out student 
of the venerable Mamluk ‘Ali (whose acolytes, as previously mentioned, also included 
founding fathers of the Deobandi school Muhammad Qasim Nanautawi and Rashid 
Ahmad Gangohi).  As a result of his scholarly gifts, Fazl al-Rahman was appointed 
deputy inspector of schools in the town of Bijnor and other towns across the United 
Provinces—a pensioned position.  But “the movement of Muhammad Qasim” beckoned, 
and Fazl al-Rahman united with it.  As such, Shabbir Ahmad Usmani’s father helped 
found the dar ul’alwm at Deoband, and served on the school’s mәjlys-e-shwra until his 
death in 1907/1325.  To this day Fazl al-Rahman is considered one of the university’s 
“Six Great Ones” responsible for the institution’s very establishment.183  One twentieth-
century Pakistani historian would write of him, “He remained a pillar of the mәdrәsәħ to 
his last breath.”184  He was married three times, two of the unions producing children—
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and it was one of Fazl al-Rahman’s sons who would go on to change the course of 
history for hundreds of millions of people. 
But even apart from the towering legacy of his father, Shabbir Ahmad’s own mark 
on the university at Deoband was significant—indeed, far greater.  From early in his 
childhood, Fazl al-Rahman’s son had seemed possessed of a serious nature.  “Games and 
amusements evoked no apparent interest in him,” wrote one biographer, adding that, 
since boyhood, “he had a boundless interest in study.”185  As such, six-year-old Shabbir 
Ahmad was placed in the hands of hafyž  Muhammad ‘Azim Deobandi for religious 
education, and the next year he was accepted at the dar ul’alwm where his instructors 
included the indefatigable Mahmud Hasan (a teacher of all-important Arabic). After 
graduation, the young, newly minted mwlana moved to Delhi, where he taught at a local 
“Arabic” mәdrәsәħ; during this period, too, the young teacher was married (1905/1323). 
It didn’t take long, however, for the university at Deoband to decide to avail itself of 
Shabbir Ahmad’s special talents (әsәl mәshGәlәħ) as a teacher-lecturer; he was hired in 
1907/1325 at a salary of 35 rupees a month.186  The man’s ability to give a great speech 
would come in handy later within the context of independence politics. 
But first he would be tested within the administration of the dar ul’alwm.  As an 
administrator, Shabbir Ahmad appears to have been especially involved in the 
university’s fundraising efforts (a duty especially pertinent to one possessed of the 
talents aforementioned), once journeying all the way to Dhaka—a distance of almost a 
thousand miles, as the crow flies—to help secure a sizable sum from the city’s ruler.187  
He also played a role, about six years later (1927/1345-1346), in facilitating a 
substantial increase in the annual donation of the Nizam of Hyderabad.188  In fact, it was 
later reported that the Nizam had only pledged the monthly donation that he did after 
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hearing Shabbir Ahmad Usmani’s religious lectures.  The ruler of the Deccan even 
offered the now-famous scholar a very lucrative position in Hyderabad—but Shabbir 
Ahmad, apparently fully invested mentally and spiritually in the life of the dar ul’alwm, 
turned down the powerful Nizam in favor of his modest university salary.  “’alamәħ 
Shabbir Ahmad Usmani,” wrote of his biographers, “was a soldier of Islam.”189  But he 
was active politically, too, in cooperation with others at the school, in the Khilafat 
movement of the early 1920s/late 1330s-early 1340s.190  As part of the latter, his 
reputation for delivering “impassioned sermons” with the capacity to energize his 
listeners (and, indeed, the “Muslim nation” at large, according to some) grew, along 
with his standing within the Deobandi movement and his general fame throughout 
India.  These early years saw Shabbir Ahmad as an “avid” member of the Deobandi 
school’s political organization, the JUH, which had been organized, as aforementioned, 
in the wake of the Khilafat movement in 1919/1337.191  Indeed, Shabbir Ahmad was 
among its founding figures, along with such luminaries as Abul Kalam Azad and ‘Abd 
ul-Bari of Farangi Mahal. 
But his greatest contributions to the Deobandi movement during this earlier period 
fell within the realm of scholarship.  When the king of Afghanistan visited the 
university in 1939/1358, it was the work of Shabbir Ahmad, along with that of Mahmud 
Hasan, which was displayed most prominently (the Afghan government would go on to 
translate it from Urdu to Persian).192  When a new section of the university library was 
added in the mid-1960s/mid-1380s, Shabbir Ahmad’s works were specially arranged 
and showcased along with those of other leading scholastic luminaries at the school.193  
Leading mufti Muhammad Shafi would later compare Shabbir Ahmad during this time 
to the great Sunni theorists, philosophers, and mystics Abu Hamid al-Ghazali (1058-
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1111/450-505) and Fakr al-Din al-Razi (1149-1209/543-606), a tribute of very high 
order.  Indeed, Muhammad Shafi likened the level of saintliness, learning, and 
scholarship then extant at the university at Deoband to “an assembly of angels” that 
included, by name, Shabbir Ahmad Usmani.  (Just as significantly, Muhammad Shafi 
added that this assembly “[ultimately] broke up”).194  Muhammad Shafi’s son, a 
prominent Islamic scholar in his own right, would later describe Shabbir Ahmad as 
having achieved “complete mastery of every science.”195  When shix ul-hynd Mahmud 
Hasan, principal of the university at Deoband since 1890/1307, was called to lay the 
foundation stone of the Jamia Millia Islamia at Aligarh—despite his exceedingly frail 
condition at the time; he would pass away one month later—it was Shabbir Ahmad, 
among a few others, who accompanied him.196  One of the most prolific Islamic scholars 
of the last century would write that God had “blessed hażrәt ’alamәħ Shabbir Ahmad 
sahyb Usmani with both writing and speaking ability unique in the world.”197  Then in 
1934/1353 Shabbir Ahmad Usmani was appointed acting vice-chancellor, only to be 
made chancellor the next year.  From 1935 to 1942/1354 to 1361, he occupied this 
exalted post.  According to one official source, the school’s advisory council had decided 
to appoint him to this supreme position on account of his “esteemed personality, 
knowledge, and integrity” (‘ažim shaxSiәt әwr ‘alm w fәżәl).198  Despite his newfound 
position, Shabbir Ahmad’s biographers insist that he continued to live humbly, 
materially speaking (and even later, when he obtained significant political power)—“to 
the end living modestly.”199 
It is not without some irony, then, that of all the Deobandi ‘alәma to reject the 
position of the school’s main political wing, rupturing friendships and associations and 
splitting the movement, it should be Shabbir Ahmad Usmani.  Perhaps a hint of 
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contrarianism on Shabbir Ahmad’s part might have been perceived when, in the mid- to 
late 1920s/mid-1340s, he sided with a raucous student group at the university against 
school administrators; many of the students and a handful of teachers and 
administrators were consequently expelled or otherwise let go, though Shabbir Ahmad 
retained his position (in name, at least).200  Perhaps an intimation of fickleness might 
have been detected, too, in his spending most of his time as university chancellor not in 
Deoband at all, but seven hundred miles away in Dabhel, a village on the southern tip of 
modern-day Gujarat (about 20 miles south of Surat), where a Deobandi seminary had 
recently been founded.201  In fact, the Dabhel school—Jamia Islamia Talimuddin 
Dabhel, still functioning and, at the time of this writing, boasting around a thousand 
students—might offer a key to understanding Shabbir Ahmad’s somewhat mysterious 
(and “sudden”) quasi-break with the institution which his father had helped found and 
which he himself had led.   
The “Dabhel Jamia Islamia,” as the Dabhel school is commonly known, was founded 
in the late 1920s/mid-1340s—just after students and, crucially, some teachers at the 
university at Deoband had been expelled or otherwise let go on account of their 
agitation-related activities, aforementioned.  Shabbir Ahmad had sided with them, at 
least for a time, as stated above.  It seems that some of these dissenters, led by Anwar 
Shah Kashmiri, decided to establish an institution of their own (though certainly still 
Deobandi in organization and philosophy [mәslәk], and even affiliation).  Shabbir 
Ahmad would rationalize the situation in terms of “divine will” when he wrote, shortly 
after becoming chancellor at the university in Deoband in the mid-1930s/mid-1350s, 
that the contention a decade previously might be compared to a “storm” or a “squall” 
which, though raging, in the end becomes “the immediate cause of the freshness and 
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greenness of the earth,” despite “partial losses” incurred during the storm itself.  In 
other words, “by the arrival of the ‘alәma of Deoband there the magnificent mәdrәsәħ 
that came into existence at Dabhel…is today watering every part of Gujarat…”202 Thus 
the removal of rebel faculty and students at Deoband had providentially resulted in the 
founding of a sister institution at Dabhel—run by the same.  And it was as dean of the 
latter that Shabbir Ahmad spent the vast majority of his time as chancellor of the former.   
But what had been the reason for the agitation in the first place—agitation that had 
been so serious as to drive a luminary like Anwar Shah Kashmiri from Deoband itself?  
The dar ul’alwm’s official history remains vague on the issue, and, when the author 
visited Dabhel in August 2012/Ramadan 1433 specifically to inquire as to the reason for 
the schism, no one at the school seemed to know much about it.  At least one scholar has 
identified some rumblings of dissent within the Deobandi movement in the 1920s/1340s 
over the school leadership’s sanction of, participation in, and cheerleading for the 
“Hindu-led” non-cooperation movement (a deal chalked out with Gandhi in return for 
his support vis-à-vis the Khilafat movement, as previously noted); evidently there were 
those who felt that working with the Hindus was too steep a price, whatever the cause.  
Could it have been this issue that eventually led to the exodus of teachers and students 
from Deoband to Dabhel?  Ashraf ‘Ali Thanawi, once singled out by Ahmad Riza Khan 
as an apostate, and head teacher Anwar Shah Kashmiri had, at least since the Khilafat 
days, spearheaded a faction within the school that felt that the dar ul’alwm’s “primary 
objective” should be the pursuit of scholarship and religious learning (i.e. not politics or 
even relgio-political “movements”).  (As early as 1920/1338, Abul Kalam Azad had 
made reference to two factions present at the school within the ranks of the Deobandi 
leadership, each vying for influence over the other, thus providing a clue as to how early 
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an intra-Deobadi political schism had begun to materialize).203  In other words, direct 
political involvement should be avoided.  Shabbir Ahmad, despite his own personal 
involvement in the JUH, evidently agreed that the school itself should adopt an apolitical 
stance—and for years he had acted as one of the faction’s chief spokesmen.  In the end 
the other faction, governed by the thinking of Mahmud Hasan and ‘Ubaidullah Sindhi 
and lead most prominently by one Husain Ahmad Madani, won out, and in 1927/1346 
the Kashmiri faction was expelled from the institution altogether.  Noting Shabbir 
Ahmad’s personal support of this group (indeed, his part as an active member of it), it is 
not surprising that he should hold a similar view a couple decades later over the JUH’s 
alliance with the INC.  In this context, Shabbir Ahmad’s repudiation of the mainline 
Deobandi political position—indeed, his active struggle against it—perhaps loses some 
of its mystery, for he’d been associated with a more dissenting element within 
Deobandism all along.  In 1928/1347, Shabbir Ahmad left Deoband, too, pushed out by 
Husain Ahmad; the latter apparently had opposed the proposition, put forward by some 
within the school’s administration, that Shabbir Ahmad be promoted to higher office.  
The idea had sparked “controversy,” and Madani’s viewpoint prevailed.204  Between 
1928 and 1934/1346 and 1353, Shabbir Ahmad taught at the mәdrәsәħ in Dabhel, acting 
as head of the school’s hәdis department for several years. 
Another theory, explained to the author by one of the dar ul’alwm’s top officials in 
2012/1433 and backed up later by one of the university’s other old-timers, holds that 
Shabbir Ahmad expected to become head of the hәdis department after Anwar Shah 
Kashmiri but was snubbed by the appointment of Husain Ahmad Madani, whose 
experience teaching hәdis in Medina reportedly granted him an aura of respectability 
with which even Shabbir Ahmad could not compete.  Shabbir Ahmad was considered the 
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school’s preeminent authority on hәdis before Madani arrived; it was customary, too, at 
the university for the head teacher to augment his duties with hәdis-teaching, thus 
combining the position with added prestige.  Apparently, then, somewhat of a rift 
developed between the two men as soon as Madani began working at the school.  
“Husain Ahmad Madani, when he started teaching here [at Deoband],” explained the 
great-gransdon of Muhammad Qasim Nanautawi, “Shabbir Ahmad Usmani had 
differences with him.”  If Shabbir Ahmad did indeed feel unfairly treated vis-à-vis 
Madani and the hәdis department position, it would have only been exacerbated by the 
fact that Husain Ahmad was also widely seen as the head of the highly politicized, 
overtly anti-colonial (Mahmud Hasan-inspired) faction within the school, opposed to the 
Thanawi- and Kashmiri-inspired group of which he (Usmani) was a vocal member.  
(The animosity, if such a strong word can be used, didn’t flow one-way, either, as 
Madani’s push for Shabbir Ahmad’s ouster in 1928/1347 appears to demonstrate).  Such 
“differences,” it seems, proved too much, and the resultant Usmani-Madani split would 
seem to define both men’s political careers (not to mention that of the JUH and the 
future Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam, or JUI) from that period forward.  Over the five to seven 
years after Shabbir Ahmad’s departure from Deoband, his difference with Madani did, 
however, “lessen” to an extent, allowing him to return and take up the post of vice-
chancellor and, a year later, chancellor.205  (The real impetus behind his return to 
Deoband, however, might have been the “pressure from his supporters within the 
executive of the School,” supporters who rallied in his behalf and ultimately opened up a 
way for his 1934 reinstatement and official elevation.)206  But even this rapprochement 
wasn’t to last.  
In the meantime, Shabbir Ahmad remained an active and high-ranking member of 
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the JUH, fought politically for the rights of Muslims as he understood them, and 
maintained a reputation for religiously inspired ardor throughout.  “But when [he] 
realized,” writes one of his biographers, “that the Jamiat Ulema-e Hind had become the 
Jamiat Ulema-e Congress”—a reference, of course, to the “Hindu-dominated” INC—he 
broke away from the organization and formed his own.207  The biographer’s 
characterization of the JUH-INC relationship as one of domination on the INC’s part, 
and humble obedience on the JUH’s, is inherently unfair.  But for those ‘alәma, like 
Shabbir Ahmad, who had opposed the union from the beginning, such a characterization 
was to become more and more compelling.  The Hindus were dominating the Deobandi 
‘alәma, they argued; the brightest Muslim scholars on the subcontinent were being 
taken for fools.  This had to stop. 
But whatever Shabbir Ahmad’s personal ruminations, between 1942/1361 and 
1943/1362 another major schism occurred among the faculty and students of the 
university at Deoband, a divide that was not so much theological as political—
inherently tied to the tumultuous events then rocking India and the world.  The British 
Empire, of course, was engaged at the time in a fight for its life against Hitler’s forces at 
home and against Tojo’s forces abroad, the latter of which were threatening to conquer 
the entire Southeast Asian peninsula; by mid-year, the Japanese were knocking on the 
doors of India and Burma.  Meanwhile, on the subcontinent itself, millions of Indians 
were outraged that the British Government had committed Indian forces to war 
without so much as a consultation with Indian political representatives.  The British 
quickly dispatched Sir Stafford Cripps to try and assuage the affronted Indian parties—
particularly the Congress; Cripps and Jawaharlal Nehru were, after all, somewhat 
close—but the “Cripps Mission” failed.  It had, in fact, only served to further distance all 
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major parties involved (the Congress and its allies, the League and its allies, and the 
British Government) from one another.  One historian put it thus: “1942 was the 
moment of political and mental alienation on all sides.”208  Gandhi’s reaction, despite the 
wartime situation, was to launch the “Quit India” movement, a massive civil 
disobedience campaign whose stated aim was complete political separation from Britain.  
But not everyone in the Congress greeted Quit India with enthusiasm (indeed, some 
prominent Congress leaders even quit the party in protest); still, most Congressites 
rallied behind their leader, reservations or no.  Jinnah would famously refer to Gandhi’s 
decision to launch Quit India as a “Himalayan blunder.”209 
Naturally, then, Jinnah and the League called on the Muslims of the subcontinent 
not to support Quit India.  Instead, Jinnah took full advantage of the subsequent 
imprisonment of many of the Congress leaders, quickly securing positions for Muslims 
in India’s several provincial governments.  What’s more, as the non-violence-supporting 
wing of Congress, including Gandhi, found itself behind bars, a more violent set of 
revolutionaries in the party quickly seized control.  Within weeks of the mass arrest, 
this more radical group had organized and carried out the destruction of an estimated 
two hundred fifty railway stations, ripped up large sections of railroad, cut telegraph 
lines, and devastated over two hundred police stations and post offices, mostly in Bengal 
and Bihar.  Indeed, supplies and communications to the British eastern front were for a 
time obstructed completely.  In the violence that accompanied the British attempt to 
restore order, around sixty thousand Indians were arrested and an estimated one 
thousand were killed, some by aircraft-borne machine gunners firing desperately into 
crowds.  Viceroy Linlithgow would describe the uprising as the most serious since 
1857/1273.210  It was against this ferocious backdrop, then, that Shabbir Ahmad’s break 
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with most of his fellow Deobandis occurred, with students and faculty often acting as 
full participants in the struggle—and lining up behind the Congress or the League. 
Not surprisingly, the number of students attending the university that year was 
considerably smaller than usual.  Some were involved in the Quit India movement and 
had put off their studies for the time being.  Others considered travel unsafe due to the 
destruction of the railway lines; this was particularly true for many of the school’s 
Bihari and Bengali students, many of whom opted not to make the journey.  (A severe 
famine in Bengal might also be added to this list of interferences).  All of this disruption 
to the university’s regular operations, combined with the overwrought mood then 
pervading the country, made for a tense atmosphere at the dar ul’alwm.  The official 
history commissioned by the school several decades later would describe the rift as a 
“difference of political ways” (siasi mәslәk ki yxtylaf) among the school’s administrators, 
largely fracturing any unity that had previously existed between them—and leading to 
a general state of aloofness (kәshidәgi) and serious confusion at the school.  But the 
official history fails to supply much in the way of details vis-à-vis these various factions, 
stating simply that the infighting “finally ended in the resignation and separation of the 
chancellor [Shabbir Ahmad] and five teachers.”  An estimated sixty students also left 
the university in response to this rupture.211 
But what was Shabbir Ahmad’s contention?  Why did he feel the need to tender his 
resignation, even as he occupied the university’s top position?  Why did five fellow 
teachers—including mwlana Muhammad Ibrahim, mwlana mufti Muhammad Shafi, and 
mwlana Zahoor Ahmed—leave, too?212  What could have been so compelling that a full 
sixty students would follow them?  The official history of the school is not especially 
enlightening here, either.  According to its version of events, Shabbir Ahmad simply felt 
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that the university should have no political position, or at least no practical involvement 
in the politics then rocking India and the world.  What resulted, the official history 
insists, was non-cooperation—causing Shabbir Ahmad ultimately (and prudently) to 
sever himself from the institution.  Thus ends the official version of events.  But 
considering the man’s later activities (not to mention those of Muhammad Shafi, one of 
the teachers who left with him), it seems clear that this is a whitewashed story.  Indeed, 
far from advocating some sort of non-alignment for the university, Shabbir Ahmad and 
his associates were actively involved themselves in a rival movement—one calling for the 
creation of a separate state for Muslims.  Thus while most Deobandis, including the 
movement’s then-imprisoned leader, Husain Ahmad Madani, called for cooperation with 
the Congress and preservation of a united (though independent) subcontinent (Madani 
supported his idea of “united nationalism” by pointing to the “pact of Medina” [see 
Chapter 1], in which Muhammad had included non-Muslim tribes of the oasis),213 
Shabbir Ahmad, like Jinnah and the Muslim League, was striving for Partition.  Shabbir 
Ahmad felt that cooperation with India’s Hindus would inevitably lead to a “kind of 
twisting of Islamic teachings or Islamic customs for the sake of Hindu-Muslim unity.”  
Additionally, supporters of the “two-nation” theory argued that working with the 
Congress (or even just within a united India) was tantamount to putting “the fate of the 
Islamic community into the hands of the Hindu majority.”214  Thus the argument for 
Pakistan (or, perhaps more accurately, the argument against working with the Congress 
for a united India) possessed both religious and political aspects.  This, and not some 
nebulous call to be apolitical, was what actually led to the schism of 1942-1943/1361-
1362.  Indeed, Muhammad Shafi’s son, himself a highly respected mufti, would write 
later that his father had resigned from the dar ul’alwm at Deoband “due to his active 
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involvement in the Pakistan movement” (italics added).215  Shabbir Ahmad had been no 
apolitical observer.  He had, instead, led the opposition, making an eventual break all but 
inevitable. 
By 1944/1363, Madani, freshly released from prison, was railing against the 
oppression of the British and, characteristically, calling for “the independence of India 
and the Islamic countries,” which “alone can satisfy our hearts; as long as it is not 
achieved, our duty will remain and the struggle for independence will continue.”216  At 
the same time, Madani’s erstwhile Deobandi rival was being welcomed with open arms 
by the JUH’s fiercest political opponent: the Muslim League.  Indeed, in time Shabbir 
would been hailed as the latter organization’s “most eminent ‘alym.”217  Another scholar 
described him as “foremost” among the pro-Pakistan ‘alәma.218  To politically secede 
from his Deobandi brethren, however, Shabbir Ahmad had to separate politics from 
religious discipleship.  Just as one Deobandi scholar could say, “I am a political disciple 
of Maulana Azad and a disciple of Hazrat Maulana Syed Hussain [Ahmad] Madani at 
Deoband”219—clearly drawing a line between the temporal and the spiritual—Shabbir 
Ahmad could claim to be a disciple of the Deobandi school despite his political 
alignment with the League (or, more to the point, against the JUH).  These seemed to 
be separate and distinct, at least in his apparent worldview. 
Long before this schism, however, the JUH had been expanding across the 
subcontinent, including within what would become the Northwest Frontier Province of 
Pakistan; here the JUH was represented (from 1924/1342) by the Jamiat Ulema-e-
Sarhad (“Assembly of Frontier Clergy,” hereafter JUS). The ‘alәma of the JUS, in 
keeping with Deobandi “policy,” attempted to set themselves up as an alternative to the 
state court system.  As part of their aim to implement shәri’at, the JUS encouraged 
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Muslims in the area to “come to the ulema of the JUS for settlements” instead of 
“turning to the state‐run courts for justice.”220  Other localized organizations, while not 
explicitly defined as branches of the JUH, nevertheless expounded a mostly Deobandi 
philosophy vis-à-vis Islam, the mainstream Deobandi position vis-à-vis independence 
(namely: pro-independence but anti‐Pakistan), and employed markedly Deobandi 
methods (including mosque‐based activism and the garnering of voluntary support in 
the name of Islam) in carrying out their objectives.221  For example, in the Punjab the 
leadership (and membership) of the Majlis‐e‐Ahrar‐e‐Islam included several notable 
Deobandi scholars, Habibur Rehman Ludhianvi and Ataullah Shah Bukhari among 
them; the latter served as the party’s first president and was dubbed әmir-e-shәri’at by 
Anwar Shah Kashmiri, who would himself serve as president of the JUH in 1926/1344.  
Samina Awan, in her groundbreaking 2010/1431 in-depth treatment of the MAI, 
described the party thus: “Many of those who joined the MAI were inclined towards the 
Deobandi school of thought.”  The organization’s ranks were swelled with erstwhile 
Khilafatists, whose movement had, as previously mentioned, been fueled in large 
measure by the Deobandi leadership.  In addition, “some of the [party’s] leaders and 
workers” had been “actively associated with the INC,” another Deobandi trademark.222  
The MAI agitated for the rights of Muslims (especially in Kashmir, just to the north, 
where Muslims lived under what was considered the repressive rule of a Hindu prince, 
and in the former princely state of Kapurthala, now within the boundaries of Indian 
Punjab).   Like the JUS to the northwest, the Deobandi‐leaning MAI acted as a sort of 
JUH on the local level in the Punjab, paving the way for increased Deobandi influence 
in politics later on; “the protagonists of the Deobandi [school of] thought,” writes 
Kamran, “owe a good deal to the Majlis‐i‐Ahrar” which “acted as an instrument of 
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political articulation for them in the Punjab.”223  The party was headquartered in Lahore 
(and was, as Kamran noted, by far most active in the Punjab), but also ran branches as 
far afield as Peshawar, Delhi, Lucknow, as well as in the princely state of 
Bahalwalpur.224  Other groups, some explicitly linked to the JUH, some not, did the 
same within their respective spheres across the subcontinent.  Certainly, the Deobandi 
political machine was a force with which to be reckoned, much to the chagrin of the 
Barelvis—and, of course, to the organization which they had selected as their “vehicle” 
for Pakistan: the Muslim League. 
What Jinnah and the League needed, then—perhaps desperately—was a religious 
leader who could throw “theological weight” (in the words of one Pakistani historian) 
behind the idea of Pakistan to counter the efforts of the anti-League Muslim parties like 
the JUH.225  True, the Barelvi leadership provided this on a certain level, but their lack 
of organization and unity was an issue, not to mention the fact that it was the highly 
organized Deobandi opposition, aforementioned, that represented the League’s greatest 
Muslim threat.  Jinnah’s answer came in October 1945/Dh’ul Q’adah 1364, when 
Shabbir Ahmad Usmani founded the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (“Assembly of Islamic 
Clergy,” hereafter JUI) in Calcutta, over which he (Shabbir Ahmad) presided as the 
group’s first president.  According to some, it was the League itself that organized the 
JUI—to be a “parallel organization” to the JUH; the League then “called upon” Shabbir 
Ahmad Usmani to lead the new party.  One historian goes so far as to claim that the 
leaders of the League intentionally sought out Pakistan sympathizers among the 
Deobandis, since it was the Deobandi JUH that was the standard-bearer when it came to 
the political organization of Muslim religious leadership.226  Evidently mwlana Zafar 
Ahmad Ansari (a future member of independent Pakistan’s national assembly) was 
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tasked with the mission to “establish contact” with the Deobandi ‘alәma and organize 
this opposition-from-within.227  Zafar Ahmad eventually found success with Shabbir 
Ahmad.  But whatever the circumstances of its coming into existence, the JUI was 
clearly organized along the same lines as the JUH, but as a League-backing clerical 
party to oppose its Congress-supporting rivals.  Of course, the JUH was being led by 
Shabbir Ahmad’s erstwhile friends and associates from the dar ul’alwm when he 
organized the JUI to oppose them. 
It wasn’t two months before Shabbir Ahmad had arranged his party’s first major 
conference of Indian ‘alәma—in Meerut in December/Muharram.  The next month, 
January/Safar, saw Shabbir Ahmad, together with Ghulam Murshid, organize and lead 
a similar conference, this time in Lahore, where a branch of the JUI had been set up the 
month before.  Though some variety of ‘alәma attended (along with a large group of 
politicians), they mostly represented urban centers in the Punjab.  A poster issued by 
Shabbir Ahmad afterwards indicated the participation of around three hundred religious 
leaders.228  In March/Rabi II, the Bombay Sentinel announced “the first Provincial 
Conference” of the JUI, a three-day event to be convened “under the presidentship of 
His Holiness Sheikul Islam Maulana Shabbir Ahmed Sahib Usmani” in Bombay; the 
ardently anti-League, pro-Congress paper declined, however, to cover the actual 
event.229  Despite his sixty years of age, Shabbir Ahmad had literally traveled “the 
length and breadth of the country” for four months, campaigning for Pakistan at the 
grass-roots level.230  His “passionate speeches” injected “zeal” into “the Muslim nation,” 
one historian has written—and his “great renown spread across all of Hindustan.”231 
The JUI had been created to carry out several purposes, chief among them (1) the 
organization of the League’s supporters among the Muslim religious leadership and (2) 
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the lending of religious credibility to a party (the League) that was often seen as secular 
(and even, according to some Muslim detractors, un-Islamic).  But whatever the talents 
of the JUI leadership vis-à-vis organizing conferences, it seems that most of the 
League’s religious support chose not to avail itself of this particular political vehicle, 
opting instead for involvement at the local level.  The JUI, according to Gilmartin, “was 
in fact ill-suited for the organization of the rural religious leaders who formed the 
backbone of the League’s religious support [mostly Barelvis], and whose influence 
remained diffuse and centered on the shrines.”232  It was true—the JUI and the JUH, 
though almost identical in terms of organization and modus operandi, were meant to 
accommodate very different groups of ‘alәma and mәshaix.  The JUH appealed to 
Deobandi scholars and teachers as well as other educated, mostly urban Muslim 
religious leaders.  On the other hand, the JUI, though a carbon-copy Deobandi 
organization led by a Deobandi, was, broadly speaking, expected to rally a largely 
Barelvi corps of scholars and pirs drawn mostly from rural areas.  It isn’t surprising, 
then, that so many among the (often Barelvi) League-supporting religious leadership in 
South Asia remained more or less aloof from the Muslim League’s political machine.  
The fact that the JUI was led by a prominent Deobandi almost certainly played a major 
role in dissuading the Barelvi religious leadership from flocking to its banner, too.   
(These circumstances would have major consequences for this latter group after 
Partition; see Chapter 4.)  In any case, if Jinnah’s purpose had been to divide his most 
formidable Muslim rivals, the JUI seems to have served this goal well, despite its 
inability to act as the League’s chief political organ for most Pakistan-supporting 
Muslim scholars and pirs. 
As for lending religious credibility to the League and its cause, it would be difficult 
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to argue that the JUI didn’t largely succeed; indeed, it was for Shabbir Ahmad’s vital 
efforts in this regard that later historians, particularly in Pakistan, would characterize 
him as “included among the highest order of the architects of Pakistan,”233 not light 
language.  In the words of Al-Mujahid, between December 1945/Muharram 1365 and 
March 1946/Rabi II 1365, Shabbir Ahmad Usmani and his party “activized the religious 
groups across the subcontinent,” mobilizing the ‘alәma and mәshayx for Pakistan “as 
never before.”  Arshad explains that Shabbir Ahmad “amassed support and power for 
the Pakistan movement from the religious element,” his relentless campaigning creating 
“a new enthusiasm among the Muslim masses” (italics added).234  The aged scholar’s 
efforts were “extremely critical” among “the semiliterate” of the latter category, 
previously swayed as they had been by the “Congressite” ‘alәma—a reference to the 
Deobandi JUH—and the Deobandi-leaning MAI and other parties.  Thus Shabbir 
Ahmad’s JUI fanned out across Hindustan, categorizing its Muslim political opponents 
as blatantly “un-Islamic.”235  And though the scholar’s rhetoric took aim at his fellow 
Muslims, one Muslim League poster of the time, described by Gilmartin, attempted to 
portray Shabbir Ahmad as a great proponent of unity.  “For Muslims to be agreed and 
unified on a true purpose is a magnificent gift,” the erstwhile Deobandi chancellor 
declared, going on to explain that Harun (Aaron) had placed the danger of division 
above even the suppression of idolatry when he had gone along with the children of 
Israel as they worshipped the golden calf.  “I worried that you would blame me if I 
caused division without waiting for your word,” Harun is reported to have told Musa 
(Moses).  Those Muslims who attacked the League, the JUI, and others struggling for a 
Muslim homeland were thus guilty of divisiveness, of attacking Pakistan “with narrow 
sectarian arguments.”  No—it was the Muslim’s duty to become “of one heart and one 
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voice” and “raise the Pakistan slogan.”236  Of course, part of that duty entailed fighting 
corruption within the Muslim community itself.  As such, the approximately two years 
between the founding of the JUI and the partition of India witnessed a furious exchange 
of fәtwas between the Deobandi ‘alәma supporting the Congress and the Deobandi 
‘alәma supporting the League—in essence, between the JUI, Shabbir Ahmad at the head, 
and Madani’s JUH.  For every fәtwa issued by the JUH, Shabbir Ahmad “answered…in 
the light of the Qur’an and the Shariat,” as he saw it.237  Meanwhile, the Barelvis looked 
on, not sure whether to be more agitated about the anti-Pakistani activities of the 
Deobandi JUH or about the rising status of the Deobandi JUI within Jinnah’s pro-
Pakistan coalition. 
The JUI was thus organized in the run-up to the 1945/1364 central and provincial 
elections, described by one Pakistani scholar as “by far the most critical” elections “at all 
levels in all the annals of subcontinental history.”238  The breakdown of the Simla 
Conference in July/Sh’aban after Jinnah’s posturing as the Indian Muslims’ sole 
spokesman provided “a shot in the arm” (to quote Hodson) for the League and set the 
stage for his call for general elections, later seconded by Cripps and even Abul Kalam 
Azad.  On 21 August 1945/12 Ramadan 1364, elections were announced by Viceroy 
Wavell, to be held over the winter of 1945-1946/1364-1365—and abruptly “election 
fever gripped India,” with Nehru even announcing, “A revolution is inevitable.”239  But 
what made these elections so potentially groundbreaking were the “two critical issues at 
stake,” questions that the contest might finally and definitively answer: Was the All-India 
Muslim League really subcontinental Islam’s “sole” political spokesparty? and Did Muslims 
support the creation of a separate, “Muslim” state called Pakistan?240  In Jinnah’s efforts to 
emerge victorious from the 1945-1946/1364-1365 elections, Shabbir Ahmad “played an 
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extremely important role in the success of the Muslim League in the central and 
provincial elections.”  “Defined structurally as an arena of public competition,” writes 
Gilmartin, “the electoral arena encouraged…the depiction of the League’s opponents as 
enemies of the community in a great electoral battle”; Muslims were fighting a 
constitutional war, Shabbir Ahmad insisted, “a war not of guns, ditches, and bullets but 
of votes, a war in which the life and death of India’s Muslims” was on the line.241  
Metcalf writes that, by now, the Muslim League “was supported by some of the 
religious scholarship, some ‘ulama, and many of the pirs of the shrines”; these last 
“brought the old ideal of Shah Waliyu’llah into play, for they wanted a Muslim state 
with all that symbolized and devoutly hoped to establish the religious leadership as 
advisers, even partners, to a ruling class whose political goals (as they perhaps failed to 
see) were largely secular.”242  Metcalf’s assertion, as far as it pertains to the ‘alәma, is 
certainly true (though her application of the Waliullahi program to the pirs seems less 
so), and may have motivated many—including, perhaps, Shabbir Ahmad—to rally 
behind Jinnah and the AIML.  In the end, the League scored far better than its 
detractors anticipated, winning big in the crucial Punjab and Bengal contests (as well as 
sweeping the central assembly’s Muslim seats).  Though the Congress walked away 
with most of the non-Muslim seats in the elections, the Muslim League obtained almost 
all of the Muslim ones (the only glaring League loss had come in the Muslim-majority 
NWFP, where the Congress-supporting and Deobandi-leaning KKs won the contest for 
the Congress—and while the League had won big in the Punjab, Bengal, and Sindh, it 
yet failed to win absolute majorities in any of these provinces).  Still, Jinnah celebrated 
11 January 1946/7 Safar 1365 as a “Day of Victory”; after all, in 1937/1356 the League 
had barely managed to win a third of Muslim seats, and now, less than a decade later, 
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the party had captured nine out of every ten.  Congress had won big, yes, but not where 
it counted—i.e. among India’s Muslims.  “Jinnah had campaigned to secure a mandate 
for Pakistan,” wrote one historian, “and in this he was successful.”243  But it may not be 
an exaggeration to say that the Muslim League, in the words of one historian, “should 
interpret its historic success in the elections as the momentous result of the efforts of 
’allamәħ Usmani.”244  The Barelvi scholars, pirs, and their supporters would meet a few 
months later in Varanasi by the hundreds of thousands, but their importance by then 
had been overshadowed by a Deobandi and his JUI. 
Soon after Mountbatten’s arrival in India in March/Rabi II, the last Viceroy 
proposed partition for India.  But what this meant for the North-West Frontier, which 
had voted majority-Congress despite its Muslim-majority population, was still 
nebulous.  The Moutbatten plan called for a referendum to be held in the NWFP to 
determine whether the province would end up affixed to India or to Pakistan.  
Jawaharlal Nehru and the Congress, perhaps surprisingly, agreed to Mountabatten’s 
partition scheme—arousing mixed feelings among the Pathans of the northwest, 
particularly those who had been loyal Congress supporters.  Had they not voted for the 
Congress just one year previously?  Had Jinnah’s Pakistan mandate not failed soundly in 
the frontier province already?  To many of the NWFP’s Congress-supporting Muslims, 
Nehru’s accord smacked, at best, of abandonment—and, at worst, of betrayal.   “We 
Pakhtuns stood by you and [endured] great sacrifices for attaining freedom,” Abdul 
Ghaffar Khan famously remarked afterwards, “but you have now deserted us and 
thrown us to the wolves.”245 
How had the Congress won so much influence in so Muslim a province as the 
Northwest Frontier?  The Deobandi layer of this history has already been mentioned.  
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Based on his contact with local residents over several decades combined with his 
experiences traveling through the region on horseback just months before Partition, 
Englishman Malcolm Darling reported, too, that “all agree that it began with the Red 
Shirt movement in the late twenties, when to challenge the established order was 
automatically to be pro-Congress, Congress being then the only nationalist organization of any 
importance.  In Abdul Ghafar Khan, too, the movement had a born leader, who succeeded 
in rallying round him the poorer and more discontented elements in the province.  After 
the fashion of those days he gave them red shirts to wear and a semi-military 
organization.  This, of course, led to violence, and the organization was drastically dealt 
with.  A legacy of bitterness is the result” (italics added).246  Darling’s supposition is 
doubtless at least partly accurate, but fails to explain why, by the late 1930s and early 
1940s, when the League was gaining ground among Muslims in, say, the U.P., it yet 
failed to win a majority in mostly-Muslim provinces like the North-West Frontier.  Of 
course, a knowledge of the Deobandi-Barelvi rivalry’s history, including Deobandism’s 
success in establishing itself among the Pathan, could have provided Darling with some 
answers in this regard.  Still, the League’s popularity in the region should not be 
underestimated; “What we want is Pakistan—to be free of the Hindus, because of their 
greater numbers,” one local told an English observer, just months prior to Partition.  
“Here we are cent per cent for the League.”247  Especially after Nehru’s October 
1946/Dh’ul Q’adah 1365 visit to the Northwest Frontier—when, according to Darling, 
the “sight of a Hindu addressing them as the spokesman of the Government of India 
made the tribesmen realize, as nothing before, the reality of the impending change and 
convinced them that it meant Hindu Raj”—League ranks began to swell more 
rapidly.248  By 1946, according to a British observer, Hindu domination was an 
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“obsession” haunting the minds of most Muslims in the Punjab.249  Still, Khan Abdul 
Ghaffar Khan and his KKs were the dominant party in the frontier regions, despite these 
developments. 
Muslims in general feared minority status within an independent but mostly Hindu 
India.  Now, and similarly, many Pathans were afraid that unification with the far more 
numerous Punjabis, Muslim or not, would “destroy the Pashtun nation,” in the words of 
Abdul Gaffar Khan.  Thus the brawny Pathan and his Congress-supporting KKs 
requested that, at the very least, the creation of an autonomous “Pashtunistan” be 
included as an option for which the people might vote in Mountbatten’s referendum.  
Exactly what such autonomy meant, much less where exactly “Pashtunistan” began and 
ended, remained hazy; Schofield has described the request, however, as “a demand for 
self-rule whilst maintaining relations with both India and Pakistan.”250  But the request 
was denied (at Nehru’s personal appeal, according to Mountbatten—an interesting 
tidbit),251 leaving Abdul Gaffar, his KKs, and other Congress supporters no choice, in 
their eyes, but to boycott the referendum completely.  As a result, only half of all 
registered voters—just over seven percent of the population—participated, casting their 
ballots between 6 and 17 July/17 and 28 Sh’aban.  With no Pashtunistan on the ballot, 
virtually no Congress supporters voting, and almost certainly significant election 
fraud,252 the League managed, however scarcely, to emerge triumphant when the 
referendum’s results were published on 20 July/2 Ramadan. 
Most histories of the northwest, Partition, or Pakistan now leave the referendum 
alone, moving along instead to the emergence of the Pakistani state and the gathering 
of that polity’s constituent assembly in Islamabad.  This version of the referendum 
narrative paints the League as lucky to have squeezed out a victory, with “an absence of 
  
  285 
any real political creativity and pragmatism on the part of the Muslim League and 
Congress towards the Tribal Areas” during the contest.253  Arguably there is some truth 
to this idea, to be sure.  But the situation was quite a bit more complicated.  Among the 
Pathans, in the run-up to the ballot casting, emotions ran high.  For years, of course, the 
League had been framing the India-or-Pakistan question in terms of loyalty to Islam.  
With the coming referendum, however, the Muslim League “mobilized all their 
resources,” sending for “leaders from every corner of India,” in the words of one KK 
leader, “to foment hatred.”254  (Future Pakistani historians would paint things a little 
differently, pointing to the “intense animosity from hard-line [mostly Deobandi] 
Muslim clerics” of “the ultra right-wing,” and their “vile propaganda.”)255 
The indefatigable Jamaat ‘Ali Shah was one Barelvi divine (of many) who heeded the 
call; just one year before, the AISC leader had stood in Peshawar, in the old gardens of 
Shahi Bagh—near the home of Abdul Ghaffar himself, not coincidentally—and issued a 
fәtwa declaring that “no Congressman will be allowed to be buried in a Muslim 
graveyard, as it is impermissible.”256  Another of these religious leaders was Shabbir 
Ahmad Usmani.  Shabbir Ahmad and his colleagues crisscrossed the province, declaring 
resistance to Pakistan as opposition to an Islamic state (Jinnah had used similar 
language when he toured the NWFP in 1945: “Every vote against the Muslim 
League…means Hindu Raj”).257  Shabbir Ahmad’s “speeches and campaigning” produced 
“a great enthusiasm” for Pakistan and the League among many of the province’s 
Muslims.258  Such a spark was critical, as will be demonstrated.  As a result of the 
renewed contest, however, “tensions and violence” were “simmering in the Province,” 
especially “among the would-be [jyhadis] in the Tribal Areas”—and by design.  For ill 
feeling and hostility had reached such an extent that a vote in favor of unification with 
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India “would be tragically divisive and risk unleashing unbridled violence” in the 
region.259  The result of such a contest would be, in the words of Wali Khan, a 
“confrontation between anti- and pro-Pakistan elements at a time when the situation 
was highly explosive.”260   
Abdul Ghaffar Khan and his supporters hadn’t boycotted the referendum out of 
pride or resentment, then; no, they feared what the contest itself (let alone a win for 
their side) might do to the Pathan population.  It was, in the words of Banerjee, 
“Badshah” Khan’s “final great act of principle.”261  And the League, with the “especially 
decisive” help of Shabbir Ahmad, had created the very state of affairs that had “forced” 
Abdul Ghaffar Khan and his supporters—whose party, the year before, had won 
provincial elections in landslide fashion; was this not a referendum?—to sit at home 
during the crucial vote of 1947/1366.262  Perhaps the League should be credited with 
some creativity after all, more than a little thanks to the energetic though aged former 
chancellor.  It was that organization’s strategy of “Islam in danger!”—with Shabbir 
Ahmad as a lead spokesperson, “visiting the entire frontier province”263—that turned 
the tide.  (Perhaps, too, the Congress-supporters should be credited with a little 
creativity as well; they did, after all, come up with the League-alluding tәppa, “The stick 
that used to beat us now has a flag on it”).264  Speaking of flags, it has been written that 
before Jinnah and Liaqat ‘Ali Khan arrived at the time of Partition, Shabbir Ahmad 
Usmani “was the first to wave the Pakistani flag in western Pakistan.”265 
In the end, the Muslim League won a mere 0.5% more than half of the vote; would 
that crucial 0.5% have come but for the efforts of Shabbir Ahmad Usmani, to say 
nothing of Jinnah’s Barelvi supporters who arrived from across India?  The result of the 
dubious frontier referendum: the North-West Frontier Province became a part of 
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Pakistan and the realization of the dream of an independent Pashtunistan vanished—
some might say, with more than a hint of irony, at the hands of a Deobandi cleric.  To 
this day the fiery cleric from Uttar Pradesh is considered by millions to have been the 
real game-changer for the destiny of the League and Pakistan; perhaps the words of one 
of the man’s scholarly biographers best illuminate this particular point-of-view: Shabbir 
Ahmad Usmani “made the impossible possible.”266 
* 
There are several observations one might make via an examination of the four 
individuals whose exploits were touched upon in this chapter: Naimuddin Moradabadi, 
Husain Ahmad Madani, Amjad ‘Ali A’azmi, and Shabbir Ahmad Usmani.  It should be 
noted, for example, that while each was politically active in the independence politics of 
pre-Partition India and/or Pakistan, none was chiefly so.  In other words, both 
Deobandi and Barelvi leaders were primarily scholars first—teaching Islam, running 
schools, authoring juridical rulings, mentoring students one-on-one, writing tracts and 
books on Islamic topics, and otherwise engaged in such religio-educational activities.  
Others in their respective movements, too (like Abdul Hamid Badayuni, for example), 
might have played a more crucial part in the politics of independence rocking the 
subcontinent before 1947/1366, than some or all of the four selected here.  Even so, 
each played an important role within the context of pre-Partition independence politics 
and in the development of a more overtly political Deobandism/Barelvism.  True, the 
‘alәma (or at least a powerful segment among them) had always been political creatures, 
from the days of the Abbasid empire to the Indian Mughal period and beyond.  But it 
was during the period covered in this chapter that the foundation was laid for the 
emergence of distinct ‘alәma parties, in the western political tradition.  These parties—
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most notably the JUI (after the creation of Pakistan, most Deobandi JUH remnants in 
the new “Muslim” state would gravitate towards the Shabbir Ahmad-founded 
organization) and the Barelvi Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan (or JUP), the latter built upon 
the ashes of the AISC—would, with one or two others, dominate clerical politics in 
Pakistan.  
Divided as they were, however, might it be said, as Metcalf did, that the role of the 
‘alәma in the pre-Partition politics of the twentieth/fourteenth century, “was in fact 
modest”?  She goes on: “Indeed, one can argue the very success of their inward-looking 
strategy developed during the nineteenth century was a hindrance to them in the 
twentieth.”267  Sanyal, in turn, would characterize the Barelvi impact as “small.”  This 
author contends that the words “modest” and “small” are probably far too feeble to 
describe the impact of the ‘alәma and pirs during this period, of either sect, despite the 
latter’s perhaps waning influence (just months before Partition, one English observer 
traveling across the Northwest Frontier noted that “all along my route people agree 
that the influence of the Pir is nothing like what it was twenty years ago”).268  Elitist 
histories shine the spotlight on individuals like Nehru and Jinnah and their parties, but 
it was grassroots elements that propelled Gandhi to power, and it was this unheralded 
base that subsequently pushed Jinnah not only out of the Congress but also into the 
arms of the League—where the one-time “Ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity” went on 
to craft that organization’s Pakistan agenda.  The Deobandi ‘alәma played a critical role 
here, fueling the Khilafat movement and populating the base responsible for the decisive 
state of affairs described above.  This alone represents, perhaps, a more than “modest” 
role.  Thousands of Islamic scholars, many of whom in turn greatly influenced hundreds 
or thousands of other Muslims each, on a local level, were politically active—attending 
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conferences, agitating for or against the League, delivering sermons in favor of the two-
nation theory or for composite nationalism, and writing, publishing, and distributing 
juridical rulings “proving by the light of the Holy Qur’an and sunnәt that the Muslim 
League was the representative party of the Muslims”—or that the opposite was true.269  
Obviously, any claim to measure the practical effect of these diverse efforts, expended by 
thousands and tens of thousands over the course of years across a large geographical 
area, would be futile.  But could Jinnah have mustered the support he needed, especially 
after 1937/1356, without Barelvi backing?  Thousands of influential scholars and pirs 
stumped for the League all across India—is this a “small” thing, their efforts ultimately 
trivial?  On another note, could Pakistan have come about without the “consent” of the 
NWFP in that province’s 1947/1366 referendum?  Here, again, it was the ‘alәma—
mostly Barelvi, but including Deobandi dissident Shabbir Ahmad and his party—who 
actually turned the tide.  The League’s victory came by a mere half-percent, despite the 
KK boycott!  Does not this, too, represent a more-than-“modest” role for the religious 
scholars?  The Deobandi-Barelvi rivalry itslef, by the early 1920s/late 1330s, had 
developed a strong political aspect, and this probably played a key role in dividing 
Muslims and thereby protracting the pre-Partition political conflict.  Throughout the 
period, the Deobandi-Barelvi divide, in the form of his Deobandi opposition and 
reluctant Barelvi support, helped push Jinnah into a corner, to a mountain over which 
he simply could not climb alone—and, it could be argued, only the sudden emergence of 
a League-supporting, dissident Deobandi faction led by Shabbir Ahmad finally saved the 
day for the Pakistan dream, pushing the League leader over the stubborn mountain’s 
summit.  Had the Barelvis lined up behind the Deobandi position, it seems highly 
unlikely Jinnah could have carried the day at all—and India might be a single, united 
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political polity today, with all that that entails.  (Indeed, Jinnah may never have become 
an advocate of the “two-nation theory” at all.)  Had the Deobandis joined forces with the 
Barelvis behind Ahmad Riza’s position, on the other hand, Jinnah might have achieved 
sole-spokesman status years earlier, or the Congress might have been forced to accede 
to League demands in the 1920s-1930s/1340s-1350s, likely resulting in an independent 
though united India operating under a highly federal system with separate electorates.  
Instead, their rivalry ensured a protracted pre-independence battle among Muslims 
over the meaning of Islam, nationhood, citizenship, heritage, and culture on the 
subcontinent.  Surely the weak “modest” is a descriptive that fails to apply when it 
comes to the impact of the ‘alәma, the pirs, and the Deobandi-Barelvi religious 
leadership in general in the context of pre-Partition politics.  
 
4 - DEFINING A NEW ISLAMIC STATE:   
The Rivalry in Pakistani Politics ,  1947-1977  
 
 
To achieve a country is easy, but to run a country is very difficult.  May Allah bless you 
with the ability to run the country. 
              JAMMAT ‘ALI SHAH, IN A LETTER TO MUHAMMAD ‘ALI JINNAH1 
 
The Ulema would like to reproduce a society which no longer exists and a polity which 
was suited to the early days of Islam. 
              G. W. CHOUDHURY, 19552 
 
 
 
 
 
With the creation of Pakistan, the religio-political Deobandi-Barelvi rivalry, while still 
vigorous from a theological point-of-view among Deobandis and Barelvis in India, 
shifted to the new “Muslim state” of Pakistan.  (The political aspect of the rivalry in 
India was there, too, of course, particularly as the Deobandi and Barelvi religious 
leadership based in Delhi, Uttar Pradesh, and Bihar contested for power and place 
within the various local, provincial, and central government bodies dealing with 
minorities, religion, and culture; a statist system of government recognizition and 
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patronage thus exacerbated the conflict.)  That the rivalry had more or less shifted to 
Pakistan was underscored as early as India’s independence day: 15 August 1947.  That 
evening, the central Deobandi dar ul’alwm’s vice-chancellor, Muhammad Tayyib, told a 
large assemblage of students and faculty that with the achievement of political freedom, 
a new opportunity had presented itself (with respect to intra-Sunni sectarian strife, 
foremost that of the Barelvis and the Deobandis) to “forget past events,” to “desist from 
the cycle of reviling and mocking” and to “stop intending to lay blame [on one 
another].”  It was time now to rid the ummәt of sects and division and unite under a 
single ymam and a single әmir.  “In my opinion,” declared the mwlana, grandson of 
Muhammad Qasim Nanautawi himself, “the chances of our being united are better now 
than ever.”  Why?  According to Muhammad Tayyib, the winning of independence, 
including the successful utilization of revolution, had “turned upside down” (munqәlyb) 
the parties involved in petty disputes.3  Now that the political side of the schism had 
been removed, Muhammad Tayyib reasoned, the two schools would surely be able to 
work out their differences.  This was one Deobandi position (and, as it turned out, not a 
very accurate one, given the events that followed), but it signaled a slight wind change 
in India alone.  In Pakistan the story was much the same as it had been before 
independence was won, only exacerbated now that an actual place at the seat of power 
was at stake.  Indeed, with the emergence of Pakistan in 1947, the Deobandi-Barelvi 
dynamic added a new dimension to the sectarian rivalry.  Within the context of pre-
Partition politics, the Barelvis had, by and large, fought for the establishment of an 
Islamic state, complete with a constitution that they would have a hand in designing 
(along the lines of Moradabadi’s “Eleven Points”) and a government that they would 
help lead as the spiritual guides of the Sunni majority.  On the other hand, except for 
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dissidents like Shabbir Ahmad Usmani, the Deobandis’ goal had revolved around British 
expulsion, not constitution-making for some Muslim “homeland,” nor position within a 
subcontinental Islamic state.  But now, in Pakistan, the Deobandis in the form of the 
JUI—and thanks in large part to that organization’s willingness (unlike the Sunni 
Conference’s) to be officially associated with the Muslim League—abruptly had a place 
at the political table.  The political game had not only shifted geographically; it had 
shifted goal-wise, such that now the political wings of the Deobandi and Barelvi schools 
were fighting over the same thing: that is, official (government) recognition, and the 
power and patronage that comes with it.  In a sense, the birth of Pakistan instantly 
turned them into direct enemies in a contest that, in the end, could have only one victor.  
One result of this new dynamic was that the clerical parties consistently failed to unite 
in truly joint action, even when they appeared to be fighting for (or against) the same 
thing (a phenomenon the author calls “separate unity”).  A unified “Sunni” party, 
populated by a unified base and led by a unified Deobandi-Barelvi leadership, might 
have presented a serious force with which to be reckoned—but this never happened; the 
rivalry was too strong, too deep-seeded.  Over time, then, and even taking into account 
the vacillations of power and prestige characteristic of politics, the dynamic generally 
helped only to marginalize both the JUI and the JUP within Pakistan’s political 
structure. 
 
Constitution-Making:  A Cold Alliance . 
Four days before Muhammad Tayyib’s remarks at Deoband (and thus several days 
before Pakistan had actually come into being), Jinnah addressed the new constituent 
assembly of the future “Muslim” state in Karachi.  He had just been elected that body’s 
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first president during its 10-14 August inaugural session, and took occasion to elucidate 
upon the assembly’s two-pronged purpose.  “The constituent assembly has got two 
main functions to perform,” he told the gathering of newly minted representatives.  
“The first is the very onerous and responsible task of framing the future constitution of 
Pakistan and the second of functioning as a full and complete sovereign body as the 
Federal Legislature of Pakistan.”  The assembly’s purposes, then, were (1) to formulate 
a constitution and, in the meantime, (2) to act as the national legislature.  (This had been 
previously stipulated, too, in the India Independence Act of 1947).  And though Muslim 
Leaguers (now the Pakistan Muslim League, or PML) largely dominated the assembly, 
the body would prove to be quite clearly split on the question of what Pakistan’s 
“Islamic” character was to be.  That religio-political battle—together with the suddenly 
ever-present tug-of-war between eastern Pakistan and western Pakistan for recognition, 
influence, and power—largely characterized the next nine years of the constituent 
assembly’s existence.  Since the debate more or less separated the secularists from the 
Islamists, the Deobandis and the Barelvis abruptly found themselves on what appeared 
to be the same side.  A cold alliance, however reluctant and superficial (certainly in light 
of what was brewing beneath the surface, on which more later), was implicitly struck.  
Over the years 1947 to 1956 (when a constitution was finally adopted, however short-
lived), though disagreements were many and resentment ran high, the Barelvi and 
Deobandi ‘alәma-politicians’ main targets were those seeking to implement a more 
secularist form of government in the new country.  For the first time on a general basis, 
both groups were forced to work together, in the spirit of Jinnah’s call, during the same 
address, to “[forget] the past,” and “bury the hatchet.”  “I cannot emphasize it too 
much,” he said.  “We should begin to work in that spirit, 
  
  295 
 
and in course of time all these angularities of the majority and minority 
communities, the Hindu community and the Muslim community—
because even as regards Muslims you have Pathans, Punjabis, Shias, 
Sunnis and so on, and among the Hindus you have Brahmins, Vashnavas, 
Khatris, also Bengalees, Madrasis and so on—will vanish. Indeed if you 
ask me, this has been the biggest hindrance in the way of India to attain 
the freedom and independence, and but for this we would have been free 
people long long ago. No power can hold another nation, and specially a 
nation of 400 million souls, in subjection; nobody could have conquered 
you, and even if it had happened, nobody could have continued its hold on 
you for any length of time, but for this. Therefore, we must learn a lesson 
from this. You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are free to 
go to your mosques or to any other place of worship in this State of 
Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed—that has 
nothing to do with the business of the State…  We are starting in the 
days where there is no discrimination, no distinction between one 
community and another, no discrimination between one caste or creed 
and another. We are starting with this fundamental principle: that we are 
all citizens, and equal citizens, of one State. The people of England in 
[the] course of time had to face the realities of the situation, and had to 
discharge the responsibilities and burdens placed upon them by the 
government of their country; and they went through that fire step by 
step. Today, you might say with justice that Roman Catholics and 
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Protestants do not exist; what exists now is that every man is a citizen, 
an equal citizen of Great Britain, and they are all members of the Nation. 
 
It seems clear from Jinnah’s words that his vision for Pakistan did not include the 
implementation of an Islamic state like that proposed by Naimuddin Moradabadi in his 
“Eleven Points.”  While a constitution like that put forward by the All-India Sunni 
Conference would have underscored the “angularities of the majority and minority 
communities”—for the most part excluding Deobandis from the state’s highest seats of 
power, for example, to say nothing of other Sunni sects like the Ahl-e-Hadis and the 
Ahmadiyya, the Shi’a, nor the country’s twelve million non-Muslims—Jinnah seemed to 
be pressing for a strongly secularist system, one in which “caste or creed” had “nothing 
to do with the business of the State.”  As one Pakistani scholar noted, Jinnah’s 
presidential address seemed to strongly indicate that “Pakistan would not be a 
theocratic state” and that “religion would be a citizen’s private and personal matter.”4  
The Pakistani founder’s reference to England’s “Roman Catholics and Protestants” was 
particularly apt, given the Deobandi-Barelvi rift then characterizing the vast majority of 
the country’s Sunni Muslims.  Whatever Muhammad ‘Ali Jinnah’s vision for Pakistan, 
whether for a secular modernist state after the Western model or a democratic-Islamic 
amalgam harking back to more traditional “Muslim” regimes, his remarks set the stage 
for a protracted battle over Pakistan’s Islamic character.5   
At this early stage, the main religious “parties,” described by one Pakistani scholar 
as the “persistent, vocal and durable protagonists” of the struggle for an Islamic state in 
Pakistan, were five.  There was the Deobandi JUI, of course, led by constituent 
assembly member Shabbir Ahmad Usmani, well organized and working mostly within 
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the Pakistan Muslim League party framework; this phenomenon would phase itself out 
as differences with the League surfaced and eventually became irreconcilable.  The JUI 
“wielded great influence on the government immediately after independence,” in the 
words of one Pakistani scholar.  After the creation of Pakistan, the party was 
reorganized (December 1947) with its new headquarters at the home of Deobandi 
scholar Ihtisham al-Haq Thanawi (d. 1980; more on Thanawi later) in Karachi.  The 
JUI—whose post-Partition purpose now clearly evolved around the implementation of 
an explicitly Islamic government, an “Islamic order,” in which the Deobandi religious 
leadership might play a key role—would eventually be resuscitated and molded into a 
political party in its own right rather than a religious wing of the Pakistan Muslim 
League.  For now, however, the Deobandi organization’s strategy lay more in gaining 
influence over power-holders rather than directly weilding that power itself.  The same 
could be said for another influencial party, active especially in the Punjab: the heavily 
Deobandi Majlis-e-Ahrar.  Apart from these two, there was also the newly organized 
JUP—a Barelvi party, borne of the now defunct All-India Sunni Conference, whose 
strategy was similar to that of the JUI: to gain influence and sway over the overtly 
political parties in order to bring about the implementation of an Islamic government in 
which they might rightfully weild influence and power as the representatives of the 
Sunni majority.  The approach of the JUI and the JUP in this regard, which shaped their 
separate policies “for a long time” (roughly over two decades) after Partition, was in 
harmony, as demonstrated in Chapter 1, with their leaders’ historical role as ‘alәma—as 
influencers rather than direct power-holders.  Though the JUP enjoyed no official seat 
within the constituent assembly, the party did have a representative present during the 
assembly’s deliberations: a lawyer named Hakim Ahmad (d. 1976 AD) from Pilibhit, a 
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town less than twenty-five miles northeast of Bareilly.6  In additional to the JUI and the 
JUP, the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), founded by Deobandi-trained Abul Ala Mawdudi, with its 
program of Islamic revivalism not unlike that of the Deobandis, was also gaining 
prominence in the country.  While the JI’s official membership count was small, 
numbering only a few hundred (due in part to very strict membership requirements), its 
sympathizers and supporters reportedly numbered in the tens of thousands.  Over the 
first two decades of Pakistan’s existence, the JI would experience significant growth in 
terms of both membership (especially among students and in the government sector) 
and influence, eventually setting the stage for the party’s high point, during the Zia ul-
Haq years.  Finally, a somewhat influential segment of the Pakistan Muslim League 
itself possessed strong religious leanings—mostly Deobandi or Barelvi, but others, 
too—and likewise played a role, often crucial, in supporting the clerical parties’ 
admonitions for an Islamic constitution and an Islamic government.7   
And while the constituent assembly was supposed to be devoid of party conflict, 
different from a typical legislative body made up of elected representatives, the truth 
was that such divisions existed from the start and were evident throughout.  “[I]n the 
actual working of the constituent assembly,” wrote one Pakistani historian of the period, 
“the presence of political parties was as conspicuous as in any other political field,” 
despite the Pakistan Muslim League’s possession of forty-nine out of the original sixty-
nine seats (this would later increase to sixty out of a total of seventy-nine).8  Naturally, 
the Deobandi and Barelvi parties sought out those individuals and parties within the 
assembly with which they might be able to work—and, hopefully, institute Islamic 
government at last.  The religious political parties “vitally affected the process of 
constitution-making,” wrote Afzal, “especially the Islamic character of the 
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constitution.”9  This was to be the scholars’ great struggle. 
Perhaps a quick note here on Mawdudi and the JI is appropriate.  The Jamaat-e-
Islami was itself borne of the Deobandi movement—a distinctly Deobandi creation. 
Over time, however, the organization would distance itself officially from a strictly 
Deobandi stance (leading Deobandi ‘alәma would do the same vis-à-vis the JI).  The JI 
was founded by Abul Ala Mawdudi, who himself had been educated in the Deoband 
tradition before working as editor of the Jamiat Ulema-e-Hind’s newspaper during the 
1920s.  By the thirties, however, Mawdudi found himself less concerned about ridding 
India of the British colonial administration than of Western ideas in general; his 
preoccupation centered around those ideas’ corroding influence, as he saw it, on Islam.  
In 1941, Mawdudi founded the JI as a sort of vanguard party—to cleanse Islam of 
Western influence in preparation for the establishment of a truly Islamic state.  Though 
he remained, like most Deobandis, a staunch opponent of the Muslim League, Mawdudi 
migrated (or, as some claim, was forced to migrate)10 to Pakistan after Partition—where 
the JI “soon turned to directly political concerns,” its aim toward an Islamic state 
intensifying.  Mawdudi focused on the rural population, dispatching JI preachers 
carrying JI literature out into the countryside to fire up the bucolic masses.11  According 
to one Indian scholar, writing in 2005, “many of the roots of Islamic terrorism sweeping 
the world today lie buried in the partition of India.”12  Indeed, both the Taliban 
administration of Afghanistan and Osama bin Laden were influenced by the ideas of the 
Jamaat-e Islami founder, himself heavily influenced by the Deobandi movement.  
Mawdudi’s ideas inspired Muslim Brotherhood founder Hassan al-Banna, as well as its 
intellectual guiding light, Sayyid Qutb (who would go on, of course, to encourage “more 
militant Islamic groups” that grew out of the Brotherhood).  The Ayatollah Ruhollah 
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Khomeini, despite his belonging to the Shi’a sect of Islam, translated several of 
Mawdudi’s works into Persian.  Yusuf Azzam, the Palestinian scholar, was heavily 
influenced by Mawdudi (and it was through Azzam that bin Laden, his young student, 
would inculcate much of the Jamaat leader’s thought).13  In Pakistan, the JI would exist 
as a “religious party” alternative to either the Deobandi or Barelvi parties. 
While the Deobandi JUI’s transition from pre-Partition party to post-Partition 
party had been accomplished smoothly, without even the need for a name-change, the 
All-India Sunni Conference’s transition to Pakistani politics was not so seamless.  
Indeed, on Thursday, 4 March 1948, mwlana Ahmad Saeed Kazimi—a well-known 
Barelvi scholar born in Amroha (now in India) and an active Muslim Leaguer in the 
southern Punjab—was upset.  From his base in Multan, where he’d migrated as a young 
twenty-something, Ahmad Saeed had watched as other religious sects—Islamic parties 
representing small minorities—were honored with titles by the League or high posts in 
the new government.  The appointment of Shabbir Ahmad Usmani had particularly 
bothered him.  In League circles, that Deobandi mwlana was being addressed as shix ul-
yslam, and he had been appointed a member of the constituent assembly, to boot—the 
body that would draft Pakistan’s new constitution (and few things were more important 
to the Barelvi ‘alәma than seeing the installation of a truly Islamic constitution, as they 
interpreted it).  As a former member of the JUH, Shabbir Ahmad had been a 
“Congressite” ‘alym, once (though not really, as previously explained), and others, 
besides, were receiving similarly high posts.  These men weren’t genuinely interested in 
an Islamic constitution, Ahmad Saeed was sure.  “In fact, they are working to usurp the 
rights of the Ahl-e-Sunnat [Barelvis], and crush them forever”—and this he wrote in a 
letter to mwlana “Abu’l Hasanat” sayyid Muhammad Ahmad Qadiri that very day.  The 
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duty—nay, the right—to protect and maintain the “rights of the Sunnis” was theirs, not 
the Deobandis’ or the followers’ of Mawdudi (the latter cut from the same cloth as the 
former, anyway).  Ahmad Saeed stressed that he was not targeting any particular sect—
only claiming what was rightfully his, and that of all other Barelvi ‘alәma and religious 
guiding lights.  They were “the majority,” thus they should lead.  All others were 
pretenders and must not be allowed to grasp the reigns of power.  The Muslim League 
had ridden to victory on the false promise of an Islamic state; the League had betrayed 
the Barelvis.  And now it was time for the Barelvis to organize a party of their own—
and take back the country from its usurpers.14  Kazimi’s letter, and subsequent actions, 
demonstrate that, whatever forced alliance the Deobandis and Barelvis were then 
experiencing in their quasi-joint fight for an Islamic constitution, underneath the 
surface the rivalry continued with vigor.  The goal was still the supremacy of one sect 
over the other within the framework of the (hopefully Islamic) Pakistani state. 
In fact, mwlana Ahmad Saeed Kazimi had already begun.  Before ending his letter to 
Muhammad Ahmad, the ‘alym from Multan informed his friend that he and other 
Barelvi ‘alәma in the city had formed what they called the Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan (or 
JUP), the first religious party to be born in Pakistan after the country’s founding.  As 
far as Kazimi was concerned, the fledgling JUP he had inaugurated was only the 
beginning, only temporary—until all of the Barelvi ‘alәma and pirs and other religious 
leaders could gather together and form a countrywide party.  Whether or not this 
future mega-party was called the JUP mattered little to him (though the name would 
stick); what mattered was that the party came into existence to stand for the Barelvis, 
the Ahl-e-Sunnat.   The great initiatory meeting was to be held at the end of the month, 
from 26-28 March.  Come to Multan, Ahmad Saeed insisted.  The invitation was sent far 
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and wide, to “all the leading Sunni ‘alәma and masha’ikh.”15 
After the realization of its chief goal—the creation of an Islamic state in South Asia, 
namely Pakistan—the All-India Sunni Conference had formally disbanded within the 
hall of the әnwar ul-ul’alwm in Multan in 1948, but the dissolving of the Conference did 
not rid the Deobandis of its politico-sectarian opposition.  Thus, in place of the 
Conference, and at the insistence of scholars like Ahmad Saeed, its (the Barelvis’) leaders 
had now established a new organization, a new party: the JUP.  “Abu’l al-Hasanat” 
Muhammad Ahmad Qadiri, the man to whom Kazimi had addressed his 4 March letter, 
was selected as the party’s first president, with Ahmad Saeed Kazimi himself as 
secretary-general.  A new era for Barelvi political involvement was thus born with the 
passing of the All-India Sunni Conference.  Over the next 22 years, the JUP would act 
as a sort of religious influencer of (and legitimator for) political elites; perhaps it is not 
inaccurate to say that it played a similar role to that of the AISC during the heydey of 
pre-Partition independence politics.  During this period it acted less as a traditional 
political party than as a loosely-organized interest group, often used by politicians and 
other power-seekers to lend an Islamic veneer to their otherwise secular pursuits.  
When religio-cultural issues of alleged import found their way into the national 
spotlight, the JUP would weigh in, often vociferously, supporting or rejecting this or 
that position, according to its interpretation of Islamic law.  (The JUP wouldn’t break 
out of this mold and emerge as a serious political contender until the 1970s, when it 
commanded considerable support in the towns and cities of Sindh as well as the rural 
Punjab, made up an important part of the opposition, and played a major role at the 
provincial level in Sindh.)16   
The party’s objectives were very similar, of course, to those of the AISC.  It sought 
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to convert Pakistan into a “true Islamic state,” one in which the political framework was 
designed specifically to eradicate “social and moral evils.”  This was the culmination of 
shәri’at—its destiny and purpose.  The JUP would not only strive to spread the “true” 
message of Islam throughout the country (“by initiating the spirit of religious-cum-
political awakening and the spirit of jihad among [Muslims]” and thus “divert[ing] 
their attention from Western culture and civilization towards Islamic culture and 
civilization”), but also fight for actual assembly seats at both the national and provincial 
levels for the ‘alәma.  The party would help maintain and improve mosques, shrines, and 
xanәqaħs, yes, but also demand that the country’s centralized education system make 
hәdis, Qur’anic commentary, fyqħ, and the history of Islam mandatory subjects in 
schools for all students, regardless of religion.  The JUP was to be an active 
organization—actively striving, for example, for “pan-Islamism” (the fulfillment of 
which promised “peace in the world”) as well as “the spirit of jihad” via the organization 
of “Muslim militia.”  The JUP resolved to organize branches of the Barelvi party across 
Pakistan.  Interestingly, given the party leaders’ anti-Deobandi motivations for 
establishing the organization, one of the JUP goals specified a resolve “not to indulge in 
any activity against other religious and political organizations.”  Still, membership in 
the party was, like its predecessor, restricted only to “Sunni” ‘alәma and other 
“religious-minded” Barelvis.17 
One of the party’s first acts was to send a delegation, headed by none other than 
mwlana Ahmad Saeed Kazimi, to East Bengal to participate in the deliberations of a 
committee of “Sunni elite.”  Their purpose: to draft an Islamic constitution, to be sent to 
government leaders and legislators as a guide in their constitution-formulating task.  
Such a draft constitution was indeed produced by the gathering—and was subsequently 
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presented to Muhammad ‘Ali Jinnah by the “Sunni” committee head, mwlana 
Muhammad Abdul ‘Alim Siddiqui.  Muhammad Abdul was a highly educated (both in 
traditional Muslim disiplines as well as the Western tradition) disciple of Ahmad Riza 
Khan from Meerut who had traveled the world as a preacher of Islam.  According to 
Barelvi sources, the learned Muhammad Abdul spoke with Jinnah for a full three hours, 
and in the end obtained a promise from the qayd-e-ә‘ažәm that the draft would indeed be 
adopted by the constituent assembly.  Considering Jinnah’s secularist sentiments, this 
seems unlikely—but likewise considering the Pakistan founder’s apparent penchant (like 
most any politician) for making contradictory promises based on the audience at hand, 
the account might indeed be based in truth.  Some Barelvis continue to believe that, had 
Jinnah not suddenly passed away, the constitution that their religious leaders had drawn 
up in East Bengal would have been implemented.18 
* 
Pakistan’s first decade of independence was an uncertain one.  After the death of 
Jinnah in 1948, the apparent cohesion of the Pakistan Muslim League gave way to 
reveal a party divided, even as provincial leaders battled for power with the central 
authorities.  The constituent assembly was marked by “varied interests and conflicting 
views,” as described by Afzal.19  These schisms actually granted the ‘alәma parties, both 
Deobandi and Barelvi, even greater power, since the various political factions attempted 
to co-opt them and thereby gain the confidence of the masses, just as the League had 
done with the JUI (and, to a lesser extent, the AISC) in pre-Partition days.  With the 
support of the ‘alәma on the line, the country’s opening years were marked especially by 
the debate over the role of Islam within the new political structure.   
Thus the conflict over the constitution—to be Islamic or secular?—really picked up 
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steam on the moment of the qayd-e-ә‘ažәm’s death.  With the great man gone, a new 
period in the young state’s history opened up, characterized by one Pakistani 
constitutional historian as “a fierce competition for influence, wealth, power, and 
prestige” between the various parties then engaged in constitution-making.  Of course, 
the constituent assembly (and those lobbying its members) were constantly dealing 
with the tug-of-war between East Bengal and West Pakistan, the former home to the 
majority of the country’s population and the latter to the vast majority of its territory as 
well as its capital city.  But two other issues likewise loomed large throughout the 
decade from 1947 to 1956 as a constitution was being formulated: (1) the question of 
implementing an Islamic state versus a secular one, and (2) the struggle by, among 
others, religious leaders for “recognition of their claim to power and influence.”20  The 
Deobandi and Barelvi religious leadership were at the forefront of the struggle over 
these two issues, sometimes at odds (as in the latter issue) but often fighting side by side 
as reluctant partners.  The Barelvis tended to be particularly reluctant to work with 
their Deobandi counterparts, whom they felt were being granted undue position despite 
their (Barelvi) position as “representatives” of the “majority,” but circumstances 
demanded joint action—and so their erstwhile nemeses were tolerated for the time 
being.  In any case, the death of Jinnah marked the beginning of this new phase, this 
period of more conspicuously jostling for position and influence, of fighting over the 
definition of “Pakistan.”  Ironically, Muhammad ‘Ali Jinnah, who might have held such a 
power struggle in check, had laid the foundation of the now out-in-the-open political 
contest—through his various (and often conflicting) pre-Partition promises to a wide 
variety of (often conflicting) groups. 
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In the beginning, both the secularists and the ‘alәma won separate battles, 
maintaining a haze of uncertainty over the nature of the future Pakistani government.  
Despite Jinnah’s personal and then lingering influence (he died on 11 September 1948), 
at first the ‘alәma seemed to seize the upper hand.  For starters, Shabbir Ahmad Usmani, 
at the time probably the most powerful Deobandi ‘alym in the country, and to the ire of 
many Barelvis a prominent member of the constituent assembly (on the Pakistan 
Muslim League ticket), more or less personally drafted the “Objectives Resolution”—a 
declaration meant to outline the “aims and objectives” of the consitution and thereby 
formally lay its foundations.  But since debate over the resolution was heated, both 
Deobandi and Barelvi, however reluctantly, were forced to side one with the other.  On 
7 March 1949, Liaquat ‘Ali Khan introduced Shabbir Ahmad’s Objectives Resolution 
before the constituent assembly.  Interestingly, given the contents of the resolution, the 
Prime Minister’s speech pointed out explicitly that the proposed system was designed 
to eliminate “any danger of the establishment of a theocracy.”  This assurance was likely 
provided as comfort for the non-Muslim members of the constituent assembly, for next 
Liaquat ‘Ali explained that, in Pakistan—and in part through government—“Muslims 
shall be enabled to order their lives in the individual and collective spheres in 
accordance with the tachings and requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy Qur’an 
and the sunnәt.   
 
It is quite obvious that no non-Muslim should have any objection if the 
Muslims are enabled to order their lives in accordance with the dictates 
of their religion.  You would also notice, Sir, that the state would be the 
very negation of the ideals which prompted the demand of Pakistan, and 
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it is these ideals which should be the corner-stone of the state which we 
want to build.  The state will create such conditions as are conducive to 
the building up of a truly Islamic society, which means that the state will 
have to play a positive part in this effort.21 
 
To the ears of the Deobandi and Barelvi ‘alәma involved in the constitution-making 
process (or following said progress), the Prime Minister’s words likely sounded like 
sweet music—a fulfillment of Jinnah’s perceived promises to them and a culmination of 
their efforts (and those of their forbears) to establish an Islamic state on the 
subcontinent.  Surely, when Liaquat ‘Ali Khan declared that “the state will have to play 
a positive part in [the] effort” to build up “a truly Islamic society,” he meant the 
institution of Islamic law and, thus, the elevation of the ‘alәma to their proper religio-
political role.  This was the spirit of the resolution, and it seemed Liaquat ‘Ali Khan 
understood this. 
According to the Objectives Resolution, sovereignty “over the entire universe” 
belonged to “God Almighty alone”; insofar as the state of Pakistan possessed authority, 
that authority was merely “delegated” from God “through [Pakistan’s] people for being 
exercised within the limits prescribed by Him.”  The “principles of democracy, freedom, 
equality, tolerance, and social justice” were to be “fully observed”—but, importantly, “as 
enunciated by Islam.”  The resolution stressed that Muslims should be able to lead their 
lives “in accordance with the teaching and requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy 
Quran and the sunnәt,” thereby implicitly hinting at a positive (i.e. actionary) role, as 
Liaquat ‘Ali Khan had stated, for the state to play in this regard.  Minority (i.e. non-
Muslim) rights were to be protected and equality maintained “subject to law and public 
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morality.”  The Objectives Resolution made it clear that the guiding spirit of Pakistan—
its essence and core—was to be the spirit of Islam.  Such concepts as “freedom” or 
“justice” were to be affected through an “Islamic” medium.  In this, both Deobandi and 
Barelvi ‘alәma hoped for a restoration of their traditional role as influencial advisors to 
the state, chief propagators of religion in the country, and interpreters of the law.  The 
resolution seemed to embody that original “promise of Pakistan,” enunciated by one 
high-profile Deobandi leader as “a promise that on this land…a brotherhood would 
rule[, believing] in ‘Allah’s rule on Allah’s land’[, considering] it a great honor…to 
obey Allah and His Messenger…  [We] would establish a society and a system of 
government that would be based on the teachings of the Quran and the sunnәt.”22 
But there were some who opposed the Objectives Resolution vehemently, holding 
fast to promises they felt certain Jinnah had made to them regarding the state’s 
secularism; “I certainly do not propose to hand over the field to Ulema,” he once 
reportedly said—and yet the Objectives Resolution, at least in spirit, seemed to do just 
that.23  Certain non-Muslim members of the consituent assembly wanted more debate 
over the resolution, which they deemed too overtly Islamic.  Its language must be toned 
down, they argued, and proposed replacing specific words and phrases (those deemed 
especially “Islamic” or exclusionary) with other, more broad-based terms—or excising 
them altogether.  A speech by one non-Muslim constituent assembly member, Birat 
Chandra Mandal, made clear that no one was under any illusion as to the source of these 
Islamocentric sections.  “Sir, I hear that [the ‘alәma] are insisting on this principle of 
Islam.”  Jinnah, he reminded the assemblage, had “most unequivocally said that Pakistan 
will be a secular state,” and had “never said that the principles of constitution will be 
based on Islam.”  Another non-Muslim assembly member, Bhupendra Kumar Datta, 
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addressed his fellow lawmakers as well.  “Sir, I feel—I have every reason to believe—
that were this Resolution to come before this House within the lifetime of the great 
creator of Pakistan, [qayd-e-ә‘ažәm], it would not have come in its present shape.”  
(Datta worried, too, that “justification” for a usurpation of power by a power-hungry 
executive might be found “in this Preamble.”)24  What of Jinnah’s secular state, one in 
which “religion would be a citizen’s private and personal matter”?  Just as the religious 
parties contended that the qayd-e-ә‘ažәm had made promises to them regarding the 
establishment of Islamic government in Pakistan, these non-Muslim members—mostly 
Hindus from East Bengal—had clung to what they had considered promises, from the 
same source, of Pakistani state secularism.   “We thought that religion and politics 
would not be mixed up,” one member said in a speech before the assembly.  “That was 
the declaration of qayd-e-ә‘ažәm Muhammad ‘Ali Jinnah in this House.”  Several of the 
assembly’s other non-Muslims made similar speeches from the house floor.   
Meanwhile, Shabbir Ahmad and his supporters within the assembly held firm, 
clamoring for adoption of the resolution.25  A large group of constituent assembly 
members came out forcefully against all of the proposed amendments to the resolution 
in its original form.  Barelvi Hakim Ahmad of the JUP, though not an official 
constituent assembly member, was on hand to lend support to the resolution, too.26  
Pakistan was always going to be a Muslim state, the resolution’s supporters argued; this 
was, after all, what millions of Muslims had fought for in the years leading up to 
Partition.  “Islam has never accepted the view that religion is a private affair between 
man and his creator and as such has no bearing upon the social or political relations of 
human beings,” said Shabbir Ahmad from the House floor.   
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Some other religious systems may expound this theory and may, 
incidentally, be too idealistic to possess a comprehensive and all-
embracing code of life.  But Islam has no use for such false notions and its 
teachings are in direct contradiction to them.  The late qayd-e-ә‘ažәm 
made the following observations in the letter he wrote to Gandhiji in 
August 1944: 
 
“The Qur’an is a complete code of life.  It provides for all matters, 
religious or social, civil or criminal, military or penal, economic or 
commercial.  It regulates every act, speech and movement from the 
ceremonies of religion to those of daily life, from the salvation of the soul 
to the health of the body; from the rights of all to those of such 
individual, from the punishment here to that in the life to come.  
Therefore, when I say that the Muslims are a nation, I have in my mind 
all physical and metaphysical standards and values.” 
 
Here, again, the idea of Islam as an all-encompassing politico-religious order, an idea 
that undergirded the very founding of the dar ul’alwm at Deoband itself, is made further 
evident.  And by striving to incorporate that system into a national government (an 
entity that, by its very nature, operated via monopoly, force, and blanket provision), 
Shabbir Ahmad and his supporters were also advocating that such a comprehensive 
system was to be enforced by the guns of government (i.e. not assume the form of, for 
example, a voluntary association).  Non-Muslims, Shabbir Ahmad argued on 9 March, 
“cannot be trusted with the responsibility of framing the general policy of the state, 
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[and of]…dealing with matters vital to its safeguard and integrity.”27  Such words 
were, of course, a slap in the face of the Objectives Resolution’s non-Muslim opponents, 
but this was Pakistan; this was what the Muslim freedom struggle had always been 
about.  Now that an Islamic state had been won, were the people to throw it all away?  
What, then, had been the point of a political split with India at all?   
In the end, under the leadership of Liaquat ‘Ali Khan (who had argued for a strong 
state role in “establishing an Islamic order”),28 the motion to further review the 
Objectives Resolution was defeated as each of the secularists’ proposed amendments was 
voted down.  Religion and politics were to be “mixed up” after all.29  The constituent 
assembly passed the Deobandi-authored Objectives Resolution, outlining the 
fundamental principles upon which the new constitution would be based, on 12 March.  
All of the constituent assembly’s Muslim members (save one) “vociferously” supported 
the resolution.30  The document’s presence would loom over the constituent assembly as 
“the center-piece” of the constitutional debate, defining “both the state and idea of 
Pakistan,” as one scholar has noted.31  As of the time of this writing, the resolution was 
still in effect (see Article 2A of the current Pakistani constitution).  Thus the first 
constitutional battle between the secularists (or at least those wary of the 
institutionalization of an “Islamic” system in government) and the ‘alәma-led theocrats 
(under the leadership of Deobandi Shabbir Ahmad) ended in clear victory for the latter.  
The situation was such that one modern Pakistani detractor of the clerical parties 
lamented how “Jinnah’s secular Pakistan” had “drifted into the hands of his enemies.”32 
In any case, as developments continued, things might have seemed, in the eyes of the 
‘alәma (especially those of the Deobandi persuasion), to be going their way.  The 
constituent assembly appointed a Basic Principles Committee (which in turn organized 
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several subcommittees) to formulate a report on “basic principles” undergirding the 
future Pakistani constitution.  Such an important task, the ‘alәma reasoned, should not 
be undertaken without the advice and direction of the Islamic scholars; fresh off of their 
Objectives Resolution victory, the ‘alәma took advantage of their powerful position to 
press for increased influence.  Some of the now-emboldened ‘alәma now demanded not 
only that Pakistan withdraw from the British Commonwealth (after all, if Pakistan were 
to be a true Islamic state, how could it owe any sort of fealty to a non-Muslim 
sovereign?) but also that all non-Muslims be removed and henceforth banned from 
important government posts.  That the demands were taken seriously was evidenced by 
the government’s taking “some steps” to at least partly meet the second demand.  The 
first, of course, was entirely in the hands of the constituent assembly and the 
constitution they would create.33  Shabbir Ahmad Usmani in particular, and beginning 
as early as February 1949,34 demanded the appointment of a committee of ‘alәma to 
advise the constituent assembly as the new constitution was being crafted.35  Thus, at 
the insistence of the Islamic scholars, the Basic Principles Committee created a 
Teachings of Islam (talimat-e-yslamiәħ) board to advise the committee on matters from a 
religious (Muslim) perspective (specifically, based on the Qur’an, the sunnәt, and the 
principles of Islamic law).   
Deobandi Shabbir Ahmad had gotten his way, yes—but the Barelvi leadership was 
not so fortunate.  When Abdul Hamid Badayuni demanded JUP representation on the 
Basic Principles Committee, he was more or less ignored, never receiving an answer.36  
In any case, five scholars were chosen to sit on the talimat-e-yslamiәħ’s board: Deobandi 
mufti, relative (and right hand) of Shabbir Ahmad and fellow JUI stalwart Muhammad 
Shafi; Muslim Leaguer and Islamic scholar Zafar Ahmad Ansari (whose leanings tended 
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toward Deobandism); ‘Abdul Khaliq, a professor from East Bengal; Gunjranwali Shi’a 
mufti Jafar Husain, who would later organize the Shi’a political party Tehrik-e-Nafaz-e-
Fiqah-e-Jafaria (tәhrik-e-nәfaź-e-fyqħ-e-j’afәriәħ or TNFJ, meaning “Movement for the 
Implementation of Shi’a Law,” founded in 1979) and be recognized as the leader of 
Pakistan’s considerable Shi’a community; and Muhammad Hamidullah, the Osmania 
University-educated doctor of philosophy from the princely state of Hyderabad.  The 
board was to be chaired by the aged ‘alym and sәyyid Sulaiman Nadvi, who had replaced 
the famous Azamgarhi mwlana Shibli at the (Deobandi-leaning) dar ul’alwm Nadwatul 
Ulama in Lucknow after Shibli’s 1914 death.  (To illustrate the relationship between the 
nәdwәt scholars and their Deobandi brethren: perusing the wares of a nәdwәt ‘alәma 
bookshop not far from the dar ul’alwm at Deoband in 2012, the author was informed by 
the store owner that the nәdwәt were, for all intents and purposes, aligned with their 
brethren at the great Islamic university at Deoband; indeed, he insisted they were 
Deobandis in all but name.  “They are the same,” he assured me.  Then he said, 
pointedly: “The ones who are different are the Barelvis.”  Several moments later he 
added: “And Shi’a.”)  Nadvi had been part of the Deobandi majority who had opposed 
the creation of Pakistan, supporting instead the idea of a united India; this had been 
reflected in his desire to change the name of the Urdu language to “Hindustani,” a term 
more suggestive of the tongue’s joint Hindu-Muslim genesis.  After Partition, Nadvi 
had opted to remain in India, probably in part due to his old age, and was only coaxed 
into coming to Pakistan after being offered a princely sum as a salary; even then, he 
didn’t arrive until late 1950.  It is clear, then, that the Deobandi school of thought and 
its scholar-leaders (especially in the form of Muhammad Shafi and the board’s chair, 
Sulaiman Nadvi) dominated the board of talimat-e-yslamiәħ, a fact that did not go 
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unnoticed by Barelvi leaders; indeed, the latter could boast not a single obvious place at 
that particular table, whatever the leanings of men like Dr. Muhammad Hamidullah or 
Professor ‘Abdul Khaliq.  Basic Principles Committee sessions, as well as those of its 
subcommittees and the talimat-e-yslamiәħ board, were held in “complete secrecy.” 
For its part, the Shabbir Ahmad-organized and Deobandi-dominated talimat-e-
yslamiәħ board produced several recommendations for the Basic Principles Committee.  
The president of Pakistan, the board insisted, should be “elected” by the “learned and 
pious representatives of the people” (i.e. not directly by the people themselves).  This 
was important, since in this context “president” was a term virtually interchangeable 
with әmir, the head of state.  This one suggestion, if adopted, may have granted the 
‘alәma—naturally the most “learned and pious”—a strong hand on the reigns of power, 
though the directive referred to the state’s duly elected legislative assembly.  The board 
also suggested that the president be advised by a shәri’at committee; the committee 
should likewise function as an advisory unit for both the federal and provincial 
legislatures.  This was in keeping with the ‘alәma’s more traditional role as on-hand 
religious advisors to the state (see Chapter 1).  Pakistan’s legislative system should be 
unicameral, with three major powers invested in the house of representatives: that of 
declaring war (or concluding peace), of passing a national budget, and of removing, if 
necessary, the president from office.  The talimat-e-yslamiәħ board thus envisioned a 
unicameral, presidential system led by an indirectly elected president and advised at 
every level by the ‘alәma.37  The board duly turned in their recommendations to the 
Basic Principles Committee. 
When the committee submitted its interim report on 7 September 1950, both 
Deobandi and Barelvi ‘alәma involved in one way or another in the process were, 
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generally speaking, very disappointed, both by its contents as well as the general 
reaction to it.  The talimat-e-yslamiәħ board members, in particular, were “shocked” at 
the report, as it “did not reflect any trace of the [their] recommendations.”38  All 
around, the response from the religious leadership seemed to be that the interim report 
was simply far too weak in terms of its Islamic provisions.  While the report did seem to 
favor a powerful executive, the committee had opted for a parliamentary system (i.e. 
with a Prime Minister as head of government and a president as head of state) and a 
bicameral legislature.  The powerful әmir (or әmir-equivalent)-led system espoused by 
many of the ‘alәma, exemplified in Moradabadi’s “Eleven Points,” and proposed (in the 
form of a powerful head of state who could issue ordinances and even abrogate the 
constitution) by the interim report was rejected almost immediately.  Though at the 
time the Governor-General (to be a temporary office) did possess sweeping powers left 
over from the office of (British) viceroy, the propositions within the Basic Principles 
Committee interim report were deemed “undemocratic and unpopular”—particularly its 
suggestion that the head of state should wield the power to suspend some or all of the 
constitution should circumstances dictate such a course.39  At this stage, then, the idea 
was not to be entertained that such dictatorial powers might be wielded by the 
president (or, if the Moradabadis among the ‘alәma had their way, әmir) of Pakistan.  
The ‘alәma were further snubbed by the setting up of a federal court and two high 
courts, formulated almost entirely after the Western model.  Far from requiring a 
degree in fyqħ or experience administering Islamic law, the criteria for membership on 
either court level rested mainly on one’s service as a barrister, pleader, or district judge 
(the latter combined with experience in the civil service).  Years of education at a dar 
ul’alwm, then, would mean next to nothing within the new judicial order.40  The interim 
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report did propose the setting up of a board of Islamic scholars appointed by the head of 
state to ensure that legislation on both the federal and provincial levels was in line with 
the teachings of the Qur’an and the sunnәt.  Despite this last, however, the report 
seemed to signal to the “‘alәma parties” that secular “democracy” was to be the name of 
the game; both Deobandi and Barelvi religious leaders dug in, prepared for another 
political battle.  At the same time, many East Bengalis opposed the report, too, arguing 
that the proposed system failed to grant their majority population position the weight it 
deserved (more on this later).   
The reaction to the report from Islamic scholars and the East Bengalis caused it to 
be withdrawan.  The Basic Principles Committee immediately appointed yet another 
subcommittee—this time with the express purpose of considering “proposals on the 
Islamic character of the constitution.”41 
Earlier, Shabbir Ahmad had convened a conference of ‘alәma at his own residence to 
work out a plan for a governmental Ministry of Religious Affairs.  According to the 
plan, the Religious Affairs Minister “would be under the Head of the State and not 
subject to ordinary votes of confidence in the legislature.”  The Ministry would act as a 
censor of all government activities, supervise government officials, and control the 
country’s mosques, religious institutions, religious endowments, and Islamic courts—a 
role that more or less mirrored that of the ‘alәma in most other “Muslim” governments 
since the medieval era (see Chapter 1; of course, within the structure a modern, 
centralized “total” state, such a role would necessarily carry with it considerably more 
power).  All the while, the Barelvi ‘alәma remained, in the words of Binder, “practically 
oblivious of the new changes and pressures in Islam,” interested in “recognition rather 
than power.”42  This author would argue that there were, in fact, plenty of Barelvi 
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‘alәma anything but oblivious to the new changes—and very interested in power.  
Indeed, “recognition” and power were two sides of the same coin to these self-appointed 
spokesmen of the “majority.”  It wasn’t just their idea that their tradition represented a 
“historical continuity” (one that, they felt, the Deobandis and others had vainly sought 
to usurp) that drove the Barelvi scholar-leaders; it was also the very fact that their long-
time rivals, not representative of that tradition, were seizing the levers of state and 
thereby threatening to displace them (the Barelvi ‘alәma) as the legitimate guardians of 
South Asian Islam.  Binder argues that as long as their place as the legitimate 
successors within this “historical continuity” was recognized, the Barelvi ‘alәma seemed 
far less interested in real politics than their Deobandi counterparts, but perhaps the 
reality wasn’t that the Barelvis were less interested—just less organized and politically 
experienced, and certainly less united.  The Deobandis operated within the framework 
of the JUI, an organization formulated after the JUH.  Its leaders had been politically 
active for decades and were far more experienced as political organizers.  As such, 
scholars and politicians of the Deobandi persuasion were able early to seize a 
disproportionate degree of political power.  It would be a mistake, however, to attribute 
this to a Barelvi lack of interest in politics.  For example, erstwhile AISC leader Jamaat 
‘Ali Shah, together with the pir of Manki Sharif and mwlana Abdul Sattar Khan Niazi, 
around this time spearheaded a new movement, the tәhrik-e-nyfaz-e-shәri’at (“The 
Movement for the Enforcement of Islamic Law”).43  As its name suggests, the 
organization was designed to promote the implementation of shәri’at (as the Barelvis 
interpreted it) in Pakistan.  For his part, Jamaat ‘Ali felt that he had been promised by 
Jinnah himself that such an implementation would take place with the establishment of 
the new “Islamic” state.  When that didn’t happen—and, perhaps worse, when the 
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Deobandis seemed to be granted official patronage instead of the majority Barelvi 
parties—Sunni leaders like the very aged Jamaat ‘Ali resumed their political 
agitations.44  But unfortunately for them and their Barelvi colleagues, the Deobandi 
‘alәma always seemed a step ahead of them. 
Efforts by the Deobandi and, less successfully, the Barelvi religious leadership 
toward the establishment of “true” Islamic government in Pakistan were not limited to 
the halls of the constituent assembly and that body’s endeavor to formulate a 
constitution.  No, the JUI, the JUP, the JI, the Ahrars, and elements within the PML 
each (separately) organized in-the-streets demonstrations to rally the country behind 
their (similar but separate) points-of-view.  The JUI, the JUP, and the JI in particular 
organized shәri’at Days and shәri’at Weeks, observed across Pakistan, in protest over 
the secularist drive for a Western, non-Islamic state—and, more importantly, in 
demonstration of their demands for the implementation of Islamic law into the 
political/judicial system.  For example, the JUP’s Day of shәri’at was set for 7 May 
1948; the occasion was “successfully celebrated” in urban centers across West Pakistan, 
from Karachi and Quetta to Rawalpindi, Dera Ismael Khan, and Peshawar.45  The JI 
organized a “Constitution Week” (14-21 November 1952), demanding “early 
promulgation of an Islamic constitution.”  The JUI hosted a massive conference in 
Dhaka (attended by around fifty thousand ‘alәma and one hundred thousand others); the 
gathering’s overarching demand was for an Islamic constitution.46  Even the Pakistan 
Muslim League got into the game, at one point attempting to form a “shәri’at Group” 
pushing for much the same thing; the effort, however, was short-lived.  From 9-10 
February 1949, the JUI hosted a conference in Dhaka (the party was actually 
significantly better organized in East Bengal than in the country’s western wing); the 
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meeting was an admonishment to Pakistan’s political leaders to adopt an Islamic 
system—and a warning that “attempts to introduce an un-Islamic order would be 
resisted.”  Meanwhile, the JUP continued to hold up Moradabadi’s “Eleven Points” as 
the best model for a future Pakistani political system.  The JI, too, pushed for 
Mawdudi’s own “Four Points”; these were the acknowledgement of (1) God as 
sovereign, (2) shәri’at as the constitutional bedrock, (3) “un-Islamic” legislation as in 
need of amending, and (4) shәri’at as the boundary for the national government’s 
activities.  The JI, too, propagated Mawdudi’s call for Pakistanis not to take an oath of 
allegiance to the state “unless it became Islamic.”47  Though some shәri’at-inspired laws 
were passed at the provincial level, they were typically not enforced.  Still, Barelvi pride 
was somewhat assuaged when, in Punjab, the Department of yslamiәt was created.  This 
branch of the provincial government included a six-member board of Islamic scholars 
and a cohort of department lecturers (sent to educational institutions and prisons to 
preach Islam).  Many of those lecturers were Barelvi (including JUP president 
Muhammad Ahmad Qadiri), and the department’s deputy secretary was a noted Barelvi 
‘alym, too.48  In addition, the Deobandi and Barelvi parties exerted influence through 
their virtual monopoly over the country’s (Sunni) mosques and religious schools.  
Friday sermons focused on the need for an Islamic constitution, and copies of these 
speeches were often sent to Jinnah or Liaquat ‘Ali Khan.49  Such street-level agitations 
and the provincial legislation that sometimes resulted provided high visibility for their 
cause, yes, but eventually the religious parties realized that the key to the 
accomplishment of their goals lay in the constitution—and ensuring it was an Islamic 
one.  This was where their efforts should be concentrated.50 
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In January 1951, about four months after the Basic Principles Committee had 
submitted and then hastily withdrawan its interim report, a Deobandi-led meeting of 
‘alәma was convened in Karachi, organized by the aforementioned Ihtisham ul-Haq 
Thanawi.  Thanawi, educated at the dar ul’alwm at Deoband as well as Punjab 
University (and who once claimed not to have “participated in the local politics of [the 
dar ul’alwm] during the era of [his] education,” nor ever to have taken “interest in 
domestic politics”), had been a reluctant immigrant to Pakistan, only opting to come 
after witnessing the mass killing that went along with the mass migration to and from 
both countries.51  The scholars present were by no means limited to the Deobandi 
school of thought; several other sects (including the JI in the person of Abul Ala 
Mawdudi himself) were represented, too—and indeed, their number even included five 
Barelvi pirs and ‘alәma.  Of the latter, two were official JUP delegates, including Abdul 
Hamid Badayuni.  Deobandi sәyyid Sulaiman Nadvi (the aged head of the Basic 
Principles Committee-appointed talimat-e-yslamiәħ board, who had recently arrived in 
Pakistan in order to reinvigorate the JUI after the December 1949 death of Shabbir 
Ahmad Usmani) presided over the gathering.  The interim report had greatly worried 
the ‘alәma.  It was obvious that the secularists needed a lesson in Islamic government, 
and so the meeting had been called.  The juridical scholars and mәshayx present 
hammered out a document later referred to as the “Twenty-Two Principles”: a list of 
twenty-two core “principles of an Islamic state.”  The “Twenty-Two Principles” 
included a requirement that the head of state (the “President”) be a Muslim male, that 
no law contradict the Qur’an and sunnәt, and that the state be directly involved in the 
propagation of Islamic education.  Pakistan should be a welfare state, its non-Muslim 
citizens should be protected from discrimination (except, evidently, when it came to 
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holding the state’s highest office), and the president should have the authority to 
suspend the consitution (but could only then administer in his office with the help of an 
[‘alәma-led] shwra.  Perhaps most importantly, any ideas deemed destrutive to the core 
principles of an Islamic state should be prohibited.  The twenty-two principles listed by 
the mixed-sect gathering in Karachi were often vague, but the heart of the issue was 
that Pakistan be an explicitly, unambiguously, unequivocally Islamic state.  Islam, as a 
political system, must be woven into the very fabric of the political system, must be 
more than just a “guiding force”—must be the very bedrock of the country’s political 
structure.  The state was to be a highly interventionist one: intervening in the market 
according to Islamic principles of money, banking, trade, interest, and finance, 
intervening in matters of “public” morality and immorality according to Islamic values 
(i.e. promoting the positive role of the state in promoting virtue and eradicating vice), 
and intervening as a taxer and redistributor according to Islamic ideals of equity and 
justice.52  The 1951 Karachi meeting and the consensus-driven document that it 
produced was more than a little astonishing; the “gathering of so many [‘alәma] with 
such a variety of viewpoints,” wrote one Pakistani scholar, “was in itself an historic 
event and the consensus they arrived at lent an unprecedented force to their 
proposals.”53  After their formulation, the “Twenty-Two Principles” were handed over 
to the Basic Principles Committee and were “duly noticed in…government circles.”54  It 
may be argued that the creation of this document represented the high-point of 
Deobandi-Barelvi cooperation, however lacking Barelvi representation might have been, 
considering their “majority” status. 
In December 1952, the Basic Principles Committee’s re-write was finally submitted.  
This draft, referred to as the “Nazimuddin Report” (since Prime Minister Khwaja 
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Nazimuddin—a Bengali career politician who had served as Governor-General after 
Jinnah, replaced Liaquat ‘Ali Khan after his assassination, and was known for “his 
religiosity and close contact with the [‘alәma]”55—helped formulate it and then 
presented it personally to the constituent assembly), drew heavily from the Basic 
Principles Committee’s do-over.  And fortunately for the ‘alәma, with whom Khwaja 
Nazimuddin and other members of the Basic Principles subcommittees had negotiated, 
this time the committee seemed to have taken their input seriously, incorporating 
aspects of some of the “Twenty-Two Principles” into their report.  The reaction of Zafar 
Ahmad Usmani of the JUI captures, perhaps, the general feeling among the Islamic 
scholars; the Nazimuddin Report was, he said, “seventy-eight percent Islamic.”56  
Among other things, the new constitutional blueprint granted the ‘alәma and religious 
(Islamic) leadership significant sway within the country’s political framework.  The 
Objectives Resolution was to be the constitution’s preamble.  The state was to take an 
active role in “helping” Muslims live their lives in accordance with Qur’anic principles 
and the sunnәt (“with due safeguards for sectarian interests”); what that “help” might 
look like was demonstrated in some of the report’s other provisions—for mandatory 
teaching of the Qur’an, for example, or prohibitions on alcohol consumption, or the 
organization of a proper zәkat system.  Perhaps most significant were the draft’s 
“repugnancy clauses,” outlining a constitutional process for ensuring that all laws 
remained within the bounds set by the Qur’an and the sunnәt (by setting up a board of 
Islamic scholars, operating under the head of state, which could vet all new 
legislation).57  Though the report opted for a parliamentary bicameral system, the head 
of state was required to be a Muslim.   
Just weeks later, in mid-January 1953, another ‘alәma gathering—much like the one 
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in Karachi two years previously that had produced the Twenty-Two Principles—
occurred, this time in Lahore.  Just as the Karachi conference had been organized to 
weigh in on the Basic Principles Committee interim report, the Lahore conference was 
organized to critique the Nazimuddin Report.  Though this second draft was met with 
far less criticism than the first from the religious quarter, there were nevertheless parts 
that, in the eyes of the assembled scholars, required amending.  Perhaps most 
important, the conference proposed that the Supreme Court include five ‘alәma, not just 
“regular” judges after the Western model.  For JUP members Muhammad Ahmad 
Qadiri and Abdul Hamid Badayuni, even this was not enough; they wanted to replace 
the Supreme Court entirely with an “‘alәma board” that they hoped the Barelvis would 
dominate.  (Khwaja Nazimuddin did, in fact, suggest this last—an ‘alәma board to “rule 
upon the repugnancy of legislation”—to the constituent assembly, but after weeks of 
debate it was decided that only the Supreme Court should be vested with such 
authority.)58  Indeed, the Deobandi-Barelvi rivalry was more than a little conspicuous at 
the Lahore conference, as the Barelvi ‘alәma present sought to gain “official” status for 
their position as the religious leadership over the “majority” Sunnis (i.e. Barelvis).  That 
status, they insisted, and “their organization” (the JUP) should be recognized in the 
Pakistani constitution itself.  Of course, the Deobandis resisted this Barelvi attempt to 
assert an allegedly superior authority.59  The meeting underscored the fragility of any 
sort of joint Deobandi-Barelvi political action, and, unlike those of the previous multi-
sect ‘alәma conference (which the Deobandis had organized and dominated), its 
suggestions were mostly ignored.  Besides, the January 1953 Lahore meeting of 
scholars, in which the Deobandi-Barelvi rift was so evident, quickly degenerated less 
into a discussion about the Nazimuddin Report and more into anti-Ahmadi agitation (on 
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which more later).60  The meeting ended in failure.  Once again, the Deobandi-Barelvi 
dynamic had prevented the Islamic scholars and their supporters from mounting a 
powerful lobby for the institution of an Islamic order.  And despite the general support 
of the ‘alәma for the Nazimuddin Report, the draft was received badly by many in the 
Punjab, who felt that it gave undue power to the Bengalis at the expense of every other 
unit in the country; “the country seemed to face a constitutional deadlock of great 
magnitude,” wrote one Pakistani constitutional historian.61   
On 21 September 1954, amidst continued opposition from both the non-Muslims in 
the constituent assembly and the Pakistan National Congress (established in 1947 from 
remnants of the Indian National Congress and made up almost entirely of East Bengali 
Hindus), the re-submitted Basic Principles Committee report was adopted by the 
constituent assembly—with all of its Islamic provisions.  It was the latter to which the 
assembly’s non-Muslims and Congress members had been opposed, after all; Hindu 
members of the constituent assembly even boycotted the meeting at which the 
constitution draft was adopted in protest of its overtly Islamic content.62  But the 
religious parties had played a critical role in seeing this adoption occur—despite their 
own disunity—as the constitution’s Islamic character was debated from October to 
November 1953.  Thus the ‘alәma politicians and their organizations had been pivotal in 
not only shooting down the interim constitution (together with the East Bengali 
opposition) but also in seeing the Nazimuddin Report become the official blueprint for 
the law of the land. 
Victory, however, was short-lived.  Just days before the constitution report was 
scheduled for consideration by the assembly as Pakistan’s new constitution, “tall, dapper 
59-year-old” Malik Ghulam Muhammad—who’d been serving as Governor-General 
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since Khwaja Nazimuddin had left the office in 1951 to take up the post of Prime 
Minister—abruptly dissolved the constituent assembly, evidently unhappy at the 
prospect of a new constitution that placed significant checks on the Governor-General’s 
(i.e. his own) power.63  The move took place on 24 October 1954.  Despite opposition to 
the “constitutional coup” from some on the Supreme Court, the move stood when the 
judiciary upheld the assembly’s dismissal in a split decision.   
Most of the ‘alәma opposed Ghulam Muhammad’s action (which the Times in 
London referred to as a “palace revolution”),64 and those close to the events tried to 
prevent it when news of an impending dissolution leaked out just prior to its unfolding.  
But their efforts were in vain.  The JUI’s top leader described Ghulam Muhammad’s 
move as “mischievous,” designed “to destroy the Islamic character of the constitution to 
whatever extent it is.”  Other Deobandi leaders, like Muhammad Shafi and Ihtisham ul-
Haq Thanawi, called the coup “a tragic deviation from the basic ideology of Pakistan.”  
The JI general secretary similarly slammed the Governor-General, characterizing his 
actions as “cheap and highly deceptive.”65  Perhaps it is not surprising, however, that 
some Barelvi ‘alәma actually supported the assembly’s dissolution, given their 
belligerence at the Lahore conference, their strong opposition to parts of the 
Nazimuddin Report (particularly as it concerned the judiciary), and the failure of the 
draft to recognize them in any way, shape, or form as the Sunni Muslims’ “official” 
spiritual leadership.  Indeed, Abdul Hamid Badayuni sent Ghulam Muhammad his 
personal congratulations on the occasion of the constiuent assembly’s forced 
disbanding.66  The most protest the JUP put up was at its annual conference on 9 
October during which the party “expressed satisfaction over the progress in 
constitution-making.”  The Barelvi leadership wasn’t giving up on the idea of an Islamic 
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state, of course; this was their goal, and their demand for a “totally Islamic constitution” 
held firm.  But it seems the Barelvi leadership hoped that, in beginning again, their 
claim to represent the majority “Sunni” position stood more of a chance of being codified 
into law than in it did in supporting any previous constitution report.67  As for the 
military, Ghulam Muhammad had ensured its support when he offered key cabinet 
positions to military leaders; Major-General Iskander Mirza became Minister of 
Internal Affairs and General Ayub Khan, Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army, 
was granted the office of Defense Minister.  (Prime Minister Muhammad ‘Ali Bogra was 
asked to stay on as head of the newly reconstituted cabinet, which he did.)  Iskander 
Mirza was particularly hostile to the Islamic scholars, warning the ‘alәma after the 1954 
coup that there would be “trouble” if they continued to meddle around in politics.68  “We 
can’t run wild on Islam,” he said.  “It is Pakistan first and last.”69  For his part, Ghulam 
Muhammad would justify the coup, marked by “troops pouring into the capital, armored 
cars patrolling outside,” and a ban on public assemblies, by blaming the constituent 
assembly itself.70  If not for its “internal strain, bickerings, and personal, sectional, and 
provincial rivalries,” he insisted, he never would have been forced to such measures.  A 
new era in Pakistani politics had been born—one in which the country’s elected 
representatives would play underdog to a bloated government bureaucracy and the 
military. 
Within a few days, Pakistan seemed to be on the verge of a full-scale military coup.  
“Pakistan, the world’s fifth largest country, is in a bad way,” wrote newspaperman 
Douglas Wilkie, at the time.  “Its Government is in the melting pot, its Parliament 
already dissolved and a state of emergency proclaimed, forbidding any assembly of more 
than five persons.”71  Combined with a veritable revolt in East Bengal against federal 
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authorities in Karachi, events seemed to be heating up.  And though Wilkie’s 
prognostication would ultimately come true, the real military coup wouldn’t come for 
another four years.  Indeed, by June 1955, five months after Ghulam Muhammad’s 
dissolution of the first constituent assembly, a new one was elected led by a coalition 
PML-United Front government.  (The United Front was a Bengali party made up itself 
of a coalition of parties determined to ensure that the eastern zone be allotted proper 
representation in government.)  The dominant United Front party was the Awami 
League, but the organization also included a JUI-breakaway called the Nizam-e-Islam 
Party (NIP), an independent political party created out of the East Bengali JUI during 
that organization’s 1953-1954 falling out with the Pakistan Muslim League, and whose 
name literally meant “The Implementation of an Islamic System Party.”  The NIP had 
been induced to join the Front when the NIP leadership became convinced that the 
PML “had taken advantage” of their party “by misleading the people in the name of 
Islam.”72  With the convening of a new assembly, the work of constitution-making 
began again from August 1955.   
The new assembly appointed a new committee to produce a draft constitution.  After 
years of effort, then, they were beginning all over again—the “work for an Islamic 
constitution…to be done afresh.”  Meanwhile, the ‘alәma continued to clamor for the 
institution of an Islamic government.  The mostly Deobandi NIP members of the 
constituent assembly in particular pressed hard for the institution of an Islamic 
constitution.  Their demands became more vocal after the first draft of a constitution 
formulated by the committee was presented in early November 1955—devoid of much 
of the old drafts’ Islamic provisions (including the critical “repugnancy clause”).  In 
protest, NIP constituent assembly members boycotted the meeting in which the draft 
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was presented.  Both JUI and JI leaders met with Prime Minister Chaudhry Muhammad 
‘Ali and Law Minister Ismail Ibrahim Chundrigar to lobby for their position and urge 
the scrapping of the committee’s allegedly “un-Islamic” constitution.73  The Deobandi 
JUI and Deobandi-leaning JI thus worked together in this regard, conspicuously absent 
any (Barelvi) JUP assistance. 
The (mostly Deobandi) ‘alәma demands resulted in the committee’s abandoning of 
the constitution draft.  Between November and December, that body worked on a new 
draft—as the ‘alәma parties’ agitation for an Islamic constitution reached a new height.  
“Hardly any day passed without a meeting being organized to voice the demand,” wrote 
one Pakistani scholar.  The JUI and JI, and separately the JUP, led the charge.  From 
19-25 December, the JUI observed “Constitution Week,” their demands enunciated in 
public meetings and during sermons in thousands of mosques across the country.  On 
the occasion of the JI’s annual conference on 22 November in Karachi, the party 
demanded specifically that not only should the Objectives Resolution and the Islamic 
provisions from the old constitutional drafts be incorporated into the new one, but also 
that the amendments formulated during the January 1953 ‘alәma conference be made 
effective, too.  The JI conference additionally warned the state’s leadership that a secular 
constitution would tear Pakistan apart—that the only thing holding the eastern and 
western zones together was Islam.  To the Barelvis, the situation appeared as a second 
chance to get the constitution of Pakistan right—meaning the document would 
recognize them as the country’s Sunni majority and their leaders as the spiritual guides 
of said majority.  As such, a “Sunni” conference was held from 11-12 December in 
Lahore, led by the JUP and dubbed the “All-Pakistani Sunni Conference,” a name 
hailing back to the organization’s pre-Partition days as the All-India Sunni Conference.  
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The Barelvi ‘alәma at the gathering produced a three-pointed resolution, demanding (1) 
that the consitution be “Islamic” in “character,” (2) that the head of state “must be a 
Muslim,” and (3) that Hanafi fyqħ be declared “state law.”74  Islamic state meant Islamic 
state, not some pseudo-Islamic-Western fusion.  The conference warned the 
constitution-drafting committee that the Pakistani people would not accept a secular 
constitution.75 
The Barelvi conference ended about a month before a new draft of the proposed 
constitution was presented (in January 1956) before the new constituent assembly for its 
approval.  As deliberations in that body were underway, yet another ‘alәma conference 
took place in Dhaka—a mixed-sect affair like the previous assemblies in Karachi and 
Lahore—on 8 February 1956.  Participants included representatives from the Deobandi 
JUI, the Barelvi JUP, the JI, and the NIP.76  The conference aimed to formulate 
amendment proposals for the new constitution.  Most of the proposals put forth by the 
various parties assembled were adopted, and their resolutions presented to members of 
the constituent assembly for consideration.  When Prime Minister Choudhary 
Muhammad ‘Ali finally introduced the draft constitution on 9 January 1956, several of 
the provisions suggested by this conference had been incorporated into Pakistan’s 
supreme governing document.  Indeed, the new constitution draft (to the relief of many 
of the ‘alәma) seemed to have met most of their long-fought-for demands, and was thus 
“welcomed by the religious-political parties and their leaders.”  Leaders of the JUI and 
the JI generally praised the new constitution.  The document fulfilled “the requirements 
of Islam as well as democracy to a considerable extent,” said Mawdudi on the occasion, 
while Ihtisham ul-Haq added that it was “commendable on the whole.”  Such 
sentiments, while mostly positive, obviously betrayed a sense that the constitution was 
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far from perfect, however acceptable it might be.  Still, it was “Islamic” enough.  On the 
other hand, the Barelvi leadership of the JUP demanded more; though the party sent a 
twelve-man delegation to personally congratulate the Prime Minister on the draft, it 
also sent a memorandum suggesting amendments, including a proposition that Arabic 
be Pakistan’s official language, that a Religious Affairs Ministry be formed, and that an 
‘alәma board to vet legislation according to its Islamic soundness be created.77  Once 
again, the JUI and the JI seemed to be on the same page politically, while the Barelvi 
JUP took a somewhat different approach. 
Within days, however, the JUI and the JI, unwilling to be left out of amendment 
negotiations, adopted the Barelvi call for still more constitutional alterations.  Soon a 
list of seventeen proposed amendments, formulated jointly by five different religious 
parties (the JUI, the JI, the NIP, the JUP, and the West Pakistan Jamiat Ahl-e-Hadis), 
was produced, reiterated, and backed by a resolution passed during a massive ‘alәma 
(and pir) conference in Dhaka on 8 February.  The conference added some additional 
amendments to those seventeen already proposed, including a demand that Pakistan’s 
head of state be a Muslim, Pakistan’s official name be “the Islamic Republic of Pakistan,” 
and East Bengal be officially called “East Pakistan.”  Apart from this resolution, the 
conference organized a committee (called the All-Parties Islamic Constitution 
Committee) with the purpose of spearheading the organization and observance of 
“Constitution Days” throughout the month of February.78 
The assembly formally adopted the constitution on 29 February, and the Governor-
General granted his official consent on 2 March.  Generally speaking, the constitution 
was “welcomed” by the ‘alәma, at least “as a first step.”79  The Objectives Resolution 
served as the document’s preamble.  The constitution included a provision requiring 
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that the head of state be “a Muslim and at least 40 years of age” (and a “he,” if the 
gendered pronoun was to be literally interpreted), and it officially bestowed upon the 
state the name suggested by the ‘alәma conference: the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.  
The state’s “directive principles” included the strengthening of “bonds of unity among 
Muslim countries”; the taking of “steps” to “enable the Muslims of Pakistan individually 
and collectively to order their lives in accordance with” the Qur’an and the sunnәt; and 
the prevention of gambling, prostitution, the use of “injurious drugs,” and the 
recreational drinking of “alcoholic liquor.”  The constitution’s “Islamic Provisions” 
required that the President establish an “organization for Islamic research and 
instruction” that would “assist in the reconstruction of a Muslim society on a truly 
Islamic basis” (a revivalist sentiment if ever there was one, with clear Waliullahi 
undertones).  The provisions also called on the President to appoint a commission 
whose purpose was to proffer advice on how best to implement “Islamic law.”  Most 
important of the “Islamic Provisions,” perhaps, was article 198—the “repugnancy 
clause,” which stated that no law could be enacted “which is repugnant to the 
Injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunnah...”  Interestingly, this 
last was to be applied to each sect according to its specific understanding of the term “Quran 
and Sunnah.”  The document tasked provincial government with the administration of 
Islamic tax systems, including zәkat, as well as the overseeing of Islamic “charitable” 
(i.e. mosque- and wәqf-centered) giving.  The state, then, was to be an active, coercive 
means of enforcing Islamic moral standards. 
Exactly three weeks after the Governor-General granted his official consent, the 
new constitution went into force—on 23 March, the same day, according to the 
Gregorian calendar, upon which the pivotal Lahore Resolution had been passed sixteen 
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years before. 
 
Distractions from Constitution-Making . 
Of course, the near-decade of Pakistan’s first go-around at constitution-making 
didn’t occur in a vacuum; several events temporarily distracted the parties involved.  
Often the Deobandi and Barelvi parties played an active role in the development of these 
phenomena, at times seemingly united in purpose but virtually always separate in 
organization and action.  Besides the riots against Hindus and Sikhs in the Pakistani 
Punjab (a reaction to similar riots targeting Muslims in Indian Punjab), there was the 
fight over Kashmir (over which, though full-scale war was avoided, significant military 
action on both sides did occur); the constant tug-of-war between Pakistan’s eastern and 
western wings (including the Urdu-Bengali language controversy); the refugee problem 
(twelve million people had, after all, migrated either to Pakistan or India at the time of 
Partition, a phenomenon that some describe as “the largest transfer of population in 
recorded history”);80 the death of the unifying figure of Muhammad ‘Ali Jinnah; the 
death of Pakistan’s official shix ul-yslam and Deobandi great Shabbir Ahmad Usmani; 
violent anti-Ahmadi riots in Lahore and elswhere (resulting in the deaths of hundreds, 
perhaps thousands, of Ahmadis and the ouster of a Prime Minister); and constitutionally 
ambivalent changes in government (like the assassination of Liaquat ‘Ali Khan, the 
removal of Khwaja Nazimuddin from office, and the “constitutional coup” of Ghulam 
Muhammad) all combined to steal attention away from the process of formulating a 
constitution. 
Pakistan’s first war with India over Kashmir (1948) naturally “strained the internal 
political situation,” as some of the country’s more militant generals argued with some of 
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the country’s more pacifist politicians over what course of action should be pursued.81  
With the British withdrawal, Jammu and Kashmir maharaja Hari Singh had failed to 
declare his polity part of India or Pakistan, vainly hoping that the princely state might 
remain independent.  Since the majority of Kashmir’s population was Muslim (but 
despite large Hindu, Sikh, and Buddhist minorities), the Pakistani government began 
(unofficially) organizing local fighters and volunteers—with regular Pakistani soldiers 
mixed in—mostly from the NWFP.  Their mission: to invade Kashmir and possess it for 
Pakistan.  The princely state’s local defense forces gave way rather quickly to these 
assailants from the west.  This development quite naturally led Hari Singh to hastily 
opt for union with India—which abruptly gave the Indian government the green light 
to send troops to defend the state from its Pakistani invaders; Indian troops were 
immediately airlifted into Kashmir, soon thereafter halting the Pakistani advance.  By 
the end of 1947, the invasion had mostly subsided, and over the following months 
Indian troops won back much of the temporarily conquered territory, until a cease-fire 
was called on 31 December 1948.  Each side lost around one thousand five hundred 
killed; Pakistan ended up with a chunk of western Kashmiri territory (now Azad—or 
“free”—Kashmir) while India secured the rest, including the Srinigar valley. 
Throughout the conflict, marked at home by “a contest of abuse in the Press and on 
the radio and in political speeches,” the religious parties in Pakistan weighed in, too.82  
Some Muslim leaders were offended by Liaquat ‘Ali Khan’s seemingly non-violent 
strategy, interpreting it as weakness on his part—a weakness that reflected badly on 
Pakistan as a nation and Muslims as a people.83  The Barelvis were particularly militant 
in this regard, and the 1948 Kashmir War proved to be a stimulant for the JUP to shore 
up its organization across West Pakistan.  Partly at the insistence of Naimuddin 
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Moradabadi and Mustapha Riza Khan, who together visited Lahore in March 1948, new 
branches of the party were inaugurated across the country (though especially in the 
Punjab) as the organization was tested with its first large-scale challenge of organizing 
for a cause.  (One of these was the Sindh and Karachi branch of the party, opened in 
January 1949 and headed by one Abdul Hamid Badayuni).  Led by their ‘alәma, the 
Barelvis collected food and distributed it to military and volunteer forces in Kashmir, 
provided other relief for jyhadis and refugees in the high mountain region, and strove to 
“invoke the spirit of jyhad” within Pakistan’s military units stationed there.  The JUP 
additionally organized and observed a countrywide “Day of Kashmir” (15 April 1949) 
and a “Day of Pakistan” (14 August 1950) to force attention onto the issue and their 
demand for “a free and fair plebiscite.”  (A U.N. commission had called for a plebiscite 
soon after the original cease-fire, a future measure ostensibly agreed upon by both the 
Indian and Pakistani governments.  But negotiations broke down after this initial 
“agreement,” and the Nehru regime, not eager to have Kashmir’s eighty-percent-
Muslim population vote between India and Pakistan, “[did his] best to delay 
negotiations.”  Eventually India rejected a plebiscite altogether, as Nehru declared, 
“Kashmir must form part of India.”)84  A fәtwa was released, too, authored by JUP 
president Muhammad Ahmad Qadiri and other noted “Sunni” scholars, declaring jyhad 
in Kashmir.   
But some other religious scholars, notably Abul Ala Mawdudi, had condemned the 
use of the term “jyhad” in the case of the Kashmir War (since the national government 
had “hypocritically” characterized the fight as a jyhad to the paramilitary fighters it 
unofficially supported while officially observing a cease-fire with India; jyhad, Mawdudi 
and others argued, must be declared openly by the government for it to be justified and 
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correct),85 but the Barelvi fәtwa denounced such points-of-view.  The fight for Kashmir, 
they insisted, was absolutely a holy war for Islam.86  For his part, Mawdudi was thrown 
in prison by the Pakistani government for alleged “sedition.”  Meanwhile, many 
Deobandis, too, supported or were active participants in the “sacred jyhad” in Kashmir.  
They generally saw the intervention of “the non-Muslim world powers” in the form of 
the United Nations as a “cunning” move to prevent the imminent takeover of Kashmir 
by the mujahydin.  The Deobandis tended to possess a more universal jyhadi mentality, 
too; for example, Muhammad Rafi remembers, as a boy, playing only those games 
“which could be useful in jyhad”—like horseback riding, the long jump, and the high 
jump.  (He even avoided hot water, either for ablution or bathing, as it might 
declimatize him from conditions at some future front.)  The Deobandi penchant for 
macro-jyhad (as opposed to regional or local conflict) would gain added significance 
later, after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.87  Still, this Deobandi proclivity was 
illustrated around this same time when JUI officials met with the leaders of several 
other Muslim states—including Egypt (whose ambassador described the liberation of 
Kashmir as “as dear as the freedom of the Nile”), Syria, and Saudi Arabia—to obtain 
support over Kashmir.88 
The refugee issue loomed large as well.  Most of the more than six million refugees 
(some say eight million)89 who flooded into Pakistan wound up in the Punjab; indeed, 
the state’s population numbered around 1.7 million more than it had before the great 
schism, and this unprecedented increase had to be dealt with if it wasn’t to spiral into a 
serious law-and-order situation.  Meanwhile, Karachi had been flooded with refugees 
from Delhi—hundreds of thousands of them—and tensions in the city between its 
original inhabitants and the newcoming influx ran high.90 There would be serious 
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ramifications for this phenomenon in the future, as the mostly Barelvi, Urdu-speaking 
refugees from north-central India (and, later, their children) clashed with local Sindhis 
and the mostly Deobandi Pathans, the latter pouring into the city from the 1970s.  To 
combat these forces and ostensibly to protect their own rights, the Urdu-speakers 
organized politically (about which more later), with serious (and often bloody) 
consequences for the Deobandi-Barelvi rivalry. 
The “sudden” 11 September 1948 death of Pakistan’s founder, Muhammad ‘Ali 
Jinnah (who’d long been keeping his debilitated condition—and terminal diagnosis—a 
secret), opened a floodgate that naught but the qayd-e-ә‘ažәm’s towering personality 
could have held strong (though historians can only speculate as to how long even that 
might have lasted).  As was touched upon previously, a furious jostling for power took 
place almost immediately afterwards, as various parties and their leaders vied for 
position.  The religious parties were certainly not exempt from this power struggle.  
Liaquat ‘Ali Khan, a close personal friend of Jinnah and one who had worked at the 
qayd-e-ә‘ažәm’s side for years before Partition, commanded some respect as Prime 
Minister (concurrent for years with other positions, including Minister of Defense, from 
August 1947 to October 1951, and Minister of Foreign Affairs, from August 1947 to 
December 1949).  But on 16 October 1951, while addressing a meeting in a Rawalpindi 
park, an Afghan assassin shot Liaqat ‘Ali twice in the chest.  Though the killer’s motives 
remain, many decades later, somewhat of a mystery, scholars speculate that it may have 
had something to do with his “soft” solution to the Kashmir war—unpopular especially 
among the religious parties—as well as his negotiations with Jawaharlal Nehru of India 
over the resettlement and treatment of refugees and religious minorities in the two 
countries.  Evidently some of the ‘alәma even pointed to Liaqat ‘Ali Khan’s wife’s 
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apparent reluctance to observe purdәħ.91  The assassin himself was reportedly a Pathan 
“ultra-nationalist” and may have carried out the deed in the hope that a “united 
Pakhtunistan” might result.92  The official report of the “Commission on the 
Assassination of Mr. Liaquat ‘Ali Khan,” issued ten months after the killing, found only 
that “it had not been possible definitely to decide whether the assassin…had acted as an 
individual or as the agent of a conspiracy.”93  Whatever the true motive of the murderer, 
the assassination of Pakistan’s first Prime Minister has been attributed—again, without 
hard evidence—to such frustrations and differences in religious interpretation.  If 
nothing else, the tragic event may have shored up the position of the ‘alәma, whether or 
not they were to blame at all—a sort of warning to those who would transgress the 
order propagated by the Islamic scholars and their parties. 
Shabbir Ahmad Usmani died in December 1949.  The passing of the great ‘alym was 
a blow for the Deobandi school’s position as the dominant one in government, as no 
other Deobandi leader in Pakistan then commanded the sort of respect and adoration 
that Shabbir Ahmad had.  Of course, the Barelvi leadership naturally felt that one of 
their own should assume the official mantle of shix ul-yslam; it was rumored that perhaps 
xәwajәħ Muhammad Qamarruddin Sialvi (d. 1981 AD) would be given the nod in this 
regard.  JUP leaders were “confident,” in fact, that something like this would, in fact, 
take place—that the “Sunni” ‘alәma might finally be given their due.  Muhammad  
Qamarruddin Sialvi, a Sufi of the Chishti order and descendent of the famous 
nineteenth-century Sufi saint xәwajәħ Shamsuddin Sialvi (known as “Pir Sial,” of whose 
xanәqaħ one admirer has written that “the number of those associated [with it]…is 
countless and [they] are spread throughout the country of Pakistan”),94 had studied in 
Ajmer at the Madrasa ‘Uthmaniyya Dar al-Khayr under mwlana Muinuddin Ajmeri (a 
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scion of the Khairabadi family) and then in Sial Sharif under mwlana Muhammad Din 
Budhwi, another Khairabadi luminary.  (As previously mentioned, the Khairabadi 
family, from whom xәwajәħ Qamaruddin Sialvi received his religious instruction and 
training, possessed strong connections to the Barelvi movement.)  During pre-Partition 
days the xәwajәħ had defied British rule, and as a consequence had spent time in prison.  
He had also served as a local Muslim League leader (in Sargodha) and been among 
those Barelvi mәshayx who had traveled to the NWFP in 1947 to help win the province 
for the League in the run-up to the critical Frontier Referendum.   But unfortunately for 
the JUP and Pakistan’s Barelvi ‘alәma, and perhaps out of the fear of sparking a low-
level sectarian war, the government opted not to bestow the coveted shix ul-yslam title 
upon anyone; the name, at least as it was officially granted by the Pakistani state, would 
die with Shabbir Ahmad Usmani.95  This did not, however, stop the Barelvis from later 
addressing xәwajәħ Muhammad Qamaruddin Sialvi as “shix ul-yslam” anyway, a title he 
would hold on to for the rest of his life.  For the Deobandis’ part, Sulaiman Nadvi (about 
whom more later) played the role of respected Deobandi ‘alym in an attempt to replace 
Shabbir Ahmad, thereby restoring some of the party’s “country-wide influence.”96  But 
Nadvi himself passed away in 1953 AD.  At that point the mantle, though not nearly as 
powerful as the one shouldered by Shabbir Ahmad, would be taken up by his erstwhile 
right hand, Muhammad Shafi. 
Muhammad Shafi was only the latest in a long line of scholars and teachers in his 
family, stretching back on his father’s side at least to the late 1700s AD; and from his 
mother he inherited a lineage allegedly going back to the Prophet himself.  His great-
great grandfather Karimullah, who had completely memorized the Qur’an and was thus 
afforded the title hafyž, had been the first to establish himself in Deoband, allegedly after 
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being unjustly dealt with at his previous residence by his Hindu neighbors.  
Karimullah’s son, Imam ‘Ali—known by all as mian ji, meaning “schoolmaster”—was a 
scholar of much renown in Deoband, where, it has been written, “there was not a house 
but he had a student therein.”  Imam ‘Ali also increased the family’s land holdings, 
subsequently dividing them up between his five sons, most of whom were able to secure 
government posts.  One son, Tahsin ‘Ali, was not so lucky, however; poor eyesight 
negated any possibility that he would find the kind of employment enjoyed by his 
brothers, and eventually he was forced to sell some of his land inheritance just to make 
ends meet.  Still, Tahsin ‘Ali loved to learn—and he loved to teach.  He transformed his 
home into a virtual schoolroom, instructing his two sons in the memorization of the 
Qur’an, Urdu, Farsi, and mathematics.  One of his sons, Muhammad Yasin—born a year 
before the founding of the dar ul’alwm at Deoband—showed especially great promise, 
and Tahsin ‘Ali decided that his home school wasn’t enough.  He thus enrolled him in 
the new Muhammad Qasim-inspired mәdrәsәħ, hoping that Muhammad Yasin might 
gain a religious education in the Arabic language.  At the dar ul’alwm, Muhammad 
Yasin labored under some of the great founding Deobandi fathers, eventually learning 
at the feet of the school’s first student and eventual leader, Mahmud Hasan himself.  
Muhammad Yasin had three daughters and two sons; one of his sons died young, 
leaving him one male heir: Muhammad Shafi, the future “Grand Mufti” of independent 
Pakistan.97  As noted previously, Muhammad Shafi would join with his cousin, Shabbir 
Ahmad Usmani, as a pro-Leaguer in the struggle for Pakistan.  Now he was the man’s 
political successor, opening up a new chapter in Deobandi politics. 
On 18 May 1952, Pakistan Minister of Foreign Affairs and noted Ahmadi scholar 
Muhammad Zafarullah Khan (d. 1985 AD) delivered a speech at Karachi’s Jahangir 
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Park.  The occasion, though public, had been organized by an association of Ahmadis—
members of perhaps the most generally deplored (and “heretical”) sect of Islam in South 
Asia.  Founded by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (d. 1908 AD) of Qadiyan (and thus referred to 
as the “Ahmadiyya” or “Qadiyyani” movement), the Ahmadis held that their version of 
Islam was the one true variety, with Muhammad and Mirza Ghulam Ahmad as true 
prophets.  The latter had claimed to be Muhammad reappeared—but also the Christian 
savior, the Muslim mahdi, and even an incarnation of Krishna.  (There is a split within 
the Ahmadi community, dating back to 1914 AD and the post-Mirza Ghulam Ahmad 
succession crisis, that revolves around the Ahmadi founder’s status—was he a prophet, a 
messenger, or simply an inspired guide?  A Lahore-based group, originally led by 
Ahmad’s son, rejected Mirza Ghulam’s claims of prophethood, while the other group, 
based at first in Qadian and then in Rabwah in the Punjab, continued to revere Ahmad 
as a prophet).  In any case, it was the Ahmadis’ alleged claim that Mirza Ghulam Ahmad 
was a post-Muhammad prophet (this despite the generally held Muslim belief that 
Muhammad was the “Seal” or “End” of the prophets [xәtәm-e-nәbәwwәt], meaning none 
would come after him) that stoked the most ire among other Muslims.  (There was also 
a widespread belief, however unfounded, that Mirza Ghulam Ahmad had been a British 
agent and the Ahmadi movement a British-designed creation “for fulfilling their own 
political ends.”)98  Then-Prime Minister Khwaja Nazimuddin had reportedly attempted 
to dissuade Zafarullah Khan, as a member of his cabinet, from speaking at a “sectional” 
meeting, but the Foreign Affairs Minister was adamant that he attend.  Amidst efforts 
by anti-Ahmadi demonstrators to disrupt the meeting, Zafarullah Khan declared that 
“Ahmadiyyat was a plant implanted by God himself, that this plant had taken root to 
provide a guarantee for the preservation of Islam in fulfillment of the promise contained 
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in the Qur’an, that if this plant were removed, Islam would no longer be a live religion 
but would be like a dried-up tree having no demonstrable superiority over other 
religions.” According to the official report of the Court of Inquiry, set up after the 
violence that would ensue, this meeting—and these sentiments—“provided occasion for 
riots in Karachi.”99  Within the socio-political context of 1953 AD Pakistan—food 
shortages going on several years that “created want and unrest among the impoverished 
masses,” economic controls by government that stifled business, and, according to 
Pakistan visitor and erstwhile U.S. presidential candidate Adlai Stevenson, “extremist 
mullahs…[who] have fanned discontent for political ends”—perhaps it was just a 
matter of time before a spark ignited the lake of gasoline.100  Incidentally, Chaudhri 
Zafarullah Khan was no stranger to persecution from fellow Muslims—and even, 
specifically, the Deobandi-leaning Majlis-e-Ahrar.  As far back as December 1931 AD, 
when he served as president of that year’s All-India Muslim League conference in Delhi, 
the Congress-supporting Ahrars had agitated against him, reportedly creating 
“disorderly scenes” outside of the League conference.  A procession was held, black flags 
were waved, anti-Ahmadi speeches were delivered at the Jama Masjid, and a “mob 
prevented the League from assembling in accordance with its program.”  The AIML 
blamed the demonstrations on the Congress, who had “engineered” the agitation 
“among uneducated Moslems.”101  Now, twenty-two years later, the same outfit—the 
Majlis-e-Ahrar—was agitating against the same man.  This time, however, there would 
be blood. 
Immediately the ‘alәma of the usually feuding sects—including both Deobandi and 
Barelvi scholars—banded together to stamp out the Ahmadi “menace” once and for all, 
forming the Tehrik-e-Tahaffuz-e-Khatam-e-Nabawat (tehrik-e-tәhәffuž-e-xәtәm-e-
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nәbәwwәt, or “Movement for the Safeguarding of the End of the Prophets”).  The 
organization was created to defend Muhammad’s place as the last of the prophets—and 
to strike down all notions that any other prophet, including the “heretic” Mirza Ghulam 
Ahmad, could have come after him.  The Tehrik-e-Tahaffuz-e-Khatam-e-Nabawat made 
three official demands to the Pakistani government: (1) that Ahmadis be officially 
declared a “non-Muslim minority,” (2) that Zafarullah Khan be removed from office 
forthwith, and (3) that all other Ahmadis be fired from important government positions, 
too.  The three demands were officially presented at an All-Pakistan Muslim Parties 
conference in Karachi in July.  The conference appointed a committee, tasked to put 
pressure on the government to meet their requests.  With their demands formulated, 
the mostly Barelvi and Deobandi Tehrik-e-Tahaffuz-e-Khatam-e-Nabawat leadership 
stood divided on how best to agitate for those demands to be met.  One section of the 
organization favored a constitutional approach and the avoidance of “direct measures” 
(rast yqdam); one of those favoring such a legal approach was JUP leader “Abul Hasanat” 
Qadiri.  But the Ahrars, who had long been engaged, under the leadership of Deobandi 
clerics like Habibur Rehman Ludhianvi, in anti-Ahmadi campaigning, and now at the 
urging of great Deobandi scholar-leaders like Ataullah Shah Bukhari, went into action 
mode, stirring the rest of the Tehrik-e-Tahaffuz-e-Khatam-e-Nabawat to just such 
“direct measures.”  Mawdudi’s JI as well as the JUI did much the same.  (Both the 
Ahrars and the JUI had supported the Pakistan Muslim League in the 1951 AD 
provincial elections in Punjab; the League won a majority of the available seats—and 
some scholars speculate that perhaps it was this victory that emboldened the Ahrars and 
others to now act on their long-held anti-Ahmadi sentiments.)  Despite Qadiri’s 
reservations, most of the JUP would come on board the Ahrar-, JUI-, and JI-inspired 
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“direct measures” bandwagon, especially after numerous attempts to gain assurances 
from Khwaja Nazimuddin, as well as provincial leaders, that their demands be met 
ended in disappointment.  The committee appointed by the All-Pakistan Muslim Parties 
conference to “pressure” the government thus officially called for “direct measures,” and 
furthermore threw down the gauntlet, so to speak, at the feet of the Prime Minister—in 
the form of an ultimatum granting him one month to comply with the ‘alәma 
demands.102  On 26 February 1953, nine months after Zafarullah Khan’s speech, at a 
meeting over which Qadiri himself presided, the Tehrik-e-Tahaffuz-e-Khatam-e-
Nabawat adopted “direct measures” as the movement’s official policy.  Upon receiving 
the news of the ‘alәma group’s decision, and guessing its intentions, the government 
descended upon its leadership in full force, arresting many of its guiding lights, 
including (perhaps ironically) Qadiri, Abdul Hamid Badayuni, and JUP vice-president 
Abdul Ghafoor Hazarvi.  Perhaps more than anything else, the arrests sparked violent 
riots across the Punjab (and especially in its urban centers) throughout the month of 
March.  Martial law was imposed on Lahore from 6 March.  Much Ahmadi property and 
some of the group’s mosques were destroyed, and anywhere from two hundred to two 
thousand Ahmadis lost their lives as targets of the rioters.103  The chaos was so 
widespread and its perpetrators so determined that martial law didn’t end in Lahore 
until mid-May.  The government blamed the ‘alәma for the riots, and Qadiri’s own son, 
mwlana Khalil Ahmad Qadiri, was among those sentenced to death by hanging.104  In 
all, five ‘alәma were sentenced to death by martial law courts for their involvement in 
the violence.  (These sentences would be commuted later to life in prison; all of the 
‘alәma thus convicted were subsequently released in 1955 AD.)  Mawdudi was 
sentenced to death, too, for his “connexion with the anti-Ahmadiya agitation in Punjab,” 
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sparking protest in Karachi, where “most” shops remained closed in a demonstration of 
solidarity with the JI chief.  Protests were also held across the city; proclaimed one press 
notice issued by Karachi chief commissioner A. T. Naqui, “Demonstrators at certain 
places indulged in acts of hooliganism.”  On 13 May, the death sentence on Mawdudi 
was commuted to “14 years rigorous imprisonment.”105  The rapid communting of 
Mawdudi’s, Khalil Ahmad’s, and the others’ sentences illustrates the perceived political 
power of the ‘alәma-supporting religious element in Pakistani society, at least at the 
time.  (One reporter, writing fifteen years later, described the religious clerics’ power 
thus: “The daily prayer meetings in more than 10,000 mosques provide [the ‘alәma] 
with a political platform that overshadows any party machine.”)106  The anti-Ahmadi 
riots of 1953 stand out as a rare example of joint Deobandi-Barelvi action.   
It should be noted, however, that the anti-Ahmadi agitation was not launched 
without reservation on the part of some of the Islamic scholars (like that of “Abul 
Hasanat” Qadiri)—and even outright opposition, especially among a segment of the 
Barelvi spiritual leadership.  For example, after Naimuddin Moradabadi disciple 
Muhammad Hussain Naeemi participated “very actively” in the agitation, the 
administrators of the (Barelvi) mәdrәsәh in which he taught actually asked him to leave.  
“You are in politics,” they argued, complaining that his focus had fallen outside the 
bounds of religion—and demonstrating disagreement among a segment of Barelvis over 
the methods adopted by the xәtәm-i-nәbәwwәt movement.  On the contrary, Muhammad 
Hussain countered, “involvement in xәtәm-i-nәbәwwәt is not a political matter, it is a 
religious matter.”  (This original accusation leveled against Muhammad Hussain—that 
he was “in politics”—turned out to be undeniably true, as he continued to actively 
participate in and support the JUP.)  In the end Muhammad Hussain Naeemi left the 
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seminary, only to found one of the most prominent Barelvi schools in all of Pakistan: 
Jamia Naeema in Lahore.  But his experience illustrates the disunity amongst the 
Barelvi religious leadership over the events of 1953.107 
Almost immediately after the riots had diminished, the Pakistani government 
launched a formal inquiry into their root causes (as well as the effectiveness, or lack 
thereof, of the state’s response).  The Court of Inquiry’s (nearly four-hundred-page) 
report, presented in April 1954 and entitled “Report of the Court of Inquiry constituted 
under Punjab Act II of 1954 to enquire into the Punjab Disturbances of 1953” (but 
popularly known as the “Munir Report” after the Chief Justice of the Lahore High Court 
and president of the inquiry committee, Muhammad Munir), came down hard upon the 
‘alәma, mincing no words in its condemnation of the clerics or of their varying and often 
contradictory conceptions of an Islamic state.  The report began by quoting Jinnah’s 11 
August 1947 speech to the newly formed constituent assembly of Pakistan (“You may 
belong to any religion or caste or creed—that has nothing to do with the business of the 
State,” to cries of “Hear, hear!”).  “We asked the ulama whether this conception of a State 
was acceptable to them,” the report’s authors wrote, “and every one of them replied in 
an unhesitating negative…”  Since the passage of the Objectives Resolution, the Muslim 
scholars contended, Jinnah’s “conception of a modern national State” had become 
“obsolete.”  But, the report asked bluntly, “[w]hat is then the Islamic State of which 
everybody talks but nobody thinks?”  The report lambasted the ‘alәma for being 
“hopelessly disagreed among themselves” about even fundamental questions like “What 
is a Muslim?” and “What is Islam?”  Among other definitions, Deobandi mwlana Ahmad 
‘Ali Lahori, head of the JUI in West Pakistan, defined a Muslim as “A person…[who] 
believes (1) in the Qur’an and (2) what has been said by the prophet.  Any person who 
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possesses these two qualifications is entitled to be called a Muslim, without his being 
required to believe in anything more or to do anything more.”  The definition of Barelvi 
and JUP head Muhammad Ahmad Qadiri differed in several respects: “He must believe 
in the unity of God,” “He must believe in the prophet of Islam to be a true prophet, as 
well as in all other prophets who have preceded him,” “He must believe in the Holy 
Prophet of Islam as the last of the prophets,” “He must believe in the Qur’an as it was 
revealed by God to the Holy Prophet of Islam,” and “He must believe in the resurrection 
[qiamәt].”  Interestingly, Qadiri failed to mention many of the criteria listed as 
requirements for membership of both the JUP and the old AISC.  Such demonstrations, 
of course, implicitly underscored a complete incapacity on the scholars’ part to 
formulate a workable framework for an Islamic state straddling the subcontinent and 
composed of a diverse group of ethnicities, languages, and geographies; if a simple 
definition of a “Muslim” could not be agreed upon, how could a constitution be 
produced?  “Keeping in view the several definitions given by the ulama,” the report’s 
authors queried, “need we make any comment except that no two learned divines are 
agreed on this fundamental? 
 
If we attempt our own definition, as each learned divine has done, and 
that definition differs from that given by all others, we unanimously go 
out of the fold is Islam.  And if we adopt the definition given by any one 
of the ulama, we remain Muslims according to the view of that [‘alym], 
but kafirs according to the definition of everyone else. 
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The report further criticized the ‘alәma for their positions vis-à-vis apostasy—or, more 
particularly, their “practically unanimous” position that within an Islamic state apostasy 
deserves the death penalty.  But who was an apostate?  The Deobandi-Barelvi rivalry 
was brought into sharp relief by the report’s findings in this regard: 
 
According to this doctrine, Chaudhri Zafrullah Khan, if he has not 
inherited his present religious beliefs but has voluntarily elected to be an 
Ahmadi, must be put to death. And the same fate should befall Deobandis 
and Wahhabis, including Maulana Muhammad Shafi Deobandi, Member, 
Board of Talimat-e-Islami attached to the constituent assembly of 
Pakistan, and Maulana Daud Ghaznavi, if Maulana Abul Hasanat Sayyad 
Muhammad Ahmad Qadiri, or Mirza Raza Ahmad Khan Barelvi, or any 
one of the numerous ulama who are shown perched on every leaf of a 
beautiful tree in the fatwa, Exhibit D. E. 14, were the head of such Islamic 
State. 
And if Maulana Muhammad Shafi Deobandi were the head of the State, 
he would exclude those who have pronounced Deobandis as kafirs from 
the pale of Islam and inflict on them the death penalty if they come 
within the definition of murtad, namely, if they have changed and not 
inherited their religious views. 
 
Clearly, the conclusion of the report’s authors was far from complimentary to the 
‘alәma, whether Deobandi, Barelvi, or of any other stripe.  “The net result of all this,” 
the report concluded, “is that neither Shias nor Sunnis nor Deobandis nor Ahl-e-Hadis  
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nor Barelvis are Muslims, and any change from one view to the other must be 
accompanied in an Islamic State with the penalty of death, if the Government of the 
State is in the hands of the party which considers the other party to be kafirs.”  Then: 
“And it does not require much imagination to judge of the consequences of this doctrine, 
when it is remembered that no two ulama have agreed before us as to the definition of a 
Muslim.”108   
Perhaps it is not an exaggeration to say that, after issuance of the Munir Report 
(ever thereafter “an intellectual weapon in the hands of those who wanted to deride the 
concept of an Islamic state”),109 the power of the ‘alәma to influence politics was never 
quite the same again.  Indeed, one Pakistani scholar would conclude just that: 
“Squabbling over the constitutional status of the Ahmadis, the religious parties frittered 
away much of the advantage they had gained since November 1950.”110  From this point 
on, the issue of Pakistan as an Islamic state faded into the background, at least for a 
time. 
One of the other side effects hemorrhaged by the anti-Ahmadi riots was the 
“bureaucratic-military coup” that booted Khwaja Nazimuddin out of office.  The action 
took place on 17 April 1953, and was probably brought on by the Prime Minister’s 
decision, amidst tight financial circumstances, to cut the defense budge by one-third, a 
move Pakistan’s military leaders were loathe to embrace.  The Governor-General could 
cite any number of issues plaguing the state under Khwaja Nazimuddin’s leadership as 
justification for his decision, including the growing schism within the Pakistan Muslim 
League between the party’s East Bengal and West Pakistan branches, the related 
intensification of the Urdu-Bengali language issue (and, subsequently, the death in 
Bengal of demonstrators at the hands of police)—and the violent anti-Ahmadi unrest 
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then rocking Punjab.111  Invoking section 10 of the Government of India Act, Ghulam 
Muhammad removed Nazimuddin and his cabinet from office, despite their initial 
resistance.  (Nazimuddin’s replacement: Muhammad ‘Ali Bogra, a Bengali like his 
predecessor and a former Pakistani ambassador to Burma, Canada, and the United 
States.)  Of course, as aforementioned, just one-and-a-half years later Ghulam 
Muhammad would be at it again, dissolving the consitutuent assembly before it could 
adopt a constitution restricting his powers and forming a new, military-heavy cabinet.  
By inciting, in various degrees, the 1953 riots, the ‘alәma parties had thus played a 
significant role not only in the violence that followed, and not only in getting Khwaja 
Nazimuddin dismissed as Prime Minister, but also in ushering in what would become 
Pakistan’s long cycle of coups by the bureaucracy-military establishment. 
The Ahmadi riots also gave the opponents of an Islamic constitution a chance to 
launch an anti-‘alәma backlash.  High-powered politicians like former PML president 
and governor of East Bengal Chaudhry Khaliquzzaman, new Punjab governor Piroz 
Khan Noon, and NWFP chief minister Sardar Abdur Rashid launched a campaign for a 
purely secular constitution.  This was in line, they argued, with what Muhammad ‘Ali 
Jinnah had envisioned for Pakistan in the first place.  New Prime Minister Muhammad 
‘Ali Bogra got into the game, too, almost immediately attempting to derail the passage 
of any Islamic constitution by introducing an “interim constitution” devoid of the 
Nazimuddin Report’s Islamic provisions.  The JUI, in particular, came out strongly 
against the Prime Minister’s move, and in a joint statement with the JI, the board of 
talimat-e-yslamiәħ, and some constituent assembly members, characterized Bogra’s 
efforts as a “clear deviation” from the legal path heretofore trod by the constituent 
assembly.  The JUI subsequently organized and hosted a conference, attended by a 
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variety of religious parties; the gathering condemned the secular constitution in a joint 
resolution on 28 September 1953, with support from a segment of PML members.  
Under this intense pressure, then, Prime Minister Bogra’s “interim constitution” idea 
was scrapped.112 
The spirit of jyhad was inflamed again in 1953 during the Suez Canal crisis, when 
Israel, Britain, and France squared off against Egypt for control over the great 
waterway linking the Mediterranean with the Red Sea.  According to one Deobandi 
‘alym, “every child in Pakistan was eager to help the brotherly country of Egypt” as 
events unfolded in the Middle East.  The dar ul’alwm in Karachi actually chartered a 
plane to transport students, “restless to take part in the jihad,” to Egypt.  The school 
additionally organized classes on “civil defense” and first aid with the jyhad in mind.  But 
Nasser quickly restricted Pakistanis’ travel to Egypt; Deobandis attributed this to the 
Egyptian leader’s being stricken with “the Arab nationalism malady,” something with 
which many Arab heads of state would be “afflicted.”  The sad result of this spiritually 
degraded leadership, reasoned Deobandi mufti Muhammad Rafi Usmani, was the 
subsequent Arab loss of control over the Gulf of Aqaba, much of the Sinai desert, the 
Golan Heights, and Jerusalem.113 
Right from the start, representatives of the majority Bengali population, whose 
people might have seemed quietly tucked away thousands of miles across India (and far 
from Karachi) in East Bengal, found cause to worry that, despite their constiuents’ 
numbers, they would ultimately be left holding the proverbial short end of the stick.  
This anxiety was only exacerbated by the seemingly ever-present Urdu-Bengali 
language controversy.  The constitutional deadlock between East Bengal and West 
Pakistan was finally, if temporarily, overcome with the introduction of the “Muhammad 
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‘Ali Formula” (having been introduced by Muhammad ‘Ali Bogra after becoming Prime 
Minister).  The “Formula,” placed before the constituent assembly in October 1953, 
granted equal representation to each unit in the House of Units—thereby placating 
those units in the west (particularly Punjab) who were demanding equal representation 
within a federal system—but population-proportioned representation to each unit in the 
House of the People.  This last made the deal acceptable to the Bengalis, whose 
population outnumbered that of all the other units combined.  Thus in the upper house, 
both Punjab and East Bengal were to enjoy ten votes, but in the lower house the latter 
would have one hundred sixty-five seats to the former’s seventy-five.  Both houses were 
to enjoy equal powers (this had been another bone of contention), and in joint sessions 
(where the more controversial issues were likely to end up) both zones would have the 
same number of seats (one hundred seventy-five).  As for the language issue, in May 
1954 the constituent assembly adopted a measure declaring that Pakistan’s official 
languages should be both Urdu and Bengali—but also that “the state should take all 
measures for the development and growth of a [i.e. one] common national language” 
(italics added).  This measure could only be a temporary fix, of course, since it still 
foresaw the adoption of a single national language at some point in the future.  “It was 
clear,” wrote one legal commentator, “from the day of its adoption that the formula 
could satisy no one.”114  The ‘alәma and their parties were affected by the East-West 
quarrel, too.  The JUP was always far more active as an organized party in West 
Pakistan, though plenty of “Sunnis” lived and labored politically in the eastern zone.  To 
facilitate the different positions and perceived needs of the Bengalis, the JUI actually 
spawned a new party: the aforementioned NIP.  (Even the Pakistan Muslim League had 
split based on zone, the PML in the west and the Awami Muslim League, also called the 
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“Awami League,” in Bengal; the latter would eventually lead the charge against 
Pakistan’s central government that would result in the emergence of an independent 
Bangladesh).  Both Deobandis and Barelvis used the divergence between Pakistan’s two 
wings to emphasize the need for an Islamic political framework.  After all, they 
reasoned, striving to unite East Bengal and West Pakistan—two geographical entities 
separated not only by thousands of miles but also by ethnicity, language, culture, 
political philosophy, and history—would be all but impossible via some secular 
constitution.  Only Islam—the one thing binding east and west—could hold the country 
together.  It was thus incumbent upon those formulating a constitution and those 
leading the country to make sure that this one, single uniting force be fused into the 
very fabric of the state.  Without it, an eventual east-west schism was inevitable.  As for 
the language issue, some of the Islamic scholars suggested making Arabic the country’s 
official national tongue, in part to avoid official preference of either Urdu or Bengali. 
 
“Secularist” Patron of pirs :  the Ayub Khan Years . 
The JUI reaction to the new (1956) constitution was perhaps predictable, given 
what had become the ‘alәma parties’ typical response to constitution drafts and reports.  
In December of 1956, this group produced a set of proposed amendments to the 
document.  The ‘alәma hoped that, given the apparent flexibility of the new constitution, 
they would be able to transform it into the “Islamic constitution” that had been their 
goal from the beginning.  But it soon became obvious that what Islamic provisions were 
there had only been included to placate the Islamic scholars and their followers; “those 
in power were not serious about implementing…the Islamic provisions of the 
Constitution.”  Iskander Mirza, who had earlier warned the ‘alәma to stay out of politics 
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or face “trouble,” was particularly reluctant to acknowledge—let alone enforce—any of 
the ‘alәma demands.115 
Absent from the 1956 constitution, too, was any provision stipulating either joint or 
separate electorates.  This had, of course, been one of the most contentious communal 
issues plaguing the political scene during pre-Partition days.  Evidently the matter was 
to be left up to future provincial and federal legislatures; the decision not to specify one 
or the other was probably calculated to get the constitution passed, as the issue of 
electorates was so divisive that partisans of one or the other system might have stalled 
the constitution’s adoption.  Now a decision regarding electorates had to be made.  Most 
of the ‘alәma took the position of Mawdudi: that separate electorates were absolutely 
necessary in order to protect Muslims from Hindu political usurpation.  After all, the 
call for joint electorates had originated with the Hindus, and after independence it was 
the Hindu parties who had carried on the demand within Pakistan.  Mawdudi estimated 
that in a joint electorate system, Hindus could control, either directly or indirectly, up 
to one hundred forty-two of the East Pakistan assembly’s three hundred nine seats, as 
opposed to the seventy allotted to them there under a separate electorates system.  The 
politically active Deobandi and Barelvi religious leadership came down in strong favor 
of separate electorates.  (For their part, the advocates of a joint electorates system 
argued that, among other things, separate electorates would only engender 
communalism.)  The final decision was to be made in sessions of the East and West 
Pakistan provincial assemblies, and then in the National Assembly. 
In West Pakistan, the vote came down (August 1956) in favor of separate 
electorates.  But in East Pakistan—despite the efforts of a joint “emergency committee” 
including delegates from the JUI, the JI, the JUP, as well as the PML, all dispatched to 
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Dhaka to lobby for separate electorates—joint electorates won the day (early October).  
This presented a somewhat delicate situation for the National Assembly, which was 
scheduled to meet in Dhaka, too.  Finally, the assembly adopted an unweildy Iskander 
Mirza-formulated system, one that attempted to please all parties.  Under Mirza’s plan, 
the West was granted separate electorates and the East was granted joint electorates.  
The system failed, of course, to address the ‘alәma’s primary concern: that Hindus in 
East Pakistan would be able to manipulate a joint electorates system to the disadvantage 
of the Muslim population.  But in the end, the Islamic scholars and their parties were 
defeated; joint electorates were adopted in both wings of the country in August 1957.  
Having lost the electorates debate, the ‘alәma parties turned their focus on the 
upcoming general elections.  If they could no longer influence the parties in power (as 
had been recently demonstrated in Dhaka), then they would contest them for real votes.  
They would aim for direct power.  Thus the JUI, the JUP, and the NIP (the latter in 
alliance with the JI) all put forward their own candidates in the general elections.116 
But none of these parties—or any of the others—ever got a chance to try their luck 
in the elections; on 7 October 1956, Iskander Mirza, ever an enemy of the ‘alәma-
politicians (and politicians in general!) and eager to retain his position of power despite 
the growing popularity of his political enemies, instituted Martial Law under General 
Ayub Khan, dissolving both the federal and the provincial legislatures, dismissing their 
respective ministries, and banning all political parties.  To the ‘alәma, and especially those 
of the Barelvi persuasion, Iskander Mirza was a panderer to the West, unappreciative of 
the rich Muslim heritage and legacy.  (Indeed, as one eyewitness remarked, “Iskander 
Mirza’s pro-Americanism often embarrassed the Americans.”)117  Mirza envisioned a 
Pakistan closely tied to the West, a prosperous, modern, secular state.  On 27 October, 
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however—three weeks after Iskander Mirza’s virtual government takeover—General 
Ayub Khan carried out a bloodless military coup, removing Mirza (he was sent into 
exile in Britain) and assuming for himself the responsibility of the state’s political head.  
Pakistan’s inaugural constitution, “prepared,” in the words of one South Asian scholar, 
“after tortuous labours of a succession of Prime Ministers and Presidents” over a period 
of almost a decade, had lasted a mere two-and-a-half years.118  This “new” role for the 
military seemed to fly in the face of Jinnah’s original vision for Pakistan; once, on 14 
August 1947, the frail qayd-e-ә‘ažәm had approached two young military officers at a 
reception in Karachi and reportedly admonished, “Never forget that you are servants of 
the state.  You do not make policy.  It is we, the people’s representatives, who decide 
how the country is to be run.  Your job is only to obey the decisions of your civilian 
masters.”  (Ironically, one of the two officers being addressed was leftist Akbar Khan, 
who, against this advice of Pakistan’s founder, would later become infamous as the 
mastermind of the ultimately unsuccessful Soviet-backed “Rawalpindi Conspiracy” of 
1951 to overthrow the government of Liaquat ‘Ali Khan).119 
In the succinct words of Afzal, “The Martial Law regime of October 1956 was not 
enthusiastic about religion.”120  Indeed, Ayub Khan assaulted the “Islamic” aspects of the 
old constitution from a variety of angles.  First, on 10 October he scratched out the 
word “Islamic” altogether—that is, from the country’s official name (changing it from 
the “Islamic Republic of Pakistan” to the more succinct but far less religion-specific 
“Republic of Pakistan”), then three days later disbanded the constitutionally mandated 
commission that had been tasked with figuring out how to Islamize Pakistan’s current 
legislation.  The regime’s unfriendliness to the religious scholars was further 
underscored when Muslim Leaguer and high-profile jurist Manzur Qadir (d. 1974 AD), 
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Ayub Khan’s Foreign Minister from 1958-1962 (and a trusted advisor on domestic 
affairs as well), embarked on a tour of the country to assess the reaction of the people to 
the coup.  Qadir identified Muslim sectarian division (“the existence of 72 sects among 
the Muslims”) as the greatest hindrance to creating an “Islamic” constitution; he would 
later head the committee to formulate the country’s new (1960) constitution himself.  
(Qadir’s remark underscores the impact that the Deobandi-Barelvi dynamic played—
and continues to play—in Pakistani politics, preventing as it does the nation’s two 
largest sects from any hope of strong, united action.)  Much like his Foreign Minister, 
Ayub Khan saw the ‘alәma parties as not only lacking in cohesiveness but also as 
advocates of a medieval system, one that failed to take into account the realities of the 
modern age.  “[If] being a Muslim meant going back to the world of 1,300 years ago,” 
he remarked brazenly in January 1960 , “then [I am] not for being a Muslim.”121  Given 
his positions vis-à-vis Islam and politics, Ayub Khan was widely regarded as a 
“modernist”; in the Field Marshal’s view, Islam was “subject to the conditions of 
contemporary nationhood.”122  Khan criticized the (mostly Deobandi) ‘alәma who had 
opposed Pakistan during pre-Partition days but now sought to impose their version of 
an Islamic order on everyone via an Islamic constitution of their creation—and this in a 
nation they had once denied a chance for existence!  He (perhaps correctly) saw the 
(mostly Deobandi) ‘alәma as the most vociferous critics of government (and his 
government, in particular); without their insidious influence, he reasoned, the people 
would be happy.  “[T]hey succeeded in converting optimistic and enthusiastic people 
into a cynical and frustrated community,” he once said of the Islamic scholars.123  
Foreign policy-wise, too, Ayub Khan was, like Iskander Mirza, more or less pro-
Western, though he was less conspicuous (some would say less gushing) than his 
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predecessor.124  In any case, Ayub Khan’s political positions reinvigorated many of the 
‘alәma in their ire against the secular state (and even united them for a time, as the 
reader shall see). 
On 2 March 1961, the regime put into effect the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 
legislation that promised more freedom to women.  In this, Ayub Khan was part of a 
trend affecting several modernizing states within the Muslim world characterized by 
heavy government legislative intervention vis-à-vis women and the family.  Indeed, 
many aspects of the ordinance merely reflected the suggestions, offered to the Pakistani 
government during the previous decade, by a commission set up specifically to consider 
reform in this area.  In any case, the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, in addition to 
stipulating that a man could only take on a second wife with the permission of his first 
(in the form of approval by an Arbitration Council), also required that, in the case of 
divorce, the husband must first inform a local government representative, then wait 
ninety days.  In effect, the ordinance required ninety-day “notice” on divorces, during 
which time an Arbitration Council would strive to reconcile the parties involved.  Many 
of the ‘alәma regarded this last—the “introduction of notice”—as contrary to the 
procedure set forth in the Qur’an and sunnәt.125  Most of the country’s Islamic scholars 
(but especially those of the Deobandi persuasion) opposed the ordinance vigorously; one 
observer described the cleric-led campaign against Ayub as both “sustained” and strong 
ever after.126  In response, the Ayub Khan regime confiscated publications promulgating 
the opinions of the ‘alәma opposed to the ordinance and even imprisoned some of the 
more vocal scholars involved in the debate. 
Ayub Khan continued his opposition to an “Islamic” constitution by rejecting the 
suggestions of the very Constitution Commission that he had created to formulate a 
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new document.  The commission (an eleven-person body from which, not surprisingly, 
the ‘alәma had been conspicuously excluded) had interviewed almost six hundred 
individuals and mailed close to twenty thousand questionnaires to people and 
organizations of consequence across Pakistan.  What the group discovered did not lend 
support to Ayub Khan’s secularist, modernist aims.  The vast majority of respondents 
had indicated strongly that the overtly Islamic Objectives Resolution should be 
incorporated into the new constitution.  The same held true for the old constitution’s 
Islamic provisions; these, too, should be included, according to most respondents.  In its 
presentation to the regime, and based on its findings, the commission even went one 
step further, advising an active role for the state in regulating the training of Muslim 
teachers and preachers “to enable them to present Islam to those of a Western way of 
thinking.”  The group also sided with the vast majority of the ‘alәma on the electorates 
issue, supporting the call for a separate electorates system.127 
On 8 June 1962, the new, Ayub Khan-created constitution of Pakistan (which had 
been approved by the dictator in early May) came into effect.  As previously mentioned, 
the regime opted to ignore most of the recommendations of its own Constitution 
Commission; the group’s suggestions were veritably absent within the new document.  
Still, the constitution’s Islamic provisions were similar to those of the 1956 version.  
The descriptive “Islamic” was not restored to Pakistan’s official name (“The State of 
Pakistan shall be a Republic under the name of the Republic of Pakistan”), and Ayub 
Khan had instituted a presidential (as opposed to parliamentary) system in which the 
very powerful President (i.e. Ayub Khan) must be a Muslim.  Indeed, one commentator 
described Ayub Khan’s new constitution as leaving “almost impotent” his political 
opposition, while making for “an impregnably strong executive.”128  The document’s 
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preamble was indeed based on the Objectives Resolution, though it offered a 
controversial watered-down version of the same.  The government was charged with 
the duty to assist Muslims in the day-to-day living of their faith, a repugnancy clause 
was included, and teaching of the Qur’an and Islamic studies was made mandatory 
(though only for Muslims).  Furthermore, the government was to take an active (though 
unspecified) role in eradicating (or at least “discouraging”) such un-Islamic evils as 
gambling, prostitution, the consumption of alcohol, and usury, and the federal 
government should be guided, on the foreign policy front, by a desire to strengthen ties 
with and promote peace among the world’s Muslim nations.  The document also 
mandated the creation of two “Islamic” bodies: (1) the Advisory Council of Islamic 
Ideology, meant to advise the government on both the Islamic soundness of legislation 
as well as on how the state might more fully facilitate Muslims’ religious practice, and 
whose members were to be directly appointed by the president; and (2) the Islamic 
Research Institute.  The latter, to become an object of much controversy, was tasked 
with the undertaking of “Islamic research and instruction in Islam for the purpose of 
assisting in the reconstruction of Muslim society on a truly Islamic basis.”  The 1962 
constitution would stand until the end of the Gregorian decade (specifically, March 
1969, when martial law was again declared), then officially replaced by a new one in 
1973. 
The same day that Ayub Khan’s constitution went into effect (8 June), martial law 
was lifted and Pakistan’s new National Assembly met for the first time.  With the 
Assembly’s adoption of the Political Parties Act in July, the JUI, JI, NIP, and others 
(including the Khwaja Nazimuddin-led anti-Ayub Council Muslim League party, or 
CML; after the lifting of Martial Law, the Pakistan Muslim League had split into two 
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parties: the CML and the pro-Ayub Convention Muslim League) began agitating for 
amendments to the 1962 constitution.  Specifically, the aforementioned parties 
demanded a restoration of the word “Islamic” to Pakistan’s official name, as well as a 
restoration in full of the old constitution’s Islamic provisions.  This pressure led Ayub 
Khan to partially concede on some points; on 24 December 1963, the word “Islamic” 
was finally restored.  The old Islamic provisions were restored, too, however slightly 
altered.129  But the religious parties, in particular those under Deobandi leadership or 
influence, were not convinced that the Ayub Khan government was being genuine in its 
concessions on the constitution’s Islamic nature.  It was one thing to include Islamic 
provisions, and quite another to actually enforce them.  And the regime rejected most of 
the suggestions proferred by the Advisory Council of Islamic Ideology—a body it had 
created by mandate of its very own constitution.  Indeed, the Ayub Khan government’s 
true colors were seemingly revealed when it jailed several Muslim scholars for 
contesting the regime-run committee in charge of announcing the sighting of the new 
moon (for Eid; the new moon marks the beginning of the month of Shawwal and the 
commencement of the Eid holiday, after the month-long Ramadan fast); evidently the 
committee had altered the date in order to help the President avoid being the subject of 
a bad omen.  In addition, Ayub Khan, whose lack of respect for most of the ‘alәma was 
by now well established, seemed to support more Western-leaning modernist Islamists 
(like Dr. Fazlur Rahman, whose work—in particular his 1966 book Islam—was the 
subject of much controversy).  The Islamic Research Institute, which his own 
constitution had established, seemed bent on interpreting Islam through a distinctly 
modernist lens, to the deep resentment of the ‘alәma (though, perhaps predictably, 
embraced by many in academia in the West).130  That perceived lack of respect could be 
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applied to some of Islam’s most revered figures, too; once, Ayub Khan’s government 
portrayed the “rightly guided” caliphs via actual illustrations on national tevelsion—a 
shocking innovation for many Muslims (to whom religious images were forbidden).  To 
top it off, the President sought (ultimately unsuccessfully) to meddle in Friday 
sermons.131  All of this seemed to indicate that, whatever might have been included in 
Pakistan’s new constitution, the regime was not serious about establishing an Islamic 
order, and it certainly wasn’t interested in obtaining the opinions of the ‘alәma in that 
regard.  The scholars were thus shut out of their traditional role as influencial advisers 
to the state—a role many of them felt they had fought for during the years leading up to 
independence.  All the while, Ayub Khan continued to consolidate his own position by 
temporarily neutralizing one of his most dangerous critics, the aged and highly vocal 
Bengali mwlana Bhashani (who, just months previously, had been “thundering about 
blood and liberty, fair shares or secession”), by making him leader of a Pakistan 
delegation to China—a journey that evidently had a transformationary effect upon the 
man.132  Concurrently, Ayub attacked the religious and political legitimacy of the JI. 
The Deobandi and Barelvi spiritual leadership often took strikingly different 
positions during the Ayub Khan decade.  Many JUP leaders actually supported the 
regime, like some of their Sufi predecessors who had upheld a monarch’s rule to the 
chagrin of the realm’s ‘alәma.  Indeed, Ayub Khan was known to be especially close to 
two Barelvi divines: the pir of Deval Sharif (West Pakistan) xәwajәħ ‘Abdul Majid and 
the pir of Sarsina (East Pakistan) mwlana Abu Jafar Muhammad Saleh.  Once, the former 
pir was reported to have publicly implied, during a meeting of Muslim League members 
at Manki Sharif, that Ayub Khan’s leadership had been sanctioned by God, and that 
dramatically; after all, in a vision the pir of Deval Sharif had seen a “divine light” on the 
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dictator’s forehead.133  Ayub Khan was known to consult with the pir frequently, often 
stopping for a visit while out hunting in the countryside.134  Perhaps this was not 
surprising, as the pir was reported to have once told Ayub Khan, “Every word you utter 
is put in your mouth by God.  You are His servant, and whatever you do is done on 
God’s instructions.”135  Meanwhile, the pir of Sarsina, who had been a part of the Barelvi 
deputation led by JUP leader Abdul Hamid Badayuni sent to lobby Khwaja Nazimuddin 
against the Ahmadis in the early 1950s,136 likewise supported Ayub Khan and was 
sometimes even referred to as “President Ayub Khan’s pir.”137  In November 1963 the 
President inaugurated the first sessions of the All-Pakistan mәshaix Conference “to 
mobilize [the JUP and other Barelvi mәshaix] in favor of his regime.”  During the 1964-
1965 elections, many of the Barelvi leadership supported Ayub Khan.  (In this they were 
joined by a small segment of JUI leaders, too, on account of the opposition’s undesirable 
gender; Fatima Jinnah was, after all, a woman).138  Among the ‘alәma, Abdul Hamid 
Badayuni was known to be especially supportive of the Ayub Khan government. 
On the other hand, the Deobandis tended to gravitate towards a strong opposition 
to the former Field Marshal’s regime.  During the Ayub Khan years, the JUI was 
veritably revived under mufti Mahmud.  The catalyst?  The regime’s attempts to 
“modernize” Pakistan, elements of which the JUI found repugnant to Islam as they 
interpreted it, mobilized support for the party against the Ayub Khan government.  In 
1962, both the NIP and the JI had come out strongly, and officially, in opposition to the 
government in power.  Indeed, these two Deobandi-leaning parties made up the leading 
segment of the regime’s political opposition throughout the 1960s.  In 1962, that 
opposition came in the form of the National Democratic Front, in 1964 as the Combined 
Opposition Parties, and in 1967 as the Pakistan Democratic Movement; in each of these 
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alliances, the NIP and JI led the anti-Ayub charge.  During the 1964-1965 (indirect) 
elections, most of the Deobandi ‘alәma supported the seventy-one-year-old Fatima 
Jinnah, sister of Pakistan’s deceased founder and considered by many to be the “Mother 
of the Nation” (madәr-e-myllәt).  Their support probably had less to do with Fatima 
Jinnah’s specific platform (which revolved around a restoration of democracy and the 
elimination of Ayub’s presidential system) than with her position as the chief opposition 
figure contesting Ayub Khan for power.  In their opposition to the regime, the Deobandi 
scholars were joined by disenfranchised politicians (thousands of whom had been 
disqualified by Ayub’s Elective Bodies Disqualification Order, or EBDO, from 
participation in politics), East Pakistanis who felt ostracized by a “West Pakistani 
soldier-President,” lawyers who opposed Ayub’s tight control over the judiciary, 
Frontier Province inhabitants following Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan in his quest for 
Pathan autonomy (and thus his opposition to a single, West Pakistani unit), and 
refugees who felt that their claims for property compensation had been ignored.  Each of 
these parties, in one way or another, resented Ayub Khan’s dictatorial position.  He had, 
after all, “EBDOed” around seven thousand of the country’s most influential (and 
oppositional) politicians, had enacted the Press and Publications Ordinances to muzzle 
the press, and had enacted the University Ordinance to keep students and faculty out of 
politics (by threatening them with degree removal), among other actions.139 
Even so, Ayub Khan won the election (which was widely believed to have been 
rigged by the regime).  Countrywide, 63.3% of the vote allegedly came down for Ayub 
Khan, with 36.3% voting for Fatima Jinnah.  The only Division won by Jinnah in the 
western zone at all was Karachi, the stronghold of her base; much of Ayub’s success in 
the rest of Sindh was attributed to the role of his loyalist Barelvi and landlord network.  
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“Sind…was safe for Ayub as the pirs (spiritual guides) and mirs (landlords) could not 
possibly defy the Government,” wrote one academic commentator a year later.140  In 
East Pakistan, the “vote” was closer, but Ayub still eked out a victory.  Some of his 
supporters—including his son Gohar—stoked the flames of opposition by parading 
through the more anti-Ayub neighborhoods of Karachi (again, Fatima’s Jinnah’s base of 
support) with the alleged intention to “kill, burn, and loot”; at least thirty people died in 
these post-election “Black Monday” clashes (and Gohar Ayub Khan himself was charged 
with fatally shooting a man, though essentially nothing came of it as the “inquiry” was 
“halted”).141  Still, the JUI didn’t openly oppose the regime until 1968, when the party 
officially joined the opposition.  One of the JUI’s leaders would later be seriously injured 
in a police-instigated clash during a joint JUI-Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) gathering 
in Lahore; government forces had charged attendees with batons, brutally beating 
many.  The JUI’s joint action with the socialist PPP vividly illustrates how overarching 
the issue of the ruling government’s perceived hostility to a truly Islamic order was to 
the Deobandi ‘alәma.  To anyone who remembered the JUH’s joint struggle in concert 
with the Hindus during pre-Partition days, however, against the British common 
enemy, such action seemed to fall neatly within the Deobandi political tradition.  In any 
case, in response to the government’s harsh actions, the JUI carried out a protest 
march—joined by several other, non-religious parties—demanding freedom from such 
tyranny and the long-promised (at least in the eyes of many among the ‘alәma) 
Islamization of Pakistan.  During this period, leading Deobandi ‘alym mufti Mahmud 
was particularly vocal in his criticism against the Ayub Khan regime.142  Mahmud was a 
graduate of the dar ul’alwm at Deoband, and like most Deobandi ‘alәma had opposed the 
call for Pakistan’s establishment, opting to cooperate instead with the JUH and the 
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Indian National Congress.  He had joined the JUI in 1956 on the occasion of a large 
party conference, together with future NWFP JUI leader mwlana Ghulam Ghaus 
Hazarvi, and (with Ghulam Ghaus) is generally considered the figure responsible for the 
JUI’s transformation from a “purely religious movement” to a “political party.”143  (This 
author would contend that the JUI was always political; what changed under the 
leadership of Hazarvi and Mahmud was strategy.  Whereas before the organization was 
more of an influencer, it would now function as a political party in every sense of the 
term, among other things directly fielding election cadidates.  The Barelvi JUP would 
undergo much the same transformation around the same time.)  Both Hazarvi and 
Mahmud served as JUI representatives within the National Assembly and the West 
Pakistan provincial assembly during much of the Ayub Khan era.  Such pronounced 
differences, generally speaking, between the Barelvi and Deobandi spiritual leadership 
in regards to politics during this period make statements like Qureshi’s, who wrote that 
by the early 1960s “in the modern context sectarian differences have lost their 
importance,” more than a little puzzling.144  
Only once was Ayub Khan able to distract the oppositional (predominantly 
Deobandi) ‘alәma enough to mostly suppress their dissent against his rule.  This 
distraction took the form, predictably, of a war—specifically, the September 1965 
Kashmir War with India.  Pakistanis and some Kashmiris had waited for more than a 
decade for any sort of plebiscite (mandated, it will be remembered, after the first 
Kashmir War by the United Nations) to settle the matter by popular vote.  Throughout 
that time, India had gradually but inexhorably tightened its grip on the region, more or 
less “absorbing” it as a part of the Indian state, despite frequent bursts of militant 
infiltration coming from the direction of Pakistan’s western zone.  (Meanwhile, Indian 
  
  366 
government officials blamed just such infiltrations for the delay in solving the dispute.  
“The threats of violence which have been [coming] from Pakistan must cease,” stated 
the Indian representative to the UN Security Council in 1964. “Once better atmosphere 
prevails, it would be possible—we are prepared to discuss with Pakistan all our 
outstanding differences.”)145  The most flagrant Indian assault on Kashmir’s “disputed” 
status, however, came in 1964 and early 1965, when India changed its constitution so as 
to “make Kashmiri administration essentially the same” as other Indian units.146  The 
move seemed to signal to many Pakistanis that India had decided to out-and-out ignore 
the Pakistan government’s claim, throw out any UN mandates connected to it, and 
simply seize Kashmir for itself once and for all.   
As these events coincided with Pakistan’s elections and Ayub Khan’s campaign 
against Fatima Jinnah, it makes sense that the President (with the help of his Foreign 
Minister—one Zulfiqar ‘Ali Bhutto) would throughout the contest stress Pakistan’s 
struggle for Kashmir as a diversion from “democracy and Islamicity.”147  Along this 
same tack, and in response to growing opposition at home (led to a considerable degree 
by the JI and the NIP), Ayub Khan had launched a minor war with India over the Rann 
of Kutch.  (According to Ayub Khan’s son, Gohar Ayub Khan, speaking in 2005, his 
father had purchased a “Secret Plan” to attack Pakistan from an Indian Army Brigadier 
in 1965 for twenty thousand rupees; the purchase was later denied by an ex-Pakistan 
Army chief).148  If the conflict was a power-consolidating ploy, it worked.  Thousands of 
Pakistanis, of both the Deobandi and Barelvi persuasion, were suddenly gripped with 
Islamo-patriotic fervor.  One recounting of events, from the pen of a well-known 
Deobandi mufti, is illustrative in this regard: 
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In 1964 or 1965, I had accompanied my father to Makkah to perform the 
Hajj.  One day, one Arab shopkeeper disclosed to me that war had begun 
between Pakistan and India at [the] Rann of Kutch.  I cannot describe 
my feelings on hearing this news.  When we returned home after Hajj, 
the war was over.  Every child recounted the brave feat of our 
courageous armed forces and the faith-inspiring stories of Allah’s help.  
The laughable episodes of the cowardice of the Indian forces were the 
topic of every assembly.  The Pakistan armed forces had routed the 
enemy much before the volunteers [i.e. jyhadis] could participate.149  
 
Absent from the memoir is any trace of enmity toward the Ayub Khan regime, or any 
doubt about the Pakistani government’s righteousness.  The writer, instead, is wrapped 
up in the “faith-inspiring” struggle, and animosity is preserved for the unbelieving 
“Indian forces.”  The twenty-nine-year-old son of Muhammad Shafi even remembered 
being “inspired” by the President’s 6 September speech to the nation—a speech that 
included a recitation of the kәlymәħ and an admonition both to the military and “the 
common man” to participate in jyhad.  “Those who…heard his speech,” Shafi’s son 
wrote, thirty years after Ayub Khan’s homily, “may be remembering its appeal even 
today.”  Though Pakistani volunteers were generally not permitted to fight at the front, 
many received civil defense and first aid training.  Deobandi mufti Muhammad Rafi 
Usmani, who was teaching at the dar ul’alwm at Karachi at the time, remembers 
watching the Pakistan Air Force planes zooming through the sky, “chasing the enemy 
aircraft,” and described how spectators shed “tears of joy,” their “hearts full of prayers,” 
caught up in the deep feelings of the moment.150  Briefly, then, Ayub Khan not only 
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secured his own position but also brought Deobandi and Barelvi scholars and their 
followers together, in a sense, against a common enemy. 
Pakistan slightly outperformed India throughout the April and May fighting on the 
Rann before a June cease-fire (and a promised arbitration between the two enemy states) 
brought an end to armed combat.  Meanwhile, however, an uprising had broken out in 
Kashmir (almost certainly instigated by agents taking orders from the Ayub Khan 
regime itself), prompting Indian troops to occupy strategic positions across the cease-fire 
line (or CFL, later called the “Line of Control,” or LoC) in Pakistani territory.  This was 
in August.  Ayub Khan’s response was to invade Jammu (1 September), which elicited a 
counter-invasion of Pakistan by India.  Some of the worst fighting took place on the 
very outskirts of major cities like Lahore and Sialkot.  The conflict was prevented from 
escalating into an all-out war after a 23 September UN-proclaimed cease-fire made 
possible by pressure from both Washington and Moscow.  Throughout the conflict, 
Ayub Khan worked hard to win the ‘alәma to his side.  Verses of the Qur’an were 
printed on the front page of newspapers, urging “believers” to fight.151  Long-time 
nemesis Mawdudi even called for a jyhad in Kashmir (thus reverting his earlier position, 
aforementioned), and after the 23 September cease-fire was invited onto Radio Pakistan 
to “speak on jihad in peacetime.”  The ‘alәma parties organized relief efforts for the 
border areas most affected by the conflict, all the while hoping that now a plebscite 
might be forthcoming.152  “There is a considerable reservoir of religious emotions,” 
wrote one commentator shortly after the war, “that a Pakistan Government can draw 
upon for purposes of national unity during a time of crisis.”153  In conducting the war, 
Ayub was seen as possessing an “independent foreign policy” (however engineered by 
Zulfiqar ‘Ali Bhutto)—i.e. independent from the West.  This sat well with most of the 
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‘alәma.  In addition, many ‘alәma looked on approvingly as other Muslim countries 
(notably Turkey, Iran, and Indonesia) offered military and/or moral support for 
Pakistan’s Kashmir fight (several Arab countries passed a joint resolution supporting 
Pakistan, too).154  But with the war over and Ayub Khan’s status temporarily repaired 
(he had fought the Indians despite pressure from the U.S. Government, and had won an 
“election,” to boot), the government abruptly seemed less interested in placating the 
religious scholars and their parties.   
But after the January 1966 Tashkent Declaration, which officially ended the India-
Pakistan conflict (at least for the time-being), any renewed popularity that Ayub Khan 
might have enjoyed began to wane.  Many were greatly unsatisfied by the agreement’s 
provisions; it seemed to some as a document of acquiescence on Pakistan’s part, 
restoring as it did the 1949 cease-fire line combined with a comittment by both states 
not to interfere in the internal affairs of one another.  Was this not a surrender of the 
original Kashmir claim?  (One of Ayub Khan’s most powerful critics: Zulfiqar ‘Ali 
Bhutto, his own very aggressive Foreign Minister; Bhutto would resign in June 1966.)  
Disillusionment over the Declaration combined with a debilitating sickness that ailed 
Ayub Khan from 1967 until the spring of 1968 (at one point the President was even 
“unconscious for a time”); though he would continue to weild the powers of his office, he 
was “never his old self again,” depending far more heavily on advisors of dubious ability 
and qualifications.  Allegations that the 1965 elections had been rigged by the 
government, of widespread corruption within the regime and within Ayub Khan’s own 
family (said to be worth tens of millions of dollars), and a perceived widening socio-
economic disparity between the super-rich and the poor likewise affected the President’s 
popularity.  Protests against the regime began to make noise again throughout the 
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country, which the increasingly desperate Ayub Khan attempted to quash using brutal 
force—resulting in the deaths of several students and an array of arrests amidst the 
subsequent rioting.155  An (unsuccessful) attempt was made on the President’s life on a 
foggy day in mid-November (on the same day, incidentally, that four Yemeni would-be 
assassins tried to terminate the life of American President Richard Nixon, an early 
example of “blowback” for U.S. government intervention in the Muslim world).156  Still, 
Ayub had managed to consolidate his position so well that, even with this growing 
surge of opposition, he remained more secure than not.  By October 1967, the 
President’s main opposition came in the form of the Pakistan Democratic Movement 
(PDM), which included both the JI and the NIP; despite achieving “visible unity” after 
five months of inter-party bickering, however, PDM leaders admitted they held “bleak 
hope” of actually seizing the reigns of power from Ayub.  The President “is entrenched 
and secure,” the alliance conceded, with a wide base of support in the Army and across 
sections of West Pakistan.  The role of the opposition “under the present restrictions,” 
said NIP head (and former Prime Minister) Chaudhri Muhammad ‘Ali, was to at least 
“maintain the country’s conscience.”157  Despite the president’s perceived 
“entrenchment,” however, it was clear that public opinion against the regime was 
spreading. 
By 1969, even the Barelvi spiritual and political leadership that had remained loyal 
to the regime had ascertained the direction of the political winds.  JUP leaders and their 
supporters had spoken out strongly against the government’s interference in the “purely 
religious matter” of the moon sighting for Eid (subsequently two Eids were celebrated 
in 1967, one according to the regime’s schedule and the other according to that of the 
‘alәma); when their criticism became too much to bear, the Ayub Khan government 
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imprisoned five of the most vocal Islamic scholars, including the aforementioned Barelvi 
acolyte of Naimuddin Moradabadi, Muhammad Hussain Naeemi.  This, combined with a 
general Barelvi sense that Ayub Khan had not delivered on the promises he had made to 
them (regarding amendments to the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance and the 
enforcement of shәri’at, for example), caused the JUP to unhitch its wagon from the 
regime’s sputtering train.  Indeed, sensing that continued support of the Ayub 
government would injure their status, as well as their continued claim to represent the 
Sunni majority, the JUP joined the oppoisition to Ayub Khan—but only after purging 
Abdul Hamid Badayuni (whose aforementioned support for the government was 
characterized as “continued and unconditional”) from party leadership.  (Two breakaway 
groups resulted from this move: one led by Badayuni and another led by Faizal Hasan, 
both of which actually released statements supporting Ayub Khan.)158  The move to rid 
the upper echelons of the JUP of Abdul Hamid Badayuni was led by sayyid Abul Barakat 
Ahmad, and accomplished on 5 January 1969.159  Thus the Ayub Khan government’s 
continued rejection of ‘alәma demands for an Islamic state, plus external political 
pressure from both religious and non-religious quarters across the country, combined to 
briefly unite the positions, again, of the Deobandi and Barelvi parties, at least in terms 
of their rejection of Ayub Khan and his government. 
In January 1969, an alliance of eight parties—including both the JUI and the JI—
was formed under the name Democratic Action Committee.  The organization’s 
overarching goal was to effect the restoration of “democracy” by coordinating a “mass 
movement” against the Ayub Khan regime.  Within the Committee, JUI leader mufti 
Mahmud continued to urge his fellow anti-Ayub agitators that any amendments to a 
future Pakistani constitution should be based on the aforementioned and ‘alәma-
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formulated “Twenty-Two Principles.”160  Whether motived by the Democratic Action 
Committee or borne of local, “spontaneous” dissent, demonstrations sprung up all over 
the country.  In response, the flailing regime sent military units into Pakistan’s major 
cities, including Lahore, Dhaka, Khulna, Karachi, and Peshawar, and imposed a curfew.  
But these actions were largely ineffective, and especially in rural areas the people mostly 
ignored the curfew.  The next month (February), Ayub Khan, sensing a lack of 
confidence in him even from some of his own generals, attempted the conciliatory route 
aimed at the politicians, inviting the Democratic Action Committee to a round table 
conference in Rawalpindi.  There he agreed not only to the introduction of a new 
constitution in the foreseeable future, but also not to stand for reelection in 1970.  But 
Ayub’s gamble didn’t pay off; on 25 March 1969, Martial Law was once again declared, 
its chief administrator Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistani Army General Agha 
Muhammad Yahya Khan, and the 1962 constitution was officially abrogated.  After the 
subsequent resignation of Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan became President of Pakistan, 
vowing National Assembly elections (not of the indirect, Ayub Khan variety, but based 
on adult franchise) and a new, Assembly-formualted constitution. 
After the 1965 Kashmir War, opposition to the Ayub Khan regime seemed to be 
colored less and less by Islamist tones and more and more by socialist ones.  This, of 
course, greatly concerned the ‘alәma on both sides of the Deobandi-Barelvi aisle, who 
began to sense that perhaps the greater threat to the establishment of an Islamic order 
in Pakistan wasn’t the waning dictatorial regime of Ayub Khan at all, nor the 
President’s modernism—but a growing wave of socialist ideology.  Indeed, much of the 
opposition to the Ayub Khan regime had far less to do with Islam than with socio-
economic factors like poverty and food shortages.  The ‘alәma had long blamed such 
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things on the failure of government to institute an Islamic order, which, they theorized, 
would put an end to such misery by instituting a God-inspired politico-economic 
system.  But the socialists were offering an alternate plan, one that was attached to 
grand promises of prosperity, equality, justice—and an end to hunger and suffering at 
the hands of greedy power-seekers.  In addition, while the religious parties stressed 
Islam as a unifying force, thereby underscoring an overarching “nationalism” and the 
unity of Pakistan, the left appeared far more sympathetic to “ethnic and linguistic 
setiments” and “socioeconomic cleavages” that the ‘alәma, generally speaking, seemed to 
ignore altogether.161  It was with such promises on his lips that Zulfiqar ‘Ali Bhutto left 
the government to form the Pakistan People’s Party, promoting the image of Ayub 
Khan as a symbol of inequality; the failure of the old PDM, with all of its pessimism, to 
garner widespread popular support in West Pakistan thus set the stage for the PPP’s 
rise, with its far more positive outlook and fantastic assurances based on “democratic 
socialism.”162  By the time the round table conference in Rawalpindi between the 
Democratic Action Committee and Ayub Khan had ended, the relevance of the former 
had been eclipsed by the rising—and now clearly more powerful—(moderately socialist) 
Awami League, based in the eastern zone, and the heavily socialist (even quasi-
communist) Pakistan People’s Party, based in the western zone.  Bhutto was, proclaimed 
a somewhat adoring Western media, “Asia’s new champion of socialism.”   
As such, the invective of the ‘alәma parties, while still aimed at the crumbling Ayub 
Khan regime, turned against the leadership of the Awami League and the PPP—and the 
socialist ideology that they espoused.  Mawdudi was particularly irritated by the 
aforementioned parties’ attempts at “mix[ing] Islam with leftist ideas.”  On 27 
February 1969, the ‘alәma of West Pakistan, representing both Deobandis and Barelvis, 
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launched a campaign “to condemn socialism and communism.”  The campaign’s 
microphone was the mosque: indeed, “almost every mosque in the western province.”  
This effort, not coincidentally, coincided with ‘aid ul-әżha (the lesser of the two Eid 
holidays, celebrated in remembrance of the willingness of both Ibrahim and Ismail 
[Abraham and Isaac] to submit to the will of God)—meaning that tens of millions of 
Muslims would be attending the mәsjyd as part of the festival’s observance.  Pakistan 
had been established on the foundation of Islam, warned the ‘alәma of Rawalpindi 
(where, just 24 hours before, Bhutto himself “received a rousing welcome”), but the 
“socialists…would undo the fabric of Islamic law.”163  By 1969, the anti-Ayub campaign 
of the ‘alәma had been overshadowed almost completely by the new conflict between the 
religious scholar-jurists and the “militant leftists” and their “champion,” Bhutto.  The 
situation reached a breaking point in March, when even the Ayub Khan regime 
“threatened firm action to suppress lawlessness” in reference to the newly emerged 
rivalry.  On the 14th, Mawdudi had reportedly admonished his followers to “silence the 
tongue that utters the word socialism.”  This was succeeded the next day by a failed 
attempt to kidnap and murder aforementioned pro-Mao and pro-Bhutto NAP leader 
mwlana Bhashani while the eighty-six-year-old was traveling by train from Lahore to 
Karachi (though the old man was slightly injured, the attempt failed).  The agitation 
against Ayub Khan had resulted in at least one hundred fifty deaths between November 
1968 and March 1969, and it was clear now that the regime’s days were numbered; the 
‘alәma parties now vied with Bhutto and the leftists for political supremacy.164 
When Ayub Khan resigned, ‘alәma party leaders called on the Awami League and 
the PPP to “demobilize” now that their chief target—Ayub—had been defeated, an 
admonition that Bhutto and Mujib failed to heed, of course.  No longer cooperatively 
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opposed to the now-defunct regime of Ayub Khan, parties like the JI on one side and the 
Awami League and the PPP on the other hit the streets to campaign against one 
another.165  
 
Yahya Khan, the 1970 Elections,  and the Birth of Bangladesh . 
After the fall of the Ayub Khan administration in March of 1969, political activity 
more or less ceased in Pakistan for about ten months.  Martial law had been established.  
This would last until early January 1970.  It was during this short apolitical 
interregnum that the Barelvi luminaries guiding the JUP, mwlana Abu’l Barakat sәyyid 
Ahmad Qadiri at the helm, decided to focus on that party’s most pressing problem: 
unity.  For it was quite obvious to even the most unobservant party insider that, since 
years—even decades—before Partition, the great ‘alәma and pirs who claimed to 
represent the vast majority of Sunni Muslims had lacked not only the support of the 
people, but also of one another.  After the resumption of political activities (from 1 
January 1970, with general elections secheduled for 5 October), the JUP made several 
efforts to bring the party’s many apparently disparate parts together.  This was 
necessary in order to restore a government of the people—the majority of whom, they 
insisted, certainly looked to them, their spiritual guides, for direction and leadership.  
Just as the Deobandi JUI had done in the days leading up to Partition, and just as the 
Deobandi-leaning JI was doing now, rival religious parties—better organized, more 
determined, and far more unified—were hijacking the political process and threatening 
to institute their apostate versions of Islam via the guns of government.  For the sake of 
the “eighty percent,” whose religious guardians they were, the “Sunnis” must demand the 
representation they deserved.  “Secularism” and “Socialism” and “Capitalism”—these 
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were significant menaces, certainly.  But always present, too, was the threat posed by 
“rival religious sects” (especially if their political wings seemed to experience more 
electoral success than that of the Barelvis). It was time to fix the problem and stand as 
one. 
All of this served as the backdrop to mwlana Abu’l Barakat sәyyid Ahmad Qadiri’s 
call for a meeting in Lahore.  The day was to be 25 January 1969.  After some 
discussion, the assembled religious scholars and dignitaries decided to form a thirteen-
member committee to act as a sort of central coordinating organ for the various 
scattered and disjointed JUP groups across the country.  The committee met again ten 
months later in Gujranwala (November) and then again in Lyallpur (December).  Try as 
they might, however, the Barelvis simply could not unite under a single, cohesive 
platform, despite the recognized fact that such unity would be necessary “in order to 
check the activities of Secularists, Socialists and rival religious sects” (italics added).  
Barelvi leaders condemned the fragmentation that seemed to plague their party—but 
this was typically followed by placing blame on one or another of their own members, 
leading to further division.  Perhaps another committee, another board, another “high 
command,” composed of the “Presidents and [general secretaries] of every group” was 
the answer.  But such suggestions were never brought to fruition, and the original 
committee remained the only one.  Such a proposal was agreed upon at one January 
1970 meeting of JUP officials at Sangla Hill, presided over by xәwajәħ Qamaruddin 
Sialvi, only to be rejected by a faction led by mwlana Abdul Ghafoor Hazarvi.  To make 
matters worse, sahybzada qazi Muhammad Fazl-e-Rasul, president of the Hazarvi 
faction of the West Pakistan JUP (the provincial branch of the JUP), who had been 
appointed to that office a year before, stepped down from office; the reason he provided 
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at the time of his resignation: the “other groups [within the JUP]” were “working for 
their own interests and had damaged the unity among the Ahl-e-Sunnat.”  The next 
month Hazarvi himself resigned, too, though he was later “forced” to withdraw his 
resignation.  Meanwhile, yet another JUP faction, this one led by Mahmud Shah 
Gujrati, functioned more or less on its own, only nominally tied to the greater party.  
Despite all of the JUP leadership’s efforts, the party’s disunity appeared quite 
insurmountable.166 
* 
Yahya’s regime superceded the civilian government bureaucracy more than any of 
its predecessors, severely straining the unspoken bureaucracy-military partnership that 
had marked previous administrations.  But even with the military assuming such a 
dominating role, in the words of one standard history, “Yahya Khan and his military 
advisors proved no more capable of overcoming the nation’s problems than their 
predecessors.”167  At least part of this lay in Yahya Khan’s dictatorial nature, one that 
conflicted with the seemingly “democratic” demands of the opposition.  All this did not 
mean that the new state head wouldn’t try to solve Pakistan’s woes, however.  On 28 
November 1969, he announced his plan to see the country return to constitutional 
government, a bone thrown to those who feared he might be a military dictator.  
National Assembly general elections were fixed for 5 October 1970, later pushed back to 
December; this would have major political consequences, as the “Bhola Cyclone”—the 
deadliest tropical cyclone ever recorded—would strike East Pakistan in November, 
killing as many as half a million people.  (The Yahya regime’s handling of relief efforts 
in East Pakistan was harshly criticized by Bengalis and likely contributed much to the 
Awami League’s overwhelming electoral victory the next month.)  Yahya’s announced 
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plan was for the National Assembly, once elected, to have one hundred twenty days to 
formulate a constitution; there would be no undue delay, no years-long squabbling over 
the state’s ruling document.  In addition, Yahya Khan promised the eventual institution 
of a truly federal system, characterized by “maximum provincial autonomy,” almost 
certainly an attempt to assuage nationalist Bengalis (and, specifically, the Awami 
League), who had been pressing for their “Six Points” (see endnote) for several years 
already.168  On the issue of taxation, however—one of the “Six Points” demanded that 
the power to tax be vested only in the provinces, with the federal government then 
entitled to a certain share—Yahya Khan put his foot down, claiming for the central 
government the all-important taxation power.  Not surprisingly, given his authoritarian 
tendencies, Yahya vested in himself final authority to approve, or disapprove, the future 
constitution as formulated by the National Assembly.  This, in a nutshell, was the 
Yahya plan for fulfilling the promises of Pakistan’s founding. 
The JI, however tacitly at first, supported the Yahya Khan regime.  Yahya had 
vowed, after all, to destroy any party opposed to the “ideology of Pakistan”—a 
politician’s phrase that allowed various parties to interpret its meaning through their 
own particular lenses.  For the JI, the “ideology of Pakistan” clearly meant an espousal 
of the country’s Islamic identity.  Just as importantly, though, the “ideology of Pakistan” 
was interpreted as a hostile statement aimed at the leftist parties like the PPP and the 
Awami League.  The JI, then, essentially threw in with Yahya in order to cleanse 
Pakistan of the greater evil of socialism/communism.  To a lesser extent, the JI’s 
support for the regime was also based on the “ideology of Pakistan” as an ideology of 
unity—meaning that the policy demands of such traitors as provincial nationalists, 
especially Bengali nationalists or, worse, would-be secessionists, should be stamped out.  
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Thus, in the words of Nasr, “Political exigency had led Islamic constitutionalism into an 
unholy alliance with the very regime it had fought against.”169  In this, the JI had 
adopted the unified-state stance of the majority of Barelvi leaders, as opposed to the 
more province-level outlook of the Deobandis.  For their part, the JUI distanced itself 
quickly from the JI, a rift that continues to the time of this writing.  (Part and parcel to 
this distance was the behavior of many among younger-generation JI members and 
supporters, particularly those of university age; on the University of Karachi campus, 
for example, those belonging to this latter category were mockingly referred to by some 
students as “Disco mwlvis”—“modernly attired and beardless” members of the JI’s 
student wing who liked pop music and had girlfriends, to boot, but who nonetheless 
proscribed to the Jamaat’s religio-political philosophy.)170  Indeed, the schism would 
play a major role in the development of the “Taliban” (about which more later).   
But the JUI itself, like the JUP (though not quite to the same extent), was during 
this period afflicted with division, and that division centered around the issue of 
socialism.  Some Deobandi leaders saw socialism as a potential vehicle for arriving at 
the Islamic egalitarian ideal—though only a vehicle; Islam was, after all, a “complete way 
of life” that needed no substitution, either by socialism or any other ideology.  Those 
calling for the Islamic parties to divert their attention to the destruction of socialism, 
this faction argued, were merely “imperialist agents” working, whether knowingly or 
not, for the Anglo-American establishment.  Those arguing in this vein included JUI 
leaders mufti Mahmud and mufti Hazarvi, who were instrumental in forging alliances 
between their faction (the All-Pakistan JUI, the bigger faction of the two; hereafter, for 
the sake of continuity, the author will continue to refer to this faction as the JUI) and 
several left-leaning political parties.  Other Deobandi scholars viewed socialism as a 
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western philosophy that would only serve to steer Pakistan further from becoming an 
Islamic state.  The faction espousing this latter philosophy (the Markazi JUI [MJUI], 
along with elements of the NIP) was perhaps led most prominently by Muhammad 
Shafi and Zafar Ahmad Usmani, who in February 1970 both signed a juridical ruling 
(along with one hundred eleven other ‘alәma, mostly Barelvis but including several Shi’a 
clerics, too) flatly declaring socialism “apostasy” and its proponents unbelievers.  The 
MJUI at times worked with the JI in condemnation of both socialism and those 
Deobandi clerics who had thrown in their lot with it.  An August 1969 attempt to 
reconcile the two factions succeeded only in getting each to agree not to malign the 
other.  The main party, led by mufti Mahmud, campaigned on a platform that included 
both Islamic and welfarist/socialist thrusts.  The former included a call for the 
institution of the old “Twenty-Two Points” for an Islamic constitution, the exclusion 
from the definition of “Muslim” of any who did not believe in the finality of the Prophet, 
the requirement for the head of state to be a Sunni, the banning of non-Muslim 
missionary efforts in Pakistan, and the institution of mandatory congregational 
prayers.171  True to the traditional Deobandi opposition to imperialism—which, by now, 
included the American variety (and mufti Mahmud, as aforementioned, was strongly 
anti-American for this reason, condemning the U.S. Government’s interventions in the 
Middle East)—the JUI’s manifesto called for an independent foreign policy, devoid of 
alliances with western powers.172 
Eight months after the announcement of his plan for elections and a new Pakistani 
constitution, Yahya dissolved the “One Unit Plan” then in place for West Pakistan, 
restoring its four original provinces to their former status.  At the same time, the parity 
system (under which East and West had enjoyed equal representation at the federal 
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level) was discontinued in favor of a population-based system; under the latter 
arrangement, former West Pakistan was allotted a total of one hundred thirty-eight 
seats in the National Assembly, compared to the more populous East Pakistan’s one 
hundred sixty-two. 
The religious parties threw themselves forcefully into the elections of 1970—the 
first “one person, one vote” elections in Pakistani history.  The Muslim scholars of both 
schools were convinced that, given the choice, the vast majority of Pakistanis would 
elect candidates from the religious parties, pious and committed to Islam.  Some of the 
repressive laws that had been put in place under the Martial Law administration were 
lifted or softened for the sake of the election; the press was mostly de-muzzled and a 
relaxing of free speech and assembly restrictions occurred, too.  As such, National 
Assembly seat contestants and their parties campaigned hard to win voters—and 
lambast their opponents.  In this, the JUI and JUP (as well as the JI) were not nearly as 
effective as their left-leaning opponents.  In recognizably communist fashion, Zulfiqar 
‘Ali Bhutto promised “bread, clothes, and a house” (rwti, kәpra, awr mәkan) for all 
(simultaneously—and, some economists might say, contradictingly, pledging Pakistan 
to a “thousand year war with India,” a point he tried to backtrack from a few months 
later).  His campaign and those of other PPP National Assembly hopefuls was focused 
almost entirely on Pakistan’s western wing, with strong support in Punjab and Sindh.173  
Meanwhile, the Awami League, based and focused almost exclusively in the eastern 
zone, continued to dominate Bengali politics, riding the “Six Points” program with help 
from the general Bengali perception that West Pakistan was indifferent to them.  As 
mentioned previously, this feeling was greatly exacerbated after the apparent failure of 
the federal government, led mostly be West Pakistanis, to send sufficient aid to cyclone 
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ravaged areas of Bengal.  Even the National Awami Party (a “successor” to the old KK 
movement of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan),174 with which the JUI would later form 
coalition governments in the NWFP and Baluchistan (again, siding with a lesser evil in 
the name of defeating the greater), ran on a platform of “socialism, democracy, 
nationalization of industries, [and] a welfare state.”175  The campaigns of both the PPP 
and the Awami League, as well as that of the smaller NAP, underscored both parties’ 
strategy of appealing first and foremost to the public’s socio-economic grievances (in the 
West focusing on poverty and government corruption, in the East on poverty, East-
West financial disparities, and government negligence). 
The ‘alәma parties (including the JI) failed to tap into such grievances, focusing 
instead throughout the 1970 election campaign season (and as always) on the 
Islamization of Pakistan as the panacea for the country’s many problems.  Indeed, the 
main thrust of the Barelvi and Deobandi religio-political organizations tended strongly, 
as ever, towards the establishment of an Islamic order.  Apart from Islamization, most 
of the ‘alәma stressed opposition to provincial nationalist (and secessionist) movements, 
as well as a resoration, in time, of “democracy” (by means of this last maintaining a 
veneer of opposition to the regime).  (It should be noted that a large faction of the JUI 
supported greater autonomy—and even outright independence—for the Pathan 
northwest, or “Pakhtunistan.”)  The PPP’s economic “solutions,” insisted the JI, were 
based on false premises; only “Islam” could serve as a “rememdy,” to Pakistan’s so-called 
social justic issues.  In East Pakistan, JI activists literally clashed with Awami League 
workers and sympathizers; one member of the JI’s male student wing was killed in a 
confrontation at Dhaka University, prompting Mawdudi to demand “that the [student 
group] cleanse Pakistani universities of the left.”  More died—on both sides—in other 
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clashes across the country’s far eastern province.  Indeed, the JI’s activities, and in 
particular the party’s observation of what it dubbed “Glory of Islam Day” (ywm-e-
shwkәt-e-yslam) on 30 May, brought the Deobandis and Barelvis, in the shape of their 
respective political parties, together in another show of “separate unity.”  JI members, 
workers, and sympathizers celebrated “Glory of Islam Day” via demonstrations, parades 
and marches, speeches, and protest rallies; their goal was to throw the spotlight onto 
Islam as the most important political issue (as opposed to the left’s emphasis on 
economics-related promises).   
But to the JUI under mufti Mahmud (who by now had consolidated his power at the 
top of the party structure by taking over the “Pashtun faction” of the JUI), the 
celebration smacked of opportunism, and represented an attempt on Mawdudi’s part to 
set himself up as a sort of religious head.  In this the JI chief was usurping the 
traditional role of the ‘alәma and thereby “monopolizing religious thought.”  The JUI 
thus opposed ywm-e-shwkәt-e-yslam and a schism ensued.  The JUP, too, demonstrated 
its opposition to the JI when it contested the party directly in forty-two National 
Assembly seat races—effectively splitting the religious vote and more or less ensuring 
PPP victory in those particular races.176  Meanwhile, the JUI put forward its own 
candidates as well.  It is interesting to note that while both the Deobandi JUI and the 
Barelvi JUP opposed the JI, and for the same reason, no alliance between the two—even 
in the name of advancing the cause of an Islamic constitution—ever took place.  Rather, 
they contested each other, especially in Punjab and Sindh.  This only accomplished in 
watering down the religious vote.  The Deobandi-Barelvi dynamic had weakened the 
religious parties’ political chances yet again. 
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Perhaps it is not surprising that no united Deobandi-Barelvi effort took place during 
the 1970 elections.  Apart from their long-standing religious rivalry, the JUP in 
particular could scarcely unite within itself.  One segment of the Barelvi leadership even 
sided with Bhutto’s PPP, remaining seemingly unmoved in their decision despite calls 
(and even juridical rulings) condemning their position.  After all of the failed attempts 
over the previous months to bring the various factions within the party together, a 
“grand meeting” of Barelvi ‘alәma was convened on 4 April in Lahore.  Only one major 
JUP faction—that of Mahmud Shah Gujrati—failed to attend.  One of the key 
stumbling blocks to achieving intra-party harmony was the seemingly perpetual state of 
disagreement and mutual mistrust displayed by its several leaders.  The Lahore meeting 
took drastic steps to combat this, accepting or forcing the resignation of five key 
officials (including party president Abdul Hamid Badayuni, who, though not personally 
present, had wired his approbation both of the meeting and its decisions) within the 
JUP.  “After all these resignations,” wrote one JUP historian, “the differences of the 
Sunni Ulama were bridged…”  A twenty-five-person committee was appointed to act as 
the party’s “executive supreme council.”  Another committee, this one composed of six 
members, was also appointed—with the task of composing an official JUP manifesto.  
Combined with the JUP’s direct contestation of the elections later that year, this marked 
the completion of the transformation of the JUP from quasi-politico-religious movement 
to full-fledged religio-political party. 
The JUP platform would highlight the “cause of Islam,” blaming the Ayub Khan 
regime as well as the newly ascendant socialist parties for twisting the faith, at the same 
time condemning “Regionalism” and those “threatening guerilla war” (these last two 
referred especially to the separatism brewing in Pakistan’s eastern wing).  One JUP 
  
  385 
leader, Mahmud Ahmad Rizvi (the convener of the newly formed party central 
committee) even suggested that the party form its own army to stamp out the threat of 
would-be secessionists and/or advocates of guerilla war, though nothing official appears 
to have come of it.  JUP candidates demanded not only that shәri’at be strictly and 
immediately instituted in Pakistan, but that ninety percent of the armed forces should 
be comprised of “Sunnis.”  The JUP promise: “As long as a single Sunni is alive, no 
other ‘ism’ can establish its roots in Pakistan.”  Like the JI and the JUI, the JUP focused 
on placing Islam and the establishment of a truly Islamc government in Pakistan atop 
the political pedestal, ahead of the PPP’s socio-economic emphases.  As to the latter, the 
long-overdue institution of an “Islamic” economic system, the JUP insisted, was the 
answer to such problems.177  A mostly united front had been created behind the Barelvi 
religious leadership, though it wouldn’t take more than a few months for some major 
cracks in its foundation to appear. 
Calls for Islam to remain the front-and-center issue on the political stage, emanating 
from the JUI, the JI, and the JUP, went mostly unheeded.  The religious parties’ own 
divisions, not to mention their rivalries one with another, further eroded their ability to 
contest the elections as major players.  Indeed, during the election period there were 
some who even proclaimed the “consummation” of the “process of political 
secularization” trail-blazed by Sir sayyid Ahmad Khan; from now on, these 
commentators asserted, “economic issues will determine the dynamics of politics”—not 
questions of theology.178  And as aforementioned, cconomic issues certainly did 
dominate the 1970 elections, pushing the issue of an Islamic state into the background, 
despite JUI, JI, and JUP efforts to wrest it back into the spotlight.  Another factor that 
seemed to be contributing to the eventual seeming irrelevance of the ‘alәma parties may 
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have been the couching, by virtually every party, of political terms in Islamic ones.  
Party propaganda—and not just that of the ‘alәma parties, anymore—was marked by a 
vaneer of “Muslimness,” of “the ideology of Pakistan.”  This was perhaps most famously 
demonstrated in Zulfiqar ‘Ali Bhutto’s slogan for the PPP, first uttered in a political 
speech four months after his resignation as Ayub Khan’s Foreign Minister: “Islam our 
Faith, Democracy our Policy, Socialism our Economy.”179  In this vein, Bhutto called his 
economic program “Islamic socialism.”  “We [the PPP] would lay down our lives for 
Islam,” Bhutto told a crowd in Rawalpindi in February 1969, at the same time 
condemning “the rule of capitalists” and the super-rich.180  (Perhaps another, far more 
consequential example of Bhutto’s political maneuverings vis-à-vis the “Islamic” 
element of Pakistani society came in 1974, when his government declared Ahmadis to 
be non-Muslims.)  The ‘alәma thus no longer held a corner on the political market in 
this regard.  For many, the PPP’s allusions to Islam were genuine—simply the natural 
result of their operating in Pakistan, a state borne of Muslim dreams.  “The significance 
of an Islamic state in Pakistan’s political culture,” wrote Pakistani scholar Sayyid A. S. 
Pirzada, “is so dominating that even parties committed to a socialist way of life mention 
an Islamic system of government in their manifestos.”181  To many among the ‘alәma, 
however, the PPP and other socialist parties were merely cloaking their own genuinely 
godless ideology in Islamic terms to fool the masses. 
Even though the major rivalries evident during the 1970 general election season 
revolved around socialism and its opponents, and East Pakistani autonomy and its 
opponents, animosity between the Deobandi and Barelvi camps flared up considerably, 
too.  At a major JUP conference at Toba Tek Singh in June (a location selected to 
counter the effect of another Toba Tek Singh conference, held earlier in March and led 
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by erstwhile JUP head Mahmud Shah Gujrati; the earlier gathering, dubbing itself a 
Farmer’s Conference, had been pro-PPP, condemning those who condemned socialism 
and using hәdis to demonstrate support for communist China), the Deobandi JUI was 
lambasted right along with “Socialism and Capitalism.”  More than three thousand 
‘alәma and mәshaix attended the Toba Tek conference, during which, M. Ahmad tells us, 
“almost every speaker” opened his remarks with a scouring of both “Socialism and the 
Congressite Ulama.”  The Deobandis, maintained mwlana Arifullah Qadiri, were out to 
destroy Pakistan once more—a country born desite their (the Deobandis’) best efforts to 
prevent the Muslim state from coming into being in the first place.  During the 
conference’s final session, mwlana Muhammad Sharif Noori, after condemning Mawdudi 
and the JI, took aim at two Deobandi heroes: sәyyid Ahmad of Raebareli and his disciple 
and friend Muhammad Ismail.  sәyyid Ahmad and Muhammad Ismail, Noori said, were 
British agents.  JUP leader Mahmud Ahmad Riza blasted the JUI during his Friday 
sermon at the same location, similarly lambasting mwlana Bhashani (head of the Awami 
League)—seen as a socialist and a regionalist—and Bhutto.  JUI ‘alәma were, Rizvi 
argued, “the followers of Gandhi and Nehru” and thus did not truly have the best 
interests of the ummәt in mind.182  Some of the Barelvi pirs used their significant social 
and religious influence to sway—indeed, almost compel—disciples and murids to vote 
according to their (the pirs’) dictates; xәwajәħ Qarauddin Sialvi, for example, threatened 
with expulsion from the dәrgaħ any of his followers who failed to heed his political 
counsel.183  During the election, Barelvi cadidates in the Punjab regularly spoke out 
against other Islamic parties; in Sindh, though, candidates tended to avoid such 
contention, focusing on the PPP instead.  Thus Barelvi leaders were divided as to how 
to confront socialism vis-a-vis the Deobandis, some opting to work “together” (or at 
  
  388 
least not to directly oppose one another, concentrating instead on Bhutto), others 
directing their opposition towards the JUI, in the tradition of Ahmad Riza Khan—who 
had been quite clear in regard to working with “bad” Muslims.  Electoral opposition to 
the JI would perhaps have been understandable, given that the JI was not, strictly 
speaking, an ‘alәma party, but even the overarching joint goals of the JUI and the JUP 
(specifically, for an unambiguously Islamic state, complete with an Islamic constitution 
and a shәri’at-based judiciary) were not enough to cause the two groups to forge ahead 
on a united platform.  This was, perhaps, the greatest weakness of the ‘alәma parties in 
pursuance of their electoral aims, and certainly the most significant political result of 
the dynamic between the two schools of thought. 
National Assembly elections were held on 7 December, with provincial elections 
following closely on the tenth.  The results spelled a staggering victory for the Awami 
League in the eastern zone, where it won all but two seats in the National Assembly 
(compared to none in the western zone).  Still, this gave the party an actual majority in 
Pakistan’s federal legislature, meaning it could legitimately form a government.  
Meanwhile, the PPP dominated the results for Punjab and Sindh.  For the Islamic 
parties, the election represented an overwhelming dissapointment—even a disaster.  
“The results of the 1970 National and Provincial Assembly elections,” wrote one 
Pakistani scholar, “highlighted the inadequacy of Islam as the sole basis for political 
legitimacy and support.”184  The only victory for the ‘alәma parties came in the NWFP 
and Baluchistan, where the Deobandis through the JUI, in a coalition with the NAP, 
were able to win pluralities.  (Perhaps one JUI victory meant the most, however; in the 
National Assembly’s Dera Ismail Khan constituency, mufti Mahmud beat out Zulfikar 
‘Ali Bhutto himself.)  All told, the JUI (operating in former West Pakistan only) won 
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almost four percent of the total vote (3.98%), translating to seven National Assembly 
seats.  (This doesn’t include one seat won in East Pakistan by combined MJUI-NIP 
efforts.)185  The JI (operating in both wings) won 6.03% of the total vote but just four 
seats in the National Assembly.  The JUP (campaigning mostly in the western wing) 
obtained 3.94% of the vote total, plus seven National Assembly seats.  The election 
results, besides illustrating the relative weakness of the ‘alәma parties (failing as they 
did to unite within a coalition), reveal, to an extent, the geography of the Deobandi-
Barelvi rivalry.  In the NWFP and in Baluchistan, for example, the JUI won twenty-five 
percent and twenty percent of the vote total, respectively, while the JUP scored zero 
percent in both provinces.  But in Sindh and Punjab, the JUP took home seven percent 
and ten percent, respectively, almost double the JUI count in both provinces.  Sindh and 
Punjab were Barelvi areas, with a significant Deobandi minority mixed in, but in the 
NWFP and Baluchistan, Deobandism clearly dominated.  On the provincial level, 
results were similarly proportioned; the JUI won four seats in the NWFP assembly and 
three in the Baluchistan assembly, but only two in Punjab and none in Sindh, while the 
JUP walked away with four seats in Punjab and seven in Sindh, but none in the NWFP 
or Baluchistan.186 
Things began to break down politically after the release of the 1970 election results.  
Possessing a majority all on its own in the National Assembly, the Awami League under 
shix Mujibur Rahman did indeed demand the right to form a government.  Predictably, 
Bhutto rejected this outright, and self-appointed mediator Yahya Khan was helpless to 
bring the two to an accommodation.  Bhutto further assured the impossibility of any 
attempt at establishing civilian government when, in protest of the Awami League’s 
perceived power grab, he announced that the PPP would not attend the National 
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Assembly’s inaugural session.  Of course, this would have effectively voided anything 
the National Assembly might have attempted to do, prompting Yahya Khan—now in a 
very delicate position—to dissolve his cabinet and postpone the sitting of the National 
Assembly indefinitely.  The move garnered an unsurprisingly hostile reception in 
Pakistan’s eastern zone, where riots, demonstrations, and strikes combined with an 
Awami League-led refusal by Bengalis either to pay their taxes or abide by Martial Law 
restrictions.  Their party had won fair and square—and now it was being pushed out of 
power by petulant West Pakistanis.  The JI, formerly a supporter of the regime, 
temporarily broke with Yahya over the Awami League government issue, 
understanding that Yahya’s non-compliance with the Bengalis likely meant more power 
for Bhutto and the PPP—the greater enemy.187 
Deobandi leaders tended to blame the gaping schism between East and West 
Pakistanis on the “weakening of Islamic ties.”  “The two wings,” wrote Muhammad Rafi, 
“…became distant because the strong Islamic ties became weaker.”  The subsequent 
state of affairs made it easy for Pakistan’s—and Islam’s—“enemies” to take full 
advantage of the situation.  Bengali Hindu teachers, for example, were among those 
blamed, as well as the ever-meddling Indian and and American governments.  Of 
course, provincial and linguistic differences played their parts, too, but these were mere 
symptoms.  What had brought on the “weaking of Islamic ties” in the first place? 
Muhammad Rafi blamed the systematic emptying from “the Muslim mind” of “the spirit 
of Muslim Nationhood.”  Such Islam-centered nationhood had been fundamental to the 
creation of Pakistan in the first place, but it had been corroded as the younger 
generation confronted western culture and fashion, laziness, immorality, “nudeness,” 
and “wasteful expenditure.”  All took their toll, and politicans had predictably exploited 
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the growing divisiness that naturally resulted in order to cultivate party spirit.  This, 
Muhammad Shafi’s son warned, would split the nation.  (It was also why, as the reader 
shall see, universities were among the first institutions targeted by the anti-
secessionists.)  Like the JI, Deobandis in the Western zone were disappointed in the 
“luxury-loving” Yahya Khan and his clumsy efforts at arbitration.188 
Yahya Khan and Zulfiqar ‘Ali Bhutto flew to Dhaka to attempt a negotiation with 
Mujibur Rahman before things could get any worse.  But this eleventh-hour move to fix 
the situation quickly broke down, in part because West Pakistani troops were at the 
same time being flown into Bengal complete with a contingency plan for militarily 
taking over the province to enforce order by the barrel of the gun.  (As early as March 
1969, Ayub Khan had sent West Pakistani troops and tanks to East Pakistan “to deal 
with internal unrest…”)189  In such an atmosphere, negotiations were useless, and on 25 
March both Bhutto and Yahya flew back to the western zone.  The next day, the 
President banned the Awami League, made political activity illegal, and put back into 
effect the old press, free speech, and assembly restrictions.  Worst of all for the Bengalis, 
the West Pakistani contingency plan went into immediate effect, targeting East 
Pakistani universities, throwing up checkpoints, erecting roadblocks—and shooting 
resisters.  Mujibur Rahman himself was arrested and flown to Pakistan’s western wing 
to stand trial for treason.  Within days, a full-scale war of secession was underway; one 
Major Ziaur Rahman proclaimed Bangladeshi independence from Chittagong, and a 
government-in-exile was set up in Calcutta.190  To many of the ‘alәma, Yahya had 
crossed an uncrossable line in pitting his Muslim army against fellow Muslims.  It 
seemed that that non-violent, diplomatic approach had been abandoned far too 
abruptly—and that the suppression of the “rebellion” had been far too brutal.  Whatever 
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happened to seeking a political solution?  Suddenly some among the religious leadership 
were even missing Ayub Khan; he’d had his flaws, yes, but at least he’d been a 
“powerful” and strong personality.  Perhaps, they reasoned, old Ayub would have been 
able to avoid armed conflict against fellow citizens through sheer force of character.191 
Whatever Ayub Khan’s reaction might have been had he been in command, it was 
Yahya Khan who was now calling the shots—and his crackdown was shockingly brutal, 
producing something in the range of ten million refugees fleeing to India.  Reports of 
rape and mass murder proliferated.  Images surfaced of dead bodies—civilians—
scattered along riverbanks or half-buried in the mud, of female corpses with their necks 
tied to metal posts as if they’d been tortured to death.  As the scale of the fighting 
increased, local Bangladeshi forces (including some former Pakistani military units) 
battled their erstwhile co-citizens from the western zone.  “Islamic” imagery was used 
by the Pakistani military both to justify its actions and to rally Pakistani soldiers; 
passages from the Qur’an and admonitions from the sunnәt were “quoted copiously” 
before the troops, while the memory of the great battles of the past—from Badr and 
Uhud to the more recent mostly Deobandi stand against the British at Khyber—served 
as a rallying cry.192  While the JUI played no role in support of the Yahya regime in 
East Pakistan, the JI (which had broken with the JUI earlier over the “Glory of Islam 
Day” scenario) and the JUP were granted “semiofficial role[s]” within the military-
imposed regime in Bengal, as was the Deobandi-leaning NIP.  It should be remembered 
that while the JUI had not really contested the 1970 elections in East Pakistan, the NIP, 
JI, and JUP had lost big to the Awami League.  Members of the aforementioned parties, 
in the words of Haqqani, “formed peace committees throughout Pakistan’s eastern wing, 
at district and even village levels.  These parties functioned as the intelligence network 
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of the Pakistan army…”193  The JI was an active supporter of the Pakistani army in its 
mission to suppress the nationalist-secessionist ambitions of the Bengalis, the Mawdudi-
led party even calling the rebel Bengalis “the enemies of Islam.”  (Supporters of the JI 
and others whom the Western media derided as “right-wing religious fanatics” claimed 
that it was the “socialist leaders” who were the real fanatics, inciting “urban upheaval” 
and “partisanship” and causing “economic damage.”  “It was Bhashani, the Maoist 
leader,” five Muslim students reminded a British newspaper in late April 1969, “who 
said that they were prepared to burn down the homes of those who would take part in  
any elections.  His supporters even broke into some Jamaat Islami [JI] offices and 
desecrated the Qur’an.  Is this not being fanatical?”)194  The JI sent delegations overseas 
to lobby on Pakistan’s behalf in Europe and the across the Middle East.  More 
ominously, from March 1971 educated JI members along with members of the party’s 
male student wing participated significantly as the core of al-badәri (“The Moon”), more 
or less a paramilitary unit (some even say “death squad”) masquerading as a “volunteer 
[rәzәkar] force,” put together by Pakistani military intelligence and responsible for the 
murder and/or humiliation of an unknown number of Bengali “intellectuals, journalists, 
student leaders and politicians” on regime-formulated hit lists.195  This was the first 
example in Pakistan’s history of the government exploiting religion by creating militant 
groups out of clerical parties in support of its agenda (though its activities vis-à-vis 
Kashmir had come close); it certainly wouldn’t be the last, but it marked the beginning 
of a new era in Pakistani government-Islamic party relationships.  Another Pakistan 
military-organized volunteer force, al-shәms (“The Sun”), though made up of a mish-
mash of individuals and groups, also included a number of Deobandi-leaning NIP 
activists.196  According to one Deobandi source, the motivation behind their 
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participation in the suppression of the “rebellion” was the entrance in the war of the 
Indian state.  Once India had picked sides, the conflict took on the color of jyhad.  
Muhammad Rafi describes how the students and teachers at the Deobandi dar ul’alwm 
Karachi were given rifle training; “the spirit of jyhad motivated every child and adult to 
obtain training in warfare” in order to serve at the front.  But before this “service” was 
really possible on a mass scale, Yahya ordered “the shameful surrender.”197 
December was the deciding month.  In retaliation for Indian assistance to the 
“rebels,” including Indian military movements along (and even across) the East 
Pakistani border, Pakistan (on 3 December) attacked a number of military targets in 
northern India.  The next day India invaded East Pakistan by land, sea, and air.  With 
the fall of Dhaka to Indian might seemingly imminent, Pakistani forces surrendered to 
India on the sixteenth (instantly transforming approximately one hundred thousand 
soldiers into prisoners of war), and within twenty-four hours Indira Gandhi proclaimed 
a (unilateral) cease-fire.  Amidst the humiliating cry of angry demonstrators, Yahya 
Khan stepped down on 20 December.198  Those ‘alәma who took part in the attempt to 
suppress East Pakistani secessionist efforts remember this time as one in which “the 
‘alәma and the students of [mәdrәsәħs] and volunteers of East Pakistan who had fought 
with their lives for Pakistan were subjected to untold torture which outdid [Genghis] 
Khan.”  Meanwhile, Pakistan had been seemingly abandoned by its fellow Muslim 
nations, which Deobandis, at least in part, blamed on the worldwide-ummәt-weakening 
phenomenon of Arab nationalism.199  Both sides in the Bangladeshi War of 
Independence had felt entirely justified in their separate struggles, and completely 
victimized by the other.  But it was the West Pakistanis who had to now live with 
humiliation.   
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Bhutto took the reigns of government in Yahya’s stead.  The JI marked the PPP’s 
assumption of power by observing a “Black Day” in Lahore (December 1971).200  This 
Islam-focused opposition to the Bhutto regime was to be characteristic of the years to 
come.  “The loss of the eastern wing in 1971,” wrote Jalal, “was a watershed with a 
transformative effect on the Pakistani psyche[,]…subverting the ‘two-nation’ theory” 
and taking “a hefty toll on national pride” after “a humiliating military defeat by India.”  
Jalal’s explanation for what happened next: “Unaccustomed to learning from history and 
more comfortable with myths of an imagined past, Pakistanis were susceptible to the 
Islamist charge that the ruling elite’s lack of religiosity had caused the country’s 
disintegration.”201 
 
Prelude to “Islamization”:  1971-1977 . 
With the 1970 elections, the departure of Bangladesh from the Pakistani polity, and 
the takeover of Zulfikar ‘Ali Bhutto, the trend towards secularization—toward a marked 
de-emphasis on Islam as the guiding force in Pakistani politics—appeared to be in full 
swing, despite the best efforts of the Muslim scholars and divines.  Zulfiqar ‘Ali Bhutto, 
who, unlike Ayub or Yahya, had barely reached adulthood when Pakistan was born, 
represented a new generation of Pakistani leadership.  The influence of the “old 
guard”—those who had served for years in the civil service or army under the British 
Raj—was waning, partly by attrition, while young forty-somethings like Bhutto, whose 
worldviews were shaped less by the pre-Partition dream of a “Muslim homeland” in 
South Asia and more by postcolonial nationalism, were increasingly taking center stage.  
Bhutto himself had visions of a grand alliance of Asian and African nations, a 
transcontinental zone he considered “a world of the proletariat.”202  He and others of his 
  
  396 
ilk thus fit into the secularist, left-leaning, and highly statist mould of many of the post-
colonial world’s new leaders.  It was a mould that neither the Deobandi nor Barelvi 
religious leadership were willing to tolerate steering the Pakistani ship of state.  And 
like so many who have ridden to power on a wave of “democratic” promises, Bhutto 
would ultimately depend on the guns of government to assure his ascendancy (utilizing 
personal ties with the Army), not to mention his rule, where, like many “socialist” 
leaders before him, he exhibited a “near-monopoly of decision-making power.”203  In 
reference to the latter, one contemporary described Bhutto as a “populist-authoritarian 
type of leader and a cosmetic democrat.”204  This was not the sort of political head that 
the ‘alәma could trust to further along their goal of Islamic government—nor even of a 
democratic restoration. 
But the prognostications of the pundits predicting the supremacy of economic issues 
(over religious ones) did not pan out, though Bhutto’s domestic program for Pakistan 
did indeed stress the socio-political situation.  In 1972 and again in 1976, the PPP 
government took over all of the country’s banks and lending institutions, all of its 
insurance companies, and scores of its industrial enterprises, effectively nationalizing 
them.  Despite all of this, and perhaps as a result of Pakistan’s geopolitical and self-
identifying reorientation after the traumatic 1971 loss of Bangladesh, Islam over the 
next half-decade regained its dominant position within the framework of Pakistani 
politics, culminating in the highly politicized Islam of the 1977 general elections; even 
Bhutto (a wily politician who understood how to employ religion for political ends) 
pushed forward a number of shәri’at-conforming laws (including the replacement of 
Sunday with Friday as the weekly day off and bans on alcohol consumption, gambling, 
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night clubs, pornography, and horse racing, though these were all last-ditch efforts 
instituted in 1977 to win over the opposition).   
It was during this period, too (1973), that Pakistan adopted a new Constitution (still 
current, as of the time of this writing) pervaded with religious provisions.  Martial Law 
had been lifted in April 1972, after which the National Assembly had been restored.  
Within that body, after the PPP, the most powerful political parties were the NAP and 
the JUI.  Once again, the National Assembly’s main task was to hammer out a 
constitution; this represented Pakistan’s third major go-around in this regard, and like 
previous attempts it was marked with tension and disagreement, especially between the 
PPP on one side and the NAP-JUI on the other.  But with previous constitution-making 
efforts having laid the groundwork, a new document eventually emerged.  On 31 
December Pakistan’s third constitution was submitted in the National Assembly; it was 
approved in April and went into effect on Independence Day: 14 August 1973.  
Throughout the deliberations, political parties like the JUI, the JI, and the JUP stressed 
their Islamic orthodoxy, while economic issues tended “to be manifested in the search 
for a truly Islamic economy as well as for an Islamic polity…”205 Islam was again 
recognized as the core of the nation’s identity, the single abiding force holding a polity 
of disparate ethnicities, languages, and backgrounds together. 
Part IX of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan contains the 
document’s specifically Islamic provisions.  With the exception of a brief preamble 
confirming the “Holy Quran and the Sunnah” as the standard by which “all existing 
laws” must be measured (“no law shall be enacted which is repugnant” to the injunctions 
therein), Part IX pertains entirely to an official body within the Pakistani polity 
identified as the Council of Islamic Ideology, though otherwise referred to simply as the 
  
  398 
Islamic Council (IC).  Qualifications for appointment to the Council, made up of between 
eight and twenty members, are broad; one member must be a woman, at least four must 
have at least fifteen years of “Islamic research or instruction” under their belts, and at 
least two must have been (or currently be) Supreme Court or High Court judges.  Apart 
from these specifics, the President may appoint anyone “having knowledge of the 
principles and philosophy of Islam as enunciated in the Holy Quran and Sunnah, or 
understanding of the economic, political, legal or administrative problems of Pakistan.”  
One other requirement: “so far as practicable various schools of thought” must be 
represented within the IC, an obvious reference to the theological divisions plaguing the 
ummәt in Pakistan, foremost among them the Deobandi-Barelvi split.  A member could 
serve on the Council for three years, barring resignation or eviction from the body by a 
majority of the total membership. 
The principal function of the IC has been to act as an advisory body on proposed law 
(i.e. its adherence to Islamic injunctions), mainly to the Majlis-e-Shoora (mәjlys-e-shwra, 
or Parliament) but also to the President, provincial assemblies, and provincial 
governors.  However, the IC is also charged with two additional functions.  First, the IC 
presents recommendations (to each of the bodies and offices aforementioned) “as to the 
ways and means of enabling and encouraging Muslims of Pakistan to order their lives 
individually and collectively in all respects in accordance with the principles and 
concepts of Islam as enunciated in the Holy Quran and sunnәt.”  Second, the IC must 
prepare regular reports, to be discussed annually within both Houses and each 
provincial assembly, recommending various Islamic injunctions that might be turned 
into future legislation.  The IC thus provides a high-level state role specifically for the 
‘alәma.  The competition between the various schools of Islam (primarily those of the 
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Barelvi and Deobandi variety) was now on for control of this and other bodies within 
the state apparatus. 
During the 1970 elections, it had been generally assumed that the National Awami 
Party—which performed well in the NWFP and Baluchistan—would hammer out some 
sort of joint program with the PPP (which dominated Punjab and Sindh) after 1971; 
they were both, after all, explicitly socialist parties.  As it turned out, however, the 
PPP’s Bhutto and NAP chief Wali Khan (son of aforementioned Khan Abdul Ghaffar 
Khan) butted heads to such an extent that any sort of joint agreement quickly 
transformed into more or less an impossibility.  Indeed, the NAP joined the opposition, 
and Wali Khan himself was elected Opposition Leader in the National Assembly.  In 
keeping with its long-held policy of siding with a lesser opponent in order to focus on a 
greater one, the Deobandi JUI formed a coalition government in the NWFP and in 
Baluchistan with the NAP in early April 1972.206  Addressing a crowd in Peshawar, 
Wali Khan announced the formation of the NAP-JUI coalition and named JUI chief 
mufti Mahmud the province’s Chief Minister.  Any decision made by the PPP-controlled 
central government-appointed provincial administration would, Wali Khan said, “not be 
acceptable.”207  That same year, mufti Mahmud announced the official launch of alcohol 
prohibition in the NWFP.  The setting he chose was significant in that it hailed back—
much to the disapproval of the Barelvis—to the movement of sәyyid Ahmad of Raebareli 
(see Chapter 1), student of the Walliullahi tradition and renowned jyhadi of the early 
nineteenth century.  After the forces of sәyyid Ahmad had captured Peshawar in 1830, 
his loyal companion Muhammad Ismail (whom the Barelvis would loathe as an out-and-
out “Wahhabi”) had stood before a crowd in the city.  The date, on the Gregorian 
calendar, was Sunday, 1 May.  Facing the multitude, sәyyid Ahmad’s acolyte publicly 
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declared alcohol a forbidden substance in the newly established Islamic state.  Now, one 
hundred forty-two years since that act, mufti Mahmud—likewise on Sunday, 1 May—
was making the very same declaration (even standing in the exact spot, as far as could 
be ascertained).208  Here in the NWFP, at least, if not in the rest of the country, Islamic 
law (as seen through a Deobandi lens) would be respected and established—a step 
towards fulfilling sәyyid Ahmad’s original, and unrealized, dream.  That mufti Mahmud’s 
symbolism harked back to such a controversial figure—indeed, possibly the most 
controversial figure—of the Deobandi-Barelvi rivalry could not have been missed by the 
province’s (and Pakistan’s) Barelvi religious leadership. 
But the Bhutto government remained strongly opposed to the NAP-JUI provincial 
administrations.  In late September 1973, an unidentified shooter attempted to 
assassinate Abdul Wali Khan.  The latter blamed the incident on the “[central] 
Government and members of the Pakistan People’s Party.”  The Bhutto regime, 
through their ambassador in London (one Mumtaz Daultana) claimed “shock and 
horror” at the alleged assassination attempt and blamed it instead on the peasants’ 
discontent with the NAP-JUI government’s seeming preference for “the local 
entrenched landlord interests.”209  Each side thus took advantage of the murder attempt 
to try to politically cripple the other.  The PPP government was more successful later, 
when it utilized the apparent discovery of “a massive cache of Soviet-made arms,” 
ostensibly meant for Baluchistan, within the Iraqi embassy in Islamabad as a pretext for 
completely dismantling the NAP-JUI government in that province.210  (Since 1973, 
Pakistan’s Baluchistan province had been the scene of a hard-fought Baluchi war of 
independence.  The war would last for four years—and flare up from time to time 
afterwards—until the independence movement was finally and brutally surpressed by 
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the mostly Punjabi Pakistan Army.)  In protest of Bhutto’s dramatic action, the NAP-
JUI government in the NWFP resigned, too.  This move only strengthened Bhutto’s 
immediate position, however, as the wily PPP head quickly replaced both province’s 
governors with his own picks.211  Thus ended the JUI’s brief stint as co-ruling party in 
Pakistan’s westernmost provinces, once more revealing Bhutto’s autocratic style of rule; 
opposition was not to be tolerated, and power was to be strong in the center—despite 
the state’s alleged federal structure (with residual powers left to the provinces) 
mandated by the constitution.  After the dissolution of the NAP-JUI governments in the 
NWFP and Baluchistan, the Bhutto regime continued to harass opposition parties using 
the state’s law enforcement agencies (together with enthusiastic PPP supporters).  At 
one NAP event in Rawalpindi several NAP members were killed by such action.  The 
response from the opposition, both to the Bhutto regime’s harassment as well as its 
specific role in toppling the Baluchistan and NWFP governments (where the PPP had 
lost badly), was to form an eight-party alliance: the United Democratic Front, which 
included the JUI, the JI, and the JUP, as well as the Deobandi-leaning Khaksars.212  The 
alliance’s goals were to “restore democracy, check dictatorship, and work for an Islamic 
and parliamentary constitution, [as well as] the release of political prisoners.”  For the 
Barelvis and the Deobandis, the alliance represented another temporary partnership 
with one another, once again borne of political expediency and characterized by 
“separate unity.” 
Despite the formation of the new alliance (indeed, perhaps because of it), the 
harassment continued, forcing the Deobandi and Barelvi leadership, generally speaking, 
to band together (though, as always, as separately as possible) against what was 
perceived as a hostile, repressive, and anti-Islam regime.  Meanwhile, the Bhutto 
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government consolidated its power both from within and without.  From within, 
consolidation was achieved by purging the party of “the more leftist elements” in its 
midst (most notably in 1974, when Bhutto “cleansed” his cabinet of such individuals), as 
well as by the purging of almost fifteen hundred military officers whose loyalty was 
deemed less than desirable.  (One of the generals he did advance, over several more 
senior personnel: Muhammad Zia ul-Haq, who became Army chief-of-staff in 1976, 
replacing erstwhile director of the brutal 1971 West Pakistani crackdown in Bengal 
General Tikka Khan.)  In addition, Bhutto organized the Federal Security Force, a 
militant entity that functioned outside of the military and ofttimes acted as a sort of 
Praetorian Guard for Bhutto himself.  From without, the PPP government secured its 
position through media censorship, aggressive “policing,” and the harassment and 
imprisonment (and even murder) of political enemies.213  Perhaps characteristic of his 
transition from “democrat” to despot, Bhutto had campaigned throughout the 1970 
elections for a parliamentary system of government—only to change his mind later 
(conveninently when he himself was in power) in favor of a presidential one (with 
Bhutto as president, of course).  When he eventually lost the presidential system battle 
after the National Assembly adopted a parliamentary order instead, Bhutto ensured via 
provision that, even so, it would be near impossible for the legislature to remove the 
Prime Minister (himself).214 
When PPP co-founder and leading propagator of socialism Hayat Khan Sherpao was 
assassinated in a bomb blast at Peshawar University (8 February 1975), the Bhutto 
government’s action was swift; the NAP, immediately blamed for the incident, was 
banned and its leaders arrested (including party head Wali Khan, as well as his son 
Asfandyar Wali Khan—the latter accused of masterminding the murder).  Though the 
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accused were later acquitted, they remained in prison until Zia ul-Haq released them 
three years later.  Any other political party that the administration deemed a recipient of 
aid from a foreign quarter was likewise banned.215  Several JI leaders were also harassed, 
arrested, and imprisoned; one of the party chiefs, Nazir Ahmad—a National Assembly 
member described by one scholar as the JI’s “most vociferous” representative in the 
federal legislative body—was shot dead by government forces.  “Never before,” wrote 
Nasr, “had any Pakistani government gone so far to silence its opposition,” and this 
under a supposedly democratic, civilian regime.  Nasr goes on to mark the assassination 
of Nazir Ahmad as “the beginning of the rapid radicalization” of the JI’s male student 
wing, an indication of the role of government in the radicalization of religious parties.216  
Indeed, together with the regime’s role in the formation and arming of so-called “death 
squads” out of religious parties during the Bangladeshi war of independence, Bhutto’s 
harassment and targeting of the religious parties during his presidential tenure initiated 
a process of militant transformation among the religious parties, or at least among a 
segment therein. 
 
 March 1977: “Zenith” of Islam’s “Politicization.”  
 The year 1977 was one of major significance in the history of Pakistan.  “The 
politicization of Islam,” wrote Esposito in the early 1980s, “reached its zenith in the 
general [Pakistani] elections of March 1977.”  When elections were first announced by 
Bhutto in January, the anti-PPP parties leapt into action mode; this was their chance to 
finally and democratically oust the strongman regime.  Standing in opposition to the 
ruling PPP government of Zulfiqar ‘Ali Bhutto was a newly formed nine-party coalition 
of political parties: the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA).  Though the union included 
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parties representating a variety of positions across the left-right political spectrum, its 
platform seemed to revolve distinctly around the watchword “Islam.”  Mosques and 
religious seminaries—thousands of them—doubled as hubs of political activity.  The 
alliance advocated for the institution of the “System of the Prophet” (nyzam-e-mustafa), 
meaning the establishment of a truly Islamic order after that founded by God through 
Muhammad in the opening days of the Muslim era.  This was the very reason Pakistan 
had been created—and Islam was the only answer, as a unifying force, to the ethnic and 
linguistic schisms plaguing the country.  Bhutto was cast as anti-Islam, the ‘alәma and 
other PNA members pointing to both his regime’s policies as well as his own personal 
way of life as proof.  The PPP government was corrupt and sick to the core, and the 
remedy lay not in the political philosophies of the world (whether socialism or 
capitalism) but in the just and egalitarian system God had instituted in Medina and 
spelled out in the Qur’an and sunnәt.  And like the old, pre-Partition Muslim League, the 
PNA warned of “Islam in Danger!”  Despite the philosophical differences between the 
various parties constituting the PNA, then—economic, political, even religious—the 
politically eclectic alliance’s “direction and leadership” undoubtably emanated from the 
Islamic parties, namely the JUI, the JUP, and the JI.217  This was a rare testament to the 
power the religious parties could have had acting jointly for some political purpose.  
That same year the Barelvi JUP was instrumental in forming the Tehrik-e-Nizam-e-
Mustafa (tәhrik-e-nyzam-e-mustafa, or “Movement of the System of the Prophet”), an 
anti-Bhutto outfit.  The organization would become a JUP front group after Zia ul-Haq 
banned political parties in October 1979. 
Meanwhile, the Deobandi JUI under mufti Mahmud campaigned passionately 
against the Bhutto regime, especially in the western provinces, combating the PPP’s 
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socialism with the publication of Mahmud’s own socialism kufәr he.  This phrase—
meaning “Socialism is Disbelief”—had been the anti-Bhutto slogan of the JUI, the JI, 
and the JUP years before, during the 1970 elections, when the rising star that was 
Bhutto first appeared to threaten the religious parties’ success in West Pakistan.  Now, 
seven years later, the issue of atheistic socialism’s alleged takeover of the Pakistani 
polity (including the widespread belief that the PPP represented a Marxist front party 
with aims of instituting one-party Communist rule) remained a central one.  mufti 
Mahmud played a leading role within the PNA as an anti-Bhutto agitator and later was 
appointed a member of the PNA delegation that met with Bhutto to attempt a 
negotiation.218  The opposition parties pointed out that Bhutto’s promises of bread, 
clothing, and shelter for all had failed miserably in their fulfillment; Bhutto had fallen 
especially short when it came to land redistribution—another broken PPP promise.  
Indeed, after India had successfully tested its first nuclear device (1974), Bhutto had 
sworn that Pakistan would catch up with neighboring India even if Pakistanis were 
forced to “eat grass” in the process.219  So much for bread! 
But Bhutto refused to be sidelined either by the opposition’s defaming of his 
economic record (he pointed to rising GDP and falling inflation rates) or by the PNA’s 
appeals to Islam.  Indeed, the opposition coalition’s pressure on the PPP forced the 
ruling party to take a more “Islamic” stance in order to garner electoral support; 
Bhutto’s party, previously an explicitly socialist entity, replaced the word “socialism” 
with the more Islamic-sounding phrase musәwәt-e-muhәmmәd (“equality of 
Muhammad”) in its literature.  Meanwhile, the PPP’s opposition, most visibly in the 
form of the PNA, asserted its own service to the Islam.  Both sides promised that their 
proposed version of government was the one most suited to ultimately bring about the 
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realization of a truly Islamic order.  Thus the heated elections of 1977 helped foment a 
competition between the major political parties of Pakistan, both secular and religious, 
over dedication to the religion of Allah.  To offset the PNA’s number one platform 
item—the institution of Islamic government in Pakistan—the PPP, too, vowed to work 
for increased Islamization; it promised, for example, to make Friday the weekly holiday 
in place of Sunday.  It should be noted that while the JUP did form part of the PNA, this 
was in no way representative of the vast majority of Barelvis, whose individual loyalties 
fell on both sides of the political divide.  Meanwhile, the Deobandis leaned heavily 
against the PPP.   
With the support of the upper class and the poorer classes (who, as always, rallied 
behind Bhutto’s promises of bread, clothing, and shelter for all), however, and combined 
with the PPP’s now well-established ability to politically co-opt religious symbolism, 
Bhutto won an “impressive victory” in the March 1977 general elections.  All told, the 
ruling PPP had won an overwhelming one hundred fifty-five seats in the National 
Assembly, compared to only thirty-six for the PNA.  Sensing that the lopsided win was 
likely to spark protest, Bhutto immediately banned political assemblies throughout the 
country.  He was right, of course; the PPP win did spark outrage among the regime’s 
opposition.  The government was charged with election fraud, and the PNA launched a 
campaign of agitation, using the mosques as venues for anti-Bhutto political speeches as 
well as staging grounds for rallies and marches.  Specifically, the PNA demanded 
another election.  When Bhutto refused to hold such a do-over, demonstrations against 
the government only increased in number and severity.  Bhutto tried to assuage the 
opposition by instituting a shәri’at-inspired ban on gambling, prostitution, and alcohol 
(as was promised as part of his Islamic makeover during the campaign), but this only 
  
  407 
succeeded in throwing the spotlight on Islam and thereby strengthening the position of 
the ‘alәma-directed PNA.  Wrote Esposito, “Islam and Pakistan’s Islamic identity had 
reemerged as the dominant theme in Pakistani politics in a manner and to a degree that 
had not been seen since Pakistan’s establishment.”220  The situation deteriorated to such 
an extent that in July Bhutto declared Martial Law.  Then, on 5 July 1977, the Army 
took over, proclaimed Martial Law itself, and forcefully placed all political leaders—
including the Prime Minister—in military custody.   
Deobandis and Barelvis stood divided on the change in management.  Zulfiqar ‘Ali 
Bhutto would not come out of the regime-change situation alive.  
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5 - ISLAMIZATION AND WAR:  
Militarization of  the Rivalry ,  1977-2001  
 
 
Even though he tried his best to steer it toward a secular democracy, Jinnah did not live long 
enough to see it become one. Over the coming years, Pakistan took a very troubling turn. In a 
matter of nine years, it became an “Islamic Republic,” and in a little over two decades, it had 
essentially become a theocracy... The same extremist clerics who had opposed Jinnah and his 
struggle for Pakistan gradually claimed ownership of the State. They formed political groups 
that used religion to amass public support. Their demonstrations of street power, frequently 
violent, meant that sectarian hatred and intolerance was the order of the day. 
             KASHIF CHAUDHRY, THE EXPRESS TRIBUNE, 19 SEPTEMBER 20111 
 
 
ON PAGE 141 of Husain Haqqani’s Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military (2005), the 
author addresses Pakistan’s “sectarian issues” vis-à-vis the creation and political 
evolution of the state.  
 
Sectarian issues had played little part in the campaign for Pakistan’s creation 
and Pakistan’s official census figures did not report sectarian identities of 
Muslims in an effort to keep the lid on sectarian differences among 
Muslims.  The demand by Shiites, in the aftermath of the [1980] Zakat 
controversy, for effective representation at higher levels of the state and 
recognition of their sectarian interests laid the foundations of bitter 
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Shiite-Sunni conflict, which later led to the creation of terrorist militias 
within both sects. (Italics added)2 
 
Here Haqqani lays out the generally accepted narrative of sectarianism in Pakistan, 
defined within the context of the Shi’a-Sunni rivalry—and, importantly, denying any 
significant role “sectarian issues” might have played in the struggles leading up to 
Partition (an assertion at least partially debunked, it is hoped, earlier in this work).  (If 
“sectarian issues” were so insignificant, too, then why—pointed out in Haqqani’s very 
next sentence—would the Pakistani state go to so much trouble to “keep a lid” on 
them?)  Developments that occurred during the rule of General Muhammad Zia ul-Haq, 
in particular, insists Haqqani, laid the groundwork for future Shi’a-Sunni conflict.  This 
is certainly true, but equally important (and perhaps more so) were similar 
developments within the Sunni community itself, mostly between the minority 
Deobandi and majority Barelvi sub-sects, each of which separately (and considerably) 
outnumbered Pakistan’s Shi’a population.  This Deobandi-Barelvi rivalry would erupt 
into steady violence in the 1990s, 2000s, and into the 2010s—violence that would 
sometimes mistakenly be attributed to the more publicized (at least internationally) 
Shi’a-Sunni conflict.  Indeed, it was in the period between 1979 and 1988—the years of 
Zia ul-Haq’s regime—that Pakistan underwent a major socio-political “Islamization,” of 
which the Deobandis, though significantly smaller in number, were able take advantage 
far more efficiently than their Barelvi counterparts.  Of course, this was no new 
phenomenon to the politically minded Barelvi ‘alәma, who had often felt ignored by the 
Pakistani state they and their theological forebears had helped create, in comparison to 
their Deobandi rivals.  And it was within the political framework of the Pakistani state 
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that the formerly civil, if bitter, rivalry between Deobandis and Barelvis—once fought 
via juridical rulings, public debates, and books, then via “all-India” Muslim 
organizations within the context of pre-Partition independence politics, and now 
represented by political parties vying for real money and real power—evolved into 
something far more brutal in character. 
 
Consolidating Power:  Zia,  Democracy,  and the  ‘alәma 
Shortly after carrying out his coup, General Muhammad Zia ul-Haq described his 
actions as those of a concerned citizen, nothing more.  Bhutto had been on the verge of 
unleashing the Army on the opposition and executing or imprisoning its (the 
opposition’s) leaders; this had to be stopped.  (The Army’s name for Zia’s July 1977 
military coup: Operation Fair Play.)  Zia vowed that the 1973 constitution, currently 
suspended, would be restored, and that free and fair elections would be held within 
ninety days; political parties would be free both to file nominations and to carry out 
their campaigns.  The promise of elections was to the PNA’s liking, as the alliance fully 
expected to assume the reigns of government now that the PPP flame had been 
extinguished.  But Zia’s promises quickly evaporated.  The reason, insisted Pakistan’s 
new dicatator, was the unexpected discovery by the regime of a wide range of abuses 
perpetrated on the Pakistani people by the Bhutto government.  There must be 
accountability, Zia argued, before the state could move on.  A flurry of “white papers” 
was produced by the government, on topics ranging from Bhutto’s illegal utilization of 
his Federal Security Force to the previous regime’s muzzling of the press.  All of this 
was used as a pretext for postponing elections.  The fawning and multitudinous 
reception that Bhutto received in Lahore (during a brief stint of freedom) convinced 
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many within the PNA that perhaps Zia was right after all—perhaps the PPP was still a 
threat, a force with which to be reckoned yet.  Suddenly, too, the PNA was far less sure 
about its own electoral prospects.3  But Deobandi and PNA president mufti Mahmud 
discounted the alleged “resurgence of support” for Bhutto and his erstwhile party; the 
pro-PPP demonstrations, he said, were “all propaganda.  Once you get to the top and 
fall down you never come back.  That’s the history of Pakistan.”  The mufti further 
asserted that rumors that the PNA was united “only in opposition to Mr Bhutto” (and 
thus devoid of any coherent platform) were untrue—and being spread by “the Western 
press and broadcasting media.”  Still, the promised elections were pushed back again, 
with the possibility of a PPP resurgence (and, subsequently, another East Pakistan 
situation—in Baluchistan, for example) cited as Zia’s chief justification.  Zia’s pushing 
back of the elections, even if it was ostensibly to “clean up” the mess left by the previous 
administration, was not greeted with favor by mufti Mahmud.  Indeed, the Deobandi 
mwlana delivered to the General a public ultimatum of sorts in early November, 
declaring that unless elections were held “next March” (1978)—at this point Zia was 
saying that even next November appeared unlikely—Pakistan “could be plunged into 
chaos again.”  Despite Zia’s assurances that the election postponements were justified, 
mufti Mahmud did not understand why this should be so.  At one point Zia told the 
press that the PNA itself had requested the election delays, but mufti Mahmud 
vehemently denied this allegation.4 
Eventually elections were postponed indefinitely.  Bhutto himself was sentenced to 
death for his alleged role in the murder of a political opponent.  In early March 1978, 
Zia banned political activity (though not political parties, yet), promising elections the 
next year.  Ironically, given his white paper concerning Bhutto’s illegal manipulation of 
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the press, the regime shut down several papers itself that same month, simultaneously 
arresting around two hundred journalists.  In April, despite pleas from international 
leaders for the commuting of his sentence (but with the strong support of the JI), the 
Zia government hanged Zulfiqar ‘Ali Bhutto.  In the meantime, Zia organized a quasi-
civilian government (two-thirds of which would be made up of PNA people, with the 
remaining third direct Zia appointees); of the religious parties, the JI benefitted most 
from this arrangement, scoring several cabinet positions.  But this government was 
dissolved in April 1979 as the PNA parties prepared for the upcoming elections.  
Perhaps predictably, however, the promised 1979 national and provincial elections, 
scheduled for November, never took place, though the regime did carry out non-party 
local elections (during which PPP candidates ran under the pseudonym “Friends of the 
People” [awami dwst]; the religious parties did much the same—the JUP continuing to 
operate, for example, under the name of the anti-Bhutto organization it had created, the 
tәhrik-e-nyzam-e-mustafa).5 
Eventually (October 1979) Zia banned political parties altogether. 
Both the Barelvi and Deobandi religious leadership were caught off guard by Zia’s 
sudden takeover, and the continued breakdown of “democracy” that followed.  On the 
one hand, the General seemed little interested in restoring the old constitutional, party 
system, a goal for which they had ostensibly been struggling when Zulfiqar ‘Ali had 
been in charge.  On the other, Zia had gotten rid of Bhutto, and also boasted a 
reputation as a practicing, observant Muslim, one who retained the humility demanded 
by his faith even in his own exalted politico-military position.6  Their confusion as to 
how best to react characterized the ‘alәma parties’ relationship with the new regime in 
general, as they strove to come to terms with a ruler seemingly far more amenable to 
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the establishment of an Islamic state but also even more authoritatrian than his 
predecessor—indeed, than any previous head of the Pakistani polity.  Journalists and 
some historians would later characterize the Zia regime, in black-and-white fashion, as 
one that favored the religious parties, but this is only partly true, as shall be 
demonstrated.  In the end, Zia’s actions seemed indicative of a man in power who sought 
to retain that power, however personally devoted he might have been to Islam.  
* 
mufti Mahmud died in 1980.  His son, Fazlur Rehman, was subsequently elected JUI 
general secretary, thus illustrating the dynastic, “family fiefdom” character of parties in 
Pakistan—what Lodhi called “the primacy of personalism over organization” (and while 
this phenomenon is more pronounced in organizations like the Bhutto-dominated PPP 
or the Sharif-led Muslim League, the religious parties have also developed this attribute; 
in another example, Fazlur Rehman would later nominate his own brother, mwlana 
Attaur Rehman—already the JUI’s vice-president—to join the Gilani cabinet as 
Minister of Tourism).7  In any case, it didn’t take long for the new party chief to find 
himself behind bars for his opposition to the Zia regime.  Early in February 1981, a 
student dispute with bus drivers in Multan quickly ballooned into a countrywide anti-
government protest.  For five days, students across Pakistan (but especially in Multan, 
Lahore, Quetta, and Malakand) demonstrated—often violently—against the regime.  
On 16 February the government arrested Fazlur Rehman, along with three other 
political party heads, all of whom were partly blamed for the unrest.  (The other 
arrested leaders: Masrullah Khan of the Pakistan Democratic Party, former NAP head 
Mehmud ‘Ali Kasuri of the surging Tehrik-e-Istiqlal Party, and M. A. Gohir of the 
PPP).  It seems that the student violence had presented Zia with a plausible chance to 
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rid himself of opposition—a chance he readily seized.  Only ten days earlier, after all, 
Fazlur Rehman and the JUI, plus almost a dozen other parties, had formed an 
opposition alliance (what would become the Movement for the Restoration of 
Democracy, or MRD) demanding “an end to military rule and the holding of 
parliamentary elections within three months.”8  Prominent among the MRD parties was 
the PPP.  The imprisoning of the opposition helped Zia stem any sudden MRD tide, but 
the real event to cripple the latter’s efforts (at least for a couple years) was the hijacking 
of a Pakistan International Airlines flight by the militant group Al-Zulfiqar—an outfit 
led by Bhutto’s sons (Murtaza Bhutto and Shahnawaz Bhutto).  Despite the indirect 
nature of the “link” between Al-Zulfiqar and the MRD (and daughter Benazir Bhutto’s 
own condemnation, while under house arrest, of the hijacking operation), the alliance 
took a hit as mass declamation of the event forced the MRD to back down, at least for 
the time being. 
By 1983, though, the opposition was able to reassert itself.  This was especially true 
in Sindh (from the beginning the PPP’s base of support; the Bhuttos were, after all, an 
aristocratic Sindhi family).  The MRD sent people onto the streets to “court arrest, 
Gandhi-style.”  Among the organizers were the Barelvi pir of Hala (in Sindh) and his 
sons, whose illustrious ancestor, Makhdoom Lutuf Allah (known as Makhdoom Nuh), a 
Sufi saint of the Suhrawardy order and a “great scholar in Islamic traditions and laws,” 
is remembered for courageously standing up to several tyrants of his own day.9  But the 
demonstrations involved more than simply daring the police to make arrests.  In a clash 
with government forces near Moro (in west-central Sindh), the MRD claimed twelve 
dead at the hands of Zia’s troops (“local reporters” would say five: two soldiers and three 
civilians).  Agitators burst the retaining wall holding the Indus River back from a 
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national highway passing through Sindh, flooding the road with water and making it 
virtually impassable.  Government troops fired into a crowd of demonstrators in the 
village of Khano Bula Khan (less than forty miles west of Hyderabad, in Sindh), killing 
at least one.10 
But by late August, the “revolt” against Zia’s Martial Law regime had stagnated 
enough that the General felt secure in leaving the country altogether on a state visit to 
Turkey.  Still, the fires hadn’t been entirely squelched.  Limited protests in Sindh 
continued.  Police broke up a march from the shrine of Z. A. Bhutto, only to be stoned 
by demonstrators before the latter were scattered by rifle shot.  In Hyderabad, several 
hundred students burned Zia ul-Haq in effigy on a university soccer field.  In Quetta, a 
general strike was announced in which many of the city’s shops took part.  During this 
period, the JUI and the JUP were united insofar as their opposition to the regime was 
concerned, though the latter’s opposition seems to have been less outright.  By the end 
of September, the MRD agitation had been ongoing for six weeks—most fervently in 
Sindh, but with notable moments in Punjab and Baluchistan, too.  But there were clear 
signs that enthusiasm was beginning to wane.  New support was needed, a fresh 
infusion of passion and numbers.  At this critical juncture, the Barelvi JUP promised to 
“join in.”  Meanwhile, Zia remained adamant that he would not negotiate with the MRD 
until the agitation ceased completely.  One headline of the time read: “Pakistan: 
stalemate or fateful spark?”11  Had the regime and the MRD reached gridlock—or was 
something about to catch fire? 
Whatever their differences with the Zia government, it seemed that perceived 
Indian aggression was often enough to ensure both Barelvi and Deobandi loyalty to the 
regime, however temporary, just as it had in 1965 over Kashmir.  After Indira Gandhi 
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and her Foreign Minister Narasimha Rao voiced controversial statements regarding the 
Sindh unrest, for example, JUP head mwlana Shah Ahmad Noorani—rather than 
making a statement himself against India—urged the Zia regime to “lodge a strong 
protest” against Pakistan’s eastern neighbor.12  This turning to Zia came despite Shah 
Noorani’s general opposition to Zia ul-Haq.  Indeed, the JUP under Noorani, as 
aforementioned, supported the MRD, though—unlike the Deobandi JUI—that support 
stopped just short of the JUP’s officially joining the alliance.  (In typical Barelvi fashion, 
the JUP organized its own civil disobediance campaign in another show of “separate 
unity.”)  After the broohaha over the Indian leaders’ Sindh-related comments had 
passed, Shah Ahmad was back to publicly opposing the military government.  Indeed, 
Noorani held a press conference in late September 1983 to protest against the regime’s 
“continuing censorship of the Pakistani press.”  One of the items addressed at the 
meeting, too, was the alleged cover-up by the government of the police massacre of 
forty-five villagers who had been mourning the death of an anti-Zia demonstrator.  The 
allegation was made by PPP head (and widow of Zulfiqar ‘Ali Bhutto) Nusrat Bhutto, 
then dying of cancer in France, and was distributed in written form by Noorani 
himself.13  Thus both the Deobandi JUI and the Barelvi JUP cooperated with the PPP 
during this period, the JUI overtly via political alliance and the latter less directly, as in 
settings such as the September 1983 Noorani press conference. 
Amidst the MRD-piloted agitation, non-party elections to Pakistan’s local councils 
in all four provinces took place (October).  Zia had abolished the local government 
system put in place by the Bhutto regime in 1979, replacing it with his own “local 
bodies” scheme focusing on rural development.  It was for these bodies that the elections 
were organized.14   In Sindh, one observer dubbed these local contests “the bloodstained 
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elections” as violence continued to rock the country.  Another commentator described 
the “[v]iolent agitation in Sind over the past two months” as resulting “in heavy loss of 
life and damage to government and private property.”15  But the fact that Zia had held 
local elections across Pakistan at all gave him “room to manoevre,” at least—a lifeline 
amidst the storm of protest in which he found himself.  Despite the agitation, Pakistan’s 
news media (“under Government instructions,” of course) the day after the local 
elections proclaimed, “Elections were held in [a] completely peaceful and disciplined 
atmosphere.  Turnout of the voters at the polling stations was quite satisfactory and up 
to the mark.”  This low-level chance for the masses to vote had bought Zia some time.  
He would use it in an attempt to shore up his position—by trying to win over the 
Barelvis.   
After all, the Deobandi JUI was too far gone, officially allied as it was with the other 
MRD parties.  But the JUP had remained more ambivalent; perhaps it could be wooed.  
(Zia’s enthusiasm for the JI, strong when he first came to power, had by now cooled 
somewhat; perhaps he saw in the Deobandi-Barelvi dynamic an opportunity to “divide 
and conquer” by co-opting the less vociferous Ahl-e-Sunnat religious leadership.)  The 
same month that Zia allowed for local elections across Pakistan, then, he summoned the 
JUP leadership to Rawalpindi for talks.  Shah Ahmad Noorani led the party’s 
delegation.  The Barelvi party’s invitation appears to have been facilitated by a 
sympathizer in the military, former NWFP governor (and future JUP general secretary, 
then president) Lieutenant-General K. M. Azhar (d. 2006 AD), an Aligarh-educated 
former Leaguer, present at the passing of the Lahore Resolution and veteran of both the 
1948 Kashmir war with India and the Rann of Kuch operation against India in 1964 (as 
well as the British campaign in Burma during World War II).16  Shah Ahmad arrived in 
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Islamabad, from where he would travel to Rawalpindi, on 10 October.17  No one was 
quite sure what the “talks” would entail, but the move proved to be a wry one on Zia’s 
part; the JUP promptly withdrew its pledge to join the agitating MRD and called off its 
own civil disobedience program.18  Indeed, Shah Ahmad had apparently met with the pir 
of Hala in late September (probably after the “talks” with Zia were put on the table), and 
observers wondered if the JUP had tried to dissuade the pir and his sons from their 
political activities, further buoying up the wisdom of Zia’s move to reach out to the 
Barelvi politico-religious leadership.19 
The impact of the JUP-Zia meeting seems to have gone both ways, at least initially, 
for it was in the very midst of the talks that the President abruptly informed a group of 
Pakistani editors that he was “willing to advance the date of general elections by a year 
if political conditions were favorable.”  Of course, unfavorable “political conditions” was 
a reference to the MRD-led agitation.  Still, Zia’s announcement opened up the 
possibility of general elections as early as March 1984.  Meanwhile, the attempt at 
conciliation with the JUP signaled Zia’s unwillingness to meet with the PPP leadership.  
He hoped, it seems, that by reaching out to the “right-wing” Barelvi party he might 
consolidate a base of support among the Sunni “majority,” especially against his PPP 
rivals and their Deobandi allies in the JUI.  Essentially, the JUP was to be used as a 
pawn in the President’s constant battle with the late Z. A. Bhutto’s party.  In just a few 
days, then, Zia had allowed local elections, reached out to the Barelvi religio-political 
leadership, and offered a more palatable timeline for elections.  The President’s game 
may have eventually dawned on Shah Ahmad, too, as the cleric later accused Zia and his 
government of “misleading” the public “by circulating its own version of the [JUP-Zia] 
meeting.”20  Indeed, in the end, Zia’s attempt to win over the Barelvis was only 
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temporarily successful; within a year-and-a-half, the President, long an imprisoner of 
political opponents, would be putting JUP leaders behind bars, too. 
Elections for state head wouldn’t come until Zia was dead; to push such an election 
back, in December 1984 the Pakistani dictator organized a “referendum”—one, 
however, that never specifically asked the people whether or not they “wanted” Zia to 
remain in charge.  Zia used the results of the poll as a legitimizing tool to prop up his 
own personal position “for another five years.”21  The long-promised general elections, 
then, would only be for national and provincial legislative bodies.  Even so, when those 
elections finally came (late February 1985)—for the national and provincial 
assemblies—the various leaders of the MRD parties were confined to house arrest by 
the government.  Shah Ahmad Noorani (though the JUP was still not officially part of 
the Movement) was placed under house arrest, too.  In protest, Barelvis across the 
country wore black armbands as they attended Friday prayers.  JUP vice-president 
Shafi Abdullah admonished Barelvis to boycott the upcoming elections entirely, and his 
call was “broadcast to the street through the mosque’s loudspeaker” despite Zia’s ban, 
via martial law order, on all “political activity in a mosque.”  Meanwhile, police waited 
around the corner in vans, together with hordes of plainclothes officers—just in case the 
agitation escalated into something more than loudspeakers and armbands.  “This is not 
an Islamic regime,” complained one Pakistani at the time.  “A purposeless election is not 
allowed in Islam.  If the people are not taken into confidence, then it is anti-Islamic.”22  
To further control the election, Zia banned not only all political parties but also 
“loudhailers, processions and outdoor meetings,” translating into one of the quietest 
contests in recent memory.  The results of the 1985 “partyless” elections were summed 
up succinctly by one reporter on the scene: “Despite the ban on political parties 
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contesting the election, the successful candidates include a large number of members or 
former members of parties wholly opposed to the Zia regime.”  Meanwhile, the JI—the 
“one party that had sided with General Zia in the past”—experienced a series of major 
electoral losses.  The contest’s big winners were the PPP and the Barelvi pir-led Muslim 
League (headed by sayyid Shah Mardan Shah II, or “pir Pagaro,” head of the Hurs of 
Sindh, who had previously been viewed as a Zia “lackey” and whose own pir father had 
been hanged by the British for his opposition to their regime).23 
* 
In May 1988, Zia ul-Haq pulled off another “constitutional coup,” restoring his 
former powers as Pakistan’s Chief Martial Law Administrator after dismissing the 
government of Muhammad Khan Junejo and the national assembly.  Zia cited 
corruption within the Junejo government, as well as its failure to secure law and order 
in Pakistan, as justification for his action.  The CMLA promised a “caretaker cabinet” 
within twenty-four hours; it took ten days, and was headed not by a Prime Minister but 
by Zia himself.  As per Zia’s own 1985 Constitution, upon dismissing the national 
assembly an announcement of elections must be made within ninety days (though 
whether this meant that elections must be held within ninety days, or merely an 
announcement, was unclear).  In any case, the situation did not present a rosy picture to 
those who had been agitating for the restoration of “democracy.”  As one observer noted 
wryly, “The last time President Zia promised elections within 90 days was in 1977.  He 
held them 90 months later, but banned political parties from participating.”  (The 
acronym for Zia’s position as Chief Martial Law Administrator, too, was sarcastically 
referred to by many as meaning “Cancel My Last Announcement.”)  If Zia’s election 
announcement was to be trusted, it would mean that he would need to reformulate a 
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party for himself—a new Muslim League.  (Some speculated that the dictator would 
select rising star Nawaz Sharif as the re-tooled party head; Nawaz was Chief Minister of 
the Punjab and popularly regarded as “a fixer,” controlling as he did Punjab’s police 
force, its powerful landlords, and its beauracratic machine.)  Meanwhile, the MRD 
continued to lead the opposition (the alliance itself led, however weakly, by the PPP 
under Benazir Bhutto) as it attempted to use the recent turn of events to its favor by 
wooing “disgruntled” Muslim Leaguers, the JI, and even Junejo himself.24 
Elections were set for 16 November, though they were to be “partyless” once more.  
But whatever might have happened—whether Zia would have pushed elections back 
indefinitely, as he was wont to do, or not—fate stepped in on 17 August 1988 (or 
perhaps, as many speculate—like the subsequently organized official inquiry 
committee—some other more sinister, and very human, force) when the CMLA’s C-
130B Hercules aircraft took a nosedive not long after taking off from little Bahawalpur 
headed for Islamabad.  The crash killed over thirty people, including Zia himself, as well 
as the US Ambassador to Pakistan.  Pakistan’s long-serving dictator was buried in 
Islamabad two days later, with a million mourners crowding the city’s streets.   
Though there were calls to push elections back, the provisional government under 
interim president Ishaq Khan decided to hold them on the date previously set.  In 
addition, Zia’s requirement that they be “partyless” was dropped; political parties would 
be permitted to organize and put forward their various candidates. 
 
Zia’s “Islamization” Push . 
Zia was determined to win over the ‘alәma and religious parties.  As such, he 
adopted the old PNA slogan, “System of the Prophet” (nyzam-e-mustafa), as his own.  
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But this was easier said than done; after all, one need only remember the findings of the 
Munir Report, which had underscored the virtual impossibility of instituting such a 
system in Pakistan, divided as its Muslim community was between various sects (the 
most prominent among them the Deobandis and the Barelvis, not to mention the Shi’a).  
Which sect’s “System” would be adopted?  Whose intepretation of the Prophet’s nyzam 
would be implemented?  From the very beginning (1977), one of Zia’s own cabinet 
ministers, mwlana Kausar Niazi (d. 1994 AD), warned him of the dangers of such a 
policy.  A political opportunist, Niazi (known by many as “mwlana Whiskey” due to his 
alleged habit of being either “drunk or surrounded by dancing girls”) was a former JI 
member who in 1969 had quit the Jamaat to join the PPP (and eventually Bhutto’s 
cabinet), before quitting that, too (in 1977) to unite with the ‘alәma-led opposition to his 
erstwhile political master.25  While nyzam-e-mustafa might function as a highly effective 
campaign slogan, the shrewd mwlana warned, its actual implementation would only 
result in sectarianism.26  Should a Deobandi interpretation be implemented, this would 
be unacceptable to the Barelvis, and vice-versa.  Meanwhile, the Ahl-e-Hadis would 
likely find fault with either, as would, certainly, Pakistan’s Shi’a population.   
Whatever its future implications, the immediate opportunity for religious parties 
and the ‘alәma to play a more significant role within the political structure of the 
Pakistani state did appear to have increased considerably with the July ascension of 
General Muhammad Zia ul-Haq.  Zia utilized the state to initiate a program of 
“Islamization” throughout the country.  “If one can bring back Islam in its purity, it 
would be a good thing,” he told the BBC in April 1978.27  Pakistan’s new military 
dictator seemed to view Islam in Pakistan as having been corrupted and in need of 
purification, of restoration to its original form; this was an implicitly revivalist—and 
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Deobandi—point of view.  Zia introduced a wide variety of “Islamic” laws, governing 
everything from business hours to television censorship to the wording of government 
documents.28  But underneath the surface, perceptive observers might notice that the 
Islamic frills of the new regime may have been just that—mere frills, veiling just 
another run-of-the-mill military dictatorship.  He remained, after all, Chief Martial Law 
Administrator from July 1977 until December 1984 (retaining the position even after 
assuming the office of President after the September 1978 departure of Fazal Elahi 
Chaudhry).  From December 1984, the General ruled as simply “President” of Pakistan, 
but even this was accomplished via a questionable referendum (in which a negligible 
percentage of the Pakistani population participated, with an overwhelming majority 
voting in Zia’s favor).  His presidential leadership would last from 1984 until his 
mysterious death by plane crash in 1988. 
A core facet of Zia’s Islamization program was his adorning of Pakistan’s judiciary 
with the trappings of an Islamic system, one through which “the supremacy of Islamic 
law” could be “established over the law of the land”—his words.  To many among both 
the Barelvi and Deobandi ‘alәma, of course, such a pronouncement was music to the 
ears.  The religious scholars, however, had learned to be skeptical when it came to the 
promises of political leaders; Zia would have to prove himself by transforming his words 
into action.  Such doubts turned out to be prophetic—though many at the time failed to 
realize this.  Zia’s judiciary promise (and the “reforms” he enacted connected to it) was 
merely for show, an attempt to placate his ‘alәma foes and reassure ‘alәma allies.  These 
trappings took the form, in 1978, of the “Shariat Appellat Bench,” one of which was 
attached to each of the state’s four High Courts.  Citizens were now free to appeal to 
these shәri’at courts regarding the verdicts reached in the secular ones.  In 1980, a 
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“Federal Shariat Court” was established, too, with original jurisdiction to hear shәri’at 
petitions (and to include up to three ‘alәma “having at least fifteen years experience in 
Islamic law, research or instruction”).  Even the Supreme Court was supplemented by a 
five-person Shariat Appellate Bench, made up of three Supreme Court judges and two 
others—the latter, significantly, selected from among the ‘alәma or the Federal Shariat 
Court.  All of this seemed transformational indeed, a major step towards the 
establishment of a long-overdue Islamic state in South Asia.  But even with Zia’s Shariat 
Appellate Benches and his Federal Shariat Court, the Martial Law Administrator’s 
incorporation of a shәri’at-based structure into Pakistan’s judiciary was a veneer, 
nothing more.  According to Article 203B of the Constitution, the Federal Shariat 
Court’s jurisdiction did not include “the Constitution, Muslim Personal Law, any law 
relating to the procedure of any Court or tribunal or…any fiscal law or any law relating 
to the levy and collection of taxes and fees or banking or insurance practice and 
procedure…”  Islam’s all-encompassing nature, prominent in the Qur’an’s concern with 
the seemingly mundance (to say nothing of the thematic scope of the sunnәt and 
centuries of Islamic juridical tradition) has already been discussed; obviously this 
constitutional provision significantly curtailed the jurisdiction of Zia’s so-called shәri’at 
courts.  In addition, the secular Supreme Court maintained its position as the highest 
and “final court of appeal for all criminal cases,” and shәri’at court judges were made up 
mostly of regular judges of the secular system anyway—i.e. not of the ‘alәma (the 
constitution still mandated that Supreme Court and High Court judges possess 
credentials and experience within the Western, British legal tradition).  At the District 
level, too, these new trappings were more or less a moot point, since district judges 
could already try someone either according to civil or shәri’at law.  Finally, the existence 
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of a shәri’at system side-by-side the secular one was illusory in that “laws were decreed 
as conforming to Islamic Shari’a, but no attempt was made to derive the legal system 
directly from the Shari’a.”  In other words, the shәri’at system was still an afterthought 
that in no way either replaced the secular system or formed a new basis for a reformed 
system; only when a law or decision was deemed anti-Islamic could a Shariat Bench 
intervene.  The Benches thus functioned only when a challenge to a law’s “Islamicness” 
was raised.  And perhaps most telling of all, Zia ensured that the decisions of his 
regime’s military tribunals as well as his own “Regulation[s] and Order[s]” remained 
above both the shәri’at and secular courts.  The regime acted outside of, or at best above, 
the law.  Zia’s supposed “Islamic” judiciary reforms were thus mostly cosmetic, doing 
little to functionally change the previous system.29 
The same held true for many of his other “reforms.”  For example, another major 
part of the regime’s Islamization program was its institution, in October 1984, of a 
“new” Law of Evidence (qanwn-e-shәhadәt).  Through this law, Zia claimed to have 
replaced the “un-Islamic” 1872 Law of Evidence (obviously on the books since the early 
British Raj period) with “an Islamic law.”  But the reality was that both laws were 
functionally more or less identical; “[t]he only change,” wrote Kennedy, “was that the 
1872 Law of Evidence had been declared to be Islamic” after all.  The promulgation, in 
February 1979, of the so-called hudwd ordinances, stand out as another example.  There 
were four such ordinances: a Prohibition Ordinance (chalking out punishments for 
alcohol consumption and the use and/or possession of illegal drugs), a zyna Ordinance 
(zyna means “adultery” and/or “fornication”; the ordinance established punishments for 
sex-related offenses like adultery, rape, prostitution, sodomy, and kidnapping), a qәźәf 
Ordinance (“for the wrongful imputation of zyna”; the ordinance laid out the punishment 
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for those who wrongfully accused an innocent man or woman of adultery), and a 
Property Ordinance (spelling out punishments for theft).  Punishments ranged from 
fines and imprisonment to whipping, “sourging” with “stripes,” and death-by-stoning.  
But the hudwd ordinances, too, appear to have been implemented mainly for show, as 
most every “crime” in the hudwd laws was already listed in Pakistan’s existant criminal 
code (and many of the punishments were exact matches, too).  Additionally, the more 
severe punishments were rarely or never employed during Zia’s tenure, and the only two 
“major sin” convictions passed during the entire period were ultimately overturned by 
the Supreme Court anyway.30 
Given the superficial nature of Zia’s reforms (however difficult it might have been to 
initially perceive this), and keeping in mind the sectarian divisions extant among 
Pakistan’s ‘alәma (remember the Munir Report), it is not surprising that reaction to 
Zia’s reforms was mixed.  The ‘alәma “interpreted each law in the light of their own 
school of thought.”  Some did not agree, for example, with the punishments the regime 
had attached to various “crimes” in the hudwd ordinances.31  Others felt that the 
government had usurped the role of the ‘alәma, while still others derided the continued 
central position of the western judicial model. 
Ostensibly for inspiration, spiritual guidance, and to aid in his implementation of 
Islamization (but probably also to shore up a base of support), Zia ul-Haq seemed to 
favor the JI.  This organization, previously hailed as a mainstream Islamic party whose 
principle platforms had included a respect for constitutional law, was actually 
represented on Zia’s cabinet (as ministers of information and broadcasting, water, 
power, and natural resources, and production).  To spearhead the country’s Planning 
Commission, Zia appointed the JI’s Khurshid Ahmad—with the express purpose of 
  
  427 
“Islamizing the economy.”32  JI representatives on Zia’s cabinet would resign in 1979, 
but the party continued to mostly support the regime.  (There were some within the 
party, it should be noted—like Abdul Ghafoor Ahmad—who were vocal critics of the 
Zia government.)33  Meanwhile, the government’s patronage allowed the JI’s student 
wing, the Jamaat-e-Taliba, to virtually take over many of Pakistan’s universities, 
intimidating professors and students alike—sometimes at gunpoint in classrooms.34  
Later, government patronage was extended to both the Barelvi JUP as well as, later, the 
Deobandi JUI.  Some within the JUI approved of Zia for his Islamization efforts, while 
others disapproved entirely.  As a result, a split within the JUI developed that continues 
to the time of this writing.  Those who supported Zia were led by Sami ul-Haq (the JUI-
S), while those opposed to the regime followed Fazlur Rehman (JUI-F).  The latter 
might be considered the “original” party and Sami ul-Haq’s faction a “breakaway.”  After 
the schism, the JUI-F continued to enjoy its dominance in Pakistan’s western provinces, 
while JUI-S influence was more or less restricted to a handful of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa’s 
districts.35 
But where Zia enjoyed perhaps the most success in terms of Islamization was in 
creating a culture of jyhad in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the 
arrival of large amounts of American and Saudi cash that followed (of which more later).  
He gradually replaced more “liberal” military officers with “conservative” ones of a more 
traditionally Islamic background (mostly Deobandi-leaning), and changed the Army’s 
motto from the more neutral, Jinnah-inspired “Unity, Faith and Discipline” to the 
religious-sounding “Faith, Piety and Jihad.”36   
But before delving into the Soviet invasion, a look toward Iran is in order. 
 
  
  428 
“Islamic Revolution”:  Deobandi-Barelvi Response . 
The arrival (on 1 February 1979), after a decade-and-a-half-long exile, of the aged 
Ruhollah Khomeini in Tehran, to the welcoming shouts of hundreds of thousands of 
Iranians celebrating in the streets, signaled the culmination of the Iranian revolution—
and the beginning of the Ayatollah’s “Islamic Revolution.”  Over the next ten years, 
Khomeini (as Supreme Leader) would establish a new government in Iran allegedly 
based on the Shi’a version of Islam.  But it was the revolution’s ability to topple a 
Western-backed (indeed, Western-installed) regime—that of the Shah—that inspired 
Muslims everywhere, and especially Shi’i, both to shake off the chains of neo-
imperialism and of Sunni oppression.  The Shi’a and Sunni in Pakistan, too, would be 
profoundly affected by these developments in neighboring Iran. 
The “Islamic Revolution” to the west seemed to infuse a new sort of political energy 
into Pakistan’s Shi’a population.  When the Zia regime attempted to introduce an 
ordinance dealing with zәkat and ‘ushәr (June 1980), for example, the Shi’i organized and 
protested vigorously.  The new scheme attempted to institute a state-run system for the 
regulation and collection of zәkat and ‘ushәr.  But unlike the Sunni, the Shi’a are not 
required to pay ‘ushәr at all; they thus naturally rejected this ordinance.  In addition, the 
Shi’a objected to the zәkat law, as their version of Islam rejected the notion of a state-
run zәkat system.  Under pressure from this abruptly mobilized minority, Zia eventually 
agreed to exempt Shi’i from the payment of both zәkat and ‘ushәr.37  Of course, such an 
exemption only angered some of the ‘alәma and their followers among the various Sunni 
sects, who watched with some trepidation as the political status of the Shi’a seemed to 
be on the rise.  Just the year before, after the introduction of the hudwd ordinances, the 
Shi’a under aforementioned mufti Ja’far Husain had, in April 1979, established the tәhrik-
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e-nyfaz-e-fyqh-e-j’afaria (“Movement for the Implementation of J’afari Law,” hereafter 
TNFJ) in protest; the crimes and punishments as laid out in the ordinances did not line 
up squarely with those prescribed by the Shi’a interpretation of Islamic law.  Though 
Ja’far Husain, appointed by Zia as the Shi’a representative on the constitutionally 
mandated Council of Islamic Ideology, was himself more or less a moderate interested 
in safeguarding Shi’a rights during the era of (Sunni-dominated) Islamization, the TNFJ 
quickly took on a life of its own.  In particular, it adopted the goal of the JUI, the JUP, 
and the JI: the formulation of an Islamic constitution—but one, of course, that would be 
distinctly Shi’a in character, “as expounded by Ayatollah Khomeini.”  (This was ironic, 
given that the organization had been founded in protest of Zia’s attempt to implement a 
Sunni system upon them; now the TNFJ would struggle for the implementation of a 
Shi’a system upon Pakistani Sunnis!)38  Many TNFJ members were trained directly by 
Shi’a activists sent from Tehran for this purpose.  By the early 1980s, too, the “most 
militant force on Pakistan’s campuses” was the Iran-connected Shi’a student outfit 
Imamia Students Organization (ISO), with its green-and-red flag and branches in every 
province of Pakistan.39  (It was about this time that, it is alleged, Zia “threw the 
resources of the state” behind the mostly Deobandi scholars and their organizations in a 
bid to contain the newly invigorated Shi’a minority; significantly for the Deobandi-
Barelvi rivalry, it was not only the Shi’i who were forced to “mobilize” against the 
growth of Deobandi power—including militant outfits—that followed, but the Barelvis 
as well.)40  After the 1983 death of Ja’far Husain , the TNFJ’s leadership fell upon the 
shoulders of the young NWFP-born ‘Arif Husayn al-Husayni (d. 1988 AD), an Iran-
trained disciple of the Ayatollah far more confrontational in his political approach than 
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his predecessor had been.  Such developments, inspired by the successful Iranian 
Revolution, worried the Deobandi and Barelvi reigious leadership. 
There were other happenings related to events in Iran that were likewise troubling 
to the Sunni ‘alәma.  Iranian literature friendly to Shi’a Islam seemed suddenly to be 
flooding into Pakistan, and the success of the revolution seemed to inspire Muslims of 
even the Sunni persuasion.  If Sunnis were convinced to look upon a Shi’a revolution 
with approbation and even admiration, could full-on conversion be far behind?  The 
Ayatollah Khomeini’s use of the term “Islamic Revolution” (rather than, say, “Shi’a 
Revolution” or “Iranian Revolution”) irked many Deobandi and Barelvi scholars.  
“Neither Oriental nor Occidental—Islamic and only Islamic,” went the Iranian slogan.  
“Neither Shi’a nor Sunni—Islamic and only Islamic.”  But how could a movement be an 
“Islamic Revolution” if it wasn’t endorsed and led by the Sunni (i.e. the majority)?  
Surely this was a Shi’a attempt at usurpation.  The term drove deeper the wedge 
between many Sunni ‘alәma and their Shi’a counterparts, the former resenting as they 
did such a pan-Islamic interpretation of the Iranian Shah’s overthrow and the 
establishment of a government under Khomeini.  One of these resentful scholars, from 
the Punjabi district of Sufi-founded Jhang, at the confluence of the Jhelum and Chenab 
rivers, was named mwlana Haq Nawaz Jhangvi.41 
* 
Militant wings of Deobandi or Barelvi organizations, or of those parties which the 
Deobandi or Barelvi religious leadership tended to support, were nothing new.  Even 
Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan’s quasi-spiritualist KK movement, which leaned Deobandi, 
had sprouted a militant outfit, organized by the “Frontier Gandhi’s” sons, Pashto poet 
Abdul Ghani and his younger brother, Abdul Wali.42  Its name was the Zalmai Pakhtun, 
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and it was ostensibly established for the “defence of the non-violent people.”  
Meanwhile, the provincial Muslim League, supported by many Barelvis, organized an 
armed wing of its own: the Ghazi Pakhtun.43  But these groups had been short-lived and 
the actual violence they meted out had been negligible.  It took the Iranian Revolution, 
the politicization of the Shi’a, and the Sunni backlash (and, perhaps, a taste for blood 
garnered in Kashmir and Bangladesh) to militarize the Pakistani ‘alәma.  This would be 
exacerbated later by Russian and American invasions of Afghanistan (and the Saudi 
inroads into Pakistan that resulted), but that will come later.  Perhaps it was just such 
militarization that led JUI party workers and supporters in Jacobabad (home to several 
thousand of Pakistan’s one million Hindus) to ransack and deface nine Hindu temples 
there.  The demonstration-turned-riot was a response to an Indian court’s decision to 
authorize the operation of a Hindu temple in Uttar Pradesh on the site of a Muslim 
mosque, a decision that had subsequently resulted in communal clashes in India—and 
over a dozen dead, eliciting “great emotion” among the Muslims of Paksitan.  Still, the 
incident represented the first time such violence against a non-Muslim minority had 
been exhibited in Pakistan since 1948.44  Perhaps something had changed. 
In 1985, four members of the Deobandi JUI—Zia-ur-Rahman Faruqi, Eesar-ul-Haq 
Qasmi, Azam Tariq, and, most importantly, Haq Nawaz Jhangvi—established what 
would become a militant offshoot: the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP; originally the 
group was called the Anjuman-e-Sipah-e-Sahaba).  Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, the Sipah-e-
Sahaba’s first leader, had been educated at the Jamia Khair-ul-Madaris in Multan, a 
Deobandi institution founded under the patronage of JUI guiding light Ashraf ‘Ali 
Thanawi.  By his early twenties, when he worked as ymam and xәtib of a Deobandi 
mәsjyd, Haq Nawaz Jhangvi had gained somewhat of a reputation in his native Jhang for 
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his passionate speeches, both against the Ahmadis as well as the Barelvis.  As a JUI 
member and a Deobandi, he had been an opponent of Ayub Khan (1969), active in the 
xәtәm-e-nәbәwwәt movement (1974), and a staunch advocate of the “System of the 
Prophet.”  Later (after the Iranian revolution and the rise of the Shi’a “threat”), his pro-
Sәhabah (a term referring to the Companions of the Prophet) speeches likewise gained 
notoriety.  This was significant, since some Shi’a used the mockery of the Sәhabah as a 
means to demean the Sunni version of Islam (it had been some of the Sәhabah, after all, 
who, according to the Shi’a version of Islamic history, had usurped the caliphate from its 
rightful heir, ‘Ali).  With Jhang’s powerful and controlling landlords prescribing mostly 
to Shi’ia Islam and its populace mostly to either the Deobandi or Barelvi Sunni version 
of the faith, the sermons of Haq Nawaz in fervent praise of the Sәhabah took on special 
meaning.45  Within the politically charged context of the Iranian Revolution and its 
spillover effects in Pakistan, Jhangvi’s animosity towards the Shi’i took on even greater 
connotations.  Concerned that the Shi’a, prodded by the new regime in Iran, were 
making excessive inroads in Pakistan, Haq Nawaz formed a committee, comprised of 
two ‘alәma representatives from each major Sunni sect in the country (Deobandi, 
Barelvi, and Ahl-e-Hadis ), with the express purpose of combating Shi’a Islam.  This is 
significant; far from being a militant Deobandi organ targeting Barelvi gatherings and 
shrines, the SSP was originally formed as a joint effort between Deobandis and Barelvis 
(plus the Ahl-e-Hadis ) in and around Jhang.  Indeed, Haq Nawaz argued that 
differences arising from the Deobandi-Barelvi rivalry should, for the time being, be 
buried—in order to fight a “great and most dangerous challenge”: the surging Shi’a.46 
Jhangvi’s anti-Shi’a rhetoric, formerly couched in pro-Sәhabah terminology, now 
became much more explicit.  To his followers, Haq Nawaz had become a near-
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redemptive figure.  “Every Firaun [Pharaoh] will meet his Moosa [Moses],” wrote one 
of Jhangvi’s disciples later, in an obituary.  “Allah Ta’ala created a Moosa in this very 
town [Jhang], to defeat the Shiite Firauns.”  His following was passionate in their 
faith—and in their certainty that not only were the Shi’i kufar (“unbelievers”), but “the 
worst brand” of kafyr.47  For his open anti-Shi’a speeches, Haq Nawaz was arrested by 
the local assistant superintendant of police, a man named Tariq Khosa.  Khosa would 
later testify (in September 2012) before a Senate Committee that he was called soon 
after making the arrest by Zia ul-Haq himself concerning the matter; according to 
Khosa, the President allegedly ordered that Jhangvi be released.48  Tariq Khosa’s 
testimony demonstrates the Pakistani state’s continued use of religious elements, 
including (perhaps in particular) those of a more militant nature, to patronize 
sectarianism.  Barelvis (and the Shi’i, for that matter) have long asserted that that 
patronage has more often than not flowed the Deobandis’ way, a charge supported, 
however circumstantially, by Zia’s actions following Jhangvi’s arrest.  In any case, the 
SSP was officially launched in 1985 with its original goals revolving around halting the 
perceived Shi’a doctrinal (and political) onslaught.  Its aims included (1) the revival of 
the caliphate as instituted during the era of the rashydwn; (2) the declaration of Pakistan 
as a Sunni state; (3) the observance by the state of holidays in commemoration of the 
first four caliphs (marked on their respective death anniversaries); (4) action to curtail 
Shi’a mourning processions commemorating Husain’s brutal murder at Karbala; (5) 
restrictions on the Iranian Council Centres in Pakistan, claimed by the SSP to be front 
organizations for the arming and training of Shi’a “agents” and preachers; (6) the death 
penalty, or at least flogging and imprisonment, for “maligning verbally” the “revered 
elders of Islam”; and (7) legislation declaring all Shi’i kufar.49  The SSP’s initial victories 
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came not in any militant fashion but in the form of promises by Shi’a Muslims not to 
mock the Prophet’s Companions.  And though the group had begun ostensibly as a joint 
Sunni effort, comprised of both Deobandis and Barelvis, among others, such intra-Sunni 
unity was impossible to maintain.  By 1987, it was shattered completely.  In that year, in 
Jhang, a brawl erupted between Barelvis and Deobandis that resulted in two Barelvi 
deaths.  The SSP, including Haq Nawaz himself, was implicated in the murders.  
Jhangvi and most of his arrested associates were subsequently released; two spent three 
years behind bars before being set free, too.  During the interim, it appeared that the 
Deobandis and Barelvis of the region had settled their differences.50  But this was to be 
an illusory peace only. 
On 22 February 1990, Jhangvi fell to an assassin’s bullet (actually six, to the chest) 
in front of his house as he was leaving to attend the final daily prayer (‘ysha).  Several 
attempts had been made on his life before (the SSP blamed unspecified Shi’i on each 
occasion), but all previous efforts had failed—until now.  He would be succeeded as SSP 
chief by his biographer and SSP co-founder Zia-ur Rehman Farooqi.  The Ayatollah’s 
“Islamic Revolution” had politicized the Shi’a and militarized the (mostly Deobandi) 
Sunnis—with major consequences for the future of the Deobandi-Barelvi rivalry.  Thus, 
while the SSP was originally borne of the strongly anti-Shi’a sentiment of its founders 
(particularly after the Iranian Revolution and “increasing Shia militancy in Pakistan”),51 
its attacks (or at least those attributed to the group) were subsequently aimed just as 
often (and, in the last two decades immiedately previous to this writing, perhaps more) 
at Barelvi Sunnis.  As of 2010, the violence had not abated, as gunmen from the SSP and 
affiliated groups attacked Barelvis celebrating mwlyd in Faisalabad and Dera Ismail 
Khan, prompting a retaliatory attack by the crowd on a Deobandi mәdrәsәħ;52 in July, 
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scores of Barelvis were killed when an SSP bomb detonated in the Data Durbar shrine 
in Lahore;53 and these are merely two incidents among many. 
But even the SSP wasn’t militant enough for some within its ranks.  As sectarian 
tensions within Pakistan mounted (especially after Jhangvi’s own 1990 assassination), 
three SSP members (Akram Lahori, Riaz Basra, and Malik Ishaquel), claiming to be 
acting in fulfillment of the martyred Jhangvi’s original wishes, organized what would 
become one of the country’s most deadly outfits.  This was the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi—
“Jhangvi’s Army.”  Meanwhile, the machinations of the state continued to play a role in 
intensifying the Deobandi-Barelvi dynamic; according to B. Rahman of the South Asia 
Analysis Group (in a report issued by SAAG in July 2002), the Inter-Services 
Intelligence Directorate had been “inciting the [Deobandi] SSP and the [LeJ] to 
counter [the] activities” of several Barelvi groups opposed to its (the ISID’s) strategic 
objectives.54  How did the state, especially under the aegis of the ISID, become so 
involved in patronizing these mostly Deobandi outfits?  To answer this question, it may 
be necessary to turn west, again—not to Iran, though, but to Afghanistan. 
 
Soviet Invasion,  US-Saudi Response ,  Deobandi-Barelvi Fallout . 
Since its 1947 birth, Pakistan had always had somewhat strained relations with 
Afghanistan.  This is typically explained away as either a strategic issue or an ethnic 
one.  Strategically speaking, the partition of the subcontinent left Afghanistan caught in 
the Cold War game, with India independent and leaning pro-Moscow and the very anti-
Soviet United States Government allied with Pakistan.  Afghanistan had previously 
enjoyed a mixed relationship with the USSR, but since 1946 had established “good 
relations” with the Soviet Union; within the new context of the Washington-Moscow 
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tug-of-war, however, would such relations pose a problem to the country’s security?  
What about the Afghanistan-Pakistan relationship?  On the ethnic front, it is pointed 
out that, with Pakistani independence, Afghanistan naturally repudiated the legally 
ambiguous Durand Line—and demanded that the Pathan-dominated region of 
Pakistan’s west and northwest be given the opportunity either to become part of 
Afghanistan (thereby uniting the heretofore Durand-divided Pathan people) or to 
become independent itself (as a free “Pakhtunistan,” as aforementioned).  After all, 
almost half of Afghanistan’s population was Pathan, for centuries the country’s largest 
and most dominant ethnic group.  Such explanations for the rocky Afghanistan-
Pakistan relationship, while certainly important, fail to acknowledge a third aspect: the 
Deobandi position.  For it was the Deobandi position, speaking generally, that 
dominated Pathan Afghanistan.  Most Deobandis in India had been opposed to 
Pakistan’s creation; is it not natural, then, that the same position might be taken by 
Afghanistan’s leaders?  The Deobandis had, by and large, supported the Pathan call for 
autonomy or independence (something the Barelvis, generally speaking, would ardently 
oppose for decades afterward); is it surprising that Afghan leaders would feel the same 
way, too?  Perhaps the “Deobandi position” should not be disregarded on this question.  
(This is not, of course, meant to disregard the complexity of Afghanistan’s ethno-
linguistic as well as religious makeup, which includes a strong contingency of Dari-
speaking Tajiks, Turkic-speaking Uzbeks, and Hazaras, not to mention Hanafi Sunnis of 
many stripes, plus Jafari Shi’i, Ismaili Shi’i, and more.)  In any case, the Afghanistan-
Pakistan relationship was to experience significant developments in the decade after 
1979: the year the Soviet army invaded Afghanistan. 
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Ever since Partition, and especially after the United States Government began 
cultivating ties with regimes (like Pakistan’s) ostensibly opposed to the expansion of the 
Soviet Union’s circle of influence, Afghanistan, though officially neutral in 
Washington’s and Moscow’s feud, had turned more and more to the Soviets for 
support—a perhaps natural phenomenon, given the USSR’s proximity compared to the 
USA’s geographical position on the far side of the globe.  The Afghan and Soviet 
governments signed trade agreements and peace treaties, and Moscow loaned large 
sums of money to Kabul for a variety of projects.  From 1965, the two states were 
connected via regular flights from Kabul to Tashkent (later extended to Moscow).  In 
the mid-1950s, the Afghan government asked the U.S. Government for military 
equipment; when it was turned down, it turned to the Soviet Union instead, and 
Moscow was happy to comply.  Along with these supplies, however, the Soviets sent 
military and technical advisers by the thousands to the central Asian state, and 
thousands of Afghans subsequently left for Russia to be trained, too.  This all allowed 
Afghanistan’s Prime Minister, Muhammad Daud, to stage a coup in 1973—made 
possibly by Daud’s left-wing, mostly pro-Soviet supporters.  As a result, the (unpopular) 
monarchy was toppled and a republic established.  But Afghanistan’s communists 
weren’t satisfied.  Just five years later, in April 1978, Daud himself was toppled (and 
murdered) by the People’s Democratic Party—a Marxist outfit—and a new Afghan 
government under Nur Muhammad Taraki was established.  The country was renamed 
the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.  Crucially (and unsurprising, given the new 
regime’s political ideology), Nur Muhammad invited Soviet advisors to come to 
Afghanistan and “assist” the new government “in all branches of government.”  Just as 
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crucially, the regime concluded a treaty with Moscow that December providing for 
military and economic assistance.55 
The coming of the Nur Muhammad regime brought with it particular challenges to 
the country’s traditional Islamic religious leadership.  Zaeef describes how, from the late 
1970s, many students from Afghan mәdrәsәħs left to continue their studies in Pakistan 
(especially after some of their teachers became vocal supporters of the Communists).  
After the coup, though, many religious leaders and teachers (including, Zaeef writes, 
“my instructor, and all the other scholars”) fled to Pakistan as well.  “Sayyeds, Khans, 
Maliks, and Mullahs were all being persecuted by the government.”  Some were 
imprisoned, others taken and never heard from again.56  Opposition to the regime grew.  
The ethnic Tajiks and Hazaras were especially opposed to Nur Muhammad.  The 
situation was so unstable by March 1979 that the Soviets refused to send more military 
aid to the Marxist regime in Kabul, despite the latter’s direct request, for fear of the 
general Afghan reaction (that same month, citizens of the Soviet Union living in Herat 
were slaughtered by mutinying Afghan troops, and the month before, the U.S. 
Ambassador to Kabul, Adolph Dubs, was kidnapped by militants and killed during a 
controversial rescue attempt). 
But after Nur Muhammad Taraki was overthrown (and executed) in September 
1979, replaced by his erstwhile Prime Minister Hafizullah Amin, Moscow 
reconsidered—and the Soviets, fearing the fall of a communist regime to the forces of 
Islam (an “Islamic Revolution” was underway in next-door Iran, after all), not to 
mention their wariness at Amin’s meetings with representatives in Kabul of the United 
States Government, sent in a “Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces in Afghanistan” 
(LCSFA).  The USSR’s troops (specifically, the Soviet Fortieth Army) crossed the 
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Afghan border on 27 December 1979.  In a week, around fifty thousand Soviet troops 
were stationed in Afghanistan, from Kabul to Herat, from Mazar-e-Sharif to Kandahar 
and Jalalabad.  (At the war’s height, that number would skyrocket to around one 
hundred forty thousand.)57  Before the year was out, Hafizullah Amin himself had been 
killed (by Soviet commandos, no less), and Babrak Kamal, backed by Moscow, was 
installed as head of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.  Over the course of 1980, 
meanwhile, the anti-communist insurgency only grew.  By now the governments of 
Saudi Arabia and the United States—and, of course, Pakistan—were all involved in the 
conflict, funneling cash and arms to the mujahydin.  Despite Washington’s concerns 
about Pakistan—its continued development of nuclear weapons, its involvement in the 
drug trade, the ISID’s sponsorship of “Islamic fundamentalists,” and Zia’s own apparent 
reluctance to re-institute representative government—the United States Government 
gave billions in military and economic aid directly to Pakistan, too.  In 1980, 
Washington spearheaded a boycott of the Olympic Games, held in Moscow.  One of the 
Cold War’s most significant (and costly, in terms of human life) proxy wars was in full 
swing, despite the fact that the details on the ground were more than a little blurry for 
the major powers involved—and perhaps even insignificant in view of the conlict’s “big 
picture.” 
By mid-decade, the war in Afghanistan had displaced over five million Afghans.  
Many fled to Iran.  Most fled to Pakistan.  Mikhail Gorbachev, newly minted head of 
the USSR, increased troop levels in Afghanistan in order to bring about a quick end to 
the war (a “surge” that the American government would mimic later in wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan)—but this merely resulted in the bloodiest year of the conflict up to that 
time (1985).  By that year, journalist Edward Mortimer was asking the question, “Can 
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the Afghans find their Arafat?”  The answer seemed far from certain.  Hizb-e-Islami 
leader Gulbuddin Hikmatyar had lost credibility both in the west (where he was 
generally viewed as “ferociously uncompromising”) as well as among fellow Afghans; 
the reason for this latter phenomenon stemmed from the engineer’s apparent tendency 
to direct his wrath “more against rival resistance groups than against the Russians.”  
Erstwhile Kabul University philosophy professor Buhanuddin Rabbani, head of the 
Jamiat Islami, failed to garner any real support among the Pathans, and the Jamiat’s 
“rising star” of the resistance, the Persian-speaking Tajik Ahmad Shah Massoud, 
likewise failed to command a Pathan following.  The head of the Harakat-e-Inqilab-e-
Islami, mwlana Muhammad Nabi Muhammadi, had the support of a broad coalition of 
Pathan ‘alәma, mullahs, and students in southern and parts of eastern Afghanistan and 
along Pakistan’s western border, but could not meaningfully reach out to the country’s 
non-Pathan (not to mention non-Sunni) population.58  Afghanistan’s “mujahydin” 
resistance was thus fractured along strongly ethnic and sectarian lines, with the Jamiat 
Islami dominant in the north and west (among the non-Pathans), the Harakat-e-Inqilab-
e-Islami in the south and east, and the Hizb-e-Islami commanding pockets of support in 
the north, east, and south.  Meanwhile, in the center, some of the most dominant groups 
were actually Shi’a.59  (It is perhaps interesting to note that Mortimer’s question is still 
being posed by foreign interventionists today, years after the mysterious mullah Omar 
probably came closest to establishing himself as an “Afghan Arafat” and the unpopular 
Hamid Karzai was propped up by the U.S. Government as its own version of an Afghan 
uniter.) 
The Pathans formed “the core of the anti-Soviet struggle,” in the words of one 
veteran journalist who covered the war from Afghanistan and Pakistan.60  The 
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dominating position of the Deobandi school of thought among the Pathan (especially in 
Pakistan but in Afghanistan, too) has already been discussed.  In this, they were assisted 
to a large extent by volunteers from Pakistan, mostly students, teachers, and 
administrators from religious (and mostly Deobandi) seminaries.  Indeed, the Deobandi 
contribution to the Afghan war effort should not be overlooked.  Not only did these 
Deobandi fighters help turn the tide against the Russian occupiers, but it was here, too, 
that the seeds of the future “Taliban” movement would be planted.  The word țalyban 
means, simply, “students” (the plural of țalyb, or “student”); by the thousands, then, these 
religiously trained students were referred to by their less religious-minded brothers-in-
arms as țalyban.  It was common, too, for the țalyban to fight side-by-side with their 
mentors and teachers, the ‘alәma.  For many of the Deobandi Pathans in northwestern 
Pakistan, the contribution of Pakistani Pathans with the help of American and Saudi 
financial and other support in the fight against communism in Afghanistan was a 
phenomenon worthy of celebration, a noble act in the face of foreign tyranny.61  To 
some Pakistani scholars in the west, however, the “blending of Saudi Wahabism with 
the neo-Deobandi  ideology…made for a witch’s brew of religious bigotry and sectarian 
hatred.”62  A more accurate picture probably lies somewhere in between these two 
extremes, as many ordinary Pathans of all ages sacrificed much to drive out a brutal 
invading force in their own land—but were armed and militarized in the process, 
setting the stage for more violent sectarian clashes (in which a minority participated) in 
the future. 
Many of the țalyban at the Deobandi dar ul’alwm in Karachi (probably the most 
worthy Pakistani successor to the dar ul’alwm at Deoband, and the largest dar ul’alwm 
in the country—far bigger than the “original,” in fact) would journey to Afghanistan 
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during their school vacations to “participate in the jihad.”  Many never returned, injured 
or killed in battle.  Many who did return did so wounded.  mufti Muhammad Rafi 
Usmani, the son of Muhammad Shafi, demonstrated this on again, off again 
participation (not unlike seasonal volunteer work) in his own memoirs.  In April 1988, 
Muhammad Rafi left Karachi for Afghanistan’s Paktika province, where he took part in 
a skirmish at Urghun.  After that, he returned home—only to go again three-and-a-half 
years later in August 1991, participating in a battle at Gardez.  For these Deobandi 
fighers, jyhad was a religious experience, a “faith reviving” phenomenon, bringing “back 
to our minds the stories of the first generation of Islam.”  Many of the mujahydin would 
bathe (and even apply perfume) before going into battle, mindful of Sahih Muslim’s hәdis 
in which the Prophet enjoins those preparing martyrs for burial not to wash either the 
fallens’ clothes or their bodies.  On the Day of Judgment, Muhammad promised, the 
wounds “will be the color of blood but have the fragrance of musk.”  In this same vein, 
these Deobandi țalyban and ‘alәma saw the fight against the Soviets as more than a 
struggle to evict Afghanistan of its Russian invaders; the jyhad (which one of the most 
prominent Deobandi muftis in Pakistan has defined as “war against the infidels for the 
sake of Allah”) was to be the “beginning point” of a more “universal jihad,” with fronts 
in Tajikistan, Kashmir, Palestine, Bosnia, East Turkestan (or “Xinjiang”), Chechnya, 
and elsewhere.  Afghanistan was to be the great training ground where the mujahydin 
could learn courage, could learn to overcome “fear of the battlefield,” in preparation for 
the larger jyhad to come.  This was all very revivalist in spirit, of course—very pan-
Islamic in nature—and very Deobandi.63  
Barelvis, on the other hand, generally did not actively involve themselves in the 
Afghan conflict.  Unlike its stance on Kashmir, where it had proclaimed jyhad and 
  
  443 
organized relief and preaching missions, the JUP did not support the jyhad in 
Afghanistan.  The Pathans (especially in Pakistan) were, after all, mostly Deobandis, 
and the jyhad itself had been launched by Zia ul-Haq, a Deobandi-leaning dictator (or, at 
worst, an out-and-out “Wahhabi”).  Ahmad Riza Khan’s rules of conduct vis-à-vis “bad” 
Muslims were thus followed and the war in Afghanistan failed to mobilize either the 
Barelvi religious leadership or their base. 
The vision of the Afghan țalyban for themselves was distinctly Deobandi, too, both 
in its emphasis on reform and on its own importance vis-à-vis society at large.  When 
one prominent Afghan commander saw the dead bodies of young țalyban fighters laid 
out before him, he addressed a țalyban commander, reportedly lamenting, “Fear God!  
You should not sacrifice our young Taliban to the Russians.”  We have no choice, came 
the answer from the other, for the Russians cannot be allowed to stay—to which the 
original speaker replied, “I don’t mean that we should not fight the jihad, but I am 
concerned about the Taliban and the Ulema, for they are the spiritual heart of our 
country….”  His own fighters knew little of Islam, smoked hashish, and shaved their 
beards; let them fight and die.  “The Taliban have a greater role in society.”64 
The memoirs of one Deobandi ‘alym demonstrate the broad, personal participation of 
the Deobandi ‘alәma in the anti-communist jyhad.  Listing the seventeen members of his 
“caravan” traveling from Karachi to Multan to Dera Ismail Khan to Afghanistan’s 
Paktika province, he identified three school administrators (from the dar ul’alwm in 
Karachi), three principals or assistant principals (of the Jami Farooqiya in Karachi, the 
mәdrәsәħ Ashrafiyah in Sukkur, and the Jamiat-ul Uloom al-Islamiya in Karachi), six 
teachers (from the dar ul’alwm Karachi and the Jami Farooqiya), a chief administrator 
for Pakistan’s official organization overseeing the country’s thousands of Deobandi 
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mәdarys, a religious newspaper editor, one ymam and xәtib from a mosque in Karachi, 
two administrators of the Harkat al-Jihad al-Islami in Karachi, and only one student.  Of 
course, students organized their own “caravans” to the front (often immediately upon 
earning their degrees), but the ‘alym’s memoirs paint quite a different picture from that 
delivered by many in the western media of evil “mullahs” conniving their students into 
harm’s way while they themselves plot further mischief tucked safely away in their 
mәdrәsәħs.  Of the seventeen travelers, a full eleven were degree-holding mwlanas.  
Their zeal, and that of their students, was inspired not only by fellow teachers and 
administrators but also by veteran mujahydin who would visit the dar ul’alwm in Karachi 
regularly to share their spiritual experiences as jyhadis.65 
One famous Deobandi mujahyd was named Irshad Ahmed.  In his early twenties he 
had formed the Harkat ul-Jihad ul-Islami to facilitate the recruitment, transportation, 
and supplying of Pakistani fighters on the Afghan front against the Russians.  Irshad 
Ahmed was killed several years later (1985) in battle.  Among the other mujahydin killed 
that night were six students from the dar ul’alwm in Karachi.  It is interesting to note 
that not one of these students was actually from Karachi; three were from Gilgit, one 
from Iran, one from Afghanistan itself, and one from Burma.  (The author experienced 
this diversity firsthand at the Karachi seminary, where he met a Kashmiri refugee a 
thousand miles from Kashmir, born and raised on the plains; a Karachi businessman 
whose grandparents had fled far-away Uttar Pradesh in 1947; and the son of a Burmese 
Indian run out of Southeast Asia by General Ne Win’s 1962 expulsion of all those of 
Indian descent from that southeast Asian state—to name a few.)  Thus the Deobandi 
fighters who participated in the anti-communist jyhad in Afghanistan hailed from all 
over the South Asian subcontinent and its fringes.  Significantly, Irshad Ahmed’s 
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Harkat ul-Jihad ul-Islami would later play a part in the militarization of the Deobandi-
Barelvi rivalry.66 
The development prompted the U.S. Government to initiate its now-famous Stinger 
missile program in 1986.  The mujahydin now possessed the means to shoot down and 
destroy the dreaded Soviet helicopter gunship.  This was the turning point of the war; 
Karmal was sacked and Muhammad Najibullah installed in his stead.  But now the 
violence was spilling over into Pakistan.  In February 1987, for example, the mostly 
non-Pathan Jamiat-e-Islami became the target of a bomb blast, set off in front of the 
group’s Pakistan-based office south of Peshawar.  A bus parked in front of the 
recruitment center had exploded, killing eleven people (including several young 
schoolchildren), injuring fifty more, and collapsing a nearby primary school and several 
houses.  After the bombing, dubbed “one of the worst bomb blasts in Pakistan,” locals 
repeatedly fired at the Jamiat office—a foreshadowing, perhaps, of the Taliban-Northern 
Alliance battles to come.67 
For the “Islamists,” even in the midst of this violent scene, the goal was the 
institution of Islamic law and the establishment of a truly Islamic state.  Warlords 
fought for territory—and the money and power that came with it—yes, but thousands 
of mujahydin fought simply for the institution of an Islamic system after so many years 
of atheistic communist regimes.  One eyewitness to Afghan resistance to the Russians in 
the south and southeast regions of the country (the heart of Pathan territory) described 
how the first order of business in an area cleared of Soviet forces (even if the latter 
continued to attack from afar) was the extension of an Islamic judicial system.  Indeed, 
even with continued Russian heavy artillery and assaults by air threatening a newly 
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liberated region, “the courts were working well and started to settle disputes among the 
communities.”68  The establishment of an Islamic state was underway. 
The conceptualization of a “brotherhood” is one that resounds within Islam, of 
course—but especially within Deobandism, a phenomenon hailing from the school’s 
beginnings to the present day.  One future high-ranking Taliban fighter, who claimed to 
have stood not twenty feet from Muhammad Omar when the latter’s eye was ripped out 
by “a shard of metal shrapnel” during a fight with the Russians, described the events 
that followed the incident thus:  
 
On that same night we held a marvelous party.  The late Mullah Marjan 
sang and we accompanied his sweet voice with percussion on whatever 
we had to hand.  I can remember the ghazal that Mullah Muhammad 
Omar Akhund sang:  
My illness is untreatable, oh, my flower-like friend 
My life is difficult without you, my flower-like friend.   
…May God be praised!  What a brotherhood we had among the 
mujahedeen!  We weren’t concerned with the world or with our lives; our 
intentions were pure and every one of us was ready to die as a martyr.  
When I look back on the love and respect that we had for each other, it 
sometimes seems like a dream.”69 
 
For many of these fighters, the struggle against the Soviets and their allies, or the 
“Jihad…against communism,” was one of the most elevated spirituality, with an 
ultimate goal of unquestionable sanctity.  “Many great battles were fought against the 
  
  447 
Russians and government forces,” remembered one Muslim fighter.70  Many would die, 
and they would be forever hailed as martyrs.  For the living, the only redemptive 
political system was that of Islam.  This was how peace could be won, however hard-
fought it might be.  Over time, the mujahydin’s war of attrition wore away at the Soviet 
occupiers, demoralizing the Russian troops and contributing significantly to virtual 
Soviet bankruptcy.  By 1988, peace accords had been signed between the governments 
of Afghanistan, the United States, the Soviet Union, and Pakistan.   
On 15 February 1989, Moscow announced that the last Soviet soldier had left 
Afghanistan.  One million Afghans (some say two million),71 as well as some thirteen 
thousand Soviet troops, had been killed in the decade-long Soviet war in Afghanistan. 
 
Proselytizing Deobandism: the Rise and Spread of the Tablighi Jama’at . 
Muhammad Ilyas (d. 1944 AD), the founder of the Tablighi Jama’at, was trained in 
the Deobandi tradition; indeed, he had been born into it.  His father, Muhammad Ismail 
(d. 1898 AD), was from the qәSbәħ  of Jhanjana, and his mother from the qәSbәħ  of 
Kandhala, both “‘alәma towns” in which Deobandism had taken firm root.  One of his 
most influential teachers was his own older brother, Muhammad Yahya, a student of 
Rashid Ahmad Gangohi (as a teenager, Ilyas himself reportedly developed a strong 
bond with Rashid Ahmad, too).  He had additionally studied, beginning in 1908, under 
the direction of Mahmud Hasan (to whom he would later swear an oath of jyhad against 
the British), and would become a disciple, too, of the eminent Ashraf ‘Ali Thanawi while 
completing his education at the dar ul’alwm at Deoband.  After completing his studies 
there, Muhammad Ilyas continued to train and teach at another Deobandi dar ul’alwm, 
in nearby Saharanpur (from 1910 to 1917). 
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But it was in the 1930s that Muhammad Ilyas really began his now-famous tablighi 
efforts.  The setting was Mewat, a region that straddles the modern-day Indian units of 
Rajasthan and Haryana.  Here he organized jәma’ats (or “assemblies”) assigned to 
specific villages in the area with the explicit mission to preach Islam to Muslims viewed 
as either weak in the faith or victims of Hindu or some other influence; this included, of 
course, the Barelvis.  The goal was revival (and numbers, as the British began during 
this period to open up junior government posts to Indians apportioned by religion, and 
Hindu groups like the Arya Samaj were reacting with “reconversion” campaigns 
claiming success by the hundreds of thousands).  Muhammad Ilyas’s gift was in 
organization.  Each jәma’at was tasked with reporting to the movement’s center in 
Delhi (where its world headquarters remained even after Partition—and to the time of 
this writing), and members were to differentiate themselves in deed, belief, and even 
look from their Hindu neighbors.  The accretion must stop, and the jәma’ats would use 
the power of persuasion combined with strict discipline and a commitment to “motion” 
(i.e. movement, as in from house to house and from place to place, preaching Islam) to 
make sure that it did.  It didn’t take long for enthusiasm for Muhammad Ilyas’s 
organization to spread, especially to Delhi, where the proselytizing group became 
popular among the city’s Muslim merchants.  The organization was called the Tablighi 
Jama’at (hereafter TJ). 
After the 1944 death of Muhammad Ilyas, his son, Yusuf (d. 1965) took the reigns in 
his stead.  Unlike the JUH or, later, the JUI, both of which played an overtly political 
role within the context of the pre-Partition struggle for independence and Pakistan, the 
TJ began presenting itself during this period as a completely apolitical entity, especially 
after 1947.  (Within Islam this is, of course, arguably impossible, at least on a certain 
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level; Yusuf here was simply keeping his organization at a distance from the specific 
political webs of India and Pakistan, despite its overtly political end game.)  The group 
especially distanced itself from the JI (Muhammad Ilyas’s nephew, Muhammad 
Zakariyya Kandhlawi, who had taught at the same Saharanpur dar ul’alwm and was 
Yusuf’s father-in-law, wrote a fiery and influential diatribe against the JI in the early 
1950s, for example).72  In any case, the TJ’s policy became one of political non-
alignment, a position it ostensibly holds to the time of this writing (but which, as earlier 
demonstrated, is practically impossible within the framework of Islam, and especially 
Deobandi Islam; in the words of Sikand, despite the group’s “immediate focus” on 
“reform of the individual,” the TJ “can hardly be said to be apolitical”).73  Under Yusuf, 
the TJ completely transformed, from a local phenomenon with little influence beyond 
north-central India to a worldwide organization.  TJ jәma’ats were organized 
throughout the subcontinent, in the Middle East, and in Western Europe, spreading as 
well to the United States, Japan, and Southeast Asia.  Throughout Yusuf’s tenure as TJ 
head, the organization held major—and highly attended—conventions in India, 
Pakistan, and Bangladesh, often counting a million or more attendees.  Significantly, 
too, the TJ under Yusuf expanded its mission to include preaching to non-Muslims, and 
like the Christian missionaries of previous centuries the TJ proselytizers traveled far 
and wide by whatever means they could manage.  Muhammad Ilyas would perhaps have 
preferred a comparison not to early Christians but to the first generations of Muslims, 
who “traveled all the time, both on land and in the water…traveling and reciting the 
Qur’an, traveling and offering salat, traveling and doing zykr” (again emphasizing the 
necessity of “motion”).74  Yusuf died in 1965 in Lahore, having led the movement for 
over twenty years. 
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His successor, the quiet and reserved In’amul Hasan (d. 1995), had known Yusuf 
since childhood (when they had been classmates) and had personally studied under both 
Muhammad Zakariya Kandhlawi and Muhammad Ilyas himself.  The expansion of the 
organization that had taken place under Yusuf continued under In’amul—especially, 
and significantly, within the Pakistani government, the Pakistani military, and the 
Pakistani intelligence agencies.  In 1990, prominent TJ member Javed Nasir became 
head of the ISID, and during the Prime Ministership of Nawaz Sharif (whose own father 
was an active member and generous financier of the TJ) the Pakistani government 
patronized TJ members with significant government positions.75  TJ inroads in the 
Army, which surged under Zia as the dictator tended to appoint Deobandi-leaning 
officers into the armed forces, allowed members to preach to soldiers in the barracks.  
Meanwhile, the organization’s worldwide spread gained a renewed vigor, especially 
given Muslim grievances in Afghanistan, the central Asian states (including East 
Turkestan), Russia, and the Middle East over foreign interventionism and domination.   
After In’amul Hasan’s June 1995 death, the organization underwent some media 
scrutiny when, in September, a large group of mostly Deobandi Army officers 
(including a major-general, some brigadiers, and several colonels) attempted to oust 
Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto.  By 31 October, up to seven hundred officers were under 
investigation “for possible complicity” in the failed coup attempt.76  All of the plot’s 
participants were later linked to the TJ, raising fears that the organization had indeed 
turned a political corner and now sought to take over governments in order to institute 
an Islamic order.  (Some were also shown to be members of the aforementioned 
Deobandi militant group Harakat ul-Mujahidin, of which more later.)77  After In’amul 
Hasan’s tenure as TJ head, the group was led by a shwra that was itself headed by two 
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leaders: Zubair ul-Hasan and Saad Kandhlawi.  By now the TJ had grown especially 
strong roots in the UK, where the group supported almost half (some six hundred or 
more) of Britain’s mosques—and where the debate has become particularly heated; 
Muslims in the UK are mostly of South Asian descent and are overwhelmingly divided 
between the Deobandi and Barelvi sects.  The situation of one twenty-one-year-old 
Deobandi man may be indicative of the general situation, and illustrates the manner in 
which the Deobandi-Barelvi rivalry plays out amongst regular Muslims on a personal 
level.  The role of tabliG is also evident.  Addressed to the muftis of the dar ul’alwm in 
Deoband, the young man wrote the following: 
 
i am very strong…follower of [the ‘alәma of Deoband]  i am very much 
influenced by them…  but where i live here is large sect of brelvis [sic] 
who follows ahmad rida khan [Ahmad Riza Khan] bidati...i know all the 
brelvis are bidati. all ulemas of brelvis use dirty languages of our 
respected ulema's they call em to be kafirs…  one of my friend is also 
brelvi he tells me not to follow deobandis they are kafirs, i ignore him 
every time, he gives me proofs of kitaabs writen by ulema e deoband, like 
our respected ulema, [mwlana Qasim Nanautawi], Rashid Ahmad 
Gangohi…  Last Time i Met Him Was When i was going to perform 
jummah prayer…  he was telling me not to go for prayer behind 
deobandis, come here, with me in our [masjid], you will not have your 
salah behind them, i ignored him… 
 
In answer to the query (which went on to describe his proselytizing efforts vis-à-vis the 
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Barelvi individual in question, and ask if such proselytizing was appropriate), the 
Deobandi mufti advised the young man to “try [his] best to take [the Barelvi] to the 
right path,” despite the Barelvis’ “abusing and blaspheming the elders of Deoband”—
which, it was explained, was done “out of ignorance” only.  The mufti’s advice falls in 
line with the behavior of the early scholars, who chose to carry out the struggle by 
means of persuasion, not compulsion.78  
By 2003, around one in twelve Muslims worldwide was a member or direct 
supporter of the TJ, and the Deobandi group represented “the largest group of religious 
proselytizers of any faith” on the planet,79 as well as “the largest Islamic movement in 
the world today.”80  In 1998, thanks again to Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif (who, in 
April, had engineered the removal of the President’s ability to sack a government, 
thereby consolidating his own power), a prominent TJ member (but otherwise virtually 
unknown figure, apart from his stint as an associate judge on the Supreme Court), 
Muhammad Rafique Tarar, was appointed to the office of state head as Pakistan’s ninth 
President.81  On the one hand, scholars have pointed to such appointments as evidence 
of the TJ’s successful efforts to infiltrate governments like Pakistan’s.  On the other, it 
may be useful to remember that, with so many millions of TJ members and supporters, 
the appointment or nomination of a TJer to some important government office did not 
necessarily signal some secret tabliGi plan to take over the state. 
One 2010 sociological study out of the University of Johannesburg found that the 
TJ system was able to tap into Muslims’ “shared experiences and interrelations,” despite 
cultural differences or geographical distance, thereby “inform[ing] identity” and 
deriving “legitimate meaning”; the study’s prognostication concerning the group’s 
future: “the success of the Tabligh Jamaat is not likely to wane.”82  The TJ’s explosive 
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growth and success (including the conversion of many Barelvis to the Deobandi school 
of thought) caused Barelvi scholars more than a little trepidation for the welfare of the 
“Sunni majority.”  (The same anxiety—though not for the Barelvi masses—might be 
displayed by U.S. foreign policy “experts” like Washington, D.C.-based Center for 
Security Policy vice president Alex Alexiev, who described the TJ’s 
“15,000…missionaries reportedly active in the United States” as “a serious national 
security problem.”)83  Barelvi ‘alәma and Western neo-conservatives alike found it 
difficult to “attack” the TJ since Muhammad Ilyas’s organization eschewed any sort of 
transparency; it published no financial reports, seemed to keep no official (or at least 
public) membership records, appeared devoid of any formal structure, and even shied 
away from the Internet.84  (This “shying away from the Internet” is a reference to the 
TJ as an organization; individual members seemed to employ the World Wide Web 
prolifically, uploading Islamic books, talks, videos, and blog posts.)  Indeed, trying to 
find any “official” information about the TJ proved a somewhat elusive endeavor, and as 
a result scholars and other researchers were forced to rely on formal or informal 
interviews directly with TJ “members.”   
One major donor to the TJ: Saudi Arabia (and other Gulf states), adding fuel to the 
Barelvi premise that Deobandism is nothing more than another strain of Wahhabism.  
When Barelvi leaders in Uttar Pradesh complained to the Indian government about the 
alleged Deobandi usurpation of tens of thousands of religious sites and institutions, they 
explained that the steady, gradual seizure of Barelvi properties (as well as the 
infiltration by Deobandi clerics of Indian government minority bodies) had been fueled 
by Wahhabi “petro-dollars.”85  Meanwhile, the Deobandis cultivated links with Saudi 
Arabia in Britain through the UK Islamic Mission, dubbed “the embodiment of the 
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Riyadh-Islamabad axis.”  The TJ also played a role in procuring Saudi cash for tabliGi 
efforts in the United States, as the group worked through organizations like the Jama’at 
ul-Fuqra, founded by the New York-based Deobandi shix Mubarek Gilani and funded by 
both the TJ and wealthy Saudi contributors.  The Barelvis attempted to counter these 
highly bankrolled Deobandi efforts through their own World Islamic Mission (presided 
over by none other than JUP head Shah Ahmad Noorani).  In between these groups 
stood men like Hyderabad-born Dr. Syed Pasha, whose Union of Muslim Organizations 
was set up, at least in part, in an effort to “see [Deobandi and Barelvi] reconciled.”86 
 
ISID Patronage:  Growth of mәdarys Networks,  Militant Outfits . 
The autobiography of Taliban leader Abdul Salam Zaeef is seething with hatred for 
the ISID, and though the focus of his work doesn’t lend itself to details in this regard, it 
clearly fingers the Pakistani intelligence agency as a backer and manipulator of the 
Taliban.87  In the early 1980s, for example, the ISID ran a special weapons training 
program for Afghan mujahydin targeting Russian tanks and helicopters.  In the end, 
according to this Taliban source, the ISID betrayed their Afghan brothers in deference 
to the Americans and their money.  In any case, it was through the mechanism of the 
state, especially that of its intelligence wing, that stimulus for the (mostly Deobandi) 
mәdarys networks along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border was distributed.  In the words 
of Jalal, “State sponsorship of the Deobandis for strategic purposes upset the sectarian 
balance in predominantly Barelvi Pakistan.”88  Not only did money collected via Zia’s 
new zәkat bureaucracy find its way into the hands of mostly Deobandi groups and 
parties, but some two billion dollars of U.S. Government covert “assistance” (combined 
with an even larger sum from Saudi Arabia and various Gulf states) was funneled—
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through the Pakistani state intelligence wing—in large part to these same groups.89  
This enormous inflow of mostly American and Saudi cash triggered a massive upsurge 
in the construction and spread of new mәdarys.  The Deobandi school, already old hat at 
organizing large (even transnational) education networks, was thus provided the means 
to spread its revivalist ideology across the country.  Zia did little to prevent the 
financial disparity between the Deobandi and Barelvi schools from growing, favoring as 
he did (by this time, anyway) the Deobandis; after all, the General himself would 
personally receive Muhammad Tayyib, head of the dar ul’alwm at Deoband, at the 
airport every time the latter paid a visit to Pakistan.90  (As mentioned previously, the 
Barelvis, under the JUP, had had their chance to curry favor with the Zia regime, but 
had opted to form part of the opposition; had the party taken advantage of Zia’s offer—
and the state patronage that would have naturally flowed from it—might things have 
been radically different vis-à-vis the subsequent mushrooming of Deobandi mәdarys and 
militant outfits?)  In any case, the ISID’s collaboration with Saudi intelligence, plus 
Zia’s liberalizing of visa requirements for Islamic activists and missionaries, opened the 
door for the introduction of a more austere version of Islam into Pakistan—one that 
favored a Deobandi approach rather than a Barelvi one.   Saudi Wahhabi preachers and 
activists by the thousands entered Pakistan from the 1980s, operating up and down the 
western border areas and in every major city. 
The now-famous dar ul’alwm Haqqania in Akora Khattack (where almost all of the 
Taliban’s senior leadership, including Mullah Omar, were educated) provides a general 
example of how state patronage worked to promote incredible (and incredibly rapid) 
growth within one Deobandi educational network.  A former teacher from the dar 
ul’alwm at Deoband founded the school in 1947.91  With the invasion of Afghanistan by 
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the Russians, students from Haqqania (many of them Afghan) were caught up in the 
jyhad against the USSR; indeed, one of the original fatawa calling for holy war in 
Afghanistan originated from Haqqania.  Soon money from the combined zәkat-U.S. 
intelligence-Saudi intelligence pot was liberally dumped into the school, and hundreds 
of sister schools were quickly constructed, mostly within the tribal regions bordering 
Afghanistan—each school autonomous within its own local sphere but run as part of a 
larger network from Haqqania.  Since Zia’s time, the school’s network has continued to 
mushroom, and today its funding still originates primarily from Saudi Arabia and the 
Gulf states.  The dramatic increase in the number of mәdarys, exemplified by the rise and 
spread of the Haqqania network of schools, represented yet another victory of the 
minority Deobandis over the majority Barelvis; by 1988—Zia’s final year as head of 
state—Deobandi mәdarys outnumbered Barelvi mәdarys approximately 2.6 to 1, with 
especially significant numerical advantages in the NWFP, Sindh, Baluchistan, Kashmir, 
and the Northern Areas.92   Over the years, scholars of the Deobandi persuasion 
continued to find positions in influential mosques (some formerly Barelvi) and religious 
posts in government, out of proportion to the two groups’ relative populations.  Barelvis 
resented this and responded with organizations of their own, dedicated to “protecting” 
Barelvi “articles of faith” (aqaid), “mosques,” money, and “rights.”93  These were the 
express goals of perhaps the most important Barelvi reactionary political organization, 
the Sunni Tehrik, founded in the early 1990s.  
But ISID patronage didn’t end with the (mostly Deobandi) seminaries (and, it is 
alleged, mosques; Sunni Tehrik head Sarwat Aijaz Qadiri, for example, claimed in 2010 
that “thousands of mosques and madressahs across the country which belonged to 
Barelvis were forcibly taken over by the Deobandis” during the Zia years—a 
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phenomenon that would have bloody repurcussions from the 1990s when Barelvis 
attempted to win them back).94  The intelligence organization adopted a number of 
(mostly Deobandi) militant groups, too, which were subsequently used by the agency as 
proxy armies, mostly in Kashmir but also against rival sects.  Previously in this work, 
Deobandi mujahyd Irshad Ahmed and his Harkat ul-Jihad ul-Islami were mentioned.  
After Irshad’s 1985 death, his organization splintered into two groups.  Fazlul Rehman 
Khalil and mwlana Masood Kashmiri led one group, which they called Harkat ul-
Mujahideen.  But differences between Khalil and Kashmiri resulted in a further fracture, 
dividing Harkat ul-Mujahideen into the Fazlul Rehman Khalil-led Harkat ul-
Mujahideen (hereafter HuM) and the Masood Kashmiri-led Jamiat ul-Mujahideen 
(hereafter JuM).  Meanwhile, the second group to coalesce after Irshad Ahmed’s death, 
organized by several Deobandi ‘alәma (including Muhammad Shafi’s son Muhammad 
Rafi Usmani) from old Harkat-ul Mujahideen remnants in 1993, was renamed Harkat 
ul-Ansar.  The jyhad against the Soviets was largely transferred to the jyhad against the 
Indians over Kashmir.  The conflict intensified beginning in the late eighties and 
throughout much of the nineties as Indian and Pakistani leaders hurled insults and 
challenges at one another.  In August 1994, for example, Pakistani Prime Minister 
Benazir Bhutto pledged her country’s support “always” to those “Kashmiris fighting 
Indian rule.”  The next day Indian Prime Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao demanded that 
Pakistan relinquish its hold on “Azad Kashmir” and turn it over to India immediately.  
On Kashmir, Bhutto insisted, Pakistan had an “unfinished agenda,” which Rao threw 
back by agreeing—“the one unfinished task,” he said, was for Pakistan to terminate its 
“occupation” of western Kashmir and give it to India.  Meanwhile, for years soldiers 
from both countries continued to shoot at one another across the Line of Control on 
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almost a daily basis, while “Islamic mercenaries” (members of mostly Deobandi and JI 
groups—plus some Barelvi outfits, too—with backing from the ISID) constantly made 
incursions into Indian-controlled Kashmir.  “With you, without you, in spite of you, 
Kashmir will remain an integral part of India,” Rao promised, even while the conflict 
continued to sap India’s resources as the government’s troops were supplied by 
helicopter high in the Himalayas (Pakistani soldiers and paramilitants, on the other 
hand, made the trip to the front “by lorry and mule”).95  Rao’s use of the term “integral,” 
echoing similar (and even more dubious) claims on Tibet by the Beijing regime, 
demonstrated the Indian government’s intractability; gone were the days of possibility, 
of hopes for a meaningful plebiscite, in the years immediately after Partition.  Of course, 
Rao’s comments were made just a year-and-a-half after the deadliest and most 
destruction bomb blasts in the history of India (12 March 1993), when coordinated 
attacks in Mumbai—that the Indian government alleged were linked both to the 
Pakistani ISID as well as “Islamic groups” backed by the intelligence agency, among 
others—left more than two hundred fifty dead and over seven hundred wounded.  (The 
blasts were evidently motivated, at least in large part, by the Hindu-led destruction of 
Babri mәsjyd in Ayodhya.) 
Meanwhile, Deobandism spread with the growth of its educational network—and 
the help of Wahhabis from Saudi Arabia.  Barelvi animosity towards “Saudi” Arabia 
goes back as far as that kingdom’s founding (1932)—and even further, when the Saudis 
were fighting for control of the peninsula against fellow Muslims.  In his presidential 
address on the occasion of the All-India Sunni Conference’s founding in Moradabad in 
1925, for example, Jamaat ‘Ali Shah had commented on the political situation in Arabia 
before condemning “the massacre of innocent Muslims” there “carried out by the 
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descendents of King Saud.”  He also took the opportunity to slam the major tenets of 
Wahhabism, “fast spreading in India,” and the emergence of “other minor sects” within 
the subcontinental Muslim community.  (One of these “minor sects” was Deobandism.)  
The house of Saud, of course, had long embraced Wahhabism—that school of Islam 
with which the Barelvis had been bitterly opposed from the beginning, and which they 
(the Barelvis) commonly associated (however erroneously) with their Deobandi 
counterparts.  A decade later (in 1935), at another AISC gathering in Badayun, Jamaat 
‘Ali Shah again condemned Ibn Saud’s “policies in Arabia.”96  Since the early 1980s, 
Barelvis had watched on, too, as the Saudis funded the proliferation of Deobandi and 
Ahl-e-Sunnat mәdarys, concurrently bankrolling Deobandi militant outfits in Pakistan—
outfits that targeted Barelvis, among others.  One 2003 study found that the JUI alone 
ran more than sixty-five percent of all of Pakistan’s mәdarys.97 
Thus, while the Deobandis “enjoyed increasing influence and state patronage during 
the Afghan [jyhad],” as well as the seemingly endless beneficence of hopeful Wahhabis 
from the Gulf, the Barelvis “remained sidelined during this period.”98  Such “sidelining,” 
however, would garner a response. 
 
Barelvi Response :  Sunni Tehrik,  Dawat-e-Islami,  et alia. 
The Sunni Tehreek, “an aggressive version of the Barelvi faith” mentioned 
previously as a “Sunni” response to Deobandi dominance in government as well as the 
perceived Deobandi capture of traditionally Barelvi mosques, was born in Karachi.  The 
organization would strive to amass a network of Barelvi groups throughout the country 
to combat what it saw as “the armed madrassa followers”—the Deobandis.99  Founded 
by one Muhammad Saleem Qadiri in 1990, the Sunni Tehrik is generally considered an 
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“offshoot” of the JUP, and was (and is) funded by both foreign and in-country 
contributors.  At first, Karachi’s business-savvy Memon community helped finance the 
outfit as it was initially getting off the ground; throughout the 1990s, too, money from 
Baghdad helped buoy the Barelvi cause—an Iraqi attempt to counter the influence of 
Saudi cash in Pakistan.100  (Thus we see the Deobandi-Barelvi conflict being co-opted by 
foreign governments in their own rivalries.)  As of this writing, the Sunni Tehrik enjoys 
the general support of Barelvis across Pakistan.   
The Sunni Tehrik’s initial mission was to win back the mosques it claimed had been 
usurped by Deobandi clerics and their followers—“the battle over houses of God,” as 
journalist Salman Siddiqui described it.  (Interestingly, the Deobandis make the same 
claim about the Barelvis.  For example, prominent Karachi cleric mufti Naeem, head of 
major Deobandi mәdrәsәħ Jamia Binoria, claimed to have “a list of 27 mosques such as 
Jamia Noor where we [the Deobandis] can prove that it belongs to our people 
belonging to the Deoband school of thought.”  Meanwhile, Sunni Tehrik (hereafter ST) 
chief Sarwat Aijaz Qadiri claimed that “thousands” of [Barelvi] mosques across 
Pakistan had been taken over by the Deobandis during the Zia years.)101  The takeover, 
the ST asserted, had been accomplished with the help of two Deobandi militant 
organizations: the Lashkar-e-Taiba and, especially, the SSP.102  For its first twelve years 
of existence (until the end of 2001), the Sunni Tehrik’s operations revolved around this 
very specific goal, focused almost entirely on mosques in Sindh (mostly Karachi) and the 
Punjab.  The first Sunni Tehrik-Deobandi clash occurred in 1992 in Karachi, when 
members of the Barelvi group attempted to take over the Noor mәsjyd (located off M. A. 
Jinnah Road at Ranchor Lines).  Deobandis insisted the mosque had always been 
Deobandi—that it had been built, after all, by Shabbir Ahmad Usmani himself.  But the 
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Sunni Tehrik were adamant, and on 18 December—in its “first show of strength”—the 
ST organized a massaive rally along M. A. Jinnah Road in protest of Deobandi 
possession of the mosque.103  The rally turned ugly, and by the time it was over, dozens 
had been injured, a number of vehicles burnt, and several killed.  A few months later, 
another ST attack occurred, this time targeting the Ibrahim Raza mosque in Karachi’s 
Burmi Colony, resulting in more deaths and the mәsjyd ‘s sealing off by police.  Between 
1992 and 2002, a purported sixty-two mosques from all over Pakistan were wrested 
from Deobandi possession by the Barelvi Sunni Tehrik.104 
In May of 2001, ST founder Muhammad Saleem Qadiri was gunned down—along 
with five others—in his car outside of his Saeedabad, Karachi home as he was leaving 
for Friday prayers.  The Deobandi SSP was blamed for the assassination, and a new 
chapter in the Deobandi-Barelvi rivalry was opened: that of targeted assassinations.  
After the attack, the streets of the city were rocked with “murderous sectarian riots”—a 
literal battle between Barelvis and Deobandis.105  Saleem Qadiri’s successor, Abbas 
Qadiri, accused the Musharraf regime of “patronizing terrorists” and, significantly, 
“standing between us and the murderers.”  The ST’s new leader was, in effect, charging 
the government of patronizing and protecting the Deobandis at the expense of the 
Barelvi majority.  “After Abbas Qadiri’s death, one thing is clear,” wrote Indian 
journalist Praveen Swami, who covered the 2006 Nishtar Park blast mentioned at the 
beginning of this work.  “Someone, sooner or later, will seek to settle the Sunni 
Tehreek’s unfinished business with his [Saleem Qadiri’s] murderers.”106  Once the 
Deobandi-Barelvi back-and-forth had been one of juridical rulings and religious books; 
now it was bullets, bombs, and ball bearings. 
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Even the state’s 1992-1994 Army-led operation against the MQM possessed a 
Deobandi-Barelvi layer of significance.  The MQM, as previously mentioned, was 
predominantly made up of Urdu-speaking Barelvis (originally immigrants from north-
central India who had arrived around the time of Partition) who not only lined up 
against the local Sindhis but also against the perceived encroachment of mostly 
Deobandi Pathans.  The latter had been flooding into Karachi, and other cities, for years 
on account of the unstable situation in Afghanistan.  Wrote one observer in 1995, “War 
has allowed a drugs and gun culture to spread across the [Afghanistan-Pakistan] 
border, which is behind the virtual collapse of Karachi, the commercial capital.”  
Meanwhile, Operation Clean-up was led by the Deobandi-leaning, Taliban-supporting 
(and Pathan) Naseerullah Babar.107  In June the Army launched the operation, seizing 
the MQM’s Azizabad headquarters within twenty-four hours and prompting the party 
to quit the government a week later.  Over the course of the next two years, thousands 
died, disappeared, were kidnapped, or were injured in the Army action (and the MQM 
response) in Karachi alone.  By mid-1994, MQM leader Altaf Hussain (and others) had 
been sentenced to almost thirty years in prison for the 1991 kidnapping and torture of 
an Army major (this was the famous “Major Kaleem Case”); in 1998, however, the High 
Court of Sindh found all of the accused not guilty, and the exhultant MQM described 
the whole affair as “politically motivated.”108  The contest highlighted, too, the role of 
the Afghan war in the militarization of the Deobandi and Barelvi outfits pitted against 
one another. 
The Barelvi religious leadership responded to the proselytizing success of the 
Deobandi Tablighi Jama’at, too—and in no more obvious fashion than in the formation 
of the Dawat-e-Islami.  Founded in 1980 in Karachi by Muhammad Ilyas Qadiri, the 
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Dawat-e-Islami billed itself as “a global non-political movement for the propagation of 
Quran and Sunnah.”109  Perhaps as a reaction to the Tablighi Jama’at’s success at 
organizing mega-conventions (including the Bangladeshi meeting referred to at the 
beginning of this work, largely considered the largest Muslim gathering in the world 
outside of the hәj), the Dawat-e-Islami organized its own conferences.  These had to be 
bigger than the Deobandi meetings, especially since the Barelvis’ foundational claim to 
legitimacy was that they represented the majority, or “Sunni,” sect.  As such, the Dawat-
e-Islami’s Multan conference (as of this writing) claims that it—not the Tablighi 
meeting outside of Dhaka—is the “world’s largest congregation of Muslims after the 
hajj.”110  In the beginning, at least, the Tablighis were instructed to differentiate 
themselves from their neighbors not only by means of their pious behavior but also in 
dress; Dawat-e-Islami members do much the same, most characteristically (at least for 
the men) by wearing a green turban, green being associated with the Prophet—and it is, 
again, the Barelvi devotion to the Prophet that primarily drives the movement.  In 2006, 
the Dawat-e-Islami came under some fire after a stampede took place in one of its 
women’s congregations; several women were critically injured—but the organizations 
leaders refused to allow male medical workers to help them.  According to at least one 
report, “several women died because of the delay in providing medical assistance.”111  As 
of the time of this writing, the Dawat-e-Islami world headquarters are situated adjacent 
to a fairly well manicured plaza called Askari Park.  Even so, most of the building’s 
surroundings are marked not by greenery but by the narrow gullies and cramped 
housing of lower-class Karachi.  Spray-painted generously onto the walls and shop-
fronts of this and surrounding neighborhoods are the initials “ST”—the acronym for the 
Sunni Tehrik; one shop declares, in thick black paint, “DOWN WITH USA.”  To enter the 
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Dawat-e-Islami’s central building one must walk down a side street that is little more 
than an alley, green-turbaned pedestrians walking up and down its length, before 
reaching the main gate.  The gate is manned by four gun-toting guards and sports 
cement road barriers, barbed wire, and a metal detector; the compound’s walls are high 
and barbed, too.  The whole presentation betrays the Deobandi-Barelvi rivalry’s 
relatively recent descent into militarism. 
Even as regards the formation of overtly militant groups—as opposed to the ST, 
which was more of a (sometimes thuggish) defense league—the Deobandis were not to 
enjoy a monopoly over the Barelvis.  The Ansar-ul Islam (AuI), for example, founded by 
the Afghan pir Saifur Rehman (about whom more later), was formed in Khyber Agency 
(in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas) in 2004, primarily to fight against a 
Deobandi group in the area led by mufti Munir Shakir called Lashkar-e-Islam (LeI).112  
The Sunni Jihad Council (SJC) was active (as of this writing) in Kashmir (and a 
supporter of another Barelvi group, Al-Barq) in response to Deobandi activities there.  
“It is regrettable,” said SJC Supreme Commander Said ‘Ali Reza in 1999, “that some 
people have tried to spread their false beliefs on the pretext of jihad in Kashmir.”  That 
Said ‘Ali was talking about Deobandis was made clear when he added, “They have even 
torched shrines and tried to occupy mosques.  This is a conspiracy against Muslims.  
We know how to defend territorial as well as religious borders.  God willing, Kashmir 
will be freed by Sunni Jihad Council, because it is a representative platform for the majority of 
Muslims.”113  This last was plainly a reiteration of the Barelvi claim to speak for South 
Asia’s “Sunni majority.”  Perhaps the point is that the oft-uttered Barelvi claim that 
religious militancy (including the targeting of fellow Muslims) is solely a Deobandi 
game should be taken with a grain of salt.  It is undoubtably true that in the Deobandi-
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Barelvi war in Pakistan from the 1980s to the present, the Deobandi outfits appear to 
have far more blood on their collective hands—but the Barelvis have entered the game, 
too.  The oftentime violent methods of the Sunni Tehrik, the militancy of pir Saifur 
Rehman’s outfit, and the Barelvi fighters in Kashmir (and, later, the religiously 
motivated assassination of Salman Taseer by one of his Barelvi bodyguards, of which 
more later) demonstrate that the contest is not by any means completely one-sided. 
Other Barelvi organizations that might be considered responses to the perceived 
Deobandi onslaught include the Nizam-e-Mustapha Party, founded by Hanif Tayyab 
(former general secretary of the JUP’s Karachi branch, three-time National Assembly 
member, and federal Minister with several different portfolios)114; the Jamaat Ahle 
Sunnat, a religious organization of Barelvi leaders founded in Karachi in 1956—the very 
one, in fact, that organizaed the mwlyd celebration at Nishtar Park in April 2006—that 
sometimes dabbles in politics (as, in 2011, when it admonished its members not to offer 
funeral prayers for murdered governor Salman Taseer);115 the Riza Academy, based in 
Mumbai, a major propagator of Barelvi books and pamphlets and the organizer of the 
August 2012 protest rally in Mumbai that ended with several dead and scores 
wounded;116 the UK-based World Islamic Mission, founded in the early 1970s by 
Mustapha Riza Khan’s xәlifәħ Qamaruzzaman Azmi (among others), and credited with 
being the first international Barelvi missionary organization;117 and student groups like 
the Hanif Tayyab-founded Anjuman Talaba-e-Islam, created in 1968.118 
 
After Zia:  Deobandi-Barelvi Politics ,  1988-2001 . 
As aforementioned, Ishaq Khan opted to respect the 16 November 1988 date for 
general elections set by Zia ul-Haq before the latter’s sudden death.  By early October, 
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then, four main groups had emerged as major electoral players: (1) the “hard-left” Left 
and Democratic Front, a six-party alliance that was by far the weakest of the four; (2) 
the PPP-led MRD (which included the Deobandi JUI); (3) the Muslim League (Fida 
group)-led nine-party Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (yslami jәmhwri yttyhad, meaning “Islamic 
Democratic Alliance,” hereafter IJI); and (4) the Muslim League (Junejo faction), allied 
with the Tehrik-e-Istaqlal and the Barelvi JUP.119  Over the proceeding month, much 
political jockeying and rearranging occurred, and with just a week to go before election 
day two main rivals had emerged from this mileau as the contest’s frontrunners.  First, 
there was the Benazir Bhutto-led PPP (which had split with the MRD, including the 
JUI, making the formerly imposing alliance largely insignificant, despite the fact that 
the remaining parties had agreed to work together “loosely” in the elections); now the 
PPP would stand on its own.  Second, there was the Muslim League-led IJI, which 
included the up-and-coming Punjabi Nawaz Sharif.  The IJI reportedly made generous 
use of “state patronage” to win over voters, forming, as it did, the caretaker 
governments in Pakistan’s provinces (indeed, its very creation had been facilitated by 
the head of the ISID itself, Hamid Gul, who later admitted to having arranged the 
funneling of state money to the failing Mehran Bank in order to procure millions in 
loans from the institution for the IJI—a revelation dubbed “Mehrangate”).120  One 
member of the IJI: the JI, which had joined only on the condition that the Qur’an and 
sunnәt be granted supremacy within the political order, among other demands.121  
Meanwhile, a distant third contender was the Pakistan People’s Alliance (PPA), of 
which the JUP was a part.  Once again, the JUP had opted to “go it alone” rather than 
join forces with other like-minded (in terms of constitutional hopes and dreams) parties.  
Even the JI had sided with an alliance apart from either the JUI or the JUP.  One other 
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party that had emerged over the previous three years and was now contesting the 
elections on its own as “potentially the most important of the smaller parties”: the 
Sindh-based Mohajir Qaumi Movement, as aforementioned created to protect the 
interests of the Urdu-speaking Mohajirs, or immigrants from India.122  The emergence 
of the MQM is significant in the context of the Deobandi-Barelvi rivalry, as the largely 
Barelvi MQM was created in the first place in order to protect the Mohajirs from the 
largely Deobandi Pathan influx into Sindh’s cities (and especially Karachi).  The first 
decade-and-a-half of the twenty-first century would see much bloodshed in clashes 
between these two groups. 
When the elections were over, the PPP had won a total of ninety-two seats in the 
national assembly, far outdistancing anyone else (the IJI came in second with fifty-four).  
And though results for the national assembly elections spelled a clear victory for the 
PPP (and a “historic step for women,” according to the headlines, as Benazir Bhutto—
who was expected to claim her place as Prime Minister—would become not only the 
first female leader of Pakistan but also of any other Muslim state), they also failed to 
give Bhutto’s party an absolute majority in the nation’s highest legislative body.  (This 
set the stage for the decade-long tug-of-war between Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif that 
would define Pakistani politics until the 1999 military coup of Pervez Musharraf.)  In 
Baluchistan, the JUI emerged as that province’s most dominant party, while in the 
NWFP the IJI took eights seats, the PPP seven, the Pathan nationalist Awami National 
Party three, and the JUI three.  In Sindh, of course, the PPP dominated, with smaller 
victories, too, for the three-year-old MQM in Karachi and Hyderabad.  Even in the 
Punjab, Bhutto’s party beat out the IJI, winning fifty-two to the latter’s forty-four 
seats.123  The elections confirmed the Deobandi JUI’s continued significance in 
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Pakistan’s western provinces (where it had obtained seven national assembly seats), and 
additionally signaled the arrival of a strong, mostly Barelvi force with which to be 
reckoned in the MQM.  The latter party’s newfound political clout (after its winning 
thirteen national assembly seats) even prompted President Ishaq Khan to meet with 
party head Altaf Hussain to discuss issues relating to Pakistan’s future government.124  
Meanwhile, the JUP won no seats at all.   
The PPP’s dominance at the national elections was somewhat dimmed soon 
thereafter by the IJI’s own dominance in Pakistan’s provincial elections, with Nawaz 
Sharif’s alliance winning three out of four provinces  (the JUI won eleven provincial 
seats overall).  Still, the People’s Party had won the national polls, and Bhutto fully 
expected to be given the go-ahead to form a government.  But JUI leaders, representing 
what had now grown to become “the largest religious party” in Pakistan (as well as “the 
fourth largest national party” overall), who suddenly found themselves facing the 
possibility of a woman as Pakistan’s leader, opposed the idea.  As previously mentioned, 
the demand that the state’s head be a Muslim male had been a staple within the 
constitutional blueprints created and proffered by both Deobandi and Barelvi scholars 
for Pakistan, from pre-Partition onward.  It should be noted, however, that this demand 
seemed to refer to the head of state—i.e. the President—as opposed to the head of 
government—i.e. the Prime Minister.  But the Deobandi leadership vowed that, despite a 
history of on-and-off cooperation with the PPP (especially during the Zia years), they 
could not accept a female head of government (interesting, considering their 
overwhelming support years before for Fatima Jinnah; might the issue have revolved 
more around politics—or, at best, preference for a certain political system—than 
religious doctrine?).125  When asked by journalist Karan Thapar about the JUI’s refusal 
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to accept a woman-led administration, Benazir Bhutto underlined the ‘alәma’s 
aforementioned lack of clarity, historically speaking, on the issue.  “At times they have 
said that they will not accept a woman as head of state,” she said, “but that they will 
accept her as head of government.  Now they are saying something different.  But we 
will…find out exactly what they mean.”126  Despite the JUI’s refusal, Bhutto’s most 
pressing obstacle at the time was not the scholars’ repugnance to the idea of a female 
Prime Minsiter, but President Ishaq Khan’s apparent reluctance to allow her to form a 
government at all, especially amidst the protest of her rival Nawaz Sharif.  Still, the 
opposition of the ‘alәma was serious.  By 26 November, the JUI had officially declared 
that it was “ready to sit in opposition” to Bhutto and the PPP.  Significantly, the MQM 
made a similar pledge.  Meanwhile, U.S. Ambassador Robert Oakley met with Bhutto in 
late November, a clear indication that she enjoyed Washington’s support (a detail that 
could not have been lost on the Deobandi ‘alәma in particular).127  Bhutto finally became 
Prime Minister on 2 December. 
Less than three months later, in late February 1989, a major gathering of ‘alәma—
reported as including more than two thousand scholars—took place in Rawalpindi.  The 
Barelvis and the Deobandis had once again come together in opposition to what was 
perceived as an obvious and imminent threat to Pakistan’s Islamic character; wrote one 
observer, “It is significant that all these sectarian groups which had been at loggerheads 
on important religious issues have found a single platform against Miss Bhutto.”  The 
conference criticized Salman Rushdie’s The Satanic Verses (demanding the author’s 
immediate extradition and execution, by hanging, in Pakistan), and accused the Bhutto 
government of not taking proper measures to prevent the book’s publication.  The 
government was also berated for “encouraging obscenity” on state-funded television via 
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“musical and dancing programmes.”  Most importantly, though, the two thousand 
‘alәma declared that Bhutto’s position as government head flew in the face of the Qur’an 
and the sunnәt.  They would, conference participants promised, “launch countrywide 
agitation” in response to this state of affairs.  The scholar-jurists also warned Bhutto not 
to repeal any of the constitution’s Islamic provisions, particularly the eighth amendment 
(dealing with, among other things, Islamic laws affecting the status of women).  The 
most vocal groups present: the Deobandi JUI (led by two senators: new dar ul’alwm 
Haqqania head Sami ul-Haq and Qazi Abdul Latif), the Barelvi JUP (led by national 
assembly member Abdul Sattar Niazi, the same who had been arrested in 1953 in 
connection with the anti-Ahmadi riots in Lahore), and the JI.  Each accused “Western 
countries” of actively “patronizing” the newly organized Bhutto regime.  (One 
opposition leader, national assembly member Syeda Abida Hussain, perhaps said it best 
when in August she wrote: “It has been her singular achievement that in the past eight 
months Benazir Bhutto, while confirming her support abroad, has steadily lost good will 
at home.”)128  In this context, Benazir represented the encroachment of a “Western” 
value system on the “Islamic” one, a fear harbored by the ‘alәma since the days of the 
British Raj and now, seemingly, coming to fruition.  PPP leaders’ reaction to the ‘alәma 
conference was to label the scholars and their parties “obscurantist elements” and 
underscore their electoral mandate from “the people.”129 
By June, at last some of those “obscurantist elements”—specifically, the JUI—had 
allied with several former MRD members (including the ANP), plus a number of other 
parties and the entire IJI to form a united opposition to the Bhutto government.  But by 
1990 President Ishaq Khan—described as “a cold, dispassionate bureaucrat with an 
austere lifestyle”—fired Benazir Bhutto from the prime ministership anyway, amidst 
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allegations of corruption (among other state woes), and as a result the PPP boycotted 
the October general elections.  This paved the way for the victory of Nawaz Sharif’s IJI.  
The JUI, though it had been part of the opposition, ran separately, as did the JUP.  The 
Deobandi party won six National Assembly seats, the Barelvi party three.  But the JUP 
was at this point experiencing serious internal divisions, ultimately resulting in the 
splitting of the party into multiple factions.  One was led by mwlana Ahmad Shah 
Noorani (called the JUP-N), another by Fazal Karim (the JUP-F); after the 2003 death 
of Ahmad Shah, the JUI-N faded somewhat in the wake of a power vacuum and the 
JUP-F emerged as the more powerful group.  The effect of this split was to more or less 
guarantee, at least as of the time of this writing, the future insignificance—on a national 
level within the realm of electoral politics—of the Barelvi party from the early 1990s 
onward.  (For example, Fazal Karim, the very head of the JUP-F, would serve as a 
National Assembly member—but on the PML-N ticket).  The political pendulum swung 
again in 1993, when national elections (characterized by heightened security and low 
voter turnout) garnered Nawaz Sharif’s party more votes—but Benazir Bhutto’s more 
seats.  Just before the elections, too, the JI had lefft the IJI, winning a handful of 
National Assembly seats as well as a couple NWFP provincial assembly seats on its 
own; in order to maintain its purity, the JI had pledged from that year forward never 
again to officially join any political alliance.  The party had vociferously opposed 
Benazir Bhutto, often protesting her policies in the streets; at one demonstration, police 
shot and killed several JI members.  Such oppressive measures, aimed at the political 
opposition, contributed to Benazir’s waning popularity and eventual dismissal.  But this 
wasn’t enough for the JI, which demanded accountability—and, specifically, an 
investigation into the corruption charges that had been leveled at her.  Crucially, the JI 
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demanded the investigation take place before new elections could be held, but this 
demand was not met and elections were held anyway.  The JI tried to stop them, 
however; the party’s modus operandi was to stage sit-ins at voting sites—and perhaps the 
low voter turnout that year was a direct result of JI efforts in this regard, combined 
with an MQM elections boycott.130  Even so, the PPP eked out a win, and, having won 
more National Assembly seats than Nawaz Sharif and his allies, formed a government 
under Benazir Bhutto. 
Perhaps as a means of currying favor with the Deobandi ‘alәma and their followers 
(to the chagrin of the Barelvis, who tended to vote for Nawaz Sharif’s PML or for the 
MQM), Benazir Bhutto’s government appointed Deobandi leader Fazlur Rehman as 
Chairman of the foreign affairs committee in parliament—interesting and perhaps 
enlightening, given the JUI chief’s anti-Western, pro-Taliban position.  In any case, 
Bhutto wouldn’t conclude this second term regularly, either; beset on all sides with 
charges of corruption, as well as a host of other issues (including the use of brutal force 
by the police under her administration, with no apparent effort to curb such official 
violence), President Farooq Leghari dismissed the PPP government in early November 
1996.  In early February 1997, Nawaz Sharif’s PML won a landslide victory over the 
PPP (the former obtaining an astounding one hundred fifty-five of the National 
Assembly’s two hundred seven seats, compared to the PPP’s meager eighteen).  The 
Deobandi JUI won only two seats (both JUI-F victories; the JUI-S won zero) and its 
Barelvi counterpart none.  The latter, especially, seemed to have fallen far after its 1970 
peak, when it had won more seats in Sindh than any other party except the PPP. 
 
Post-Soviet Afghanistan and the Establishment of Taliban Rule . 
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Though the Russians were gone, the Communist regime in Kabul lived on.  But with 
the USSR out of the way—the chief goal of American involvement in the war—U.S. 
government cash began to dry up.  This was a serious issue for many Afghan 
commanders, whose funding depended on the U.S. taxpayer, as well as for thousands of 
mujahydin foot soldiers, many of whom actually drew salaries, however irregular, as 
members of one fighting force or another.  Najibullah therefore developed a new 
strategy: he would fill the void caused by disappearing dollars by buying off the various 
commanders himself.  Of course, he would need help.  Where else to turn but the 
Kremlin?  Kabul’s venture was enthusiastically funded by the Soviet Union, and within 
a short period of time—and to the dismay of the țalyban fighters and others—the very 
commanders and their mujahydin who had kicked the Russians out had abruptly landed, 
one degree removed, on the Russian payroll!  The stratagem eroded alliances between 
one-time allied commanders and turned entire armies previously engaged against 
Najibullah into defenders of the Kabul regime.  The ‘alәma and țalyban’s goal of an 
Islamic government—and peace, in their eyes—seemed further away than ever.  “The 
Taliban had carried out many military operations against the Russians and had been one 
of the most important pillars of the jihad,” one Taliban leader said of the period, 
“sacrificing their lives and sustaining thousands of casualties, but we had been 
betrayed.”  In the end, “most” of the țalyban at this time returned home to continue with 
their religious studies, resigned to their fate.  Mullah Omar’s conversion of the țalyban’s 
original Sangisar base into a mәdrәsәħ aptly embodies the movement’s retreat, however 
reluctant, from the battlefield back to the seminary.131 
Meanwhile, the chaotic scenario playing itself out in Afghanistan was too much for 
the governments and intelligence agencies of the world to resist.  Each saw an 
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opportunity to pursue its own regional interests—and seized it.  The USSR’s continued 
meddling, vis-à-vis the Najibullah regime, has already been mentioned.  Pakistan’s 
government (and, more particularly, the ISID) backed Hekmatyar and his Hizb-e-Islami 
(directly contributing, in the words of one commentator, to the destruction of “half of 
Kabul”).132  As early as July 1989—just five months after the Soviet withdrawal—
Hekmatyar’s outfit (mostly Pathan) had slaughtered a group of Jamiat Islami 
commanders (almost entirely non-Pathan), casting an ugly light on the shrinking 
possibility of cooperation between Afghanistan’s various “mujahydin” parties.133  
Meanwhile, Iran’s government, in a bid to out-influence the Saudis in the region, 
supported Abdul ‘Ali Mazari’s Hazara Hizb-e-Wahdat (a Shi’a outfit), while the regime 
in Riyadh backed the Ittihad-e-Islami of Abdul Rasul Sayyaf (a Wahhabi group).  
Through the eyes of the Pathan religious scholars and țalyban, traitorous commanders 
raped the country from within while equally traitorous foreign regimes raped the 
country from without.  “[T]he idea of being ruled by westernized technocrats produces 
a gut reaction among many Mujahidin,” wrote journalist Lieven from Peshawar.  
“Revolt against this class has, after all, been an underlying theme of their holy war.  
This has been in part a struggle of all those traditionalist forces—tribesmen and Islamic 
clergy—excluded and impoverished over the past half century by the modernizing and 
westernizing state.”134  The role of foreign governments in the Afghanistan mess was 
especially underscored in 1992, when Kabul was captured from the Russia-backed 
communist regime only to see the various warring factions turn on one another; one 
observer reported, “As darkness fell yesterday [26 April], superpower weapons given in 
another era thundered over Kabul.”  The situation conjured up the “prospect of 
permanent civil war.”135 
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Seeing all of this destruction, this petty tug-of-war between great powers and 
power-hungry warlords, what did the țalyban have to show for their years-long anti-
communist jyhad that had costs thousands of lives and ravaged their homelands?  Of a 
truth, the situation could scarcely have appeared bleaker.  The streets of Kabul were a 
warzone, the government was plagued by infighting, and the entire country (especially 
the southern half) was crawling with gangs: some mere bandits, others mujahydin-
turned-robbers-and-rapists.  Travel meant risking one’s life, not to mention the 
monetary cost involved.  It is ironic that many of the țalyban who had returned from 
Pakistani exile to fight Russians in Afghanistan now opted, long after the Russians had 
been ousted, to leave Afghanistan—despite the risks of long-distance movement—for 
refugee status in Pakistan once more.  Meanwhile, for those who remained, the fighting 
between the various mujahydin parties “became so intense that it was impossible to live a 
normal life,” according to one Afghan commentator who experienced the commotion 
firsthand.  The period became known as twpәkiyan: “the time of the men with guns”—a 
poignant title given that it describes circumstances after a war.  One ymam at a small 
mosque not far from Kandahar remembered, “Many of the people who went to the city 
would come back with tales of anarchy and chaos, and often I heard artillery fire in the 
distance.  The stories made me feel uneasy; I remembered the jyhad and the sacrifices we 
had made.  It seemed that it had been for nothing, but I still remained patient and gave 
the same advice to my congregation.”  But the situation continued to deteriorate, until 
regular Afghans were holding demonstrations against the mujahydin they had once so 
esteemed; such protests often ended with the local commander firing into the crowds 
with machine guns—or even with tanks.  These demonstrations of public outrage often 
took place, perhaps significantly, after Friday prayers.136  To the țalyban (many of whom 
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were now full-fledged ‘alәma), these acts of defiance were nothing less than calls for the 
establishment, finally, of Islamic government and the order, security, and peace that 
such a regime would, God-willing, surely provide.  The Russians, the Afghan 
Communists, and now the traitorous “mujahydin” government had all failed; all ignored 
the injunctions of God and the people had reaped the whirlwind as a result.  Holy war 
had been waged against the unbelievers—but this had not been enough.  “The events 
after victory [against the Soviets],” wrote one Deobandi ‘alym, “[teach] us that it is not 
the known disbelieving enemy alone against whom we must wage jihad.  Rather, we 
must wage jihad against our own base soul…”  It was this failure—failure to continue 
from the lesser to the greater jyhad, from the physical fight against communist atheism 
to the spiritual struggle for personal purity—that had deprived the ummәt of the “fruits” 
of the anti-communist struggle.137  Just as spiritual corruption on the part of the 
Muslims had led to their political downfall and misery in India from the later eighteenth 
through the nineteenth centuries, sin and impiety now prevented Afghanistan from 
taking its place as a proud and prosperous Islamic state. The road was thus paved for an 
Islamic revivalist movement to offer a popular solution to Afghanistan’s political and 
social ills. 
When many of the țalyban regrouped in mid-1994, then, it was in response to the 
law-and-order situation in the country.  American-born writer Eric Margolis, an 
eyewitness to post-war, pre-Taliban Afghanistan, described the scene.  Along with the 
deaths of between one and two million Afghans, villages “were razed in reprisals, 
livestock slaughtered, ancient irrigation systems destroyed, and millions of mines, some 
in the form of exploding toys, were scattered across Afghanistan.”  Some of the worst 
perpetrators were the leaders of the Northern Alliance, including Mohammed Fahim 
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(erstwhile Afghan Communist Secret Police chief) and Rashid Dostam (an Uzbek 
warlord).  Their crimes included the “frightful massacres and the most abominable 
crimes against real and fancied opponents, including flaying, impalement, burning and 
burial alive, acid baths, freezing to death in refrigerators, as well as more conventional 
tortures of electrocution, beatings, drownings, and the ripping out of eyes, beards, and 
fingernails.”  (It should be noted that these very same communist war criminals would, 
ironically, later become allies to the U.S. Government in its post-September 11th fight 
against the Taliban.)  In addition, the hated Russians were still backing the Northern 
Alliance (with help from Iran and India; the meddling of the Saudi and Pakistani 
governments, too, has already been mentioned), and the Alliance’s traitorous leaders 
had become “the nation’s leading drug kingpins,” to boot.138  Meanwhile the illegal 
checkposts, the rapes, murders, kidnappings, and looting continued unabated.  The 
perpetrators of these crimes had to be punished.  This, along with (indeed, via) the 
institution of an Islamic order, would finally bring both justice and peace to 
Afghanistan. 
Thus, in response to the security situation, several dozen erstwhile țalyban got 
together at a mosque in little Pashmol to come up with a plan.  Something had to be 
done.  Over the coming weeks, the small Pashmol group was able to gather many more 
to its cause—including mullah Muhammad Omar, though he was evidently reluctant at 
first to take the reigns of leadership (it was only after he had conferred with “some of 
the [Deobandi] Ulema” that the one-eyed cleric agreed to take command).  Finally, in 
late autumn, four to five dozen men gathered at the old Sangisar base-turned-mosque to 
officially launch the rebooted movement.  Significantly, the țalyban this time around 
were to be organized the traditional Islamic way, just as Deobandi precursor sәyyid 
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Ahmad of Rae Bareilly had done it, and just as the “Hindustani Fanatics” of Patna and 
Sittana.  There must be a spiritual leader, or ymam (in this case a scholar named Abdul 
Samad) as well as a commander, or әmir; Muhammad Omar was sustained in the latter 
position.  All present swore on the Qur’an to stand by their әmir, “and to fight against 
corruption and criminals.”  “The shari’a would be our guiding law,” according to one 
who was present at the gathering, “and would be implanted by us.  We would prosecute 
vice and foster virtue, and would stop those who were bleeding the land.”139 
One of the first actions of these țalyban, so the story goes, involved a local 
“governor” who had kidnapped and facilitated the rape of two teenage girls; some 
commanders in the area had also kidnapped a boy, with the intent to sodomize him.  
The țalyban apparently freed the girls and the boy, and the governor was hanged from 
the barrel of a tank.  In April 1996, Mullah Omar famously donned the Prophet’s mantle 
in Kandahar and proclaimed himself “Commander of the Faithful.”  All present swore 
allegiance to him.  The meeting bypassed the customary Pathan tribal structure (i.e. this 
was no loya jirga), instead being organized along traditional Arab lines as a shwra, or 
religious council, made up of ‘alәma.  In this way, mullah Omar and his țalyban (hereafter 
designated as Taliban, denoting their official and organized group status) could bypass 
the tribal chiefs.  This was significant, for, as Ahmed Rashid pointed out, “The Deobandi 
tradition is opposed to tribal and feudal structure and the clan chiefs.”140  Thus even 
here at the beginning—or, more accurately, especially here—the Taliban’s politico-
religious foundation in Deobandism is evident.  Within weeks it would be even more 
pronounced, as the Taliban’s manpower, initially numbering in the hundreds, was 
augmented by the arrival of thousands upon thousands of students from Pakistani 
(mostly Deobandi) mәdrәsәħs and dar ul’alwms.  Indeed, the vast majority of these 
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students’ erstwhile schools were operated by the Deobandi JUI (run separately by either 
the Fazlur Rehman faction or Sami ul-Haq faction), their construction made possible by 
Saudi and American cash during the days of the anti-Soviet jyhad and facilitated by the 
Pakistani government through the military and the ISID. 
The success of the Taliban was to fuel the increasing militancy and jyhadi zeal of at 
least one strain of Deobandism, once again making Afghanistan a training ground for 
future operations (often anti-Barelvi) in Pakistan.  The Barelvis, meanwhile, had no 
parallel theater in which to develop similar elements apart from its relatively minor 
activities in Kashmir.  But to the Deobandis following the events in Afghanistan, the 
rise and initial successes of the Taliban, driven as they were by their faith in Islam and 
the transformational effect it could have on Afghan affairs, was a phenomenon worth 
celebrating.  Here, perhaps, was the promise of true Islamic revival—a revival that 
could subsequently spread throughout the Muslim world.  “[T]he power that has 
emerged as the Taliban,” wrote one high-level Deobandi cleric in Pakistan, “gives us 
hope that the sacrifices offered in the [anti-communist] jyhad against disbelief would 
bring their result.  May Allah preserve the Taliban from every mischief of self and the 
devil and from the conspiracies of the enemies of Islam, and may He make them worthy 
of [the] renaissance of Islam.”141  It is interesting that this particular mufti, who had 
himself taken part in the anti-Soviet jyhad, invoked God’s blessing first and foremost 
that the Taliban would be preserved “from every mischief of self.”  This had been the 
mistake of the earlier mujahydin.  Perhaps the Taliban would remember. 
Not long after the Pashmol and Sangisar meetings, the Taliban won Kandahar 
(1994).  Immediately a new government was installed in the city and surrounding areas.  
“The city was at peace,” one Taliban member remembers.  “The old habits of keeping 
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boys, adultery, looting, illegal checkpoints and the government of the gun were over.  
An ordinary life was given back to the people, and they were satisfied for the first time 
in years.”  Of course, one of the first institutions established by the movement was an 
Islamic judicial system.142  One American journalist, who was intimately aware of the 
goings-on in Afghanistan at the time and whose warnings and prognostications about 
Afghanistan had gone mostly unheeded (despite their uncanny accuracy) by his mostly 
Western audience, described the peace the Taliban brought to a war-torn country thus: 
“It was frontier justice at its harshest and most medieval, but Mullah Omar’s cure 
worked, bringing peace and security to southern Afghanistan.”143  Indeed, it was the 
Taliban’s very “strict Islamic agenda,” among other things, that gained the group 
widespread popular support in the first place.  One of the Taliban’s first acts to gain 
recognition outside of Afghanistan was its freeing (in November 1994) of a Pakistani 
trade convoy that had been hijacked by warlords near Kandahar.  Deobandi-leaning 
Pakistani Interior Minister Naseerullah Babar (d. 2011 AD), a retired two-star general 
and Pathan member of the PPP who had experience dating back to the 1970s training 
Afghan mujahydin (and who had led the aforementioned two-year anti-MQM operation 
in Karachi called Operation Clean-up), expressed support for the Taliban, admitting “a 
closeness” between the group’s goals and “our [Pakistani] perceptions.”144 
By early 1996, the “student warriors” had “cut [a] swath through [its] Afghan 
opposition” and sat perched on the edge of the country’s chief city.  “Taleban, the 
Islamic students’ army, is sitting on the outskirts of Kabul,” wrote one London Times 
reporter in Islamabad, “with enough artillery, tanks, rockets and heavily armed men to 
blow the Afghan capital to pieces, after sweeping across the country, defeating its 
enemies and astounding neutral observers.”145  By late September the Taliban had won 
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Kabul, too, driving out Ahmad Shah Massoud and establishing the Islamic Emirate of 
Afghanistan. 
The government that the Taliban set up in Kabul was “a bizarre combination of 
ninth-century Islamic political and legal thought mixed up with the most backwards 
and primitive customs of isolated Pashtun mountain tribesmen.”  It was this 
combination that differentiated the system that, say, the ‘alәma of the dar ul’alwm 
Deoband or the dar ul’alwm Karachi might have instituted from that of the Taliban.  
The latter was infused with local Pathan custom—most apparent, perhaps, in the 
regime’s quick and often brutal forms of punishment, as well as its apparent aversion to 
the education of women.  Both of these—the Taliban’s harsh punishments and its lack of 
“women’s rights”—could be explained, if not justified (in the context of twenty-first-
century Western sensibilities, that is), as a reaction to Afghanistan’s recent war 
experiences.  Hadn’t the country been torn asunder by crime—robbery, looting, rapine, 
murder—and hadn’t the Taliban, via admittedly severe “frontier justice,” mostly 
eradicated these problems?  Even the growth of the poppy seed had been mostly wiped 
out, something at which later regimes (under the protection of the mighty U.S. 
Government, no less) failed miserably.  Surely an element of the Taliban’s harsh idea of 
justice can be traced, too, to the exalted place enjoyed by both protection and revenge in 
the Pathan tribal code—again, not a part of Islam itself, despite the faith’s shades of the 
old Arab tribal code.146  And as for women’s rights, hadn’t it been the evil communists 
who had attempted to destroy the fabric of Afghan society by striving to blur the 
distinctions between the sexes, primarily through the education (or propagandizing) of 
women?  The Taliban’s reaction on both counts was to send no mixed messages.  These 
were sub-issues, anyway; the most important thing was that a truly Islamic government 
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finally take the reigns of state in Afghanistan, and the Taliban, for all its provincial 
“boorishness” and lack of urban grace, had at least accomplished this overarching goal 
that had so long eluded the war-torn Central Asian country. 
True to its Deobandi roots, the Taliban saw itself as merely the vanguard of a grand 
Muslim liberation movement, with its sights set, crucially, by and large on communism 
(i.e. not “Western” values, unless one includes communism itself in that category).  This 
was not a nationalist movement, neither Pathan nor Afghan per se, but the springboard 
for Muslim repossession of all of Islam’s lands and peoples languishing under 
foreign/infidel subjugation.  Muslims had watched as one great Central Asian Muslim 
city after another—from Samarkand to Bukhara—had fallen to the Soviets, only to be 
“liberated” and placed under the thumb of yet another communist or socialist 
government.  For a while, it appeared that even Afghanistan had fallen, with Pakistan 
next on the list.  But the Taliban had ensured that the wave of oppression had stopped 
at Afghanistan—and had pushed the communists out almost entirely, reversing the tide.  
Outgunned, poorly armed Pathan tribesmen had defeated the world’s most powerful 
land army.  Couldn’t other Muslims do the same, in the spirit of the warriors of Badr?  
Indeed, yes—and now it was time to reverse the wave and win back the Muslim world 
for Muslims.  (During the Afghan jyhad against the Soviets, Zia ul-Haq—perhaps 
betraying Deobandi leanings—had reportedly planned to use the nascent Taliban 
movement and its “foreign” helpers to liberate the Central Asian republics from their 
communist regimes.  He would not be the last foreign politician to entertain the idea of 
using these “freedom fighters” as a proxy army, either.147) 
As “a gesture of pan-Islamic solidarity,” then, the Taliban invited freedom fighters 
from around the world to come to Afghanistan and train for just such an effort in 
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specially designed camps set up for this purpose (as they were taught by the Pakistanis 
and Americans during the anti-Soviet jyhad in Pakistan).  Students and teachers alike 
came from across the globe, but especially from the conquered “Muslim” states of 
central Asia, both to experience Islamic solidarity and to prepare for their own freedom 
struggles.  Uighurs from East Turkestan (now “Xinjiang,” a Chinese term meaning, 
tellingly, “New Frontier”) hoped to eventually rid their country of communist China’s 
domination.  Members of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan sought to topple 
“Central Asia’s most brutal and savage Communist dictatorship” (that of Islam 
Karamov).  Muslim Filipinos hoped to acquire the means necessary to defend Muslim 
rights in their country, or at least establish a free Muslim base in the Phillipine south.  
Chechens sought to wrest their homeland from Russian rule.  Others—Thais, Bengalis, 
Tajiks, Turkmens, and more—had similar, regional concerns.  But the most populous 
group were the Pakistanis, preparing to fight in Kashmir.  Pakistan’s very government 
(a U.S. Government ally) backed these last.  For the most part, then, these volunteer 
jydahis were not driven by some seething hatred for “the West”; their concerns were far 
more local and/or regional, centered on the liberation of their own countries and 
peoples, mostly from communist regimes.  In early April 2001, a massive Deobandi 
gathering at the village of Taro Jaba (near Peshawar) was organized by Fazlur Rehman 
in celebration of the dar ul’alwm Deoband’s many achievements.  According to some 
sources, over a million people attended.  Critically, the Deobandi assemblage declared 
its support for the Taliban in Afghanistan, as well as for all other Muslims fighting for 
their identity or independence, anywhere else in the world.  The two speeches (both 
taped recordings) that reportedly garnered the most acclaim during the Taro Jaba 
conference: one from Taliban head mullah Muhammad Omar, the other from mujahydin 
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leader and financier Osama bin Laden.148 
The mostly anti-communist aims of the aforementioned groups—from the Taliban 
to the Uighurs to the Chechens—fit in so neatly with the U.S. Government’s 
interventionist foreign policy that some American policy-makers before September 11th 
2001 even considered “using” these various benighted groups for their own regional 
interests, just as they had the Afghan mujahydin during the 1980s.  The Taliban were, 
after all, both ardently anti-communist and passionately anti-Iran/anti-China, positions 
that some elements within the U.S. Government found highly appealing.  (This at least 
partly explains how, until just four months before the September 11th attacks, 
Washington actually provided clandestine—and even some overt—financial support to 
the Taliban regime.)149  Wrote Pulitzer Prize-winning writer Steve Coll: “In history’s 
long inventory of surprise attacks, September 11th is distinguished in part by the role 
played by intelligence agencies and informal secret networks in the preceding 
events.”150  It was within the context of the Soviet fall, of the “cleansing” of Afghanistan, 
of the rise of the Taliban, and of the preparation of a wide range of “Muslim freedom 
movements” for the reclamation of Muslim lands, then, that many Deobandis celebrated 
the collapse of the World Trade Center at the hands of bin Laden’s Al-Qaida.  
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EPILOGUE 
 
 
Be warned, you are not prepared for Afghanistan! 
               ABDUL SALAM ZAEEF, 20091  
 
 
 
 
 
To most Deobandis, the response of the Bush regime in Afghanistan to the Taliban’s 
harboring of Osama bin Laden was repressive and brutal.  Interestingly, for many 
Barelvis—and many other Muslims, too, around the world—the initial US Government 
response was a legitimate one, however frustrating—a justifiable reaction to a major 
criminal act.  The Barelvis, by and large, had neither supported the Afghan jyhad against 
the Soviets in the 1980s nor the Taliban movement in the 1990s.  As for the American 
intrusion into Central Asia and Pakistan, the militant Deobandis had had it coming.  
The Barelvis would actively campaign against the Taliban in Pakistan for years 
afterward. 
Meanwhile, Deobandis across the country protested Washington’s Afghan invasion.  
After all, the Americans had teamed up with the Northern Alliance, many of whose 
leaders had been pro-Soviet during the Russian occupation era.  Indeed, men like 
  
  486 
General Muhammad Fahim and Rashid Dostum had been among that earlier conflicts’s 
worst war criminals (not to mention their continued crimes against humanity after the 
war had “ended”).2  These post-September 11th alliances with some of the most infamous 
names connected to Afghanistan’s communist era fomented especial enmity among the 
Deobandis of Afghanistan and Pakistan, whose blood had been spilt over the previous 
decades against these very same individuals.  To the Deobandis who had participated in 
the 1980s jyhad, the American occupiers of Afghanistan were simply the Soviets 
reincarnate.  Perhaps Margolis’ description of the Soviet-American parallels clarifies 
this attitude:   
 
[The US Government-orchestrated] fixed elections [of 2004 and 2005] 
underlined the unsettling similarities between the Soviet and American 
occupation of Afghanistan.  The Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979 
citing internationalist duty and the need to fight Islamic terrorists.  
Washington’s slogan was fighting terrorism and spreading democracy.  
Both allied with the minority Tajiks and Uzbeks.  Both were interested in 
carving out a corridor to and from the Arabian Sea coast in Pakistan…  
Both claimed they were fighting medievalist Islam, nation-building, 
liberating women, and bringing the benefits of modern education and 
democracy.  Both claimed victory was just around the corner.  …Suffice 
it to say that once the US bested the USSR in the Cold War, and saw its 
old enemy collapse, it lost little time in assuming the role and aggressive 
behavior of the former Soviet Union…3 
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It was clear to many Deobandis that the Americans—who had by now proven 
themselves as interventionists and meddlers in the Muslim world for decades—were no 
better than their Soviet predecessors in Afghan occupation.  The Pathan/Deobandi 
reaction to both invading forces had thus been consistent. 
But as the war wore on, and it became evident that U.S. Government ambitions 
extended beyond simply finding and punishing Osama bin Laden—as drone strikes 
devastated villages in Pakistan, as American forces continued to occupy a Muslim 
country, as a corrupt regime and its corrupt allies were propped up by Washington’s 
guns, as Pakistan’s apparently weak-kneed leaders continued to bow to U.S. pressure, 
and as the fruits of the invasion, including the militancy of the so-called “Pakistani 
Taliban,” hit closer and closer to home—Barelvi opinion about the war changed.  “By 
2005,” wrote one journalist on the scene, “[the] consensus [was] that the US had taken 
advantage of the 9/11 attacks to implement long-prepared plans to seize the Muslim 
world’s energy wealth and establish new bases in its most strategic regions.”4  Whether 
or not there was truth to this version of events, it was widely believed, and the Barelvi 
religious leadership, while not supporting the Taliban, came to despise the United 
States Government and its meddling ways. 
In any case, the war would have a devastating effect on the Deobandi-Barelvi 
rivalry, further militarizing the schism (and especially the Deobandi groups, who 
happened to be the most operative along Pakistan’s border regions and within Pathan 
Afghanistan).  When jyhadis from Iraq came to Afghanistan to assist in the struggle 
against perceived American neo-imperialism, they came armed with the knowledge 
necessary to build roadside bombs, truck bombs, and suicide bomber vests—all devices 
that were “previously unknown” in Afghanistan and Pakistan.5  Is it any wonder that 
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Deobandi attacks on Barelvi processions or shrines from this period on were often 
committed using just such devices?  This was a new development in the rivalry, and it 
had been brought on by the American war in Afghanistan.  The rise of the “Pakistani 
Taliban,” too, pitted what was considered a quasi-Deobandi force against the Pakistani 
government, a conflict that the Barelvis utilized in order to demonstrate their own 
reasonableness as compared to Deobandi “militarism” and “terrorism.”  Here was an 
opportunity to crush their long-time opponents—by branding them terrorists and using 
the power of the state to finally bring them low.  As such, Barelvi leaders railed against 
“Pakistani Taliban” attacks on government forces as a Deobandi phenomenon, even as 
many Deobandis wondered who, exactly, the “Pakistani Taliban” really were.  “We 
don’t know who they are,” one Deobandi Waziri physician told the author in 2012.  
“They are foreigners.”6 
* 
In 2001, the focus of the Sunni Tehrik changed.  The timing was not arbitrary, as it 
was in that year that ST founder and director Muhammad Saleem Qadiri was 
assassinated.  Within months the organization became overtly political, organizing 
itself as a full-fledged party and abruptly butting heads with Karachi’s heretofore most 
dominant local party, the likewise Barelvi-dominated MQM.  According to the ST itself, 
between 2004 and 2006 alone some seventy-five of its members (one report calls them 
“militants”) were killed in the politico-religious war that followed, the ST mostly 
blaming the MQM and the Deobandis for its losses.7  These targeted killings soon 
became mass killings—in particular with the execution of the deadly Nishtark Park 
blast of April 2006.  Now mass murder was the order of the day. 
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This brings the reader, then, to the transformational event.  Of course, it is perhaps 
presumptuous of any historian to claim to have identified the “transformational” moment 
in any years-long historical process, and there are, admittedly, many such 
“transformational” points in time that one might justifiably point to as equally or more 
important as regards the process at hand.  In terms of the Deobandi-Barelvi rivalry and 
the process of its militarization, one might point to the founding of the dar ul’alwm at 
Deoband by Muhammad Qasim, or Ahmad Riza’s very specific 1902 juridical ruling 
against Deobandism, or the formation of the JUH, or the organization of the AISC, or 
the entrance of the JUI into Pakistani politics, or that of the JUP, or the phenomenon of 
the Iranian Revolution, or the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, or that of Washington, or 
even the American invasion of Iraq—these could all vie as candidates for the 
transformational moment within the Deobandi-Barelvi rivalry’s evolution from 
theological schism to violent contest.  However, the Nishtar Park bombing was the first 
mass killing of Barelvis by Deobandis, and it did seem to initiate a string of similar mass 
killings over the years that followed it, suggesting that the rivalry had moved into a 
new era in its development.  Let us look closely, then, at the Nishtar Park bombing, and 
see if it cannot shed additional light on the topic at hand.  
 
The Suicide of Muhammad Siddiq:  11 April  2006 . 
On the evening of 11 April 2006, a nondescript man made his way through a 
shoulder-to-shoulder mass of Barelvi celebrants in Nishtar Park, Karachi, and 
approached the rickety wooden stage upon which the multitude’s spiritual leaders were 
seated.  Seconds later the C-4 strapped to the man’s chest exploded, propelling 
thousands of ball bearings at bullet-like speed in every direction.  Within moments the 
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gruesome remains of almost sixty dead were scattered among the splintered vestiges of 
the stage, the carnage underscored by the moaning of approximately one hundred and 
fifty wounded. The bomber was publicly identified more than a year later by Pakistani 
authorities; he was a village-born twenty-one-year-old named Muhammad Siddiq. 
Most international news organizations would, in knee-jerk fashion, immediately 
report the incident within the now-familiar Sunni-Shi’a framework.  Even without 
explicitly stating that the attack had likely been perpetrated by a Shi’i fanatic, this was 
the implicit message; several paragraphs devoted strictly to the event narrative would 
generally be followed by the statement of a Shi’a leader (like, for example, ’allamәħ 
Hassan Turabi, who was subsequently assassinated himself by a Sunni Bangladeshi 
three months later), placing the one in the context of the other. 
Only a few scraps of information, loosed piecemeal by the government and police of 
Pakistan (admittedly dubious sources at best), exist concerning Muhammad Siddiq.  
Problematizing matters, a specific context to the man (and, particularly, his April 11th 
actions) has been pre-constructed before the historian has had a chance to assemble one 
of his own.  It is within a similar vein that Guha, in that Subalternist classic “Chandra’s 
Death,” notes that a critical condition of historiography is “contextuality”—a framework 
that directs the historian in terms of the text at hand.8  Guha’s concern lay with 
“fragmentation,” those anecdotes “with no known context [that have] come down to us 
simply as the residuum of a dismembered past.”  Might the scattered snippets about 
Muhammad Siddiq be approached the same way?  Though contextuality has already 
been provided, it just may turn out that the “torn fabric” to which this event has been 
linked is the wrong one.   Contextuality must therefore be restored, as far as is possible, 
to the fragments available, then work from this potentially new vantage point.  In the 
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process, it is hoped, the meaning behind the suicide of Muhammad Siddiq might be 
revealed. 
 
I 
Perhaps the discourse of space-time provides an appropriate starting place.  Of all 
the places Muhammad Siddiq might have selected in which to end his life (not to 
mention those of many others) he chose Karachi’s Nishtar Park, and of all the times he 
might have selected, he chose 11 April 2006—or, perhaps more correctly, the 12th of 
Rabi I 1427.  According to Sunnis the world over, the 12th of Rabi I is the anniversary of 
the birth of the Prophet (what South Asian Muslims call mwlyd, as aforementioned).  As 
previously noted, the Deobandi-Barelvi rivalry revolves in large part around the two 
school’s separate understanding of the “traditional” South Asian Islamic “rituals.”  
Foremost among them is mwlyd, and the controversy of the holiday goes back to the 
very beginning, to some of the first anti-Deobandi rulings of Ahmad Riza Khan and his 
disciples. 
From the initial emergence of debate between Barelvi and Deobandi adherents over 
doctrine in the late nineteenth century, it has been the sects’ relative stance on the 
attributes of the Prophet Muhammad that have most widened the divide, as noted.  The 
ritual of the Barelvis has compounded this doctrinal difference, particularly as they 
celebrate the birth of the Prophet.  Indeed, mwlyd is often marked as of the time of this 
writing by processions in the streets, massive gatherings, the recitation of religious 
poetry, prize-giving, sweets-giving, prayers, and feasting (in Pakistan the date is 
marked as a public holiday, typically complete with speeches by high government 
officials at both the national and provincial levels—and even the screening of films with 
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“morale-building themes” in place of the “usual movies”),9 much of which is considered 
“innovation” by Sunnis of the Deobandi persuasion.  Several deadly clashes between 
Deobandi and Barelvi groups have taken place on this significant date of the Islamic 
calendar. 
It is no wonder, then, that on this date Muhammad Siddiq carried out his deadly 
attack. 
 
II 
According to the bomb disposal squad dispatched to the grisly scene at Nishtar 
Park, the explosive used in the violence was of “the same type” used in earlier attacks—
in particular, on the ‘Ali Raza Mosque (31 May 2004; 23 killed, 37 injured) and on the 
Haideri Mosque (7 May 2004; 26 killed, 98 injured).10  Both of these previous attacks 
had likewise taken place in Karachi.  But explosive type and location weren’t the only 
elements tying these blasts together; by November 2004, Karachi authorities had 
identified both the Haideri11 and ‘Ali Raza12 mosque attacks as having been perpetrated 
by aforementioned Deobandi organization Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, by this time officially 
banned in Pakistan. On 15 June 2007, the Sindh Home Department issued a statement 
identifying Muhammad Siddiq as the Nishtar Park bomber and one “said to have had 
links with the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi.”13  This brings us back to the question of location.  
Why did Muhammad Siddiq and his co-conspirators select Nishtar Park as the place to 
carry out their attack?  At first glace this seems obvious; a massive Barelvi gathering 
was taking place there, one that would include much of the sect’s leadership.  But 
digging deeper, it seems clear that, in fact, the location’s significance goes beyond this.  
The similar attack on ‘Ali Raza Mosque—the one that the bomb disposal team had 
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identified as having employed “the same type” of explosive—had taken place less than 
fifteen hundred feet away, just across Muhammad ‘Ali Jinnah Road near the intersection 
of Madina and Zainabla Roads.  The Haideri Mosque is located not much further down 
M. A. Jinnah Road, placing all three easily within the southwestern quadrant of Karachi, 
between Saddar and Jamshed (parts of Karachi described as possessing many “sensitive 
areas” revolving almost entirely around mosques).14  Thus Nishtar Park seems not only 
convenient for Lashkar-e-Jhangvi elements on account of its being the venue of a major 
Barelvi gathering, but possesses additional significance as falling within the radius of 
what was apparently the killers’ “turf.” 
The consequence of the perpetrators’ selection of Nishtar Park probably doesn’t go 
beyond this—but it might.  For Abdur Rab Nishtar (d. 1958 AD), after whom the park 
was named, represented much that the Deobandi school had once abhorred: he was an 
active and high-ranking Muslim Leaguer, a graduate of the modernist Muslim 
University at Aligarh, and, some years after Partition, served as President of the 
Pakistan Muslim League.15  Whether Muhammad Siddiq and his co-conspirators had 
any of this in mind when Nishtar Park was named as the fateful site for their deadly plot 
one will likely never know. 
 
III 
With apparent ties to the LeJ (described as “the most dreaded sectarian terrorist 
outfit in Pakistan”),16 it behooves one to ask the question: what exactly is the LeJ—and 
how might a young man allegedly hailing from an obscure village in the far 
northeastern hill district of Mansehra have wound up in the southern port city of 
Karachi connected to it?  In an attempt to answer this double interrogative, it may be 
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necessary to examine the beginnings of the Deobandi-Barelvi conflict, in full swing 
many decades before Muhammad Siddiq was even born.  Of course, that is one of the 
main purposes of the present work; the reader has been introduced to the religious 
thought of Shah Waliullah and the revivalism that it inspired, the founding of the dar 
ul’alwm at Deoband, the Barelvi counter-reformation, the fәtwa wars of the early 1900s, 
the early (pre-Partition) political battles between the two schools in the form of the 
JUH-Congress alliance and the AISC call for Pakistan, the further politicization of the 
JUI and the JUP within Pakistani politics, and the emergence of militant wings of the 
two schools from the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s and 1990s.  Already 
discussed, too, has been the 1985 establishment of what would become the SSP by Haq 
Nawaz Jhangvi and his companions and the emergence of its even more militant 
offshoot, the LeJ.  The Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, or “Jhangvi’s Army,” targeted both Shi’a 
Muslims and Barelvis.  In one of the group’s earlier operations, LeJ members attacked a 
congregation of Shi’i in Lahore while the latter were in the act of prayer, slaughtering 
thirty; the event sparked a violent response, a “Shi’a mob” numbering in the thousands 
smashing cars, setting fire to buildings (including a provincial courthouse), and 
attempting to storm the Pakistani parliament.17  It was to this “Deobandi” group—one 
that the ISID had been using for years to push its own political agenda—that 
Muhammad Siddiq allegedly attached himself sometime prior to April 2006.   
Whatever the stimulus for the now-violent nature of the Deobandi-Barelvi rivalry, 
what had once been a schism among scholars had mutated over time into a bloody battle 
between religious parties and their terrorist wings.  The century-and-a-half 
transformation of the Deobandi-Barelvi dynamic had seemingly swept up Muhammad 
Siddiq in its current. 
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IV 
Four of Muhammad Siddiq’s alleged co-conspirators were arraigned on 4 May 2009: 
Sultan Mahmood (also known as “Saifullah”), mufti Zakir Hussain Siddiqui, 
Rehmatullah, and Muhammad Amin (also known as “Khalid Shaheen”); the last of these 
was exonerated several months later “for want of evidence.”18  By early September 2009, 
the other three—“Saifullah,” Zakir, and Rehmatullah—had been indicted (FIR 71/06) 
by an anti-terrorism court.  Such courts, known as “ATFs,” had been established in 1997 
shortly after PML-N won its landslide (even historic) electoral victory.  The idea was 
that the ATFs would deter would-be terrorists since they represented the “promise” of 
“speedy justice, unencumbered by the procedural niceties of the regular court system.”19  
Three others, identified by police as Amanullah (also called “mufti Ilyas”), Qari Abid 
Iqbal, and Khalid (also known as “Abrar”), are thought to have been involved in 
masterminding the Nishtar Park attack but, as of the time of this writing, remain at 
large.20  mufti Ilyas almost certainly acted as the leader of the group, with mufti Zakir as 
a chief lieutenant. 
Sultan’s 2007 testimony to police (if it is to be believed), combined with the latter’s 
follow-up investigation, revealed several details about Muhammad Siddiq’s time in 
Karachi, and especially the final hours leading up to his suicide.  According to Siddiq’s 
brothers (Shafi and Shafiq), Muhammad Siddiq had been “sent” to Karachi by his 
“friends” (though these are left unidentified).  He would have been about sixteeen years 
old at the time of his arrival in the big city.  His (Siddiq’s) goal, according to his 
brothers, had been to get a job in Karachi, then to save up, “enabling him to marry 
soon.”21  A tantalizing yet ultimately unanswerable question spurred by this 
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information: did Muhammad Siddiq know who he was going to marry—or at least who 
he would like to marry?  Did he have plans for a specific life in place that did not include 
suicide and murder?  Whatever the answer, Siddiq moved to Karachi around 2002, 
where he soon obtained employment at a religious bookstore in Saddar (south of 
Nishtar Park).  Later, he traded his job in Saddar for a similar one at a religious 
bookstore near prominent Deobandi university Jamia Binoria (northwest of Nishtar 
Park).  It is highly possible that Muhammad Siddiq, up to this point, was engaged in the 
very pursuits his brothers claimed for him: earning money in the city in order to 
establish himself for marriage.  Still, his choices of employment—both peddlars of 
Islamic literature—suggest at least a leaning towards religion.  Jamia Binoria, too, 
besides being a sizable Deobandi university, had been the site of several Barelvi-
Deobandi clashes, including a 1999 incident involving a Sunni Tehrik procession that 
engaged in stone-pelting against students of the university (though it is unclear who 
“threw the first stone,” so to speak), escalating into the shooting deaths of at least two 
individuals before police broke up the fight using batons and tear gas; perhaps not 
incidentally, the clash took place during mwlyd celebrations.22 
And then, for unknown reasons, Muhammad Siddiq abruptly left his place of 
employment—and went to Afghanistan “to train in jihad.”  Not surprisingly, this 
decision would dramatically change the young man’s life, though just how dramatically 
Siddiq may not have guessed.  For it was in Afghanistan that Muhammad Siddiq met 
Sultan.  The two quickly became “close friends.”  What Siddiq probably didn’t know, at 
least at first, was that Sultan was a recruiter for Lashkar-e-Jhangvi whose task was to 
“identify, prepare, and brainwash” suicide bomber prospects.  When Muhammad Siddiq 
returned to Karachi, he regained his job at the bookshop near Jamia Binoria, but Sultan 
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returned with him.  According to one of Siddiq’s friends (a co-worker at the bookshop), 
Sultan would come to discuss “plans” with Muhammad Siddiq often.  This continued 
until that final fateful twenty-four hours, during which events passed, as far as the police 
reports reveal, in the following sequence: 
 
10 April   [Evening] Sultan and Qari Abid Iqbal arrive at the 
bookshop outside Jamia Binoria.  After a “discussion” with 
Muhammad Siddiq, all three drive away. 
  Sultan, Qari, and Muhammad Siddiq arrive at House No. 2, 
Islamia Colony, Pahari Wali Gali, Qasba Colony, Orangi 
(Karachi).  This is the house of Rehmatullah.  mufti Ilyas is 
there as well, presumably along with mufti Zakir and Khalid 
(“Abrar”). 
11 April  [Morning] The group eats at Rehmatullah’s house, after 
which Muhammad Siddiq performs two voluntary prayers. 
  Muhammad Siddiq puts on an explosive jacket bearing 
seven-eighths of a kilogram of explosives and three 
thousand ball bearings. 
  [Late afternoon] Sultan and Khalid take Muhammad 
Siddiq towards Nishtar Park via M. A. Jinnah Road.  They 
make the trip in a taxi, which stops on three separate 
occasions at police checkpoints; each time it is allowed to 
pass. 
  On or near Jinnah Road, the trio joins a rallying crowd on 
its way to the mwlyd celebration. 
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  Sultan, Khalid, and Muhammad Siddiq remain at the gates 
of the park (to avoid cameras), the former two “sheltering” 
Muhammad Siddiq behind them. 
  mufti Zakir arrives at the park (on orders from mufti Ilyas) 
to make sure his men are in position.  Assured that all is in 
place, mufti Zakir leaves. 
  The vehicle of Sunni Tehrik leader Abbas Qadiri enters the 
park.  Sultan and Khalid ask Muhammad Siddiq if he knows 
who is in the car.  Siddiq replies that he does.   
  [Just after sunset] Moments after Siddiq identifies Abbas 
Qadiri’s vehicle, Sultan and Khalid leave Muhammad Siddiq 
alone; their departure occurs just as the mәGryb prayer 
begins. 
  The prayer ends. Muhammad Siddiq makes for the stage 
and commits suicide. 
  
IV 
Mansehra is Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa’s easternmost district, bordering (Indian) 
Kashmir on its eastern edges yet only one hundred miles or so, as the crow flies, from 
Afghanistan to the west.  The district has long been a venue for militant training camps 
(including at least thirteen “major” facilities responsible for the training of “thousands” of 
fighters), mostly connected to operations across the LoC into Kashmir.  After 
September 11th 2001, such activities were ostensibly curtailed by the Pakistani 
government, but by 2005—the year before the Nishtar Park blast—the camps appeared 
to be humming again, and this time they were alleged to be providing soldiers both for 
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the Taliban in Afghanistan as well as the usual fight in Kashmir.23  It should be 
remembered that such agitation, particularly in Kashmir, was nothing new; seventy 
years before any planes struck the World Trade Center, the Deobandi-led Kashmir 
Movement (1931) was launched not far from here.  Deobandi activists (in particular 
mwlana Ahmed ‘Ali) collected thousands of rupees during this period in order to carry 
out jyhad in Kashmir (Ahmed ‘Ali would become president of the West Pakistan JUI in 
1956). “Hence,” writes Tahir Kamran, the “Deobandi penchant for jihad in Kashmir has 
a historical context.”24 
But in the years leading up to the suicide of Muhammad Siddiq, this atmosphere of 
aggression in Mansehra was compounded by the Barelvi-Deobandi contest.  Not far to 
the west, in Khyber Agency, the doctrinal disputes between two clerics—mufti Munir 
Shakir (Deobandi) and pir Saifur Rahman (Barelvi)—had escalated into violence (mostly 
perpetrated by the former).  Both employed the use of illegal FM radio stations to 
spread their rival theologies and denounce the other (not unlike their debating, 
pamphlet- and book-producing forbears; it would seem, however, that in this case mufti 
Munir Shakir spent less time discussing doctrine and more denigrating pir Saifur 
Rahman).  Such operations were widespread, as the growth of pirated FM stations 
across the north attested as of late 2006 (when there were an estimated eighty-eight), 
including two stations in Muhammad Siddiq’s own Mansehra District.25  In fact, just 
two weeks prior to the attack on the Barelvis gathered at Nishtar Park, approximately 
twenty-five people (mostly Barelvi) were killed and twenty-five injured in gun battles 
after Deobandis (followers of mufti Munir Shakir) laid siege to a Barelvi (a follower of 
pir Saifur Rahman) in the Khyber Agency.26  The event may have been the last major 
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clash between Deobandi and Barelvi to be contemplated by Muhammad Siddiq before he 
himself contributed to the conflict. 
The violent struggle for Afghanistan and, especially, Indian Kashmir, combined 
with the ever-present Deobandi-Barelvi rivalry, was thus almost certainly simply “part 
of life” for Muhammad Siddiq from the time of his childhood—a state of affairs that 
would, perhaps, have allowed for a level of desensitization to violent religious struggle, 
whether against Indian or American soldiers or the followers of Barelvi clerics. 
 
V 
Muhammad Siddiq had at least three brothers.  All were likewise named 
Muhammad: Muhammad Shafi, Muhammad Shafiq (also identified as Shafiqur 
Rahman),27 and Mohammed Rafiq.  At least the first two (Shafi and Shafiq) maintained 
their brother’s innocence and blamed the Sindh Home Department for falsely 
implicating him in the Nishtar Park bombing case.  A local paper, Mәhasyb (operating in 
northeastern Pakistan), carried their appeal in mid-June 2007.  The thrust of the 
brothers’ petition, however, dealt not with Muhammad Siddiq but with their parents, 
who had allegedly been taken by a “secret agency” to Karachi, where they were being 
detained.  “Our parents do not know anything about the Nishtar Park carnage,” Shafi 
and Shafiq asserted, urging the president and Prime Minister of Pakistan to intervene 
on their behalf.28 
What is curious about the brothers’ appeal is the absence of the voice of Muhammad 
Siddiq’s third brother, Rafiq.  It was Rafiq, after all, who seems to have first gone 
searching for his missing brother.  On 25 May 2007, about a year and six weeks after 
the Nishtar Park blast, Rafiq arrived in Karachi, according to his police statement.  
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Rafiq went immediately to the small bookshop outside Jamia Binoria where his brother 
had last been employed.  Here he apparently met a man named Afzal—a friend of 
Muhammad Siddiq’s.  Rafiq asked Afzal where he might find his missing brother.  Afzal 
replied that he thought his brother might have been killed in the Nishtar Park blast.  
Rafiq went straightway to the Soldier Bazaar police station, explained his situation, and 
was shown a photo album of the carnage from 11 April; if his brother had been killed by 
the blast, his remains would likely be visible inside.  Sure enough, the album included a 
photo of Muhammad Siddiq’s decapitated head, resting on a pillow; Rafiq recognized his 
brother, despite the fact that a part of the latter’s face, blown off in the blast, was held in 
place only by a piece of string.29  Rafiq’s DNA was subsequently tested at the Dr. A. Q. 
Khan Lab in order to confirm his familial relationship to the alleged attacker.  It appears 
that Rafiq’s arrival at the Soldier Bazaar police station precipitated the Sindh Home 
Department’s announcement, released just two weeks later, identifying Muhammad 
Siddiq as the Nishtark Park bomber.  Muhammad Siddiq’s head was handed over to 
Rafiq.  Rafiq opted not to carry the head home to Mansehra; “it would not be good for 
the family,” he told police.  He buried it instead at the Edhi graveyard “at Mochko” 
(assumedly Mowach Goth).30  The graveyard, owned and operated by the Edhi 
Foundation (a well-known non-profit social welfare program in Pakistan), had, as of 
February 2010, acted as the final resting place for almost three thousand unidentified 
bodies.31  The remains of Muhammad Siddiq are now numbered among them. 
Muhammad Siddiq’s parents survived him, his father identified in June of 2007 as 
one “Mr. Israel” and his mother as “Zewar Jan.”  Both were taken into some sort of 
government custody within days of Muhammad Siddiq’s identification as the Nishtar 
Park assailant.  The SAG’s allegation that the ISID had been inciting Deobandi groups 
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to violence against Barelvi ones seems buoyed by the claim of Shafiq and Shafi that a 
“secret agency” had taken their parents away—and further shored up by their claim that 
they were being “threatened” over the phone.  Evidently, too, an “anonymous caller” had 
ordered them not to disclose the fact that their parents had been arrested from their 
home village area.32 
Muhammad Siddiq also had two sisters: Safia and Soba Jan. 
 
VI 
One newspaper headline succinctly summed up the likely target of Muhammad 
Siddiq’s suicide attack: TOP LEADERSHIP OF THE SUNNI TEHRIK WIPED OUT.  This was 
no exaggeration; the dead included  
- ST chief Muhammad Abbas Qadiri (whose car Muhammad Siddiq was 
asked by his co-conspirators to identify when it entered the park, just 
before the two left Siddiq on his own; Qadiri’s arrival was thus the signal 
that the attack could move forward, implying that he was the primary 
target); 
- Iftikhar Ahmad Bhatti, a founding leader of the Sunni Tehrik; 
- Ikram Qadiri, another Sunni Tehrik founder; 
- Dr. Abdul Qadir Abbasi, a member of the Sunni Tehrik’s “legal aid 
committee”;33 
- and dozens of other Sunni Tehrik members. 
 
Prominent figures from other Barelvi parties were likewise murdered in the incident, 
including: 
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- Muhammad Taqi, a former government official, former head of the JUP 
in Karachi, and a member of the (Barelvi) Markazi Jamiat-e-Pakistan 
party; 
- Qari Mukhtar Qadiri, of the (Barelvi) dar ul’alwm Amjadia in Karachi; 
- Muhammad Hanif Billo, a prominent businessman and president of the 
Tehrik Awam Ahl-e-Sunnat, a Barelvi party; 
- and Faridul Hasnain Kazmi of the Jama’at Ahl-e-Sunnat, a large Barelvi 
religious organization; it was this group that had organized the Nishtar 
Park mwlyd celebrations. 
 
The statement released by the Sindh Home Department on 15 June 2007, however, 
asserted that “the motive of Lashkar-e-Jhangvi behind committing this offence [the 
Nishtar Park bombing] was to create unrest and a law and order situation in Sindh in 
order to avenge the present government’s policy against religious extremism” (italics added).34  
A brief glance at Muhammad Siddiq’s victim list makes it clear, however, that despite 
what the Sindh Home Department might claim, this was almost certainly a clear-cut 
case of Deobandi-Barelvi sectarianism, even if a side motive might have been served in 
the process. 
 
VII 
Sometime between the old debating days of Ahmad Riza Khan and the carnage of 
Nishtar Park, Deobandi-Barelvi articulations of power underwent a transformation.  
Metcalf identifies an early Deobandi sense of әxlaq, or “civility characteristic of 
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respectable people,” as a check on intolerance—preventing, for example, the Deobandis 
in Muhammad Qasim’s day from denying others of being Muslim despite doctrinal and 
ritual disagreements (though, admittedly, this did not seem to have applied to the 
Shi’a).35  әxlaq was a foundational concept within Islam, and had been from the 
beginning; according to one hәdis (narrated by Osama bin Sharik), the Prophet 
explained that the “dearest” of all “Allah’s slaves” is the “One who has the best moral 
character [әxlaq].”  Another hәdis (narrated by Abdullah ibn Amr) presents the Prophet 
explaining that “the most likeable person to me…who will be the nearest to me on the 
Day of Judgment” is “he among you who has the best moral character [әxlaq].”36  For 
those of the Sufi tradition, in particular, әxlaq was considered paramount; many Sufis 
during the period of its genesis literally defined Sufism as әxlaq, including Abu al-
Husayn al-Nuri (d. 908) and Muhammad ibn ‘Ali al-Kattani (d. 838).37  An “English-
Hindustani” dictionary published in the 1880s (the formative period of both the Barelvi 
and Deobandi movements) translated “morality” (defined as “the rule which teaches us 
to live soberly and honestly”) as әxlaq.38  It is important to note that both the spiritual 
masters of the Deobandi tradition and those recognized as the Barelvi guiding lights 
were also practitioners of Sufism, though this is rarely acknowledged as far as the 
Deobandis are concerned (certainly in comparison to their Barelvi counterparts).  
Perhaps this buoys up Metcalf’s assertion that әxlaq may have played a significant role 
in maintaining a semblance of tolerance (and preventing outright violence) between the 
rival Sunni groups. 
The formative periods of both the Barelvi and Deobandi movements took place 
during the peak of British power on the subcontinent, thereby providing both sects with 
some form of a common enemy.  Neither group engaged in politics for itself but rather 
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as subsumed parts of larger independence and/or nationalist efforts.  Indeed, it wasn’t 
until Deobandi and Barelvi groups entered politics within the framework of the 
Pakistani state (and money and political power were on the line) that әxlaq appears to 
have been knocked off of its pedestal.  Concurrently with this development came the 
dramatic increase, from the 1970s onwards, of a more Saudi version of Islam—one that 
rejected Sufism and, perhaps along with it, the exalted place which that strain of the 
faith reserved for әxlaq.  Years of desensitization to war, fueled by Russian and 
American (and Indian) incursions and funded by Pakistani, Saudi, and American (and 
Indian) intelligence agencies, also doubtless played a role in removing the barrier to 
certain social behaviors that had previously been thrown up by әxlaq. 
The mushrooming of mәdarys in Pakistan brought about by government support 
(“or exploitation,” in the words of Cohen, and it appears that the SAG would agree)—
from around two hundred fifty at the time of Partition to almost three thousand in 1987 
to between ten and forty-five thousand by the mid-2000s—produced, perhaps not 
surprisingly, a considerable surplus of Muslim scholars, clerics, and teachers, a 
“religious lumpenproletariat” of mostly young men who may have found it difficult to 
secure employment in the world outside the mәdrәsәħ.39  It isn’t unlikely that young 
Muhammad Siddiq himself met this description—an erstwhile student in a Deobandi 
mәdrәsәħ, a recent graduate perhaps, yet unable to secure meaningful employment 
beyond a junior position at a bookshop.  Devoid of a foreseeable future as a scholar and 
well-versed in sectarian vitriol, Muhammad Siddiq may have been targeted as an ideal 
recruit for the LeJ. 
By the time Muhammad Siddiq approached Nishtar Park, minutes before his death, 
әxlaq was likely the last thing on his mind. 
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* 
The Rivalry Continues . 
The April 2006 Nishtar Park bombing—almost certainly a high-collateral 
assassination effort targeting Abbas Qadiri—sparked outrage among Barelvis in 
Karachi and across Pakistan.  It also cast a negative light on Deobandism throughout 
the country, buoyed up a year later by the Lal Masjid incident—during which 
Deobandis seeking the enforcement of shәri’at in Islamabad refused to vacate a school 
and mosque, resulting in the storming of the facility by government forces.  Despite the 
disavowal by Deobandi religious leaders of the Lal Masjid movement, the incident 
exacerbated Barelvi fears of an increasingly militant Deobandism and seemed to 
legitimize Barelvi claims of the same. 
Barelvis had political cause to worry, too.  Though the JUP had allied with other 
Muslim political parties—finally; it had only taken half a century for such an alliance to 
emerge—it had continued its decline in terms of national influence.  The JUI, on the 
other hand, had skyrocketed into prominence.  Formed in the run-up to the 2002 
general elections, the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal Pakistan (or MMA) included both the 
JUI and the JUP, as well as the JI, the Shi’a Tehrik-e-Jafaria Pakistan, and the Jamiat 
Ahl-e-Hadith.  With the religious parties finally forming a united front, the MMA won 
a large portion of the vote—indeed, the greatest electoral victory for the ‘alәma parties 
since Pakistan’s birth.  All told, the MMA obtained a whopping sixty-three seats in the 
National Assembly.  (The Barelvi-dominated MQM managed seventeen.)  But of the 
five parties that formed the alliance, the JUI emerged as by far the most powerful, 
especially since JUI (F) candidates alone had garnered forty-one of the MMA’s sixty-
three seats.  This, coupled with the party’s twenty-nine provincial assembly seats in the 
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NWFP (MMA seats in the province totaled forty-eight) propelled Fazlur Rehman to 
the Leader of the Opposition position in 2004, a post he held until 2007.   
But the MMA experienced a rapid drop in popularity after its declaration of “loyal 
opposition” (as opposed to outright opposition) to the Musharraf regime, at a time when 
Pervez Musharraf was losing supporters on all sides.  The declaration was made despite 
the MMA’s official stance against Pakistan’s participation in the U.S. Government-led 
“War on Terror.”  But by mid-2007, even the MMA could sense Musharraf’s impending 
fall, issuing a call (together with the PPP and the PML-N) for the President’s 
resignation.  In November 2007, Musharraf declared a state of emergency, pushing 
elections back “indefinitely.”  For a time it seemed that the old pattern of military 
dictators delaying elections, perfected by Zia ul-Haq, had returned to Pakistan.  But a 
few days later, and perhaps to Musharraf’s credit, elections were announced for January 
2008 (later pushed back to February after the killing of Benazir Bhutto).  Meanwhile, 
the MMA broke up before the election took place (2008), and the JUI managed to win 
only seven seats (compared to the JUP’s zero).  The MQM garnered twenty-five seats.  
The big players in the 2008 contest were the Pakistan People’s Party, now led by 
Yousaf Raza Gillani (after the assassination of Benazir Bhutto earlier that year), and the 
PML-N, led by Nisar Ali Khan—both outright opposition parties to the increasingly 
unpopular Pervez Musharraf.  Musharraf’s own Pakistan Muslim League (Qaid-e-
Azam) had come in a distant third.  The religious parties, it seemed, had thrown away 
their chance to be politically dominant. 
Meanwhile, the U.S. Government-led war in Afghanistan continued to aggravate 
the Deobandi-Barelvi schism.  The Barelvis used the conflict, and the “terrorism” brand, 
to continue its attack on Deobandism’s image.  In 2009, Pakistani Foreign Minister and 
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Barelvi Shah Mehmood Qureshi (who also happened to be the spiritual custodian of one 
of Pakistan’s most significant shrines—that of Shah Rukn-e-Alam, in Multan) told a 
large crowd gathered at the tomb, “The Sunni Tehreek has decided to activate itself 
against Talibanisation in the country. A national consensus against terrorism is 
emerging across the country.”40  Just days later, the Sunni Tehrik—in league with 
several other Barelvi organizations including the JUP, the Jama’at Ahl-e-Sunnat, the 
A’almi Tanzim Ahl-e-Sunnat, the Karawan-e-Islam, the Markazi Jama’at Ahl-e-Sunnat, 
the Markazi JUP, and the Nizam-e-Mustapha Party—launched the Sunni Ittehad 
Council (SIC), an explicitly anti-Taliban alliance.  The JUP spoke out, too, against the 
peace agreement that the Pakistani government had chalked out with the Tehrik-e-
Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM)—a “Pakistani Taliban” group—that paved the 
way for the implementation of the TNSM’s version of shәri’at over the Malakand region 
of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa.41  The Deobandi-Barelvi rivalry was to be played out in the 
context of the Taliban and international “terrorism.”  Opined one Pakistani newspaper 
around the same time that the SIC was born: “The Taliban are not the distant upholders 
of true Islam in Kabul being pulverised by the Americans after 2001. They are militants 
who use terror to subjugate communities, kill innocent Muslims through suicide-
bombing, and want to replace democracy with a despotic order.”  Whatever the initial 
Barelvi reaction to the American invasion to the west, the school’s proponents now 
protested vociferously against it—and, more importantly, against the Taliban, too.  
Once they might have been described as mere spectators.  Not so now.  In addition, the 
Barelvi-dominated MQM joined the fray against the Deobandi-dominated Taliban.  “A 
highly disciplined political entity, the MQM has resolved to stand up to them,” the same 
newspaper reported.  “It may come to regard the Barelvi school of thought as its 
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ideological base because most of its cadres are old followers of the great Barelvi leader, 
Maulana Shah Ahmad Noorani of the Jamiat-e Ulema-e Pakistan.”42 
Even with the formation of the SIC and the MQM’s anti-Taliban declaration, 
Barelvis and Deobandis temporarily united (at least in the old form of “separate unity”) 
from around November 2010 to mid-2011 to rally against anti-blasphemy law reform.  
This was, of course, typical of both schools, in light of similar “alliances” against 
perceived government intrusion into the ‘alәma’s purview that had occurred from the 
time of Pakistan’s birth.  Anti-Taliban rhetoric from the Barelvi camp (most 
conspicuously in the form of the JUP and the SIC, of which the former was a part) 
noticeably died down during this period.  “We had seen the Barelvis getting ready to 
organize a campaign against the Taliban,” observed analyst Nasim Zehra, “but they got 
sidetracked by the blasphemy issue and this was forgotten.”43  Of course, the Barelvi-
instigated assassination of Salman Taseer, mentioned previously, was tied up in the 
matter.  The JUP’s Fazal Karim did not mince words, stating plainly that the proposed 
change in the laws were meant merely to placate Westerners; “We will not allow it,” he 
said.44  At the same time, JUI-F senator mwlana Sherani opposed legislation dealing 
with domestic violence, claiming that it was “not a major issue in Pakistan until 
women’s rights groups appeared.”  Passage of the law would “promote Western culture 
in the Islamic state,” Fazlur Rehman said, and the JUI would fight it “tooth and nail.”45  
Both the Barelvis and the Deobandis, too, strongly opposed U.S. Government drone 
strikes in Pakistan. 
As of this writing, the direct violence between Deobandi and Barelvi had not abated 
either.  In February 2010, gunmen from the SSP and affiliated groups attacked Barelvis 
celebrating mwlyd in Faisalabad and Dera Ismail Khan, prompting a retaliatory attack 
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by the crowd on a Deobandi mәdrәsәħ.46  In July of that year, scores of Barelvis were 
killed—and much of the country outraged—when an SSP bomb detonated in the Data 
Durbar shrine in Lahore.47  But that same month, local Barelvi leader and Dawat-e-
Islami activist Abdus Sattar justified the “severe beating” of a local father of five (a 
forty-five-year old named Faryad) on the grounds that the man had committed 
blasphemy against the Prophet Muhammad; “Due to this indecent and blasphemous 
utterance and adamance of the accused,” Abdus Sattar explained, “we [the residents of 
the town of Marzi Pura neighborhood of Khanewal, northeast of Multan] decided to 
teach him a lesson and thrash him.”48  The same justifcation would be used by Barelvi 
leaders in early 2011, when Punjab governor Salman Taseer (who wanted to tone down 
Pakistan’s anti-blasphmeny laws) was murdered by one of his Barelvi bodyguards, as 
aforementioned; clerics subsequently forbade their followers from uttering funeral 
prayers for the slain politician and hailed his murderer as a national hero.  In late June 
2011, perhaps as a Deobandi reaction to the joint SIC-MQM resolution to resist 
Pakistan’s “Talibanization,” a “kill list” began circulating in Karachi targeting Dawat-e-
Islami head Muhammad Ilyas Qadiri, the heavily Barelvi MQM leadership, at least one 
Shi’a cleric, and several anti-SSP police officers; those named, the list explained, had 
insincerely labeled honest jyhadis “terrorists” while ignoring real criminals like thieves 
and murderers.49  Dawat-e-Islami leaders had been targeted before, of course; indeed, 
just four months before the list began circulating, thousands of “angry activists” from 
the Barelvi proselytizing group had marched along Karachi’s streets, firing guns into 
the air, burning tires, and forcing shops to close down and people to remain “confined to 
their homes”—all in protest of the killing of a Barelvi ymam (and Dawat-e-Islami 
member) on 19 February.50 
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Barelvi mobilization had its consequences, too.  The Pakistani government (in the 
form, perhaps not surprisingly, of its largely Deobandi-leaning intelligence agencies) 
began to publicly crack down on Barelvi activities in September of 2011 when military 
authorities decided to “curtail the activities” of the Dawat-e-Islami (now claiming to be 
active in almost seventy countries worldwide), particularly in reference to the Barelvi 
organization’s missionary efforts within the ranks of the armed forces themselves.  The 
group was reported to have been so successful in gaining followers from within the 
military that the Dawat-e-Islami’s “key source of funding,” by 2011, came from this 
unique section of its membership (more than twenty million rupees were collected from 
the Pakistan Air Force alone—and that just during the month of Ramadan/August).  
Intelligence agencies warned the military that the Dawat’s “growing influence” would 
have “serious implications,” despite the group’s official “apolitical” stance.  Evidently, 
some within the Pakistani government had been reassessing the influence of ostensibly 
non-violent preaching groups like the Dawat-e-Islami ever since the assassination of 
Salman Taseer.  Indeed, the Barelvi bodyguard who had killed Taseer, a twenty-six-
year-old from Rawalpindi who had been working for the police since 2002, was himself 
“believed to be a follower of Dawat-e-Islami.”51  During “interrogations,” the 
bodyguard, Mumtaz Qadiri, even admitted that “Qadiri” was not actually his last 
name—but that he had adopted it out of devotion to the Dawat-e-Islami founder, 
Muhammad Ilyas Qadiri.52  He would later confess to having been inspired to carry out 
the killing after listening to “the speeches of Hanif Qureshi,” a Barelvi cleric and Dawat-
e-Islami leader.53  To many Barelvis, however, the government’s move to scrutinize the 
Dawat-e-Islami was just another example (in a long train of abuses) of official patronage 
reserved for Deobandis over the Barelvi majority; even police officials connected to the 
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case, after all, had admitted that “no suspected militant out of the 150 arrested from the 
suburbs of the capital belongs to this religious party [the Dawat-e-Islami].”54 
* 
It should be noted here, towards the end of this work, that, outside of clerical and 
political circles (or militant jyhadi ones), the typical Deobandi-Barelvi dynamic is more 
subdued, and varies generally from place to place.  In much of India, for example, the 
rivalry is mostly a scholarly one, barely manifested in the everyday lives of lay Muslims 
of either stripe (of course, it flares up from time to time as a political issue when matters 
of government largesse are concerned).   The general feeling of the “everyday” 
Deobandi or Barelvi (at least in the experience of the author, having “mixed and 
mingled” with Deobandis and Barelvis at various levels on three continents over seven 
years as of this writing) might best be summed up in the words of a Kashmiri refugee in 
Lahore named Anjum.  Anjum’s father had fled the cool valley of Srinagar amidst the 
“massacres” that accompanied Partition and the initiation of Indian Government rule 
there; thus Anjum had been born on the sweltering Punjabi plains.  Asked what his 
feelings were about the Deobandi-Barelvi rivalry, he explained, “I just want to follow 
the Qur’an and the sunnәt.  There are no sects in the Qur’an—all are one.”  Rather than 
shine a light on the schism, he had laid emphasis on the faith’s original purity as well as 
its ideal of a unified ummәt.  Pressed further, however, Anjum admitted cautiously, 
“Some ‘alәma have added a few things to the religion that were not there in the 
Prophet’s time.  This is not good.”  This was, of course, a clear reference to the Barelvi 
scholars and pirs. 
“So you are a Deobandi, then?” I asked. 
“Yes,” he answered quietly, seemingly uncomfortable affirming that such a division 
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existed within the ummәt at all.  Most Kashmiri Muslims lean Deobandi, he informed 
me.  Thus Anjum’s inclination was one of toleration, despite his feelings—even strong 
feelings—against the alleged “accretions” espoused by the Barelvis of the subcontinent.  
His initial answer to the question of Deobandi-Barelvi animosity had been conciliatory.  
“I would pray behind a Deobandi or a Barelvi,” he had assured me.55 
On a visit to Junagadh in Gujarat, hundreds of miles away from Anjum in Lahore, 
two Muslim men in their twenties who had previously approached the author and 
initiated a conversation admitted that they did not belong to the same sect.  “I am 
Deobandi, he is Barelvi,” one of them said, motioning to the other.  “But we are both 
Muslims.”  And best friends, at that.   
Anjum’s attitude, like that of the Gujarati pair, seems generally representative, in 
the author’s experience, of the vast majority of Indian Sunnis vis-à-vis their “Others”—
whether that Other carries a Deobandi or Barelvi distinction.  Perhaps it has been so 
since the schism first materialized in the late nineteenth century.  
* 
From the days of Islam’s first generation, divisions have plagued the faith—schisms 
that were serious enough to bring about the bloody murder of caliphs and the 
fragmenting of nations.  In this sense, the Deobandi-Barelvi divide is nothing new.  The 
differences between the great schism of today and the ones of ages past are in large 
degree tied up in the development, from the late nineteenth century, of the modern 
“total state” and its underpinning political philosophy: statism.  Among Western states, 
at least, this development was occurring rapidly from the first few decades of the British 
Raj period (i.e. post-1857), and the nationalist and/or separatist movements that grew 
up in India were nurtured by these Western ideas of political organization and 
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philosophy.  Both Nehru’s INC and Jinnah’s AIML operated like formal British activist 
organizations, and each sought to establish strong, “modern” states on the 
subcontinent—the former advocating for a socialist system, the latter a republican one.  
The JUH (born of a tradition that had already assumed the British educational model) 
adopted these same forms, as did (to a lesser extent) the AISC.  With the establishment 
of Pakistan, both groups worked within the new, “modern” system fashioned after the 
western model, first as “influencer” parties and later as full-fledged political parties.  
Despite constitutions ostensibly meant to curb the activities of central and provincial 
regimes (and despite Jinnah’s original dream of a truly federal system), the scope of the 
(central) government (following the example of Western states) was assumed to be 
virtually unbounded, and as such presidents and ministers and elected representatives 
(and dictators) were free to craft legislation of broad scope, creating departments and 
bureaucracies and agencies and offices touching upon almost all aspects of life.  The 
rulings of government were, of course, enforced by violence or the threat of violence.  
At the same time, the government collected vast sums in taxes (of a wide variety), 
borrowed more and more money to fund its activities (and expansion), and printed (from 
the early 1970s, completely fiat) money when needed, increasing its scope (and ability 
to, among other things, wage war) even more—and attracting thousands of partisans, 
lobbyists, and activists. 
This all-encompassing patronistic kind of system (i.e. the total state) engendered 
competition between the Deobandi and Barelvi schools for money and power on a scale 
never seen before on the subcontinent.  True, religious scholars and pirs had been 
granted salaries or land in the past by sultans and princes, but this had been a patron 
relationship between a ruler and various individuals (indeed, a mere handful, relatively 
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speaking).  But the modern, near-total state essentially transformed the Deobandi and 
Barelvi schools into enormous, religio-political lobby groups, each vying for a piece of 
the colossal government “pie”—and the guns and patronage that such benefaction 
brought with it; this was no association between a patron and a scholar but rather one of 
massive government and massive interest group.  (Looming at the edge of possibility, 
too, was the notion of one or the other school actually taking over the reigns of the state 
as direct controllers.)  This contest over the “pie” combined with both direct 
government manipulation of religious parties for militant ends (as in Kashmir and 
Bangladesh) and prolongued, brutal persecution of religious parties (as during the Z. A. 
Bhutto years) to initiate a militarization of said groups that would culminate from the 
1980s onward.  Thus, with the entrance of both sides into the “modern” (i.e. total) 
political structure of the Pakistani state (and the contests for power and money inherent 
therein), a phenomenon that had once been simply a doctrinal division between religious 
schools had transformed into a fierce political rivalry between powerful religious 
parties.  Indeed, as the struggle for political power became the central focus of the 
‘alәma parties as seemingly the only means of implementing an Islamic order, their 
leaders came to regard their respective co-religionists “as landlords do their 
constituencies, as political jagirs [fiefdoms],” in turn resulting in an emphasis by said 
leaders on the differences between the various Sunni schools.56   
At the same time, the concept of an “Islamic state” was shoved roughshod into the 
modern, total-state structure, transforming the shәri’at system into one of all-
encompassing coercion and compulsion.  To the ‘alәma (if not for the pirs, for whom the 
issue is far more complex), the totalitarian doctrine that lies at the heart of “modern” 
state ideology (specifically, to quote Mises, “that the rulers are wiser and loftier than 
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their subjects and that they therefore know better what benefits those ruled than they 
themselves”) seemed nicely suited to their own political philosophy.  As an all-
encompassing social, political, and religious system, Islam (according to this ‘alәma-led 
view) must be entrenched into the very bedrock of the state system, its injunctions 
given the power of state legislation, and its enforcement backed up by the guns of 
government.  Past systems had allowed for such integration before, but the 
decentralized nature of the old state, the traditional restrictions on its domain, and the 
individual-to-individual character of ‘alәma-ruler patronage largely mitigated its effects.  
The emergence of the modern “total state” presented a prize over which the ‘alәma 
parties and their partisans would fight more intensely than before.  
But the influence of the total state on the transformation of the Deobandi-Barelvi 
rivalry didn’t end with the organization of the JUH or the JUI or the AISC, or with the 
birth and development of Pakistan.  Perhaps the most “total” total state yet seen in 
human history, that of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, invaded and occupied 
Afghanistan in the 1980s, while other near-total states intervened, too—including the 
Iranian, Indian, Saudi, American, and Pakistani governments, each projecting power 
through proxy fighters and funding their efforts via mostly fiat printed or borrowed 
cash (made especially possible after Nixon’s 1971 closure of the gold window, though in 
progress for years).  The effect of these foreign interventions on the rivalry in question 
was immeasurable.  The interventions armed and trained thousands of mujahydin, thus 
militarizing a segment of the Deobandis.  They funded the mushrooming of (mostly 
Deobandi) mәdarys, stimulating later, reactionary growth among Barelvis in this same 
sphere.  They allowed for the centrally planned influx of thousands of Wahhabi 
preachers from the Gulf.  They stimulated the illegal drug trade.  They stimulated the 
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illegal gun trade.  They inadvertently led to the birth of Barelvi reactionary outfits like 
the Sunni Tehrik, and even of the MQM.  They buoyed up Pakistani dictators.  They 
patronized one school at the expense of the other.  Their interventions in other parts of 
the Muslim world galvanized members of one school or the other (or both).  They led 
directly to the arrival of foreigners—Arabs, Uzbeks, Chechens, others—trained in the 
use of such weapons as the improvised explosive device and the suicide bomb jacket 
(hitherto unheard of in Pakistan).  In short they armed, funded, and provoked 
Deobandis and Barelvis alike over the course of several decades.   
Perhaps it is no wonder that the above-described, intervention-led transformation 
came to characterize the Deobandis’ and Barelvis’ long-standing rivalry—already 
politicized by the Pakistani state—with one another.  Thus within the context of the 
rise of total statism, to quote Eric Foner (writing about a different “tragic irony of 
history”), “each side fought to defend a distinct vision of the good society, but each 
vision was destroyed by the very struggle to preserve it.”57
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Glossary  
 
әhl-e-sunnәt : denoting the “people [who follow] the sayings and deeds of Muhammad”  
әmir : title of a military head or political leader, whose secular leadership was to be 
augmented by the spiritual guidance of an ymam; often Romanized as “Amir” or 
“Emir” 
әmir ul-mwmynin : “Commander of the Faithful,” a title bestowed both upon proto-
Deobandi jyhadi Sayyid Ahmad of Raebareli and Deobandi-trained Taliban chief 
mullah Muhammad Omar 
‘alәma : pl.; see ‘alym  
’allamәħ : one who is learned/educated  
‘alym (plural: ‘alәma) : a religious scholar       
bi’at : allegiance or fealty; a covenant between Sufi shix and disciple 
but pәrәst : one who worships idols (but = “Buddha”) 
but shykәn : one who destroys idols 
byd’at : (forbidden) religious innovation 
bynnwt : a South Asian martial art form 
dәrgaħ : the burial site and shrine of a Sufi pir 
dәrs-e-nyžami : the traditional curriculum featured in most South Asian Islamic 
seminaries, developed after the decline of Muslim power by the scholars of Farangi 
Mahall 
dar ul’alwm : a “house of learning,” or a religious university, considered superior to a 
mәdrәsәħ 
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dar ul-hәrb : “house of war,” denoting a geographical area in which Muslims are not free 
to practice their religion 
dar ul-yfta : department within a seminary that issues juridical rulings, or fәtawa 
dar ul-yslam : “house of Islam,” denoting a geographical area in which Muslims are free 
to practice their religion 
fәqir : a holy man 
fәtawa : pl.; see fәtwa 
fәtwa (plural: fәtawa) : a juridical ruling, typically composed by a mufti 
fyqħ : Islamic law tradition (not unlike the western term “case law”) 
gwrdwara : a Sikh temple and place of worship 
hәj : the journey to Mecca mandated to all Muslims 
haji : one who has completed the hәj  
hәżrәt : a title of respect for one who is especially learned and pious 
hәdis : a tradition of the Prophet related by someone who witnessed it firsthand; each 
hәdis possesses a chain of authority indicating its trustworthiness or lack thereof 
hәram : denoting something that is forbidden by Islamic law 
hafyž : one who has memorized the Qur’an in its entirety 
hyjrәt : migration, denoting a migration from a “house of war” to a “house of Islam,” as 
the first Muslims did in leaving Mecca for Yathrib (Medina) 
hysba : “verification,” denoting the concept of regulating an Islamic order, including the 
moral behavior of its members  
jәm’aiәt : organization or party 
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jәm’aiәt ‘alәma-e-hynd : “Organization of Indian Islamic Scholars,” a Deobandi-
dominated party that mostly supported the Indian National Congress and 
“composite nationalism” 
jәm’aiәt ul-әnsar : “Organization of Helpers,” organized by Mahmud Hasan and run by 
Obaidullah Sindhi as a network of Deobandi students and alumni who might be 
called upon to politically or otherwise support the Deobandi leadership in times of 
need 
jyhad : struggle, or “holy war,” either denoting an internal struggle for personal purity 
or an external struggle against a physical enemy 
jyziәħ : a tax on non-Muslims, ostensibly to pay their exemption from military service 
kәlymәħ : the basic Muslims statement of faith (“There is no God but God and 
Muhammad is his Prophet”) 
kafyr (plural: kuffar) : an unbeliever 
kufәr : unbelief 
kuffar : pl.; see kafyr 
mәdarys : pl.; see mәdrәsәħ 
mәdrәsәħ (plural: mәdarys) : a religious seminary, larger than a simple mәktәb but a step 
below a full-fledged dar ul’alwm 
mәGryb : denoting the fourth of five daily prayers, undertaken just after sunset 
mәjlys-e-shwra : an advisory council; in Pakistan: Parliament 
mәktәb : an elementary-level religious seminary or school 
mәnqwlat : denoting the traditional Islamic disciplines, including commentaries (tәfsir) 
on the Qur’an, the apostolic traditions (hәdis), and jurisprudence (fyqħ) 
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mәqwlat : denoting the rational disciplines, including instruction in grammar, logic, 
philosophy, rhetoric, mathematics, and astronomy 
mәsәlәħ ymkan-e-kәźb : the possibility that God can tell a lie 
mәshayx : pl.; see shix 
mәslәk : educational track 
mәsjyd : mosque 
mufti : one who is trained in fyqħ and fәtawa-writing 
muhajyr : an immigrant; especially applied after 1947 AD to Urdu-speaking immigrants 
from north-central India who settled in and around Karachi after Partition  
muhajyrwn : “emigrants,” originally denoting those who emigrated from Mecca to 
Medina with Muhammad, but today often applied to those who emigrated to 
Pakistan (and particularly Karachi) from (mostly north-central) India during and 
after Partition. 
mujәddyd : a title conferred on one who is considered the “renewer” of the faith for a 
given Hijri century 
murid : the disciple of a shix 
murshyd : a Sufi guide or teacher 
musәwәt-e-muhәmmәd : “equality of Muhammad,” a term used by the PPP in place of the 
word “socialism” 
muttәhydәħ qwmiәt : “composite [or “united”] nationalism,” the idea that South Asian 
Muslims  could be (indeed, were) both “Indian” and “Muslim” at the same time 
mwlyd : a term denoting the birthday of the Prophet 
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mysәl : in the context of this work, one of several sovereign states within the Sikh 
Confederacy (early to late eighteenth century AD/early twelfth to early thirteenth 
century AH). 
n’at : poetic composition praising the Prophet Muhammad 
nәdwәt : denoting a group of Muslim scholars who established a religious school in 
Lucknow and who considered themselves heirs to the Shah Waliullahi tradition 
nwr-e-muhәmmәdi : the concept of Muhammad as pure light, or a “being with his own 
natural light” 
nyzam-e-mustafa : “system of the Prophet,” denoting an Islamic socio-political order 
according to the revelations, teachings, and personal example of Muhammad 
piGәmbәr : “messenger,” denoting the Prophet as God’s Messenger 
purdәħ : the covering of women before the eyes of men 
qәSbәħ : a “Muslim city,” typically a small town connected by patronage or familial ties 
(at least at some point) to the royal court at Delhi 
qayd-i-ә‘ažәm : “Great Leader,” a title reserved for Pakistani founder Muhammad ‘Ali 
Jinnah 
qari (plural: qurra) : a reciter of the Qur’an 
qazi : a judge 
qazi-e-mәmalyk : Chief Judge 
qiamәt : the resurrection (of the dead). CHECK 
qurra : pl.; see qari 
rashydin (or rashydwn) : denoting the first four (or “rightly-guided”) caliphs after 
Muhammad; often Romanized as “Rashidun” 
Sәdәr ul-Sudwr : a title for the head of the Department of Religion 
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sәtyagrәhә : “soul-force,”  
sәyyid : a descendent of the Prophet 
shәhid : a martyr 
shәri’at : Islamic law 
shaħәnshaħ : “king of kings” 
shix (plural: mәshayx) : a Sufi saint, or pir; can also denote, simply, “great man” 
shuddhikәrәn : an ancient rite that came to symbolize the early 1900s AD Arya Samajist 
effort to “reconvert” Muslims and others back to Hinduism and to prevent the 
conversion of Hindus to either Islam or Christianity 
shwra : a council 
sunnәt : the sayings and deeds of the Prophet Muhammad 
swәraj : freedom or independence 
swrәt : a chapter in the Qur’an, often Romanized as “Surah” 
sylsәla : chain of succession or authority that links back to the Prophet Muhammad 
tәbliG : missionary work or proselytization 
tәfsir : commentary on the Qur’an 
tәjdid : renewal (of faith) 
tәppa : a traditional form of song originally born in the Punjab but popular (particularly 
in the 1800s and early 1900s AD) across north and central India, especially in 
Bengal 
țalyban : students, often referring specifically to students of religious seminaries; applied 
later to the religious students and scholars who took over much of Afghanistan in 
the early 1990s AD and Romanized as “Taliban” 
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țybb : traditional (“Greek” or “Yunani”) medicine 
twbәħ : repentance 
ummәt : the worldwide Muslim community of the faithful 
‘urs : death anniversary of a Sufi saint or pir 
wәqf : a shәri’at-mandated religious endowment, typically in the form of money, land, or 
infrastructure 
wylayәt : spiritual (and sometimes temporal) authority of a pir over a specific 
geographical area 
xәlifәħ : “deputy,” often Romanized as “caliph” 
xәtәm-i-nәbәwwәt : the finality of the Prophet—that Muhammad was the last, or “seal,” 
of the prophets and there will be none to follow him 
xanәqaħ : a pir- or shine-center 
xuda-e-xydmәtgar : Deobandi-leaning quasi-spiritual political movement founded by 
Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan among the Pathans of India’s northwestern frontier that 
generally supported the Indian National Congress; often referred to by the acronym 
“KK” 
xәwajәħ : an honorofic title meaning “Lord” or “Master” 
xuțbәħ gaħ : a pulpit from which religious sermons are preached 
xylafәt : “deputyship,” often Romanized as “caliphate” 
ylm-e-Gaib : “knowledge of the unseen” 
ymkan-e-nažir : “the possibility of an equal” 
zәkat : a tax mandated by Islamic law 
zәmindar : a landowner or landlord 
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zykr : typically, a ritual form of “remembrance” of God, often performed via the 
recitation of the names of God  
źymi : non-Muslims living within the geographical boundaries of an Islamic state; often 
Romanized as “dhimmi” 
zyndabad : “long live,” commonly used in combination with “Islam” or “Pakistan,” in the 
sense of “Long live Islam!” or “Long live Pakistan!”
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